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Institutional Change in Russia:  The Case of Urban Land Rights, 1990-2013 
 
 
Why, when, and how do institutions change?  The dissertation contributes to theory-
building on these questions by examining variation in urban land rights in Russia after seven 
decades of state ownership.   Urban land privatization is taken as a proxy for institutional change. 
Using inductive methods to identify patterns of urban land privatization, three cities are 
selected to represent institutional change that is either rapid (Kazan), incremental (St. Petersburg), 
or in stasis (Moscow).   Case studies test the hypothesis that the motivation for institutional change 
will be a function of the revenue-maximizing incentives of political authorities.  Consistent with 
Levi’s (1988) theory of predatory rule, at a given time, political authorities will opt for the highest-
yielding and most feasible revenue sources that strengthen their hold on power and security in 
office.  Why and when land was privatized correlated with these factors in the case study cities. 
How institutions change is hypothesized to vary according to consistency in policy actions 
by political authorities and the bureaucracy (explanatory variables), with public engagement in 
decision-making as an intervening variable.  The variables are compared in the three case study 
cities in the 1990s and 2000s, using a land governance model to simplify the change process.  
Based on qualitative and quantitative indicators, the pace of land privatization (dependent variable) 
was found to be rapid only when political authorities, the bureaucracy and society were aligned on 
policy actions.  Such alignment was rare.    
In all case study cities, administrative barriers to privatization declined sharply following 
the transformation of the land rights registration agency into a rule-bound bureaucracy, and public 
engagement contributed to institutional change.   
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
How do countries acquire institutions favorable to growth and prosperity?  For 
development policy analysts and practitioners, this is the singular puzzle underlying the divergence 
in living standards between developed and developing nations.       
Institutions are rules and shared beliefs that influence the behavior of public and private 
actors.  A large literature is devoted to examining institutions as a critical if not the primary 
explanatory variable in economic and political development.1   Buoyed by several Noble prize-
winners of diverse disciplines,2 research in the field of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) is 
advancing the search for solutions to the puzzle of divergence in wealth among nations.  
Yet a generalizable theory to predict the path and pace of institutional change remains 
elusive.3   The term “institution” is highly elastic and used differently among the social science 
disciplines; even official publications of the World Bank apply divergent definitions.  This 
confusion complicates the research agenda in an otherwise promising field of inquiry.   
The dissertation contributes to theory-building by taking a narrow interpretation of 
institutions and providing empirical content through the aperture of urban land privatization in the 
Russian Federation.   The 1993 Constitution recognizes and guarantees the right of private 
property, including in land, thus reversing seven decades of state ownership under the Soviet 
Union.  To date, urban land privatization in Russia for both firms and citizens has not received 
                                                 
1 For an excellent overview of the literature on institutions and practical applications, see Brian Levy, Working with 
the Grain:  Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies, (Oxford University Press, 2014).  
2 Leading theorists of the NIE who received Nobel prizes are Douglass C. North, Elinor Ostrom, Herbert Simon, 
Ronald Coase, and Oliver Williamson.  Levy, Working with the Grain, 19. 
3 As Oliver Williamson noted, “The new institutional economics is a boiling cauldron of ideas. Not only are there 
many institutional research programs in progress, but there are competing ideas within most of them.” Oliver E. 
Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sept 2000), 610.   According to Fukuyama, we lack a theory of institutional change that can be 
generalized and applied as policy guidance. Francis Fukuyama, State-Building:  Governance and World Order in the 




scholarly attention.  It merits investigation as a self-standing case because it represents a radical 
institutional change in a country without a history of predominant private land ownership.4  
Moreover, private urban land ownership holds the potential to transform Russia spatially, 
economically and politically.  Yet in contrast to the rapid pace of enterprise privatization in the 
1990s, the sale of municipal land to citizens and firms is proceeding slowly, with significant 
variance in rates of privatization. The puzzle is this:  why are some cities privatizing land while 
others are not?  What is driving the difference among cities in private land ownership?   
Using urban land privatization as a proxy for institutional change, the dissertation 
hypothesizes that the property rights regime will be a function of the revenue-maximizing 
incentives of ruling elites.  Why and when institutional change occurs will depend on a policy 
decision by political authorities at a given time to privatize, lease, or seize privatized land.  
Following the theory of predatory rule (Levi 1988), political authorities will opt for the highest-
yielding and most feasible revenue sources that strengthen their hold on power and security in 
office.  Put simply, the choice for political authorities is to own land and collect rents, or to sell 
land and collect property taxes.   This choice determines whether or not private land rights are 
established.  The dependent variable is the outcome:  it measures urban land privatization, i.e. the 
share of urban land transferred from state to private hands.   
How institutional change transpires is determined by state organizations, which represent 
the explanatory variables.  The dissertation hypothesizes that the pace of land privatization is a 
function of the consistency of policies and actions by political authorities and bureaucrats.  If both 
resist privatization, institutional change will be in stasis; if both promote it, the pace will be rapid.  
                                                 
4 Leonid Limonov,  Vlast’ i sobstvennost’ na zemliu v Rossii: k voprosu o zavisimosti ot 





Inconsistent policies and actions will result in institutional change that is incremental.  Society, 
discussed in a later section, can influence the pace of change by taking an active or passive 
position. 
The research methodology for this understudied case of institutional change offers several 
innovations to the NIE literature.   First, it shifts from a macro-historical perspective, spanning 
centuries, to a micro-analytical study in a modern post-communist economy, covering two 
decades.  Second, it examines diverse cases within one large federal country rather than across 
multiple countries.  Third, it treats institutional change as the dependent variable and thus, as the 
outcome rather than the input to development.   Let us consider each of these innovations in turn. 
First, to increase the relevance of the findings for development practitioners, the 
dissertation examines factors that influenced the path and pace of institutional change in Russia 
from 1990 to 2013.  Several excellent analyses at the macro-historical level explore the evolution 
of institutions over centuries, including Greif’s Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy 
(2005), Acemoglu and Robinson’s Why Nations Fail (2012), and North, Wallis and Weingast’s 
Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History 
(2009).5  These give useful insights into the forces shaping the evolution of institutions.  Indeed, 
the authors’ intention is to explain economic and political development as a long-term process of 
incremental institutional change.  However, for governments facing contemporary policy 
dilemmas, an exclusively historical approach lacks a relevant counterfactual to inform the 
                                                 
5 Other examples in this tradition are Anvar Greif, “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early 
Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition,” American Economic Review 83(3):525–48 and Douglass C. North, 




efficiency of design choices.   The dissertation takes a different approach by examining whether 
meaningful institutional change can be implemented within a generation.6    
Second, to control for variation in country conditions, the study compares diverse cases 
within rather than across multiple countries.  Due to their design, studies using multivariate 
econometric analysis or indexes to compare country institutional performance exclude distinctive 
national historical, social and political factors that may influence institutions.7   The introduction 
of private land rights in a country that lacked market and democratic experience offers a rare 
laboratory to test core concepts on whether the existing institutional order can be reversed.   
To take the point further, advanced economies represent an exceptional historical case in 
that they permitted private ownership and transactions in urban land.8  In much of Western Europe 
and the United States, private property rights became a foundation for investment and wealth as 
well as a source of political influence as legislative bodies defended the sanctity of private 
property.9  Over the course of five centuries in England, for example, land privileges of the 
monarch and barons evolved to become land rights for society at large.  In the process, the monarch 
and landowners secured their own property rights while accepting the constraints of an impersonal 
rule of law.10     
                                                 
6 Using the same logic, Levy examines entry points for governance reforms that can be implemented within a 
decade.  See Levy, Working with the Grain, 8.   
7 Several multi-country econometric analyses have explored factors that drive institutional change.  These employ 
indicators that generalize from subjective judgments on country performance.  See Martin Raiser, Maria L. Di 
Tommaso, and Melvyn Weeks, “The Measurements and Determinants of Institutional Change:  Evidence from 
Transition Economies,” (EBRD Working Paper No. 60, 2001).  
8 Andro Linklater, Owning the Earth:  The Transforming History of Land Ownership, (New York:  Bloomsbury, 
2013).  The book traces the global history of land ownership, noting that Western patterns of widespread private 
ownership are exceptional.  Chapter 19 argues that US-instituted land reform after World War II in Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, contributed to their success as Asian Tigers. 
9 Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of institutions 
governing public choice in 17th Century England” Journal of Economic History 49, (1989): 803-832.    
10 Douglass C. North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, (New York: Cambridge 




In contrast, Russia represents the more common historical case where state and communal 
land ownership predominated. Beginning with Peter the Great, land ownership was a privilege 
bestowed by the tsar in return for service in the state bureaucracy or military.  Wealth, power and 
prestige derived from imperial service rather than land ownership.11  Private property received 
legal sanctity under Catherine the Great, and was gradually expanding in the late 19th century until 
the Russian Revolution, when land was nationalized violently.  Soviet constitutions banned the 
purchase and sale of land.12 When the 1993 constitution restored private land rights in Russia, 
millions of businesses and citizens could own land for the first time in nearly a century.  
Nevertheless, land privatization at the outset was a politically contested and socially painful 
process.  Soviet-era legal concepts and land allocation practices lingered after the USSR fell.  
Under these circumstances, why do some cities in Russia promote land privatization while others 
resist it?   What are the development outcomes in cities where institutional change has been rapid?  
The question is relevant to cities in Russia with lagging privatization rates as well as to transition 
and developing countries where the state also dominates land ownership.13  
Third, to unpack inter-related processes, the research isolates a single but significant 
instance of institutional change as an outcome.  Urban land is of particular interest for the 
examination of institutions because it is the foundation of real estate that comprises a high share 
of wealth in developed and developing countries.14   Cities are also engines of growth.  In advanced 
economies, major cities contribute from 30 to 50% of GDP and the output of metropolitan areas is 
                                                 
11 Max Weber, Economy and Society, (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 1978) 1064-68. 
12 W. E. Butler, Russian Law (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009), 388-390. 
13 Gershon Feder and David Feeny, “Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development 
Policy,” The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1991), 135-36. 
14 Real property comprises from one-half to two-thirds of the economic wealth of countries around the world. 
Kenneth Dam, Land, Law, and Economic Development, (Brookings Institution, 2006), 1.  A home or dwelling is 





often higher than national growth rates.15  Land markets contribute to the productivity of cities by 
increasing spatial and economic efficiency.  In the absence of land markets, Soviet planners put 
people on the periphery and factories in the city center, creating highly inefficient spatial density.16  
Aside from the economic importance of urban land, the evolution of more secure land 
rights is correlated with political constraints on rulers to expropriate property.17  European 
medieval city-communes were founded on private urban land, self-management of civic affairs, 
and municipal finance including property taxes.  These “bourgeois” features were found only in 
the West.   Like all other regions of the world, Russia lacked a tradition of self-governing cities 
where land formed a basis for personal wealth and municipal finance.18  Can institutional change 
in urban land rights lay the basis for these developments in Russia? 
Finally, the management of private urban land in a market economy entails a complex set 
of supporting institutions, organizations and systems.  The most critical are: “(i) clear and tradable 
property rights; (ii) efficient market-oriented information systems; (iii) a taxation system 
consistent with efficient land use; and (iv) the publicity and contestability of urban planning 
decisions.”19 The dissertation reviews each as a factor in the formation of urban land rights, and 
examines how political authorities, the bureaucracy, and society at large contribute to the process.   
 
                                                 
15 Large cities (or metropolitan regions) in OECD countries generate from 30% (Paris, London, Stockholm, Tokyo) 
to nearly half of national GDP (Budapest, Seoul, Copenhagen, Helsinki).  Provincial capital cities in Canada 
(Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver) also generate half or more of their respective provinces’ output. Most OECD 
metro-regions have a higher GDP per capita than their national average (66 out of 78 metro-regions), and a higher 
labor productivity level (65 out of 78 metro-regions), and many of them tend to have faster growth rates than their 
countries. OECD (2006), "Executive Summary", in OECD, Competitive Cities in the Global Economy, OECD 
Publishing. DOI: 10.1787/9789264027091-2-en., 13-27. 
16 Alain Bertaud, “The development of Russian cities: Impact of reforms on spatial development,” (Mimeo, March 
13, 2010), 6-10, 14.    
17 North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment,” and Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change 
and Economic Performance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 139.   
18 Weber, Economy and Society, 1220-1227. 
19 Alain Bertaud and Bertrand Renaud, Cities without Land Markets: Lessons of the Failed Socialist Experiment, 




Defining key terms: institutions and organizations 
 A principal question for the dissertation is how to define institutions.  The full definition 
used by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) includes “formal rules, written laws, formal social 
conventions, informal norms of behavior, and shared beliefs about the world, as well as the means 
of enforcement.”20  While this may already appear broad, Avnar Greif takes the concept one step 
further by including organizations. For Greif, organizations also function on the basis of internal 
rules, norms, and beliefs.  Hence, human behavior is constrained by the actions and incentives of 
organizations as well as individuals.  However, Grief restricts beliefs to those that are compatible 
with the incentive framework set by institutions. North, Wallis, Weingast (2009) differ from this 
approach by explicitly removing organizations and by treating beliefs more generally.21  Roland 
(2004) adds a further dimension by distinguishing “slow-moving institutions” such as cultural 
values that evolve in the same way as technology or scientific knowledge.22  
To focus the analysis, the dissertation applies the relatively more restrictive approach of 
North, Wallis, Weingast (2009) and North (1990).  Succinctly, institutions are humanly-devised 
rules and shared beliefs that guide human conduct. 23    These serve three primary functions.  
Formal political rules define the hierarchical and decision-making structure of a polity, including 
election rules.  Formal economic rules define how the stream of benefits from property rights may 
be used or allocated.  Contracts specify the terms of an agreement or exchange of property rights.24   
Institutions differ in form, but if efficiently designed, they should perform the function of reducing 
                                                 
20 North et al, Violence and Social Orders, 15. 
21 Beliefs are “resulting from cultural, educational, and religious organizations.” North et al, Violence and Social 
Orders, 29, 259.  
22 Gerard Roland, “Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions,” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 38 no. 4 (2004), 111-112. Roland provides a helpful classification of 
institutions. 
23 Rules comprise both formal and informal constraints. Examples of the latter are codes of conduct, customs, or other 
social conventions that enable cooperative behavior.  North, Institutions, 36-45.   




risk and transaction costs, thus facilitating markets (political and economic) and cooperative 
human endeavor.25    
Institutions are rules; organizations enforce them. Organizations are “specific groups of 
individuals pursuing a mix of common and individual goals through partially coordinated 
behavior.”26 The interaction of institutions and organizations leads to a two-way causality that 
shapes the evolution of institutions.27  For example, private land rights (an economic institution) 
require state agencies to measure, monitor, and enforce the contracts that govern ownership.  
Private land rights also stimulate new private organizations, such as housing associations, 
mortgage bankers, real estate agencies and law firms, and appraisers that shape property rights 
institutions.  Following North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), multiple organizations comprise the 
state, both vertically (federal, regional, municipal) and horizontally (across executive and civil 
service agencies).  The state is thus not one but a bundle of independent variables that defines and 
enforces the rules on property ownership.28   
The interaction of governance and institutions 
The term governance is often used interchangeably with institutions in the development 
literature.   To complicate matters, governance is used differently in the NIE literature, depending 
                                                 
25 Transaction costs are treated differently in the literature on institutions, but seek to answer the question why it is 
costly to transact.  Neoclassical economic models exclude transaction costs. Distinguish Williamson (2000, p. 599) 
and North (1990, p. 28), who states that they are “…defining, protecting, and enforcing the property rights to goods 
(the right to use, the right to derive income from the use of, the right to exclude, and the right to exchange).” 
26 North et al, Violence and Social Orders, 15. 
27 North, Institutions, 6-7. 
28 North et al, Violence and Social Orders, link the development of organizations to the development of the state (pp 
7, 73-74). They differentiate between adherent organizations, which are personalized, and contractual organizations, 
which are impersonal and require third-party enforcement (pp 16, 259-260). For example, a bank can operate either 
as an adherent or contractual organization depending on whether it lends to related parties or according to 
impersonal rules.  This distinction is not central to the dissertation. On the state as an organization of organizations, 




on whether the application is macro or micro-analytic.   For conceptual clarity it is important to 
disentangle these terms. 
In a broad definition used by development practitioners, governance comprises “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised in a country.”  This definition “includes 
the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (italics 
added).”29   Institutions are thus an input to the governance of the polity.  Good governance 
comprises “a strong rule of law, capable bureaucracies, low corruption, and accountability of 
politicians and public officials to citizens.” 30   
A narrow definition used at the micro-analytic level forms the basis for transaction cost 
economics (a branch of NIE).  As defined by Williamson, economic institutions are an input to the 
governance of contractual relations between economic units.  If the rules governing contracts 
reduce risk, and if there is a “credible commitment” that the “rules of play” will obtain in the 
future, the result will be a greater number of more productive investments.  A technocratic 
bureaucracy that adheres to rules and routine is important for secure property rights.  In this 
understanding, Williamson puts governance at the level of the contract, not the polity.31   
In both the macro and micro definitions, institutions are inputs to governance.  Confusion 
arises, as well as a tautology, when institutions are not clearly delineated from organizations.  The 
actions of political authorities and the bureaucracy (two forms of government organization) are 
                                                 
29
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII:  Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators, 1996-2008, (World Bank: Policy Research Working Papers 4978, 2009), 5.  
30 Levy, Working with the Grain, xiii. 
31 Oliver Williamson, “Institutions and Economic Organization:  The Governance Perspective,” (Paper presented at 





distinct from the rules.  How state agencies implement the rules – de facto rather than de jure – 
will determine the governance of property rights.  The dissertation distinguishes institutions from 
organizations and employs the more narrow reasoning of Williamson to remove the confusion and 
the tautology. 
Defining property rights 
Urban land privatization in a formerly communist country raises questions of political 
philosophy.  What are private property rights?   How do they become more efficient?   The answers 
are not straightforward.   The following brief review is intended to clarify how the dependent 
variable will be operationalized.   
Two classic authors of the property rights literature, Alchian and Demetz,32 observe that 
common speech about “ownership” obscures the complex social relationships underlying property 
rights.   A property right is not a physical possession; rather, what is owned is the right to use a 
resource for a defined purpose.  Rights are always subject to constraints.   Ownership rights to land 
may be defined to allow a house to be built on it, but not necessarily a nuclear plant.  Moreover, 
there is not one property right but a “bundle of rights” that are divisible among different users, 
both public and private.  Succinctly, “what are owned are socially recognized rights of action.” 33   
Of particular relevance to the dissertation, the authors note that: 
There can and does exist much confusion about whether a resource or "property" is state or 
privately owned. Some rights to some uses of the resource may be state owned and others privately 
owned. While it is true that the degree of private control is increased when additional rights of use 
become privately owned, it is somewhat arbitrary to pass judgment on when the conversion to 
private control can be said to change the ownership of the bundle of rights from public to private.34 
                                                 
32 The definition in this paragraph is based on Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “The Property Rights 
Paradigm,” Journal of Economic History 33, no. 1 (1973): 16–27.   
33 Alchian and Demsetz, “The Property Rights Paradigm,” 17. 




How property rights are defined and distributed will impact power structures, social 
relations, and the potential for economic development.35   Buying and selling of land use rights 
will increase efficiency if the purchaser can use the land more productively.   Tenure security 
increases investments in land that can underpin growth.  The state can make land rights more 
secure if transactions are transparently documented and enforced.36  However, these positive 
outcomes are highly dependent on the governance of property rights.   The state can undermine 
security and economic development if land rights are conferred only to powerful elites, as is the 
case in many developing countries. 37  
Property rights and legal systems first emerge when ruling elites seek to secure privileges 
over scarce land, according to North, Wallis and Weingast (2009).  Land rights evolve as the state 
matures politically from a fragile natural state to an open access order typical of modern market 
democracies.  In early stages of state development (fragile natural states), land is redistributed 
among the ruling coalition.  Later, in basic natural states, landownership stabilizes but the state 
largely controls land resources.  Finally, in mature natural states, landownership moves beyond 
the direct control of the state and ruling elites and may become increasingly subject to impersonal 
institutions.  In this framework, elites will first consolidate property rights within the ruling 
coalition before allowing others to share those rights.  “Clear property rights make land more 
valuable, but they may also reduce the ability to use land as a tool to structure elite relationships 
in natural states.  As a result, elites have conflicting interests in making land rights more secure.”38  
                                                 
35 Klaus Deininger and Gershon Feder, Land Registration, Governance, and Development:  Evidence and 
Implications for Policy (World Bank: Oxford University Press, 2009), 237.  
36 Deininger and Feder, Land Registration, Governance, and Development, 235-236. 
37 Deininger and Feder note that “the state’s monopoly on the exercise of legitimate power, which is a precondition 
for the functioning of advanced societies and securing property rights, may be abused to appropriate property or to 
assist in the unfair acquisition of land by elites, thus undermining the security of property rights in a number of 
respects.” Land Registration, Governance, and Development, 238.  





The starting point for the dissertation is the Soviet Union in 1990, when land use was 
largely under the control of central planners and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
not the people living within the territorial borders of Russia.  Boris Yeltsin’s initial privatization 
effort transferred de facto land privileges within Russia into de jure rights for the political elites 
who would assume authority under the new Russian state. The main beneficiaries in terms of urban 
land were municipal officials.  The dissertation examines whether and how urban land moves 
outside the direct control of the state and becomes increasingly subject to impersonal institutions. 
The role of society in urban land use and development 
 
Every major urban development project contains a clash of interests.  Should a church be 
built inside a city park? Can private developers remove an iconic cultural object to build a hotel?  
Can the city tear down homes to expropriate land for an unknown purpose?  Such questions give 
rise to the publicity and contestability of decisions over urban land use in advanced economies.  
City councils, community organizations, and neighborhood groups, each representing local 
taxpayers, demand a voice in investments that carry long-term implications for property values 
and lifestyles.39  This weaving of economic imperatives and social objectives creates the 
institutional fabric of property rights in a market society.40  Yet when each of these precise 
questions arose in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan in the 2000s, the primary recourse for 
citizens was to watch the house or cultural object come down and take to the streets and protest.   
Intrinsic to contestable urban land use decisions in advanced economies is a characteristic 
not yet found in Russia and the former Soviet Union: a dense network of organizations, 
representing diverse social interests, which can provide a meaningful counter-balance to state or 
                                                 
39 Bertaud and Renaud, Cities without Land Markets. 
40 Roy J. Burroughs, “Should Urban Land be Publicly Owned?” Land Economics. 42, no. 1 (February 1966):11-20.  




big business interests.  Fukuyama argued that social capital based on the proliferation of 
organizations and voluntary organizational interactions was the barometer of a healthy capitalist 
democracy.41  North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) built on this insight but deviated by observing 
that organizations “function with the explicit support of the state.” 42   North et al perceived that 
the thickness and sophistication of organizations in society, both political and economic, depend 
on the evolution of the state into an open access order.  The number of organizations per capita 
rises with per capita income; liberal democracies are thus rich in organizational density and 
capacity, not only because of their wealth, but because the state permits diversity and creativity in 
the formation of organizations.43  In contrast, the concept of a civil society comprised of diverse 
organizations did not exist in Marxism-Leninism, and in the Soviet Union, it was absorbed into 
political society as represented by the Communist Party and the state.44 
Empirically, Howard demonstrated that countries in transition from communist or 
authoritarian regimes have lower organizational density than advanced democracies.45   Citizens 
are likely to be “disengaged from the public sphere” because disillusionment and a sense of being 
cheated by the new system has increased demobilization and withdrawal from public activities.  
Howard believes broad-based growth that raises living standards will foster more civil society 
organizations; in the meantime, opportunities to practice democratic skills in small groups and 
                                                 
41 Francis Fukuyama, Trust:  The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, (Penguin Putnam, 1995), 10, quoted 
in North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 7. 
42 North, Wallis, Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 7. 
43 North, Wallis, Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 7-9. 
44 I am grateful to Bruce Parrott for this observation. 
45 Marc Morje Howard, “The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society,” Journal of Democracy, 13, no. 1 (January 
2002).  Based on a quantitative analysis from the World Values Survey in 1995-97, the postcommunist mean of 0.91 
organizational memberships per capita was exactly half of the post authoritarian mean of 1.82 and well below the 
2.39 of advanced democracies.  Prior regime type was the most statistically significant indicator in differentiating 




popular leverage on the political process through interest aggregation of civil organizations may 
not protect citizens from potentially unjust laws.46  
In light of the limited density of organizations in Russia, and the conflation of political 
society with civil society in the Soviet period, the role of citizens in urban land use planning 
requires careful specification.  If we define the explanatory variable using Western concepts of 
civil society or “the public,”47 it may confuse the analysis with value-laden judgments on the 
quality of democracy, which is not the focus of this study.  Likewise, while social movement theory 
may be highly relevant to the fragmentation of public discourse in Russia, where protest has 
become a primary form of political expression, the political, social, and fiscal significance of 
private urban land ownership is insufficiently appreciated in Russia for it to become the basis for 
broad-based collective action.  Indeed, it could be argued that, from the perspective of property 
rights, civil society has not consolidated in Russia, rendering it all the more inappropriate as a 
variable.48   
                                                 
46 Howard, “Postcommunist Civil Society,” 164-65. 
47 This term does not have the same meaning in English and Russian.  Public is understood in English as a separate 
sphere from the state, whereas in Russian, narodnyi (of the people), obshchestvennyi (of society) and publichnyi (of 
the public) are indistinguishable from each other and from the interest of the state.  Hence finding a balance between 
public and private interests, as would be revealed through public hearings, is not salient in Russia since the 
government and private investor determine what is in the public interest.  Tatiana Vlasova, Interview, St. Petersburg, 
Russia, August 1, 2013. 
48 Greene uses social movement theory, drawing on Charles Kurzman, to investigate why the consolidation of civil 
society has been inhibited in Russia.  For Greene, civil society is more than the existence of non-governmental 
organizations, which confuses the ends with the means.  Rather, the “’public good’ at the heart of the concept of 
civil society is generated by an iterative process of action and interaction between the state (as represented by the 
ruling elite and/or more consolidated institutions of power) and society (as represented by civic initiatives.).” 
Following social movement theory, he argues that the nature of the state’s intervention (coherent or incoherent) into 
society’s private sphere will determine whether society can respond with collective action. The consolidation of civil 
society occurs after state-society interactions become institutionalized. His thesis does not depend on the 
mobilization of interests based on private property, as in de Toqueville, or on the accountability of the state to 
society, as in Locke, but in arrangements to achieve the subordination of government to the public, as in Rousseau. 
Samuel A. Greene, Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia. (Stanford, California: Stanford 




Rather than taking the broader concept of social movement or the narrower one of civil 
society, the study aims to understand if society was a salient factor in shaping the formation of 
property rights.  Street protests or lawsuits in defense of one’s home or favorite park are a cry for 
the same legal protections accorded to the property rights of ruling elites.  For society to serve as 
an intervening variable, however, a sufficient number of groups must be able to identify unique 
self-interests apart from those of the state.49  After extremely large social protests to decry 
manipulation of the 2011 parliamentary elections, Kramer and Shevtsova perceived society 
emerging as a broad-based movement of the middle class and intellectuals who were coalescing 
into a collectivity. “For the first time in Russian history,” they said, “it is society, not the elite and 
leadership, which is striving for change. They represent an independent force that is able to do a 
better job than incompetent, corrupt bureaucrats.”50  Given the historical connotation of political 
and civil society in the Soviet period, the dissertation further borrows from Michael Urban’s 
understanding of political society as “that interactive ‘space’ in which the affairs of state and the 
concerns of citizens are publicly mediated.”51   
To summarize, this study uses society as an intervening variable that may shape the 
direction of institutional change either for or against private urban land rights.  Society is used 
interchangeably with civic organizations (public-minded groups) and the public (as a sphere 
separate from government) but not with civil society.  Conceived in this manner, the channels for 
interest articulation are broadened considerably -- from elected deputies to lawsuits to housing 
                                                 
49 More precisely, according to Bruce Parrott, society is a “collectivity which has an interest or interests distinct 
from the interests of the state.” Lecture notes, Political Theory and Civil Society, Spring 2007. 
50 David Kramer and Lilia Shevtsova, “Civil Society Is the Kremlin's Worst Nightmare,” The Moscow Times, July 
23, 2012. 
51 Michael Urban, Vyacheslav Igrunov, and Sergei Mitrokhin, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia, (Cambridge 





associations to street protests – to capture the contestability inherent in the formation of property 
rights.  
Structure of the study 
Chapter Two introduces the key institutional changes that accompanied land privatization 
in Russia and presents the theoretical framework, research design, hypotheses, and methodology 
for analysis.  I develop a land governance model to simplify the process of institutional change.  
Three case study cities are selected on the basis of quantitative analysis of land privatization 
outcomes that represent different patterns of institutional change.   
Chapter Three explores historical precedents of urban land rights in Russian history.   
Chapter Four applies the land governance model at the national level and compares the post-Soviet 
struggle for urban land rights prior to and after adoption of the Land Code in 2001.  Chapters Five, 
Six and Seven apply the land governance model to the three case study cities.  Chapter Eight 
compares the case study cities using qualitative and quantitative indicators, including land market 






Analytical Framework and Research Design 
 
Why, when, and how do institutions change?  The literature offers a “boiling 
cauldron of ideas”1 that both frustrates and inspires the search for answers.  Competing 
interpretations in the social sciences of what institutions are and how they function frustrate 
the researcher.  Yet inspiration comes from the potential to apply an institutional lens to 
solving the most intractable dilemmas in the field of development.  The dissertation 
addresses one of these: the conversion of privileges for elites into secure property rights 
for the population.   
The first section of the chapter explains why the case of urban land privatization in 
Russia offers an exceptional opportunity to study institutional change.  According to the 
United Nations Economic Commission on Europe, “No country in the world has ever 
experienced s[uch] radical, large-scale changes in land tenure patterns as the Russian 
Federation did in the end of the twentieth century.”2   Yet progress is mixed.  Some 
municipalities are leading institutional reforms, while many others are lagging.   The share 
of state and municipal land ownership in urban areas is declining but remains high at 86 
percent in 2014.3  How can this regional variation and low overall rate of privatization be 
explained?  For students of institutional change, the introduction of private land rights in a 
country that lacked market and democratic experience offers a rare laboratory to test core 
concepts.  The chapter argues that the case of Russian urban land rights contributes to 
                                                 
1 Oliver E. Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sept 2000), 610. 
2 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Land Administration Review: Russian Federation, 
HBP/WP.7/2003/, (May 17, 2003), 8. 
3 Rosreestr, Federal'naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi registatsii, kadastra i kartografii, Gosudarstvennyi doklad 
o sostoianii i ispol’zovanii zemel’ v rossiiskoi federatsii v 2014 godu. Moscow: Ministry of Economic 
Development and the Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and Cartography, (Moskva, 2015), 





theory-building on institutional change, offers insights on the role of the state in promoting 
land privatization to citizens and firms, and highlights the importance of the public 
bureaucracy in establishing secure property rights. 
The second section reviews the literature for explanatory power and concludes that 
the new institutional economics (NIE) offers the most appropriate conceptual framework 
to predict why, when and how urban land institutions change.  North, Wallis and Weingast 
(2009)4 provide steps in the process, starting with the conversion of elite privileges to elite 
rights.  Margaret Levi’s (1988)5 theory of predatory rule predicts that rulers will relinquish 
their privileges when such action maximizes long-term revenues.  However, this decision 
depends on trade-offs that serve to increase the bargaining power and office security of the 
ruler, while reducing the transaction costs of raising revenues.  Absent a theory of 
bureaucracy, the dissertation posits that establishment of secure land rights depends on the 
conversion of the land administration bureaucracy from a rent-seeking to a rule-bound 
organization. 
The final section presents the research design and working hypotheses.  The 
research methodology for institutional analysis follows Grief (2006).6  It includes a 
deductive model, inductive use of quantitative data, and context-specific case studies 
(including qualitative interviews).  Put simply, the choice for political authorities is to own 
land and collect rents, or to sell land and collect property taxes.   This choice determines 
the path of change.  Based on divergent rates of land privatization, the cities of Moscow, 
                                                 
4 Douglass C. North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
5 Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1988). 
6 Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade.  (New York: 






St. Petersburg, and Kazan are selected for examination as case studies of institutional 




Land is a foundation of wealth in every society.  As a basis for wealth creation, 
citizens and firms must have access to land, and land tenure rights must be secure and 
transferrable.   Whether property is fully private or subject to long-term lease, whether held 
individually or collectively, the security and transferability of these rights will determine 
credit and investment decisions that lead to economic growth.7  These principles are as 
valid for urban land as for agricultural land. 
In the Soviet period, Russian citizens were spatially dispersed both across the 
country and within cities, leaving the economy less efficient and competitive than it would 
have been under market economy conditions.8  The reasons are twofold.  First, cities were 
created in inhospitable climatic zones that were far from global markets, dispersing rather 
than concentrating economic geography.  To compare countries with similar climatic 
conditions, two out of three Australians and Canadians live in the three largest cities; in 
Russia, only one out of three lives in Moscow, St. Petersburg or in Nizhny Novgorod.9 
Second, there were no markets within cities to allocate land according to economic criteria.  
The result was lack of spatial concentration and economic diversification: urban 
development patterns misallocated enterprise land and separated people from their place 
of work. The absence of land markets also contributed to insufficient housing construction, 
                                                 
7 Russia:  Reshaping Economic Geography, World Bank, Report No. 62905-RU,(2011), 114-115. 
8 This paragraph is based on World Bank, Reshaping Economic Geography. 





restricting the mobility of Russians in work and lifestyle choices.  Mobility is a critical 
factor in economic efficiency:  Americans, for example, are ten times more mobile than 
Russians.10 These Soviet-era spatial distortions raised production and transportation costs 
and constrained economic growth.11   
Soviet-era General Plans that dictated land use in urban areas also contributed to 
spatial and economic inefficiency.12 Under the Soviets, mechanisms for the planning, 
allocation and development of land were well developed and broadly dispersed.  An 
elaborate General Plan, approved in secret by the Communist Party Central Committee, 
detailed what could be constructed and for what purpose on every land parcel in every large 
municipality.  A labyrinth of state agencies, land committees, and state-owned construction 
companies allocated and developed each parcel.   The more powerful or influential the 
ministry or industry, the more desirable was the location of the land plot it received for 
development.   Soviet planning created a highly distorted urban landscape, giving rise to 
the unique spatial density of a ‘socialist city.’ 13  
The privatization of land in the 1993 Constitution did not lead to immediate changes 
in the urban planning process.  Land privatization conferred new rights to citizens and 
firms, but it also conferred new roles to municipal authorities.14    The decentralization of 
control over land management in the 1990s turned municipalities into monopoly landlords, 
giving them power to influence land acquisition and use by private parties. 
                                                 
10 World Bank, Reshaping Economic Geography, 10. 
11 World Bank, Reshaping Economic Geography, 8.  
12 World Bank, Reshaping Economic Geography, 27. 
13 Alain Bertaud, “The development of Russian cities: Impact of reforms on spatial development,” (Mimeo, 
March 13, 2010), 6-10, 14.    
14 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of California Press 1978), 
957-993.  Weber observed that permissive rights that allow an action give the bearer power of control.  





At the outset of the privatization process, federal authorities did not fully consider 
the need for institutions and organizations that would support land markets.  Privatization 
entails more than passing a law conferring ownership rights to property.  Rights must be 
clearly defined and enforced.  Information on land transactions must be recorded in a 
publicly-accessible register.  Tax policy must be considered to provide incentives for 
efficient land use and revenues for the state.  Finally, public engagement in urban planning 
is necessary to increase land values and improve spatial efficiency.  This broad agenda, 
involving myriad laws, regulations, and investments, constitutes the transaction costs for 
establishing private land rights. In the 1990s, the Federal Government was too weak to 
implement a land privatization program of this complexity.15   
In the absence of market-based institutions and organizations, inherited Soviet land 
administration mechanisms continued to function as Russian firms and citizens sought to 
convert Soviet-era land privileges into rights.  Soviet-era constitutions outlawed the right 
to private ownership but permitted ‘personal’ urban and rural land plots for dachas and 
family gardening.  Privileges included lifetime use and hereditary succession.   Detached 
houses for ‘personal’ use could be constructed in cities with fewer than 100,000 residents.   
In addition, enterprises held the privilege to use land under their buildings in perpetuity. 
This was a reversal of the market concept that ownership of land comes first as the basis 
for rights to objects on the surface (superficies solo cedit). 16 While no individual or 
enterprise held title to a private plot of land that could be traded or sold, the constitutional 
                                                 
15 Michael McFaul, “State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia,”  
 World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Jan., 1995), p. 238 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950651 .  McFaul’s 
argument regarding the weakness of the state pertains to the privatization of industrial assets.  However, it 
is equally germane to land privatization. 
16 W. E. Butler, Russian Law (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009), PAGE. William Pyle, “The 
Ownership of Industrial Land in Russian Cities: Explaining Patterns of Privatization across Regions and 





concepts of ‘personal’ and ‘perpetual’ use bestowed land privileges (rather than rights) to 
nearly 500,000 enterprises and an estimated 30 percent of the population by 1990.17 The 
conversion of these claims to private ownership would carry far-reaching social and 
economic implications when the Soviet Union collapsed. 
 The Yeltsin (1991-99), Putin (2000-2008) and Medvedev (2008-2012) 
administrations employed different political and fiscal tactics, but each president pursued 
a strategic policy of promoting land privatization, both urban and rural.  Under President 
Yeltsin, 77 decrees, resolutions and laws were issued to advance land and property rights.18   
Due to a highly polarized political environment, he was unable to pass a Land Code that 
would fully legalize the purchase and sale of land. 19   The 1993 Constitution and 
presidential decrees had established rights of ownership and alienation in principle only.  
In the absence of a national code, regions20 and municipalities had wide latitude to adopt 
diverse legislation.  Only 50 of Russia’s 89 regions had adopted laws allowing private 
landownership by 1999.21   
With less political polarization generally and greater personal bargaining power,22 
President Putin succeeded in getting the Duma to approve a Land Code in 2001 that 
established the national legal framework for private urban land rights and transactions .  
                                                 
17 Vera Matusevich, “Land Reform in the Russian Federation:  Why it was Not That Efficient,” (Mimeo, 
2011).   
18 Vera Matusevich, “Land reform in the Russian Federation.” 
19 Timothy M. Frye, Building States and Markets After Communism:  The Perils of Polarized  Democracy, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010),  Kindle location 2277-2309.  Matusevich, “Land Reform 
in the Russian Federation.” 
20 “Region” is used collectively to refer to Russia’s 89 Subjects of the Federation, which include republics, 
oblasts, krais, and two municipalities, Moscow and St. Petersburg.  It is the administrative level between 
the federal government and municipalities.  The dissertation treats Moscow and St. Petersburg as cities.  
21 Stephen K. Wegran, Land Reform in Russia:  Institutional Design and Behavioral Responses, (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 62-63. 
22 Frye, Building States and Markets, Kindle location 2499.  Frye does not reference the Land Code 
specifically, but observes that the decline in polarization contributed to passage of numerous acts that had 





Together with passage of the Civil Code in 2002, the Land Code replaced a decade of 
decrees that had authorized land sales but with contradictory and restrictive provisions.23  
The Code widened access to property rights by authorizing the sale of land under privatized 
buildings in urban areas, which had previously remained in state ownership.24  Urban land 
became fully and legally marketable. 
The municipal response to these institutional changes at the national level varied 
greatly. A “patchwork quilt” of enterprise land privatization patterns25  reduced the 
economic potential of land privatization. Surveys of businesses conducted by the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) in 2004 revealed that private land sales were highest 
in regions that adopted favorable pricing policy and administrative requirements, while 
corruption, bureaucratic hassles and high prices deterred businesses from purchasing land 
in other regions.  Such administrative barriers enabled municipal authorities to keep land 
rents high and grant access to land to favored firms.26  Pyle confirms these findings using 
business surveys in 2009, noting that the highest rates of land privatization occurred in 
cities where the economic and political costs to the local authorities were lowest, i.e., where 
land values were lower and the industrial lobby more influential.  Both municipalities and 
enterprises were motivated to own land in order to secure rents.27  In 2008, firms in Russia 
                                                 
23 Stephen K. Wegran, Stephen K, Land Reform in Russia:  Institutional Design and Behavioral Responses, 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 16, 24-27. 
24 William Pomeranz, Whither Russian Property Rights? Center for International Private Enterprise, 
2004.www.cipe.org. 
25 William Pyle, “The Ownership of Industrial Land in Russian Cities: Explaining Patterns of Privatization 
Across Regions and Firms,” (National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2011), 2. 
http://www.nceer.org. 
26 Gregory Kisunko and Jacqueline Coolidge, Survey of Land and Real Estate Transactions in the Russian 
Federation, (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4115, 2007), 1-4. 





reported having more difficulty in accessing land for business expansion than firms in all 
other regions of Europe and Central Asia (ECA) (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Obstacles to Land Access in Europe and Central Asia in 200828 
 
 
The absence of a national system to survey and register property contributed to 
local administrative barriers and also limited transactions in the sale and purchase of land.  
Despite reforms in the legal and regulatory framework, the bureaucracy dealing with real 
property continued to operate largely as it had since the early 1990s, constraining  
government revenues and economic growth.29 
To reduce administrative barriers at the local level and enhance the economic 
potential of land and property, the government invested massively to improve bureaucratic 
organization and performance (Federal Targeted Program 2006-2011).   Starting in 2008, 
Russia installed federal offices in major municipalities for property registration and 
                                                 
28 Customized report prepared from EBRD-World Bank Business Enterprise Environment Surveys 
(BEEPS) for 2009.  Data is available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/. 
29 World Bank,  Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Loan in the Amount of 
US$100 million to the Russian Federation for a Cadastre Development Project, Report No. ICR2038, 
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cadastral surveys and reduced and standardized the time, cost, and number of procedures.   
By 2011, the average time to complete transactions in immovable property declined from 
80 to 19.5 business days and the time spent by clients in cadastral offices was reduced by 
more than half to 48 minutes.30  Russia became a world leader in ease of property 
registration. Following these improvements, 65 percent of the firms surveyed in 2011 
reported no obstacle to land access compared to 37 percent in 2008.31   
Despite the strong economic logic and federal investment in liberalization of land 
markets, aggregate improvement in access to land at the national level was not mirrored in 
all regions.  In 2011, private land ownership by citizens and firms ranged from an estimated 
29% in Kazan to under 2 percent in Moscow city.32  Difficulties in access to land restrain 
business expansion by denying firms an asset to use as collateral for financing and “may 
slow enterprise restructuring given the potential for rent-seeking officials to translate 
control rights into opportunities to enrich themselves and/or pursue political objectives.”33  
Despite the federal push to improve bureaucratic organization and performance, the drag 
of local factors is inhibiting land privatization.    
Once land is acquired, the lack of a credible commitment to secure property rights 
may also constrain business expansion.  Using survey data, Frye demonstrates that 
constraints on state agents are necessary in Russia to strengthen the security of property 
                                                 
30 World Bank,  Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Loan in the Amount of 
US$100 million to the Russian Federation for a Cadastre Development Project, Report No. ICR2038, 
(Washington, D.C., December 13, 2011), 7-8. 
31 EBRD-World Bank Business Enterprise Environment Survey (BEEPS), 2011.  Data is available at 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.  
32 Rosreestr, Gosudarstvennyi doklad o sostoianii i ispol’zovanii zemel’ v rossiiskoi federatsii v 2011 godu, 
Moscow: Ministry of Economic Development and the Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and 
Cartography, 2012. 





rights.34  The more business managers believed their property rights would be protected in 
disputes against the regional government relative to competitors, the more they invested in 
business expansion.35  This was true not only in general but with respect to land 
specifically.  Firms with uncertainty over land titling were less likely to have received 
foreign financing for capital investment.36  Political development was also a relevant factor.  
Scholars have found positive correlation between civic participation (membership in 
business associations) and security of property rights.  Frye suggests that security may 
emerge through political struggle between state and private actors37; Pyle finds that regions 
rating higher on regional democracy indexes also have higher private land ownership.38 
The regional variations and low overall level of urban land privatization in Russia 
pose fundamental questions.  What motivates some sub-national authorities to promote 
land sales that contribute to economic development and increased revenues through land 
taxes, while others block them?  How does the performance of the bureaucracy for land 
administration influence access to land and security of land rights?    More broadly, to 
rephrase the questions of Douglass C. North, what determines the path and pace of 
institutional change?  What motivates the ruling elites in some regions to give up land rents, 
and not in others? Can an inefficient institutional order be reversed?     
To gain insight into these questions, the following chapters will explore political 
economy factors influencing land rights regimes in Russia by drawing on the conceptual 
                                                 
34 Timothy Frye, “Credible Commitment and Property Rights:  Evidence from Russia,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 3, (August 2004), 453-465. 
35 Timothy Frye, “Corruption and the Rule of Law,” in Anders Aslund, Sergei Guriev and Andrew C. 
Kuchins, eds., Russia After the Global Economic Crisis, (Washington, DC:  Peter G. Peterson Institute of 
International Economics, 2010). 
36 William Pyle, “Ownership and Allocation of Industrial Land in Russia,” Bank of Finland Institute for 
Economies in Transition (BOFIT), Focus/Opinion 4/2009.  www.bofit/bofit 
37 Frye, “Credible Commitment and Property Rights,” 464. 





framework of the new institutional economics.    Formal and informal rules governing 
urban (as opposed to rural) land rights are selected as a proxy for institutions.  The 
expansion of freehold land rights is taken as a proxy for institutional change.  
An expansive literature empirically demonstrates how secure property rights 
contribute to efficient resource allocation and economic growth.  This scholarship does not, 
however, elucidate how property rights are established in countries where political 
authorities and government agencies have control rights over assets.39  Likewise, there is a 
growing and important body of scholarship on property rights in transition economies, 
including Russia.  The focus of this research is primarily the privatization of industrial 
enterprises rather than urban land.  The few studies on land privatization, including 
Kisunko and Coolidge (2007) and Pyle (2009, 2011), are oriented to enterprises rather than 
citizens.  A premise of the dissertation is that land ownership by citizens will lead to greater 
civic activism and engagement in urban planning decisions.  
How are private urban land rights established?  What motivates ruling elites to 
broaden access to private property?  And what motivates state agents to make property 
rights more secure?  These questions remain unexplored in the scholarly literature on 
Russia.40    
                                                 
39 Andrei Schleifer, “Establishing Property Rights,” The World Bank: Annual Conference on Development 
Economics, Washington, D.C. April 28-29, 1994, pp 1-4.  Among numerous leading scholars on property 
rights, Schleifer refers to Harold Demsetz, “Towards a Theory of Property Rights,” American Economic 
Review 57: 347-359, 1967; Douglass C. North and Robert P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: a 
New Economic History, Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1973; and Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of 
Property Rights, Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1989.  
40 The most exhaustive treatment of land rights in Russia is Stephen K. Wegran, Land Reform in Russia:  
Institutional Design and Behavioral Responses, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009).  
However, his focus is exclusively on rural agricultural land.  Timothy Frye explores the factors that 
contribute to more secure property rights but his study pertains to enterprise rather than land privatization 
and it assumes that ownership rights are already acquired.  See Timothy Frye, “Credible Commitment and 
Property Rights:  Evidence from Russia.”  American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 3, (August 
2004), 453-465.  The expansive privatization literature reviewed in Estrin et al (2009) deals exclusively 





A state-centered political economy analysis of land rights in Russia is of interest 
for three reasons.  First, it will enlighten the debate over theories of institutional change.  
North and other institutional scholars illustrate the contribution of institutions to growth 
through the economic history of advanced capitalist (principally Western) countries, in 
which private property rights were critical to economic development, and where political 
and economic organizations evolved concurrently (North and Weingast, 1989; North, 
1990, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, North, Wallis and Weingast 2009).  Russia presents 
a distinct case, having created capitalism in the early 1990s in the absence of private 
property, democratic political organizations, regulatory bodies, an active civil society, and 
the rule of law.41  Can private property rights develop, and if so, how? 
Second, for scholars of state-centered approaches, the state is of interest as the 
sponsor of private property in 1993.  McFaul has argued that a strong state is 
“paradoxically” a precondition to “extract the state from the economy.”  State power is 
defined as the autonomy to set policy preferences and the capacity to implement them.42 
Applying this definition, he found that the new state, under Boris Yeltsin, was too weak to 
prevent insiders from acquiring state industrial assets during the large-scale privatization 
of the early 1990s.  Generally speaking, enterprise directors retained the control rights over 
industrial assets that they held during the Soviet period.43  However, after privatization, 
                                                 
Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies,” Policy Research Working Paper 4811, 
(Washington, D.C.:  The World Bank, Development Economics Department Research Support Unit, 
January 2009). 
41 Peter Rutland, “Business and Civil Society in Russia,” in Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung, eds., 
The Dynamics of Russian Politics:  Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional Relations, Vol. II.  (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 
42 Autonomy implies sufficient consensus within the state to act independently of strong economic interest 
groups while capacity depends on the effectiveness and cohesiveness of government agencies.  Michael 
McFaul, “State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privatization in Russia,”  
 World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Jan., 1995), 214-216. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950651. 





some of these rights turned out to be politically contingent.  A decade later, widespread 
public perception that state assets were acquired dishonestly undermined the legitimacy of 
property rights and provided political justification for renationalization.44  However, a 
similar analysis about the role of the state in urban land privatization has not been 
conducted.  Is the state strong enough to ‘extract the state’ from land ownership and make 
a credible commitment to respect property rights?  Or is it too strong and thus at liberty to 
violate them?   How does state action in a decentralized environment affect the path and 
pace of institutional change?   
An unexplored factor in the establishment of secure property rights is the role 
played by the bureaucracy at all levels of government.  The cadastral mapping and formal 
registration of land rights is a technically complex task in a country the size of Russia.  
Academic research on property rights in transition countries tends to ignore the 
administrative investments required to establish, monitor, and enforce new institutions.  
Yet these actions are a precondition for property rights to be secure.  Formalizing land titles 
has been criticized as a top-down approach without substantiation of benefits. There is also 
little systematic analysis of the value of land administration investments.45 This is true in 
general, and in the Russian case specifically.46 Given the paucity of evidence, is state 
capacity an explanatory factor in the establishment and security of land rights?  
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
                                                 
44 Timothy Frye, “Original Sin, Good Works, and Property Rights in Russia,” (Cambridge University 
Press:  World Politics, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Jul., 2006), 483, 500. Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40060147. 
45 Klaus Deininger and Gershon Feder, Land Registration, Governance, and Development: Evidence and 
Implications for Policy,  (Oxford University Press: The World Bank, 2009), 233-234. 
46 The primary studies dealing with urban land privatization, by Kisunko and Coolidge (2007) and Pyle 





To answer these questions, we would ideally draw on a theory of institutional 
change.    However, the elasticity of the term institution has contributed to “chaos” in the 
field of development studies, according to Fukuyama.47  This is partly due to different 
scholarly approaches to institutional analysis by political scientists and economists. For 
example, Michael McFaul states “The invisible hand is aided by visible institutions” such 
as banks and courts, while Douglass C. North says “we cannot see, feel, touch, or even 
measure institutions; they are constructs of the human mind.”48  
From a political science perspective, political institutions derive from “state power, 
authority, and sanctions to enforce prescribed behavior.”49 There are three analytical 
approaches to institutions in political science. The rational choice-based approach argues 
that the design of political institutions is the determining factor that shapes the behavior of 
political actors. For example, Przeworski (1996) argues that in post-communist societies, 
democratic quality and stability depend on institutional (constitutional) design. In the 
cultural (or sociological) institutionalist approach, deep-seated cultural beliefs frame 
behavior.  For example, Uriel Procaccia (2007) attributes the failure of market reforms in 
post-Soviet Russia to values and beliefs, such as philosophy and religion,  that divide 
Russia and the West. Finally, scholars in the comparative-historical school treat political 
institutions as organizations that evolve from social structures and history.  Such 
organizations are actors that behave according to formal rules and informal, historically-
derived behaviors.  In applying this approach to Russia, for example, analysts would 
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“conceive of the executive as a grouping of historically determined organizations defined 
both by formal and informal rules.”50 
While a political science perspective is important in understanding how control 
structures influence the definition of property rights, it falls short in analyzing the structure 
of property rights from the standpoint of efficiency.  Hence, an economic perspective is 
also vital.  
Neoclassical economists using rational choice-based theories seek to understand 
the contribution of institutions to market efficiency.  A market is a “system of voluntary 
transactions between independent property owners pursuing their self-interest.”  Property 
rights are thus key institutions for economists.  However, neoclassical economic theory 
assumes that actors possess full information to make correct choices and that the market is 
free of imperfections (such as incentives to cheat).  Institutions are important in the long 
run; in the short term, institutions tend not to vary and so are disregarded as a factor in the 
way markets allocate property.  They are outside of the neoclassical economic model.51   
For the purposes of the dissertation, an economic perspective is necessary but 
insufficient since it ignores the role of the state in establishing and influencing the structure 
of property rights regimes. 52 
Theorists in the school of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) such as Douglass 
C. North, Barry Weingast, Mancur Olson, Margaret Levi, Oliver Williamson, Elinor 
Ostrom, and Robert Bates seek to integrate institutions into a dynamic theory of long-run 
economic development.  Institutions are intrinsic to political decisions and economic 
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performance by defining rules for coordination and cooperative endeavor among human 
beings.  For institutional economists, the competitive, frictionless model of markets 
assumed by neoclassical economics does not exist; in reality, markets are obstructed by 
power imbalances, information asymmetries, and transaction costs.  Under these 
conditions, the potential gains from market exchange are not realized, and efficient 
outcomes that maximize wealth for all parties are prevented. 53  
The logic of the new institutional economics (NIE) originates in political rules.  In 
demonstrating the contribution of property rights to economic growth, North assumes the 
state comes first; it precedes the development of economic institutions.54  The state must a 
priori design the institutions to allow private exclusive rights to property that can be bought 
and sold in markets.  To establish rights, the state “will attempt to act like a discriminating 
monopolist, separating groups of constituents and devising property rights for each so as 
to maximize state revenue.”55  Historically land has been a major source of state revenue.56  
Once property rights are defined, the security of those rights must be established through a 
credible commitment by the state to property owners that rights will obtain in the future.  
Yet even with radical changes in the legal framework, as occurred in Russia, North argues 
that there may be a continuation of informal constraints that became embedded as 
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extensions of rules in the previous regime.  Fundamental institutional change that alters the 
long-run economic development trajectory of a country is thus slow and rare.57  
Of the various institutional approaches, the NIE is most relevant to the dissertation 
because it weaves economic and political logic into explication of the structure of property 
rights.   The state in all countries is the primary independent variable in defining rules 
governing access to property and in providing security through enforcement of the rules.  
A given property rights regime is the outcome of a process – i.e. the dependent variable – 
and historical factors influence the development of political and economic institutions that 
define property rights.   
 
3. Sources of institutional change 
To paraphrase Roland, there are by now as many interpretations of the bible of 
institutional change as there are Protestant churches.58  It is a tribute to Douglass C. North 
that he has written and revised many of these sacred texts, publicly acknowledging 
misconceptions as his thinking evolved on the sources of institutional change.  This section 
briefly reviews North’s primary concepts and weighs the utility of applying to the 
dissertation either path dependence or the transition from personal privileges to impersonal 
rights that he presented with co-authors Wallis and Weingast in Violence and Social Orders 
(2009).   
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Throughout his intellectual evolution, North sought to explain why and how 
institutions change. In 1973, he defined institutions as the determinant of economic growth.  
Relative price changes were the source of institutional change.59   He later discarded this 
theory because it could not explain the persistence of inefficient property rights that 
satisfied the short-term fiscal needs of rulers at the expense of growth and social welfare.  
By 1981, North determined that the self-interest of rulers, not the desire for efficiency, 
defined institutions.  Due to transaction costs from state and market imperfections, 
inefficient property rights would persist that did not support economic growth.60  But if 
better models existed, he asked, why did political leaders of stagnating countries not adopt 
the policies of more successful economies?  
North solved the puzzle of persisting inefficiency in property rights with the theory 
of path dependence.61 In Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 
(1990), North distinguished institutions from organizations and argued that their 
interaction created a lag effect that made fundamental institutional change slow and rare.  
Opportunities in society were determined by standard economic theory (e.g. relative price 
changes, scarcity, competition) plus institutions that created the incentive for new political 
and economic organizations to emerge. These new organizations took advantage of 
incentives provided by the existing institutional environment.  The source of incremental 
change was the investments made by these organizations in skill and knowledge to enhance 
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their objectives.  Once organizations became dominant, in either the political or economic 
sphere, they were difficult to dislodge due to the benefits of a monopolistic position. The 
path of institutional change was shaped by the increasing returns to these organizations.62  
In addition, transaction costs from incomplete information led organizations to rely on 
historically-derived models.  To preserve their position, organizations then influenced the 
path of institutional change.  In summary: 
Path dependence is the key to an analytical understanding of long-run economic change.  
The promise of this approach is that it extends the most constructive building blocks of neo-classical 
theory – both the scarcity/competition postulate and incentives as the driving force – but modifies 
that theory by incorporating incomplete information and subjective models of reality and the 
increasing returns characteristic of institutions….Path dependence comes from the increasing 
returns mechanisms that reinforce the direction once on a given path.  Alterations in the path come 
from unanticipated consequences of choices, external effects, and sometimes forces exogenous to 
the analytical framework.  Reversal of paths (from stagnation to growth or vice versa) may come 
from the above-described sources of path alteration, but will typically occur through changes in the 
polity.63 
 
To simplify his thesis, North distinguished two paths:  one was productivity-
enhancing, the other was not.  An example of the first was the 1787 Northwest Ordinance 
in the United States.  Among other institutions, it provided political rules for westward 
expansion and economic rules for secure property rights (fee-simple ownership of land, 
inheritance, contract enforcement) that facilitated efficient land transactions. Together with 
newly-created political organizations in the Western states, the Ordinance gave birth to 
myriad banks, farms, shipping firms, etc. that later shaped the evolution of land policy over 
the following century.  Despite some policies that created profits through inefficiency (e.g. 
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tariffs, monopolies), on balance, the incentives in this institutional matrix led organizations 
to pursue productive activity that sustained economic growth. Common law, which is 
precedent-based, also illustrated this pattern because organizations continuously and 
incrementally modified the institutional framework by bringing cases to courts. 64  
The centralized monarchy and bureaucracy of 16-17th-century Spain illustrated a 
contrasting institutional matrix that was economically destructive rather than growth-
enhancing.  Onerous and excessive decrees aimed primarily at furthering the interests of 
the crown.  Unable to meet the costs of empire and war, Spain extracted higher taxes and 
confiscated property, leading the economy into a downward spiral.  The response to fiscal 
crisis created insecure property rights.  The increasing returns to the institutional structure 
prevented the monarchy and bureaucracy from implementing numerous reforms that would 
reverse the path, despite widespread understanding that the situation was dire.  From a 
position as the most powerful empire since Rome, Spain went into decline.65 
Institutional change that reverses an order is rare.  Even in extreme events such as 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union, North would argue that continuity of informal 
institutions and bureaucratic organizations from the previous regime is likely to place a 
brake on radical change.   Societies can become locked into a “path dependent” trajectory 
that is sub-optimal for economic efficiency and growth, leading to stagnation. For example, 
when revolutions in Latin America created countries independent of Spain in the 18th   to 
19th centuries, they imported U.S. and British political institutions.   However, these 
institutions were alien to countries long accustomed to political and economic control by a 
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centralized bureaucracy.  Hence, according to North, the countries gradually reverted to 
the more familiar pattern of bureaucratic control in the 19th to 20th centuries.66 In contrast, 
institutions embedded from British colonial rule remained in the US after independence.  
Based on their institutional legacy, countries such as the US, England and France offer a 
“consistent story of incremental change induced by the private gains to be realized by 
productivity-raising organizational and institutional changes.”67  A specific path cannot be 
foreseen in the short term because policy choices provide opportunities to change course.  
However, “the overall direction in the long run is both more predictable and more difficult 
to reverse.”68 
History, as a story of institutional evolution, is central to path dependence.  
However, it should not be used for ex-post rationalization to fit an institutional perspective.  
While Pierson argues that path dependence is a critically important concept for political 
science, he warns that it must be applied narrowly, beyond the simple assumption that 
“history matters.”  Unlike economic theory, which assumes that self-regulating market 
mechanisms will correct for inefficiency, there is no single, predictable outcome in political 
science that is optimal.69 Given conditions of increasing returns, multiple outcomes are 
possible, with the path unknown.70 To understand the direction of change, the concept of 
path dependence “can be greatly strengthened by more systematic attention to the ways in 
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which institutional arrangements that are in place for an extended period can structure the 
conditions for their own revision.”71  In this view, the “path” is set by critical junctures that 
lead to institutional evolution rather than intervals of abrupt change.  It is not driven by 
“skilled social actors” and “losers” or “institutional reformers” but by, in North’s words, 
an “interdependent web” of formal political institutions and informal rules that condition 
the behavior of actors. 72 
Path dependence is appealing as a conceptual basis for scholarship on contemporary 
Russian institutions. Evidence of continuity abounds.73  For example, McFaul’s conclusion 
on why insider privatization transpired in the early 1990s is consistent with a path-
dependent interpretation.  The state was not strong enough to replace Communist-era 
institutions with market-supporting ones, so the rules of the game from the late Gorbachev 
period carried over, allowing enterprise managers to privatize what they had already 
appropriated.74 Specifically with respect to land, there has never been a period in Russian 
history when the property rights regime was predominantly private.75  Rules from the 
Soviet era governing urban land planning through the General Plan continue to frustrate 
emergence of land markets.76 Given the continuing high level of state land ownership after 
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two decades and stagnation in investment due to incomplete institutional reform more 
generally,77 path dependence might explain why resistance to land privatization is part of 
a broader pattern.   
On the other hand, path dependence is a deterministic theory that predicts the long-
run evolutionary path in terms of historical institutional patterns.  It would not have 
identified the key turning points in South Korea’s transition from authoritarianism to 
democratic and economic institutions that uphold the rule of law.  In Russia, it would not 
predict executive branch advocacy for urban land privatization under Presidents Yeltsin 
and Putin against the resistance of municipal landlords.  When critical junctures open 
historical turning points, there are real policy choices for ruling coalitions that rest on 
political, economic and social dynamics.  Within those choices, Williamson’s injunction 
to meet the “remediableness criterion” (test of feasibility) bears repeating.  If a superior 
feasible alternative cannot be affordably implemented it will deter institutional reform, 
even if the institution is inefficient.78 Is institutional “stickiness” the result of path-
dependent trajectories or of factors that are unexplored?   Path dependence explains 
institutional continuity with minimal specification and lacks explanatory precision 
altogether for institutional change. 
More recent scholarship from an interdisciplinary perspective departs from the 
determinism of path dependency.   In Violence and Social Orders (2009), the central insight 
of North, Wallis and Weingast is that institutions perform differently depending on whether 
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they are, at one extreme, personalized, that is, informal and implemented through repeated 
interactions with known individuals, or impersonal, that is, codified into law and 
impartially implemented by legal persons.79  There is an intermediary condition where state 
agencies may implement formal rules, but in a personalized or arbitrary manner.80   
Weber describes the intermediary condition, in which institutions are personalized, 
as one where the legal order is characterized by laws that the political authorities choose to 
enforce.  In countries with a patrimonial heritage such as Russia, authority tends to be 
exercised arbitrarily, according to the prerogative of rulers and the compromises they make 
with individual power-holders.  Such a legal order contrasts with one where systemic law 
is implemented by a modern, rule-bound bureaucracy that separates public official activity 
from private life. In modern bureaucratic management, be it in the private or public sector, 
officials hold office as a vocation in exchange for income security.   Officials serve 
functional objectives rather than rulers. No agency is entitled to act on individual cases; 
general regulations may be issued only on abstract principles.  In contrast, Weber notes, 
the dominant pattern in patrimonialism is to issue decisions according to favors and 
personal privileges.81  The degree of personalization of institutions and implementing 
                                                 
79 Douglass C. North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).  The degree of personalization of institutions tends to correspond with 
the nature of a political regime and how it uses rents. Economic rents provide financial returns greater than 
the best alternative use of capital.  In regimes dominated by a single leader or party, where institutions are 
personalized, ruling elites “manipulate[s] the economic system to produce rents that then secure political 
order,” p. 18.  Impersonal institutions are associated with impersonal organizational forms, which are legal 
entities that exist independently of the identities of their individual members.  Such organizations appeared 
only in the last five centuries. They are limited in societies dominated by a single leader or powerful elites, 
who want to control economic rents and political order.  In contrast, competitive political and economic 
systems are founded on impersonal institutions implemented by impersonal organizations. (pp. 22-25).  
Also see Levy 2014, pp. 19-22.  When institutions are impersonal, the quest for rents drives innovators to 
introduce new products or political solutions (Levy 2014, p. 23).   
80 Levy 2014, pp 20-21,62-63.  





organizations influences the credibility of commitment and the risk of arbitrary 
expropriation by the state and thus is critical to the security of property rights.  The less 
deterministic approach of North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) suggests that institutional 
change is not teleological.  In contrast to path dependence, these scholars suggest that “the 
transition from personalized to impersonal rules of the game tends to be cumulative, 
incremental”82 while not necessarily linear or inevitable.  83 
Under what conditions do impersonal institutions and organizations arise that are 
critical to the formation and security of property rights?  Drawing on Western models, 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) argue that the transition to impersonal institutions can 
occur in two stages.  First, elites in the state’s dominant political coalition are motivated to 
pass laws that will transform their personal privileges into impersonal rights.  Second, so 
long as impersonal rights continue to serve the interests of political rulers, they are 
extended to the broader population. How does rule of law emerge?  When elite privileges 
are transformed into rights, the state transforms into a set of perpetually-lived organizations 
that in turn “transform the identity of the ruler from a powerful individual with a unique 
social persona into an impersonal office.”  The new institutions and organizations are 
binding on future leaders, who fall under the larger identity of the state.  “It is the state that 
comes under the rule of law.” 84   The capacity of the state is thus critical to the 
transformation process and the sustainability of impersonal institutions that constitute the 
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rule of law.85  But “because rule of law cannot be improved by fiat – which is too easily 
undone – many attempts to enhance and extend the rule of law fail.” 86 
The strength of this argument is that it provides a causal chain of actions rooted in 
the incentives of ruling elites.  The weakness is that it does not provide sufficient 
granularity to predict why or when ruling elites would give up the rents from land privileges 
and instill a rule of law in property rights.  To explain changes in property rights, we need 
a theory grounded in the incentives of rulers.   
 
4. Theory of predatory rule 
Margaret Levi’s theory of predatory rule (Of Rule and Revenue, 1988) frames the 
motivations of rulers in terms of maximizing revenues to the state.   This is pertinent to a 
decision by the state to sell land and collect a land tax, or lease land and receive rents.  Levi 
predicts that rulers will choose according to three constraints: bargaining power with 
bureaucratic agents and constituents, transaction costs related to negotiating and 
implementing policies, and security of tenure in office (the discount rate).  The more rulers 
are uncertain about the future (high discount rate), the more they seek returns in the short-
term.  In contrast, the greater their security (low discount rate), the more they are likely to 
build stable sources of revenues for the long-term. 87  “The major implication of the theory 
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of predatory rule,” according to Levi, “is that rulers will devise and formalize structures 
that increase their bargaining power, reduce their transaction costs, and lower their discount 
rate so as to better capture gains from exchanges of politics.” 88 In other words, among a 
set of alternatives at a given time, rulers will opt for the highest-yielding and most feasible 
revenue sources that strengthen their hold on power and security in office.  
Given the benefits of land to rulers as both a political and an economic resource, 
Levi’s theory would initially predict that rulers would not give up state land privileges.  
Politically, a ruler who controls urban land will have greater bargaining power over 
constituents who need land for businesses or housing.  Economically, monopoly rights to 
land give rulers market power to set and manipulate rents, particularly if leases are not fully 
marketable or of relatively short duration.     The more that urban land ownership serves 
political interests, the less urban land will serve economic purposes.89      Levi’s theory 
predicts that rulers who rely on income from rents more than taxes from the local base will 
become more predatory and less accountable over time.90   
How do institutions change if the benefits to rulers of control rights over land are 
so great?  Levi notes that rulers initially design institutions that are most efficient in serving 
their interests, but “as relative prices change, institutions that once facilitated exchange 
may begin to hinder exchange or reduce return.  Rulers will then try to redesign state 
structures and rewrite state policies.”91   Rulers may also revise institutions in response to 
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changes in their bargaining power, transaction costs or discount rate.  The decision by 
municipalities to rely more on land rents or land taxes will influence the share of state land 
ownership and the definition and distribution of property rights.   
Several studies explore the relationship between institutional reform and the fiscal 
incentives and constraints of rulers.    Myerson, using mechanism theory, found that an 
autocratic ruler would provide political guarantees for property rights that lead to a higher 
tax base, even if it meant giving up some power. However, with a high natural resource 
base, the same ruler would lack the incentive to reform, even if it reduced investment 
needed for long-term growth. 92    Desai, Goldberg and Freinkman validate this finding 
based on the impact of local revenue sources on reforms in Russian regions in the 1990s.  
Those that relied on rents, either from oil extraction or federal subsidies, reformed the least; 
regions with a high share of local revenues and moderate natural resource rents went further 
with economic reforms to stimulate business development and investment.93  Similarly, 
Zhuravskaya found that local authorities in Russia lacked fiscal incentives to raise local 
revenue due to federal revenue-sharing policies that offset any additional revenues by 
requiring higher transfers to federal authorities.94   This in turn reduced the incentive of 
local officials to develop the private sector as a source of local taxes.95  In China, political 
centralization through the state-party nexus maintained a check on lower levels of 
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government even as local authorities were encouraged to develop a local tax base.  As a 
result, local authorities in China fostered the growth of local enterprises to enhance their 
tax base; in Russia, enterprises became the targets of predation by revenue-hungry local 
officials.96   In these cases, Levi’s theory is pertinent in predicting that the revenue-
maximizing incentives of local officials depended on their relative bargaining power with 
higher political authorities and the availability of rents that could replace local taxes.  The 
choice of revenue system in turn influenced the security of property rights. 
While the theory of predatory rule has application across political systems and 
historical epochs, there are some limitations that may restrict its applicability to transition 
economies.    For example, the theory would suggest that rulers with greater security of 
tenure and thus, a low discount rate, would undertake more far-reaching institutional 
reforms to strengthen the tax base.  In contrast, Hellman found that in post-communist 
countries in the 1990s, elected officials who faced ballot-box challenges from “losers” in 
the reform process were more likely to pursue comprehensive reforms than officials with 
security of tenure.97   However, Hellman’s partial reform model is consistent with Levi’s 
theory in that short-term “winners” who benefited from rent-seeking opportunities early in 
the reform process, such as enterprise insiders and local officials, had an incentive to block 
long-term reform in order to keep a stream of rents.  Reforms will remain incomplete if 
these winners have sufficient bargaining power to veto policy change.  Another limitation 
arises from Frye’s proposition that the degree of political polarization in society is the 
decisive factor in explaining variation in the pace of economic and institutional reform.   In 
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his model, the consistency and sequencing of reforms will influence the response of 
citizens and firms to economic and institutional changes.  More polarization increases the 
risk of policy reversals and reduces the incentive of citizens and firms to invest.98  This 
model exposes a lacuna in the new institutional economics more generally by increasing 
attention to political polarization in society that can shape institutional reforms.   While the 
predatory ruler is subject to constraints that include making bargains with constituents, a 
more explicit integration of society into theories of institutional change may be warranted.   
Finally, the theory of predatory rule is an “exercise in comparative statics”99 that 
may insufficiently consider the temporal implications of institutional change. Both 
Hellman and Frye raise negative consequences specific to transition economies of the 
different time dimensions inherent in any bundle of institutional reforms.  For example, if 
privatization of assets proceeds faster than development of governance mechanisms over 
those assets, the security of property rights may be jeopardized.  A time dimension is 
critical because the distance required for fundamental institutional change in transition 
economies is particularly long, and “getting from here to there” is fraught with risks of 
reversal.100  Pierson’s starting point is thus that “we need to think not just about moments 
of institutional selection and moments of institutional change, but of processes of 
institutional development unfolding over significant periods of time.”101    Levi notes her 
theory is static, with an initial policy based on an existing choice set, yet she argues that 
the rules are written today for application in the future.  The theory becomes dynamic as 
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rulers seek to ensure compliance over time through modifications in the original tax 
contract that build cooperation by society.102  This dynamic aspect will be important to 
assess in applying the theory to the puzzle of variation in land privatization in Russia.    
 
5. The State and the Bureaucracy as Explanatory Variables 
To apply the NIE literature to the dissertation, it is necessary to unpack the state as 
the independent variable.  Following North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), the state is 
defined as an organization of organizations rather than as a single actor.103  To rephrase 
Weingast, the ideal state is one that is strong enough to protect property rights but not so 
strong as to violate them.104   The state needs to recognize that “…the ready exercise of 
administrative discretion is the source of contractual hazard,” for which effective 
governance mechanisms are the solution.105  Such mechanisms can come from checks and 
balances within branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial), between the 
executive and government agencies (the bureaucracy), and across levels of government 
(federalism).   
Because the state defines the political rules and controls governance mechanisms, 
NIE appears to assign both the problem and the solution to the same source. To narrow the 
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analysis and reduce the risk of tautology, it is important to distinguish between governance 
at the macro and micro levels.   
Governance at the macro level analyzes the “rules of the game” including the legal 
order and government functions (executive, legislative, judicial, bureaucracy) that define 
and enforce property rights.  Its limitation is the evolutionary nature of institutions, which 
are subject to major changes in design only during “defining moments” such as coups, 
crises or breakdowns.106   
Governance at the micro-level analyzes what Williamson terms the “play of the 
game,” that is, market transactions and related state regulatory actions. Scholars at this 
level107 focus on the governance of contractual relations. Contracts are necessarily 
incomplete and can easily be broken; reversion to courts, while the ultimate recourse, is 
not costless.  Hence, to improve the chances for cooperative human endeavor, governance 
structures should be designed to “craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual 
gains.”108  Transaction cost economics argues that since markets and governments are both 
flawed, the most efficient governance structure is one where there is no feasible alternative 
that can be implemented.  Corrections to regulatory structures in specific sectors (including 
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land) can be realized within a decade, and thus are more easily subject to improvement 
using an institutional economic perspective. 109  
The performance of state regulatory agencies -- the public bureaucracy -- will 
influence the process of institutional change by strengthening or undermining the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to the rules.  However, “bureaucracy remains 
a poorly understood condition, whatever lens is brought to bear.”110   The ideal public 
agency as depicted by Max Weber in Economy and Society is rule-bound, rational, 
technocratic, and impersonal; it depends on a stable system of taxation for continuous 
functioning.  A capitalist market economy “demands that the official business of public 
administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, and with as much speed as 
possible.”111 Once these performance standards are met, bureaucracy becomes 
the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action.  
Therefore, as an instrument of rationally organizing authority relations, 
bureaucracy was and is a power instrument of the first order for one who 
controls the bureaucratic apparatus….When administration has been completely 
bureaucratized, the resulting system of domination is practically 
indestructible.112 
 
In the absence of the Weberian ideal, can public bureaucracy be transformed from 
“a patronage machine for conferring rents on political allies and clients to a rule-based 
organization committed to public service provision?”113  Levy examines this question from 
experience in the United States and developing countries and observes that political leaders 
need the incentive, capacity, and a long time horizon to introduce and consolidate a merit-
based civil service system.  Where these conditions prevail, bureaucratic transformation is 
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generally initiated as a top-down, elite project.  In developing countries with discretionary 
decision-making, the process is problematic; in the United States, the process was 
protracted but succeeded for three reasons.  First, top-down reforms laid the basis for a 
professional civil service.  Second, an emerging middle class and business sector demanded 
improved public services.  And third, enlightened public entrepreneurs within federal 
agencies reached out to public constituencies on key issues of concern.  These “islands of 
excellence” helped establish a professional reputation for agencies that were formerly 
dismissed as patronage and campaign machines for politicians.114  Given the difficulty of 
importing such experience into countries with discretionary decision-making, Levy 
advocates an incremental strategy of “public management lite” to increase adherence to 
rules.  One such approach is to focus reforms on a specific sector or agency.115  
Even if the Weberian ideal can be achieved, a question remains:  who controls the 
bureaucratic apparatus?  For Moe, the organization and performance of the bureaucracy is 
related to the logic and structure of politics of a given system.  Citing American experience, 
Moe notes that the system of checks and balances provides incentives to the winning 
coalition to formalize a bureaucratic structure and make it rule-bound to ensure continuity 
of purpose against shifting political winds.  At the same time, the losing coalition has 
incentives to impose restrictions on bureaucratic agencies so they are “designed to fail.”  
Due to conflicting political goals, bureaucratic effectiveness is thus “in the eye of the 
beholder”116 (the party in or out of power).  For Weber, the bureaucracy can serve varied 
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interests, political and economic; the direction the bureaucracy takes depends on the 
powers that instruct it.  The political “master” whom the bureaucracy serves can either be 
the people, represented by an elected legislature, or head of state.  In practice, the 
bureaucracy is “overtowering” in expertise and autonomous vis-à-vis the public and the 
ruler.  The overarching and single loyalty of the bureaucracy, however autonomous, is to 
serve the objective “raison d’etat” (reason of state.)117 
The NIE literature frames the relationship between political authorities and the 
bureaucracy as a principal-agent problem that must be analyzed according to the specific 
case.118   Levi sees the ruler as principal and the bureaucracy as agent that performs all the 
functions critical to implementation of institutions:  measurement, monitoring, and 
enforcement.  Historically, ensuring that the agent performed properly was a perennial 
problem.  In modern bureaucracies, Levi notes that computerization can reduce agency 
problems but not entirely.  Discretionary behavior, shirking, and conflict of interest are still 
possible.  Moreover, the bureaucracy is a multi-faceted, multi-functional set of 
organizations that is not easily managed.119  The solution to these agency problems has 
often been the proliferation of rules.  However, Williamson observes that the number of 
rules can serve two purposes:  either slow decision-making and thus delay contracts or, by 
absence of flexibility, increase confidence that the commitment to a contract is credible 120 
Since a credible commitment to the rules is central to the security of property rights, the 
answer to agency problems may lie in less flexibility, not more. 
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To recap this section, the NIE literature offers a conceptual framework to predict 
why, when and how urban land institutions may change.  North, Wallis and Weingast 
(2009) provide steps in the process, starting with the conversion of elite privileges to elite 
rights.  Levi’s theory of predatory rule, while aimed at revenue systems, is germane to why 
and when rulers would relinquish their privileges, establish property rights, and amend the 
institutional structure.  The macro and micro levels in NIE analysis begin to answer how 
institutions change by conceptualizing the state as two explanatory variables: i) political 
authority and the legal order and ii) bureaucratic organization and performance.   The term 
political authority is synonymous with ruling elites.121  Thus, the NIE opens an analytical 
window on the state’s role in determining slow-moving ‘rules of the game’ as well as the 
more fast-paced ‘play of the game’ in land transactions.  It does not sufficiently specify the 
role of society, except as constituents in the theory of predatory rule, or the time dimension 





6. Relevance of theory to urban land rights in Russia 
The adoption of the constitutional right to own private property in 1993 was a 
critical juncture in Russian history after decades of state land ownership.  It also 
represented the de jure transformation of state land privileges into impersonal property 
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rights.   De facto, however, urban land remained in state ownership.  The monopoly state 
owner became the monopoly municipality landlord.   
The Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev administrations pursued a strategic policy of 
urban land privatization but each president employed different political and fiscal tactics 
with respect to the regions.  The primary differences between the Yeltsin period in the 
1990s and the Putin-Medvedev periods in the 2000s relate to political decentralization and 
fiscal federalism.  Yeltsin famously told regions to take all the power they could swallow, 
and 30 regions repaid this gesture by not remitting taxes to the center.122  In contrast, the 
Putin administration recentralized authority and reduced revenue-sharing to encourage 
greater reliance on local taxes.123 The dissertation uses the conceptual framework presented 
in North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) and Levi (1988) to assess how these federal efforts 
affected the incentives of municipal officials to convert municipal land privileges into 
secure property rights.  
The two levels of analysis in the NIE literature are relevant to the implementation 
of urban land privatization at the federal and subnational levels in Russia.  At the macro 
level, federal political authorities determine the legal order for property rights, design and 
manage the land administration bureaucracy, and design and implement tax-sharing 
policies.   At the micro level, the performance of the land administration bureaucracy 
influences contractual relations between the state and physical or juridical persons as 
buyers or tenants of state land.  The decentralization of land administration functions raises 
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principal-agent problems because federal administration offices are subject to local and 
regional political pressures.124  
The performance of the land administration bureaucracy in Russia influenced the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to urban land privatization, for several 
reasons.  First, the formation of an appropriate land administration bureaucracy was a 
torturous process that contributed to poor public services.   Second, at the national level, 
privatization of land rights was hotly contested and socially sensitive in the 1990s, putting 
the land administration bureaucracy between opposing forces in the executive branch and 
the Duma (legislature).  Third, at local levels, the control rights of politicians and 
bureaucrats presented the greatest risk to land privatization, according to Shleiffer, because 
they actively blocked reforms.125  Frye concurs, noting that better training and development 
of the public bureaucracy in this context could raise risks rather than lower them by giving 
bureaucrats better tools for rent-seeking.126  Brian Levy’s examination of the 
transformation of public bureaucracy into a depersonalized, Weberian prototype is relevant 
to Russian experience, particularly his focus on sector-specific interventions to raise the 
quality and efficiency of a given agency. 
The societal and temporal factors that require strengthening in this theoretical 
framework will be addressed in the land governance model, discussed below. 
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7. Research Design and Working Hypotheses 
The research methodology for institutional analysis follows Grief (2006).127  It 
includes a deductive model, inductive use of quantitative data, and context-specific case 
studies (including qualitative interviews).   
I hypothesize that institutional change is a function of the revenue-maximizing 
incentives of ruling elites (political authorities).  The policy decision by political authorities 
at a given time to privatize, lease, or seize privatized land will define the property rights 
regime. Consistent with the theory of predatory rule (Levi 1988), inputs to policy choice 
are constraints posed by the bargaining power of rulers, their security of tenure, and the 
transaction costs of implementation.  The pace of institutional change, measured by the 
rate of land privatization, will depend on the alignment of policies and actions by political 
authorities and bureaucrats to either promote or retard land privatization.   
Put simply, the choice for political authorities is to own land and collect rents, or to 
sell land and collect property taxes.   This choice determines the path of change.  The pace 
of change can be rapid, incremental, or in stasis.    
The unit of analysis is municipal land registrations and transactions. The dependent 
variables measure institutional change according to indicators of private land ownership, 
land market activity, and land as a source of fiscal revenue and mortgage collateral.    A 
higher share of private land ownership by citizens and firms and land market activity in a 
given location will represent a faster relative pace of institutional change.     
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To operationalize the hypotheses, I develop a land governance model based on NIE 
literature pertinent to the institutional environment and governance of property rights.  
Indicators in the model are specified according to World Bank Group operational 
experience in transition economies.  The land governance model is comprised of three 
factors that are critical to the formation and planning of urban land rights: (i) political 
authority and legal order; (ii) bureaucratic organization and performance; and iii) public 
engagement in decision-making.   
 The dissertation employs the land governance model to compare three 
municipalities with diverse land market outcomes over two periods.  The first period, 
1990–2001, begins with the first reference to private ownership of land in Russian Republic 
(RSFSR) law and ends with adoption of the Land Code and related Civil Code 
amendments.  Passage of these laws represented a watershed federal achievement to 
promote privatization of urban land in regions of the Federation.   The second period, 2002-
2013, covers the implementation of the Land Code up to the roll-out of a nationally 
digitized property rights registration system.   Case study municipalities have been selected 
according to quantitative measures of land ownership to illustrate diverse property rights 
regimes.    
Each case study poses three analytical questions: why, when, and how do 
institutions change?  Why and when rulers decide to privatize or lease state land will depend 
on their bargaining power, security of tenure, and the transaction costs of policy 
implementation.  The answer will shed light on the dynamic processes that shape the 
revenue-maximizing incentives of political authorities.  How institutions change is a 





process is captured in the land governance model and quantified in output indicators, 
discussed below. 
 
8. Why and When Institutions Change  
Before assessing the implications of a given policy choice, we need to understand 
why political authorities choose to follow a particular path.  According to the theory of 
predatory rule, the choice of a given revenue-maximizing policy will depend on the 
constraints faced by rulers related to their bargaining power, security of tenure, and 
transaction costs of institutional change.  These trade-offs vary at any point in time and 
thus, the outcome is not predetermined.   Theory guides the prediction of outcomes. 
Bargaining power is understood in Russia’s federal system as autonomy of national 
and sub-national authorities to determine the land-rights regime in their respective 
jurisdictions.  Following Levi, the more rulers control resources that are needed by others, 
the greater their bargaining power. Bargaining power will be a function of the economic 
and political resources at the disposal of local political authorities in relation to federal 
authorities and constituents.  Ideology is also a political resource if it translates into policy 
action.  Where political authorities have relatively more political and fiscal autonomy they 
will pursue the path most beneficial to their interests. 128   Trends in land values will 
influence the decision by political authorities to privatize. If these are high or rising, there 
                                                 





will be greater likelihood that municipal authorities will manipulate the process to forestall 
privatization to keep control of land rents. 129  
Transaction costs comprise the time and investments needed to negotiate, measure, 
monitor, and enforce a transparent property rights regime.  Transaction costs will be a 
function of the cost of modernizing property registration and land planning systems versus 
continuing with the organizational structures inherited from the Soviet period.  Rulers will 
seek the most feasible organizational structure and economize on the costs of each step.130 
If transaction costs are too high, the “remediableness” condition (test of feasibility) of 
Williamson will not be met, and existing institutions will dominate over more efficient 
ones.    Included in transaction costs are negotiations among political authorities, 
bureaucrats, and the public to decide on a course of action. The higher the transaction costs, 
the slower will be the process of changing systems.   
The discount rate affects the security in office of the ruler, which influences their 
revenue-maximizing incentives.   Those with a longer time horizon are more inclined to 
invest in systems and reforms that will generate stable revenues.  Those who are more 
uncertain about the future will maximize rents in the present, even at the expense of 
efficiency and growth.131  The appointment or election of governors and mayors will be a 
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factor of security in office.132  Length of tenure can affect relations with business 
organizations and collusive behavior.133 
The case studies will test the explanatory power of bargaining power, transaction 
costs, and discount rate in determining why and when rulers choose to own or privatize 
land. As noted earlier, empirical evidence from transition countries found that the discount 
rate of rulers may be counter to theory, that is, rulers with longer tenure in office tended to 
reform less than those subjected to periodic elections.134  In addition, theory may not 
adequately account for the polarization of politics135 or the role of society in constraining 
the bargaining power of rulers.136  These factors will be examined in the case studies. 
 
9. How Institutions Change  
The land governance model explains the pace of institutional change by simplifying 
complex interactions among political authorities and bureaucratic organizations.  Imagine 
two groups of players, politicians and bureaucrats, who can choose to promote or resist 
land privatization.  A typology of four cases is postulated.  In two cases, politicians favor 
land privatization while bureaucrats either hinder or support the process.  In the other two 
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cases, bureaucrats drive land rights reforms with active or passive resistance from political 
authorities.   The cases are presented schematically below: 
Figure I.  Hypothesized Land Governance Model 
II.Incremental Change 
 
Political authorities oppose land privatization 
Bureaucrats implement policies effectively  
 
Society is passive or active 
IV.Rapid Change 
 
Political authorities promote land privatization 
Bureaucrats implement policies effectively 
 




Political authorities oppose land privatization 
Bureaucrats resist implementation 
 
Society opposes privatization  
III.Incremental Change 
 
Political authorities promote land privatization 
Bureaucrats resist implementation 
 




The ability of political authorities to carry through on a particular policy depends 
on actions by bureaucratic units responsible for two functions:  land registration (titles) and 
land use (zoning and construction permits).  If all state organizations support land 
privatization, institutional change in land rights will be rapid (box IV).  The outcome would 
be stasis in the absence of political leadership and bureaucratic support (box I). Such an 
outcome is also possible if political authorities and land developers collude to retain control 
of the most valuable land.  Finally, change will be incremental if political authorities and 
the bureaucracy pursue inconsistent policy directions.  This could occur if, for example, 
the chief architect’s office imposes restrictions on urban land use despite political support 





land effectively but sales benefit political insiders or state agencies expropriate property 
(box II). 137 
Public engagement is an intervening variable that may influence the actions of 
political authorities and bureaucrats.  The public may either be the principal or the agent of 
change in the theory of predatory rule; what is most critical is who sets the agenda, state or 
society.  The premise of the dissertation is that the public in Russia does not set the policy 
agenda and is therefore not the principal directing the actions of agents in government.  
Nevertheless, public engagement may put pressure on political authorities and bureaucrats 
to open access to land and increase the security of land rights.  Active public support or 
opposition to land privatization would reinforce a rapid pace of institutional change or 
stasis.  A passive public role is likely to reinforce incremental institutional change.  Given 
this intervening role, society is not a primary explanatory variable of institutional change. 
While typologies do not mimic actual cases, as Weber noted, Russian history offers 
precedents that illustrate the influence of conflict or convergence among politicians, 
bureaucrats and the public on the substance and pace of institutional reforms.   The land 
governance model is thus consistent with empirical evidence in Russian history. 
Three contrasting cases illustrate how the presence or absence of alignment among 
the three levels of the land governance model (political authorities, bureaucracy, society) 
influenced institutional change in Imperial Russia. Beginning in the 18th century, Peter the 
Great and Catherine II aimed to instill zakonnost’ (rule of law) among the citizenry and 
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public administration. Yet proizvol (arbitrary rule) by administrative officials undermined 
tsarist reforms, while censorship and passivity muted the public’s voice.  Passive resistance 
also characterized bureaucrats.  Fearful of tsarist surveillance, officials hid behind 
regulations and routines.  Institutional change from the top suffered from the absence of 
support by the bureaucracy and society from below.  In 1840, with three million decrees 
lying idle, several ministers initiated efforts to reform the civil service.  By the mid-19th 
century, with the support of Tsar Alexander II, enlightened bureaucrats and educated 
society led the most significant reforms such as emancipation of the serfs. The confluence 
of actions by political authorities, civil servants, and educated society on the Great Reforms 
of 1857-64 “created a new role for citizens in national affairs and heralded the beginning 
of the greatest era of social and economic renovation to occur in Russia’s history since the 
death of Peter the Great.”138  After the revolution of 1905, enlightened political leadership 
by Count Sergei Witte (Prime Minister, previously Finance Minister) and Prime Minister 
Peter Stolypin (1906-1911) instituted new political and economic institutions, including 
conversion of communally-held peasant land into private land rights. They were supported 
by a ‘Great Reform’ society of responsible social and professional groups that assumed a 
new role as the champion of transformation. Yet land reforms in particular faltered due to 
resistance by Tsar Nicholas II, the conservative land-owning nobility, and an ineffective 
bureaucracy: 60% of applications for land rights remained unprocessed as of the onset of  
World War I.139   
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As these cases illustrate, major institutional change occurred when political 
authorities, civil servants and society were aligned on the direction of reforms.  Institutional 
change was incremental or stalled in the absence of alignment.   In the interest of brevity, 
the cases gloss over the acrimonious debate that accompanied each policy decision.  Any 
major institutional change will create rival groups at each level of the land governance 
model.  However, by simplifying a complex process, the value of the typology is to sharpen 
the distinction between political authorities and civil servants, and to highlight how the 
interface of these actors and society will determine the pace of institutional change over 
the course of a decade or more.   
To review each category in the typology, land rights are expected to be most secure 
in municipalities where local political authorities favor land privatization and where the 
bureaucracy supports and implements organizational changes to improve land services to 
the public.  In this case there would be a clear alignment of policy objectives and actions 
in favor of land privatization by political authorities and bureaucrats at the federal, regional 
and local levels.  For reasons given by North et al on the difficulty of instituting the rule of 
law when property rights are contested, I expect these to be the exception.   
At the other extreme, opposition to private land ownership at the municipal level 
by local political authorities and the bureaucracy will stall implementation of federal land 
privatization policies.140 In these locations, institutional stasis would result, with land 
privatization relatively low and limited improvement in public land services.  The 
intermediary category is incremental change.  Land registration was federalized after 
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adoption of the Land Code in 2001. Thus, if local performance deviates significantly from 
federal priorities, it indicates that municipal authorities have greater bargaining power over 
the federal registration office in their jurisdiction than the federal government. This was 
the case in Moscow until President Medvedev replaced Mayor Luzhkov in 2011.   I 
hypothesize that the more common cases are expected to be those of incremental change, 
where political authorities and the bureaucracy lack alignment on land policies.   
The inputs to decision-making will enable us to understand the motivation of 
political authorities in pursuing a particular path of institutional change.  To test the 
hypothesis, we also need an objective method to evaluate whether political authorities and 
bureaucrats are promoting or obstructing the implementation process. Output indicators in 
the land governance model will be used to compare the implementation capacity and 
performance of case study cities.  These indicators will capture factors that influence the 
efficiency, quality and security of the land rights regime at the local level.  Efficiency refers 
to procedures, time and cost to transfer property.  Quality and security refer to the 
transparency of information, reliability of land parcel and property titles, geographic 
coverage, and existence and performance of dispute resolution systems.141  
Output indicators for each level of the land governance model will be compared in 
Chapter 8 for the selected case study cities.  Indicators for political authorities and the legal 
order may include the registration success rate (rejections per total registered), survey 
results on obstacles to land access, and the performance of a complaint or dispute resolution 
system.  Indicators for bureaucratic organization and performance may include efficiency 
(improvement in time, cost and number of procedures to register land), client satisfaction 
                                                 





and corruption ratings.  Public engagement in decision-making would be reflected in public 
information requests per capita, transparency and accessibility of information on land 
rights and land use planning, knowledge of citizens of their rights, and participation in 
public hearings on the city’s General Plan and major development projects. 
Implementation capacity and support by political authorities for more secure land 
rights would be reflected in higher land registration success rates, better enforcement of 
land rights (e.g. fewer cases referred to courts), and fewer obstacles in access to land.   
Greater efficiency and quality of public services by the bureaucracy would be evident in 
improving trends on registration processes, client satisfaction, and corruption.   
Public engagement in land-related decision-making is difficult to assess given the 
power of the state on land issues.  Historically, arbitration of property rights by the state 
through police and courts increased the dependence of constituents on rulers.142  “Property 
rights in land are sensitive everywhere due to the significant value of the asset for 
households and firms in relation to management of the asset by a monopoly state 
institution.”  The implication is that there is a power imbalance between property owner 
and the state that affects the security and transaction costs of administering property 
rights.143  For this reason, according to Transparency International, land administration is 
the third-highest sector subject to corruption after the police and the courts.  
In Russia specifically, reliable information on civic activity is limited given the 
“normally placid surface of Russian political life”144 and bias in reporting on public 
                                                 
142 Levi 1988, p. 19. 
143 Gavin Addlington, Principal Land Economist, World Bank, personal interview October 2, 2014. 
144 Lilia Shvetsova, “Implosion, Atrophy, or Revolution?”, Journal of Democracy 23, 3 (2012): 19-32   
quoted in Tomila Lankina, “Daring to Protest:  When, Why, and How Russia’s Citizens Engage in Street 





protests.145  Nevertheless, a data set analyzed by Tomila Lankina reveals a consistent, 
relatively flat trend in civic protests related to legal, environmental and cultural concerns 
constituting 27% of all protests recorded from 2007 to 2013.146  Many of these relate 
specifically to abuse of property rights and urban planning, such as the destruction of 
cultural monuments for development projects.147   
Following Lankina’s observation of the formation of “constituencies for protest,”148 
the dissertation will examine whether protection of property rights may be a determinant 
of increasing civic engagement in land decisions and greater public outreach by local 
governments.   This will be done more qualitatively, by examining local cases of protest, 
rather than quantitatively.  Quantitative data on information requests is available but 
reporting on public hearings is patchy and unreliable.   
  
10. Identifying Patterns of Institutional Change 
 
There is currently no accepted diagnostic framework to quantify institutional 
change and benchmark municipalities accordingly.  Hence, the dissertation examines 
several possible methods based on ease of property registration, as an explanatory variable, 
and share of private urban land ownership, as the key dependent variable of institutional 
change.  Property registration is a local government responsibility that is subject to a 
national legal and regulatory framework.  The selection of case study cities needs to be 
                                                 
145 Lankina, Protest, 1. 
146 Other categories are political (38%), social (20%) and economic (15%).  Lankina, Protest, 7. 
147 Lankina observes that after the severe crack-down on political protest following President Putin’s re-
election in 2012, there has been a rechanneling of public grievances into issues with more local content, 
including property issues.   These include “…the corrupt municipal officials who enrich themselves by 
generating kickbacks from illegal construction projects on beautiful nature reserves; [and] the private 
companies that dupe citizens into paying for apartment blocks that never get completed, and then get away 
with it because of the complicity or inaction of municipal and regional officials…” Lankina, Protest, 3.  





based on the de facto rather than de jure performance of municipalities.   The Doing 
Business Subnational Reports for Russia in 2009 and 2012149 provide a unique data set to 
examine municipal performance because the methodology examines laws and regulations 
as implemented rather than as promulgated.   
The premise of Doing Business (DB) is that adherence to rules by local officials 
will reduce the regulatory burden and benefit business activity of small and medium 
enterprises.   A particular focus is clarity of rules to establish property rights.150   In 2009, 
ten municipalities agreed to an objective analysis of key regulations under their authority 
that influence the competitiveness of the environment for business activity, including 
property registration.151  In 2012, the analysis covered an additional twenty municipalities 
that were selected by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation 
according to criteria that included population, level of economic activity, and geographic 
and political diversity.152    Hence, performance of municipalities in the two series is not 
directly comparable.  Moreover, because the indicator for property registration measures 
the transfer of both land and buildings of previously privatized property, and the property 
is free of title disputes, it represents unencumbered transactions in the secondary property 
market rather than first-time privatization of land only.   With these limitations, the data 
nevertheless enable an initial comparison of bureaucratic performance on the core function 
of property registration.    
                                                 
149 World Bank and IFC, Doing Business Subnational: Doing Business in Russia, 2009, 2012. 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/russia 
150 Doing Business Subnational:  Doing Business in Russia 2012, p. 7. 
151 This was the first study to compare business conditions at the local level in Russia.  It was requested by 
the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation to the World Bank Group. A letter 
inviting expression of interest was sent to 19 economically significant regions.  The first nine to respond  
were included in the study, in addition to Moscow.  World Bank and IFC, Doing Business Subnational in 
Russia 2009. 






Table 2. Ease of Property Registration in 30 Cities, 2012 
Property Registration Easier Property Registration More Difficult 
Kaluga (1); Vladikdavkaz (2); Vladivostok 
(3); Kazan, Omsk, Rostov-on-Don, 
Volgograd (4); Petrozavodsk, Samara, 
Saransk, Surgut, Tver, Ulyanovsk, 
Voronezh, Vyborg (8) 
Yaroslavl (16); Khabarovsk (17); Irkutsk 
(18); Stavropol (19); Kirov, Yekaterinburg 
(20); Kaliningrad (22); Murmansk (23); 
Novosibirsk (24); Tomsk (25); Moscow 
(26); Perm, St. Petersburg (27); Kemerovo 
(29); Yakutsk (30) 
Source:  World Bank and IFC, Doing Business in Russia Subnational, 2012, p. 32. 
By using their ranking on ease of property registration, we might hypothesize that 
municipalities which strive to facilitate property markets are more inclined to hasten the 
pace of land privatization and thus institutional change.  Empirically, the longer the 
duration of the property registration procedure, the lower the rate of land privatization and 
higher the level of corruption.153  In Table 2, the municipalities are divided into two 
categories:  high (rank 1-15) and low (16-30) 154 according to performance of the land 
administration bureaucracy.  By this measure, the cases of rapid institutional change might 
include Kazan and Rostov-on-Don, each ranked 4.  At the other extreme, lower-ranked 
municipalities such as Moscow (26), St. Petersburg (27) and Perm (27) might represent 
                                                 
153 Based on a survey of land and real estate transactions in 15 regions covering 1188 legal entities and sole 
proprietors in 2004, Kisunko and Coolidge found that a reduction of 30 days would increase the 
privatization rate by 11% per 100,000 residents.  Gregory Kisunko and Jacqueline Coolidge, “Survey of 
Land and Real Estate Transactions in the Russian Federation,” Policy Research Working Paper 4115, 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007), 3. 
154 The ranking on property does not correlate with the overall aggregate ranking of municipalities based on 
four indicators: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, and property 
registration.  This is because no city does equally well in all four categories.  However, with a few 
exceptions, the top performers on property registration also tend to be in the top 15 aggregate rank on 
overall ease of doing business.  The exceptions are Stavropol, Yaroslavl, Irkutsk, and Kirov. In addition, 
several cities share the same ranking because they have equivalent procedures in line with national 
legislation.  Cities that do not follow national law have lower rankings.  See Doing Business in Russia 





stasis.   While a useful initial differentiation, one static indicator is an insufficient basis on 
which to draw meaningful conclusions on institutional development.      
A complementary approach is to study trends over time.  Comparing progress in 
the subset of ten municipalities that were ranked in 2008 and 2011 shows stronger initiative 
on the part of several municipalities to make property registration easier, as noted below.   
On this basis, St. Petersburg demonstrates the fastest relative improvement, while it 
remains the slowest in terms of days to register property, together with Perm and Moscow. 
   
How does ease of business property registration correlate with share of enterprise 
land ownership?  This is a potentially more useful comparative framework that describes 





– correlates with one explanatory variable -- bureaucratic performance on property 
registration.   Data on land ownership are gradually improving following the establishment 
of unified records under Rosreestr (Russian land registration agency).   Nevertheless, data 
by municipality are not available.  As a close approximation, the dissertation uses data on 
land ownership by region in urban areas (zemli gorodskikh naselyonnikh punktov) rather 
than all population points, which include villages.  Since the regional capital city generally 
represents the highest share of the urban population as well as the center of industrial 
activity, the data on urban land ownership will be taken to represent the regional capital.155  
By this definition, urban land in 2011156 in principal municipalities totaled 8,040,800 
hectares, of which citizens owned 697,400 hectares (9.6%), enterprises 291,800 hectares 
(3.35%), and municipal governments 7,051,600 hectares (87%). 157 Land owned by the 
federal and oblast governments is excluded as outside the control of authorities in the 
regional capital city.   
While a focus on enterprise land ownership is important, it is incomplete.   What is 
missing is a second dependent variable:  ownership of urban land by citizens.   Including 
citizen land ownership corrects for two limitations in the DB surveys. First, the secondary 
property market analyzed in DB concerns previously privatized property, both land and 
buildings, so the transaction cost of registering such trades does not represent the ease or 
difficulty of privatizing land in municipal ownership.  Such land may be vacant or 
                                                 
155 Population of the 30 DB municipalities in 2010 was 34,548,565, or 55% of the population of the regions 
(54,809,525).  Excluding Moscow and St. Petersburg, which are technically categorized as regions, the 
capital cities constitute 36% of the regional population.   
156 The Doing Business in Russia Subnational report for 2009 is based on 2008 data; for 2012 it is based on 
2011 data.   
157 Rosreestr,  Gosudarstvennyi doklad o sostoianii i ispol’zovanii zemel’ v rossiiskoi federatsii v 2011 
godu, Ministry of Economic Development and the Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and 





encumbered by a building that is privately or municipally owned.  Business growth 
depends on getting access to new land that is unencumbered.158  Hence, while the ease of 
registering property is an important indicator of government interest in supporting business 
development through faster property registration, it is silent on whether municipalities are 
inclined or disinclined to favor land privatization.   
Second, a high relative share of private land ownership by enterprises does not, ipso 
facto, signify that municipalities are motivated to liberalize the economy and develop land 
as a long-term revenue source.   While enterprises may advocate for more secure property 
rights in order to protect and leverage their investments, the circumstances by which 
enterprises acquired land can either promote or retard further expansion of private land 
ownership.  These circumstances can range from transparent auctions in the best case, or 
in the worst, to insider networks or unofficial payments between enterprises and their 
former state ministry owners.  Once enterprises acquire urban land they may also limit 
competition by colluding with state officials to exclude newcomers from purchase of land 
in lucrative locations.  In either case institutional change will be stymied.   
Hence, a broader indicator of the pace of change must include urban land ownership 
by citizens, held either for private uses (e.g. garden plot) or attached to homes, dachas, 
apartments, shops, or small (family or limited partnership) businesses.   The premise of the 
dissertation is that, as citizens increasingly come to enjoy the fruits of land ownership, they 
                                                 
158 According to Alan Bertaud, the Silicon Valley phenomenon was dependent on easily accessible land 
that enabled entrepreneurs to expand, both spatially for business development, but also competitively, by 
reducing transaction costs of non-core business operations.   That is, management could concentrate on 
chip manufacturing rather than on cumbersome bureaucratic requirements to access land.  Interviews 





will become a louder voice for the sanctity of property rights against the encroachment of 
the state, and become more interested in zoning laws and regulations.  
To determine the correlation between the ranking of 30 municipalities in 
Subnational Doing Business in Russia in 2012 and the share of citizen and enterprise land 
ownership, I ran two simple econometric tests, using data for 2011.    Table 3 presents land 
ownership data compared to municipality rank on ease of property registration.   The 
correlation table follows.  Based on Kisunko and Coolidge (2007), we would expect that 
enterprise ownership would be higher in municipalities that have improved the ease of 
property registration.159 
Table 3: Land Ownership in Russia in 2011 and Ease of Property Registration 
Municipality Citizen Share Legal Entity Share 
Ease of Registration 
Rank 
Irkutsk 4.69 3.62 18 
Kaliningrad 7.57 1.85 22 
Kaluga 11.11 4.53 1 
Kazan 10.89 14.98 4 
Kemerovo 4.72 3.38 29 
Khabarovsk 2.98 0.23 17 
Kirov 6.44 3.22 20 
Moscow 0.27 2.93 26 
Murmansk 0.19 1.75 23 
Novosibirsk 12.77 3.84 24 
Omsk 13.95 3.02 4 
Perm 6.85 3.10 27 
Petrozavodsk 3.25 3.55 8 
Rostov-on-
Don 11.74 6.24 4 
                                                 






Petersburg 4.42 13.33 27 
Samara 7.49 6.91 8 
Saransk 12.96 2.43 8 
Stavropol 17.79 5.73 19 
Surgut 1.80 0.44 8 
Tomsk 4.55 1.85 25 
Tver 9.29 2.99 8 
Ulyanovsk 8.21 0.85 8 
Vladikavkaz 5.29 0.79 2 
Vladivostok 5.65 2.70 3 
Volgograd 6.29 0.43 4 
Voronezh 15.12 2.24 8 
Vyborg 8.60 5.81 8 
Yakutsk 1.82 1.14 30 
Yaroslavl 8.74 5.63 16 





  Citizen Share  Legal Entity Share Rank 
Citizen Share 1     
        
Legal Share 0.2556 1   
  .(0.1728)     
Rank -0.3873 -0.0211 1 
  .( 0.0345) .( 0.9120)   
 
 
The results are surprising: against expectations, improvements in the ease of 
property registration have benefited citizens more than enterprises.  As evidenced by the 
correlation table and the scatter diagrams (in Annex 1), the correlation between ease of 
property rank and enterprise land ownership is negative as expected (lower the rank, higher 





of 0.91).  In contrast, there is a moderate correlation between citizen ownership and ease 
of property registration that is statistically significant (p-value less than 0.05).  There is a 
positive relationship of medium strength between enterprise share and citizen share, but 
the finding is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.17). 
To understand why enterprise land privatization is anomalously unrelated to the 
ease of property registration, I analyzed the World Bank – EBRD Business Environment 
Enterprise Survey (BEEPS)160 conducted in 2011 to determine the characteristics of 
businesses that reported obstacles in access to land.   Following Kisunko and Coolidge 
(2007), we would expect firms that are renting land to have more difficulties than those 
that own land.  To augment their analysis, bivariate and multivariate analyses were 
conducted to determine if there is a correlation between enterprises that report obstacles in 
access to land (privatize or lease) and the following enterprise characteristics: 
a. Size of firm  
b. Year operations initiated 
c. How the firm was established 
d. Whether a single individual owned more than 50% of the firm 
e. Whether the firm owns or leases land 
f. Bribe Tax: Expectation of informal payments to get things done  
We would expect firms with ties to the state to have fewer obstacles in access to land. The 
nationally and regionally representative sample of firms is as follows: 
How was the firm established? Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
Privatization of a state-owned firm 282 6.68 6.68 
Originally private, from time of start 3,774 89.43 96.11 
Private subsidiary of a formerly state- 86 2.04 98.15 
Joint venture with foreign partner(s) 25 0.59 98.74 
State-owned firm 19 0.45 99.19 
Other 34 0.81 100 
Total 4,220 100  
                                                 







This sample is larger and more diversified in terms of enterprise size than previous 
enterprise surveys analyzed in the literature.161   To simplify the analysis, three indicator 
variables were created to combine firms with or without state ties.  These are presented 
below as private, some government, and SOE (state-owned enterprise).  The table below 
reports the significant (at 0.1 level) correlation coefficients between firms reporting 
obstacles to land and firm characteristics.  
 
Characteristics of Firms Reporting Obstacles in Access to Land 
  
Firm Indicators Obstacle land 
  
firm_size 0.0702 










The results validate two propositions: i) it is easier for firms with state ties to access 
land;  and ii) private firms and those that lease land face greater difficulties.   Firms 
                                                 
161 Previous surveys tended to focus on privatized state-owned enterprises of different sizes. Pyle (2011) 
surveyed 359 large former state-owned enterprises in 2009; Frye (2004) surveyed 500 large enterprises in 
eight capital cities in 2000, of which two-thirds were former state-owned enterprises; he also reviewed 
surveys of 190 small business managers in 3 cities in 1998; Kisunko and Coolidge (2007) surveyed 1188 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 15 regions that had undertaken land and real estate transactions in 
2004.  An important feature of the survey was to understand the difficulties in privatizing land under buildings 






reporting obstacles also admitted to having paid bribes for public services.  Finally, firm 
size is statistically significant, with larger firms encountering more difficulty than smaller 
firms.  The reason is unclear and requires further analysis.  There is no relationship between 
obstacles to land and the year the firm was established, majority ownership by one 
individual, or land ownership by the firm. 
 The findings from the bivariate analysis were further tested using a logistic 
regression (attached in Annex 2).  The multivariate analysis confirms the bivariate results.  
Firm size, land leasing, and bribes are all significant and correlate positively with firms 
reporting obstacles to land. In addition, firms with state connections tend to have fewer 
obstacles to obtaining land (and private firms more). 
 Based on the statistical analysis, it is evident that enterprise land privatization is 
highly politicized.  Municipalities do not treat all firms equally.  Former state-owned firms 
are favored over larger private firms, and those that lease land are more likely to pay bribes.  
These findings raise questions about the motivations of political authorities and bureaucrats 
in denying property rights to some categories of firms, thus constraining their opportunity 
to expand and grow. 
 Citizen land ownership represents a less politicized indicator that also captures the 
attitudes of society on institutional change, distinct from enterprises with ties to the state. 
Surveys on citizen perceptions comparable to those for enterprises are not available.  
However, the correlation between ease of property registration and citizen land registration 
suggests that citizens have benefited more than enterprises from the reduction of 
administrative barriers to property registration.  While more current information is not 





to new post-Soviet social and economic conditions were eager to register property.  These 
Russians generally had positive expectations about personal income, political stability and 
security of their legal rights; nevertheless, they remained anxious that arbitrary actions of 
federal and local authorities may undermine their rights.   Those Russians who chose not 
to register property (apartments, dachas, land) generally had negative expectations 
overall.162  While there appear to be fewer barriers to property registration by citizens, the 
security of property rights may remain in question. 
  The premise of the dissertation is that by adopting the constitutional right to 
private land ownership, federal political authorities aimed to establish land rights equally, 
without bias, for both legal and physical persons.  Hence, municipalities that have higher 
than average private ownership in both categories (enterprises and citizens) are defined  as 
representing rapid institutional change; those with lower than the national average in either 
category are defined as  cases of incremental change; those that fall below the national 
average in both categories are defined as cases of  stasis.    
Based on the foregoing, the dissertation proposes four categories according to the 
share of private urban land ownership by enterprises and citizens.  Each of the 30 
municipalities in Doing Business in Russia Subnational 2012 is plotted on a 4-square 
diagram according to private ownership share by enterprises and citizens.   The vertical 
axis represents ownership share by enterprises that is above or below the national average; 
the horizontal axis represents the same for citizens.   
Using the rate of private ownership as a proxy for the path and pace of change, 
Diagram 1 demonstrates the dissertation’s hypothesis that rapid institutional change is 
                                                 





relatively rare.  The largest quantity of municipalities (14) falls into the quadrant of stasis.   
In the northeast quadrant with above-average private ownership, there are five 
municipalities (and two borderline), while the remaining nine fall into quadrants 
representing incremental change or stasis.   The selection of municipalities was not random 
and cannot be taken as representative of the country.163  Nevertheless, as a first 
approximation, it suggests that Russia remains deeply divided on private urban land 

















                                                 






Diagram 1: Municipalities by Ownership Shares of Legal Entities and Firms 
 
 
Differentiating municipalities by this method demonstrates the importance of local 
factors in institutional development and the need to complement quantitative analysis with 
qualitative case studies.   The selection criteria for case study cities should include:  i) high 
variation in pace of change and performance on property registration; and ii) similarity in 
industrial structures and demographics, to control for factors that may influence 
privatization.  A growing or stable population and rising per capita income are particularly 
critical for land values and privatization incentives.   
On the basis of the selection criteria, the dissertation will examine Moscow 
(institutional stasis), St. Petersburg (incremental change) and Kazan (rapid change).   
Moscow has one of the lowest rankings of municipalities in institutional stasis.  Among 





was the second most aggressive reformer of property registration procedures (after St. 
Petersburg) from 2009 to 2012.    St. Petersburg commands the highest position among 
incremental institutional reformers for enterprise private ownership.   All three cities – 
Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan – contained large industrial sectors when the Soviet 
Union collapsed, and each has positive growth in population and per capita income in the 
period under investigation. 
There are several benefits of this research design and methodology for the study of 
the path and pace of institutional change.  First, inductive use of quantitative data enabled 
the identification of significant patterns for further examination.   These include the puzzle 
of high regional variation in municipal land ownership nationally and shares of enterprise 
and citizen land ownership locally.  Second, a deductive model provides a micro-
foundation for analysis of complex inter-related institutions.  The case studies employ 
quantitative indicators to explain empirical trends and qualitative field research to gain 
understanding of causal factors that may hinder or advance privatization. 164       Finally, 
the three case studies were selected according to Mill’s method of difference in order to 
compare divergence in the revenue-maximizing incentives of municipalities and the 
alignment of incentives of political authorities and actions of the bureaucracy.  Taken 
together, the research methodology aims for analytic generalization, i.e., a “level two 
inference,” where theory is tested in cases and against rival theories.165 
                                                 
164 This distinction between explanation and understanding is in Robert E. Stake, The Art of Case Study 
Research, (Sage Publications, 1995), p. 37. 
165 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Applied Social Research Methods Series, 







Correlation between Citizen Land Ownership and Municipal Rank on Ease of 
Property Registration (2011) 
 
 
Data sources for Annex 1 are i) for rank on ease of property registration: World Bank-IFC, Doing Business 
in Russia: Subnational Series, 2012; ii) for urban land ownership by legal entities and citizens: Rosreestr, 
Gosudarstvennyi doklad o sostoianii i ispol’zovanii zemel’ v rossiiskoi federatsii v 2011 godu. Ministry of 







Correlation between Land Ownership by Legal Entities and Municipal Rank 
































Russia: Characteristics of Firms Reporting 
Obstacles in Access to Land in 2011 
 
The logistic regressions report correlation coefficients using only the variables that are 
significant in the bivariate analysis. Those with a negative sign (SOE, Some Government, 
State Ties) indicate that access to land is not an obstacle for these firms.  Firm size, land 
rent, and payment of bribes are all correlated with obstacles to land access.  Data source: 
EBRD-World Bank, Business Environment and Enterprise Performance (BEEPs) Survey, 




 obstacle obstacle obstacle obstacle 
firm_size 0.567 0.528 0.571 0.576 
 (3.78)*** (3.55)*** (3.81)*** (3.84)*** 
land_rent_dummy 0.342 0.372 0.335 0.335 
 (3.46)*** (3.80)*** (3.39)*** (3.40)*** 
bribes_dummy 0.846 0.843 0.844 0.845 
 (10.29)*** (10.25)*** (10.26)*** (10.27)*** 
some_government -0.325    
 (2.23)**    
soe  -1.923   
  (1.83)*   
private   0.342  
   (2.48)**  
State ties    -0.384 
    (2.67)*** 
Constant -1.370 -1.413 -1.700 -1.358 
 (13.13)*** (13.81)*** (11.10)*** (13.00)*** 
N 2,896 2,896 2,896 2,896 







Urban Land in Russian History 
 
 “Every man is more concerned with what belongs to him, than with what is another’s, and does not take care of that 
which he fears someone will take away from him.”   
Catherine II, Empress of Russia, Article 296 of the Nakaz (Instruction), 1767 
 
“Power follows property.”  
John Adams, second president of the United States, 17761 
 
 
In histories of land ownership in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, the peasant is 
protagonist.   When, on rare occasion, scholarly attention turns to urban land ownership, the page 
goes rather blank, much as it does in the literary works and archives of Russian scribes.  Using the 
theoretical lens of the New Institutional Economics, this chapter looks at urban land ownership in 
the thousand-year span of the world’s largest country, from the first record of private property to 
the fall of the Soviet Union, within the limits of retrievable evidence.  Given the expanse of time 
and territory, it is necessarily a cursory account. 
In five centuries of Tsarist and Soviet rule, urban communities never acquired self-
governing authority.  Tsarist fiscal and political rules forced urban merchants to finance national 
needs ahead of local ones; political representation was not equated with taxation obligations.  For 
most of the Imperial era, there was no incentive for commercial classes to own land, pay property 
taxes, or participate in civic affairs since nobles, who were tax-exempt, carried higher social and 
political status.  Hence, private landed property failed to generate political power, and “taxation 
without representation” never became a rallying cry by citizens in defense of individual rights.  
During the Soviet period, when the state owned all land, central planners favored industry over 
consumers, leading to misallocation of urban land and underinvestment in housing.  As a 
                                                 




consequence, cities that were at the center of political and economic development in Western 
Europe became like minor actors in an unpopular play in Russia. 
The first section provides a survey of secondary sources on urban land in Tsarist and Soviet 
history.  The second compares the impact of urban land rights on municipal autonomy in Russia 
and Western Europe.  The third, fourth and fifth sections deepen the analysis by applying the land 
governance model to several periods in the Tsarist and Soviet eras.   The sixth section concludes. 
 
1. Historiography on Urban Issues  
The historiography on urban issues in the Tsarist and Soviet periods is sparse.  It is not 
surprising that the village takes precedence over the town both in the academic literature and 
Russian fiction; Russian society remained largely rural until the Stalin period.   Hence, Russian 
urban history “looks paltry indeed, as poor in theoretical innovation as in titles in print” when 
compared to American or European studies; it is sufficiently understudied to represent a “’blank 
spot’” in our understanding of Imperial and Soviet Russia. 2  Moreover, the bulk of scholarship by 
publication date occurred before the collapse of the Soviet empire.3  As such, McReynolds argues, 
either the shadow of the 1917 revolution skewed scholarship to urban class consciousness, or else 
the focus was on urbanization themes, bypassing urbanism’s broader perspective on the interaction 
of human behavior and the political, economic and cultural environment.4   
Within the urban development literature, urban land rights do not feature in Western or 
Russian scholarship prior to 1995.5  Writing in 1998, Richard Pipes observed that Russian scholars 
                                                 
2 Louise McReynolds, “Urbanism as a Way of Russian Life,” Journal of Urban History 20:2 (1994): 
doi:10.1177/009614429402000204, 241. 
3 An important and masterful exception is Timothy J. Colton, Moscow:  Governing the Socialist Metropolis, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
4 McReynolds, “Urbanism as a Way of Russian Life,” 240-41, 250.  




had not researched the country’s history of private property to that point.6  This may partly be due 
to the paucity of data.  Before 1917, urban land ownership was largely unregistered.    After 1917, 
urban land privileges allocated by local land committees were not systematically reported in the 
otherwise copious statistical documentation of the Soviet Union.  General Plans guiding urban 
development were classified as secret.   
Descriptive profiles of Tsarist and Soviet cities by Western scholars provide useful context 
on municipal administration, urban planning and housing conditions.7  However, these do not 
analyze the origins or implications of property rights for political and economic development.   
Colton compared housing data between Russia and Western Europe, observing that only 4.1 
percent of Muscovites lived in family-owned houses or apartments in 1912, far below levels in 
Western European or New World cities.8  He noted that the absence of private property in turn-of-
the-century Moscow restrained civil society and contributed to the powerlessness of urbanites.  
However, he did not intend his “city biography” to examine why private ownership was minimal 
and Muscovites were treated as subjects of the tsar rather than as citizens of Russia.9 
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Why was private urban property ownership minimal in Russia, and why were Muscovites 
treated as subjects and not citizens?  To answer these questions it is instructive to compare the 
political and legal implications of city development in the history of Russia and Western Europe.   
2. Comparing Urban Land Rights in Medieval Western Europe and Russia 
The reason why Russian cities were politically weak is not found in standard urbanization 
themes, such as demography or modernization.  Whether Russian cities matched those in the West 
in population by 1800, as argued by one Western scholar, 10 or whether the Russian city at the time 
was remarkable for its insignificant size, as lamented by a Russian historian,11 would not have 
impacted the position of cities in Imperial Russia.  In any event, as revealed by the first official 
census in 1897, the Russian and Western urbanization level was roughly equal.12  St. Petersburg 
ranked with Paris; Moscow with Naples.13  Nor did a failure to modernize in the 19th century 
distinguish Russian from Western European cities.  Literacy rates had reached similar levels in 
Russian and Italian cities by the turn of the twentieth century,14 and transport networks connected 
cities in Russia that supported a boom in internal and external trade.15  Urban congestion and 
squalor were blights both in Western and Russian cities.  Scholars agree that local governments in 
Russia failed to modernize apace with waves of rural migrants;16  their principal disagreement is 
on the relative weight of industrialization and migration in stimulating rapid urban growth.17 
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The main distinction between Russian and Western European cities harkens to the 
medieval period, when urban property ownership became a foundation of municipal political 
autonomy in Western Europe but not in Russia.  In Economy and Society, Max Weber18 describes 
four distinct features in the evolution of the medieval European town that led to the creation of 
city-communes.    
The first feature in Western European cities relates to urban land rights.  While all world 
cities of the period differentiated laws on house lots and farm land, the real estate law in medieval 
Western Europe enabled owners to buy, sell, and inherit land without restrictions.  This did not 
occur with regularity in Russia or Asia, where encumbrances that tied use rights to the manor or 
village, such as prevailed on farm land, were more common.   
Second, serfs or laborers who came to cities in medieval Western Europe could rise from 
bondage to freedom through payment of a tribute to the lord or labor wages.  This path toward 
equal social and legal status was unique to medieval Western Europe.  While it was also possible 
in Russia until the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 for migrants to raise their economic status 
through urban migration, legally the peasant remained bound to the village and the mir 
(community) could force him or her to return.    
Third, while an honorary stratum of society led municipal affairs in all cities, creating 
social stratification, only in medieval Western Europe did the urban citizenry unite in solidarity 
against non-urban citizens, whether noble or not.   Burghers who had acquired property held a 
common interest in preventing demands by the nobility for services such as billeting of soldiers 
and horses, which commonly occurred in Russia even in the 19th century.   
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As a consequence of these developments, the fourth critical feature of medieval Western 
European cities arose:   
The urban citizenry therefore usurped [i.e. seized] the right to dissolve the bonds of 
seigneurial domination; this was the great – in fact, the revolutionary – innovation 
which differentiated the medieval Occidental cities from all others.  In the central and 
northern European cities appeared the well-known principle that Stadtluft macht frei 
[“Town air makes free”], which meant that after a varying but always relatively short 
time the master of a slave or serf lost the right to reclaim him….In cities the status 
differences disappeared – at least insofar as they signified a differentiation between 
“free” and “unfree” men.19  
 
The attainment of individual freedom based on urban property rights led to several legal 
and political innovations. The city community fused into an association that owned, controlled, 
and taxed property.  Citizens had equality before the law.  These associations gradually became 
legally incorporated cities that attained, after considerable struggle, autonomous political and 
financial administration.  In England, this occurred under Edward I (1272-1307) while in France, 
Germany and Italy the process was completed by the close of the Middle Ages.20  The city unions 
spread universally as lords competed to provide charters for new cities that would attract wealthy 
citizens.  As active members of a sworn burgher community, citizens received the right to define 
objective laws to which they themselves would be subject.  According to Weber, this right did not 
exist in any city outside Western Europe, with a limited exception in Israel.21  As expressed by 
Weber: 
The main legal achievement of the urban revolutions was the creation of a special trial 
procedure which excluded irrational means of evidence and in particular the test by 
duel….The legal gains further comprised the prohibition against hailing burghers 
before non-urban courts, and the codification of a special rational law for urban 
citizens….Formally, the new urban law signified the extinction of the old personality 
principle of the law.  Substantively, it meant the destruction of the feudal associations 
and of patrimonialism [in those areas where “bourgeois” law applied.]22 
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An important factor facilitated the development of city-communes in medieval Europe:  
the absence of a strong central political authority backed by military force. 23 A lord or patrician 
family represented the nucleus of every city; lords owned manor estates and urban property that 
accumulated wealth through profitable urban economic activities.  In medieval Western Europe, 
the property of the lord provided the political foundation of legitimacy for the city, while the 
military foundation rested on armies equipped by the lord.   
In contrast, royal bureaucracies developed in the Near East and Asia that eventually 
extended to a bureaucratized military structure with a dependent army.  Subjects, however rich, 
could not confront the lord militarily.  (In Russia, as we will see later, military and bureaucratic 
administration evolved contemporaneously.)  A king or emperor in Western Europe who sought 
to extract monetary tribute faced independently-armed subjects.   
The burghers of Western Europe relied on the economic self-interest of the lords to defend 
the city-commune and property of burghers from expropriation by outsiders.  In return, “the 
financial strength of his urban subjects forced the lord to turn to them in case of need and to 
negotiate with them….all city unions of the Occident, beginning with those of early Antiquity, 
were coalitions of the armed strata of the cities.  This was the distinctive difference.”24  
The physical formation of medieval cities in Russia transpired in the same manner as in 
Western Europe.  The Riurik dynasty (Scandanavians) introduced private landed estates in the 
tenth century that became the nucleus of early cities. 25  Artisans and merchants gathered in the 
manorial seat that served as the center of administration for a prince’s estates.  Cities were the 
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collection point for taxes.   Frequently cities were established as fortified garrisons along rivers to 
protect land acquired by princes through settlement or confiscation of peasant communes. 26   
However, Russian cities lacked the essential features of city-communes:  “town air in 
Russia never made free.”27 While communal associations were formed by the Kievan period (9th 
to 13th centuries), bound by common social and economic interests, cities remained subordinate to 
the prince.  A notable exception was Novgorod.  After a popular revolt against the prince, the 
assembly of Novgorod decreed in 1136 that only residents of the city could own and use its land.28  
But even Novgorod ultimately succumbed to central authority under Ivan III (the Great) and Ivan 
IV (the Terrible).29  While European cities were operating under self-governing charters in the 
Middle Ages, even Moscow, the largest urban formation in Russia, had no government.  It fell 
under direct control of the sovereign, who appointed vice-regents (namestniki) to fulfill functions 
of interest to the crown, most particularly, to maximize revenues to the state.30  Hence, while some 
Russian cities boasted the physical attributes common to other cities around the world, with 
markets and a fortress, they never acquired the self-governing identity of those founded on urban 
private property in Western Europe. 
3. Tsarist Land Governance prior to the Great Reforms 
a. Political authority and the legal order 
The Russian Empire epitomizes the potency of elite land privileges as a basis for regime 
formation.   At five critical junctures -- corresponding to the reigns of Ivan IV (the Terrible), Peter 
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II, Catherine II, Alexander II, and the 1917 Revolution – political authorities revised land rights to 
strengthen their hold on power.   
Although princes established towns as garrisons to protect their property,31 the main source 
of political and economic power and social prestige throughout Russian history was the rural 
estate.  Ivan the Terrible (1530-1584) consolidated the autocratic regime of Muscovy by rewarding 
nobles with inheritable land privileges in return for hereditary duties to the court.  Thousands of 
estates were allocated to the royal court and senior civil servants.  At the same time, a new law 
code in 1550 established regional councils, zemskii, that managed civil justice and raised taxes.  
Significantly, the councils reported to Moscow rather than to the boyars (local barons).  To quell 
resistance to centralization of authority, many of the boyars were murdered during a reign of terror, 
the oprichina.  Over time, these steps broke the feudal power of the boyars.32  The tsarist land 
monopoly became the foundation of national unity and the central administration.   
Land resources became synonymous with autocratic control in an expanding empire.  If 
state agents failed in their duties or abused their tax privileges, the reaction of the sovereign was 
harsh.  The monarch subjugated cities and nobles, consistent with the revenue-maximizing aims 
of the predatory ruler, in order to maintain the land monopoly.33   
Subjugation of cities became imperative in the 17th century once they acquired the role of 
“revenue provider for the state.”34 The urban tax was communal and paid by merchants and 
tradesmen on their business turnover.  When businesses failed, as often happened due to state 
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monopolies and preferences to foreigners, the remaining merchants had to pay a higher share.  
Rising tax burdens fell on a diminishing merchant class.  The incentive was immense for city 
residents to flee the urban tax burden. 35  While lords in Western Europe attracted burghers to new 
towns with self-governing charters, wealthy nobles in Russia connived with merchants and artisans 
to set up trade and commercial activities just outside the city limits, to avoid taxation.  For example, 
in 1648 such a settlement of 600 people sprang up outside Nizhny Novgorod.   Both to exert 
autocratic authority and expand the tax base, Tsar Michael seized all property in such settlements, 
merged villages into neighboring cities, and bound all urban taxpayers to the town, on penalty of 
death.  “No compensation was given to the owners because it was an offense to reside on the 
sovereign’s land or to buy municipal land.”36  Henceforth, in return for the right to live in cities 
and conduct commerce, urban residents were tethered to their hometown and taxed.37    
Subjugation of the nobles became equally imperative as they quietly usurped royal land 
privileges as private rights.  The loyalty system of Ivan IV was slowly breaking down.  Nobles 
leased and transferred land and failed to provide their hereditary military or civil service 
obligations.   After numerous military victories, including the defeat of Sweden at Poltava in 1709, 
Peter II (the Great, 1682-1725) was at the crest of his bargaining power with the nobles.  To reassert 
autocratic authority, he retracted the privilege of inheritance and created a new bureaucratic 
structure in 1722 that matched rank to revocable land privileges.38  Only the highest-ranking nobles 
received estates with serfs.  Serfs could not leave the estate. Families could not possess or pass on 
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land to their heirs.39   By putting all property rights in state control, Peter surmounted the 
continuous risk of noble insurgency. 
Peter’s land-redistribution scheme contradicted his professed aim to Westernize by 
replacing arbitrary rule (proizvol’) with a rule of law (zakonnost’).40   Land privileges could be 
revoked for failure to fulfill official obligations.  The loss of property rights spelled the end of 
personal rights.41  It also destroyed the incentive to increase the productivity of land.42  Instead, 
property ownership was bound to noble privilege and service.  Land became a source of social 
prestige until the mid-1800s.43  Since Peter’s scheme by-passed merchants and city residents, who 
were less than ten percent of the population,44  he further reinforced the political significance of 
the rural landed estate. 
In an abrupt reversal of Petrine policies, Catherine II (the Great, 1762-96) established de 
jure individual property rights for the first time in Russian history.  The theory of predatory rule 
explains why.  First, Catherine was deeply shaken by the threat to her rule from disputed 
circumstances surrounding her accession and a related, violent peasant uprising (the Pugachev 
Rebellion) in 1773-75.  Her tenure in office was at risk, and she needed allies.  The aristocracy 
also saw a threat in the rebellion, but their deeper fear came from the Petrine policy of revocable 
land privileges.45  Second, Catherine was ideologically disposed to private land ownership.  In her 
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1767 Instructions (Nakaz) to the Legislative Commission of 1767-68, she had famously defended 
“ownership” (sobstvennost’) as essential to agricultural productivity and overall prosperity. 46  Her 
ideological predisposition brought her common cause with nervous nobles.  In short, they struck a 
mutually beneficial bargain to expand property rights for ruling elites. 
The 1785 “Charter of the Rights, Freedoms and Prerogatives of the Noble Russian 
Dvoriantsvo” was “a revolutionary measure in the fullest and most constructive sense of the word 
that set the course of Russian development” until the Great Reforms in the 19th century.47  It 
bestowed on nobles civil liberties and property rights similar to those granted by the English 
monarchy to barons 600 years earlier.48  Land could be bought and sold to nobility under a new 
form of property right – perpetual and inheritable ownership (vechnoe i potomsvtvennoe vladenie) 
– that would endure into the twenty-first century. 49   
Catherine also introduced private rights to urban real estate for both nobles and urban 
residents who held the status of merchant (kuptsy) or tradesman and artisans (meshchane).  These 
classes gained the right to own both movable and immovable property. 50  In essence, the legal 
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b. Bureaucratic organization and performance 
The nature of Russia’s territorial expansion into non-Russian territories – what Starr calls 
the “imperial dimension” 51  – also reinforced bureaucratic standardization and role of the nobility.    
Absent a strong non-governmental agent such as British trading companies and competent civil 
administration, Russia relied on the expertise of its large army to administer control over vast 
territories.  The cost of maintaining the army dictated the need for a bureaucracy to collect taxes.  
The breadth of territory reinforced a desire for centralized and standardized administrative 
procedures.  At the same time, the bureaucracy reached the local level, where taxes were 
collected.52   
But the empire was expanding faster than it could be administered.  The bureaucracy was 
fundamentally undermanned.  In 1763, the difference between the number of civil servants 
employed by Russia (16,500) and Prussia (14,000) was not great, but Prussia had 1% of the 
territory of Russia.53  Moreover, the civil service carried less prestige than military service, and its 
lower uneducated ranks were pilloried in Russian literature.54   In short, the crown was incapable 
of managing administrative functions without the service obligations of the nobility, which Peter 
III ended in 1762.  Those who left service were the wealthiest:  only 16 percent of the nobility 
could afford to live on the fruits of serf labor. Those who stayed in state service required a salary.55  
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Trained manpower and financial resources were insufficient to meet the responsibilities of empire 
with a centrally-appointed bureaucracy.56   
The solution provided by Catherine the Great coincided with her need for the support of 
the nobility just after the Pugachev Rebellion.  In the 1775 Statute of Provincial Administration, 
Catherine reorganized the empire’s administrative structure by creating provincial capitals with 
governors and law courts and tax collectors. 57  This measure favored the local nobility by design, 
and it stood the test of time.58  As the theory of predatory rule would predict, the new fiscal 
structure aligned with Catherine’s reliance on the slender stratum of educated local nobles, whose 
bargaining power continued to rise in the political order. 
 
c. Public Participation in Decision-Making 
The high transaction costs of running the empire and growing fiscal needs also put higher 
priority on revitalizing the urban economy and enlisting the support of the residents.  However, 
the secondary role of urban land in the Russian Empire had a political counterpart:  urban residents 
lacked a voice on local matters.  All of the urban initiatives from Ivan the Terrible to Catherine the 
Great were top-down; none engendered the urban identity found in Western European city 
communes.59   
For example, Ivan the Terrible created the first local administration in Moscow, the Zemskii 
prikaz (Local Office), which collected property taxes, conducted trials, and managed public works, 
but mainly provided police surveillance.  Community elders were consulted, but not regularly.60  
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Peter the Great instituted a city-wide council in Moscow that received the unlucky duty of raising 
taxes from communities around Russia from 1699-1710.  This unpopular idea eventually gave way 
to local administration by provincial sub-divisions.  However, the tsar appointed the Governors to 
run the provincial gubernii and county-sized jurisdictions, uyezdy,61 which remained under central 
supervision.    
In an ambitious effort to stimulate the urban economy, Catherine the Great promulgated 
the Charter of Rights and Privileges Granted the Cities in 1785 to mimic the corporate features of 
a Western European city-commune.  All urban residents became subject to common administrative 
and judicial procedures and received the right to own private urban property.  Merchants, who 
were defined by their capital, acquired commercial privileges.   In statutes, propertied males 
received the right to elect the mayor and representatives to exercise authority in managing city 
affairs.  In practice, the municipality fell under the tsarist regime’s provincial governor and only 
handled residual tasks such as sanitation, roads, and billeting of the tsarist army.62    
Urban reforms that were intended to increase municipal independence paradoxically led to 
a loss of bargaining power.  Urban citizens were subjected to onerous obligations by central 
authorities; rights turned into burdens. 63  As in the previous century, the merchant class had a 
strong incentive to evade taxes and avoid participation in city government.   
Property taxes, the primary municipal revenue, epitomized the conflict between local 
administration and the tsarist regime.64  Legally-defined townspeople bore a collective service and 
fiscal responsibility to the state budget; nobles were tax-exempt, and as non-urban residents, 
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peasants paid rural land taxes. 65  Tsarist revenue demands on a narrow slice of urban residents 
continued to increase.  For example, municipal taxes rose by 50 percent from 1840 to 1853.  
Inspectors recognized the taxes were excessive but were obliged to meet expenses for tsarist 
administration and billeting of soldiers.  The merchant estate avoided involvement in municipal 
activities because they judged the obligations of service and tax payments as onerous.  The costs 
exceeded the benefits.66 
Ultimately, the reforms created a culture of corruption in cities.  The wealthier merchants 
could buy their release from municipal duty.  Lesser businessmen accepted official responsibility 
as a means of personal enrichment.  They could use public office to extract bribes in exchange for 
reducing taxes on residents or giving incumbent businesses commercial advantages over new 
market entrants.  Powerful families in Moscow used networks to block tsarist encroachments while 
protecting their market dominance.  Thus the perception of corrupt municipal officials became the 
norm, as captured in Gogol’s Revizor. 67  Until the Great Reforms, the interference of tsarist 
officials and the retreat of capable local leaders from city affairs staunched urban self-rule.  The 
ideals of Catherine’s Charter were never fulfilled. 
That an urban identity failed to develop should not be surprising due to fundamental 
conflicts of interest in the urban initiatives of Peter II and Catherine II.   First, the tsars wanted to 
stimulate self-government, yet they burdened urban taxpayers with collective responsibilities to 
the central state.  Cities had to fill national needs before local needs; fiscal rules on retention of 
revenues were notoriously unclear.  Second, the tsars interfered excessively in the details of urban 
life, e.g., dictating the layout of streets and architectural styles, dividing residents into social 
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categories that existed only in St. Petersburg, and creating and abolishing towns when it appeared 
efficient.  Catherine went so far as to determine the length of the meal breaks of apprentices.68  
Finally, the legal status of cities – as separate from or subject to central authority – remained in 
doubt.  “Lacking both the means and the incentives to deal with urban needs, the municipalities 
operated primarily as inferior branches of state administration.”69   
Ironically, the introduction of private property favored tax-free nobles and their peasants 
over the urban soslovie (social estate).  Manufacturing arose mainly around noble rural manors.70  
On the eve of the Great Reforms, there was little industrialization or urbanization, and the country 
remained rural and agrarian.  Moscow (370,000 and St. Petersburg (almost 500,000) were world-
class cities in population in 1856, but only 6% of Russians lived in cities.  None were notable for 
commercial vitality; the state founded most cities for defense or administrative purposes.  “They 
had neither corporate or patrician traditions nor any libertarian ones: town air in Russia never 
‘made free.’71  
4. Tsarist Land Governance from the Great Reforms to the 1917 Revolution 
a. Political authority and the legal order 
Most scholars view the “era of Great Reforms” in the 1860s as the period of the most 
serious social and economic renewal between Peter the Great and the uprisings of 1905.  Serfs won 
freedom, local self-government began in parts of the empire, press censorship lightened, and courts 
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adjudicated on the basis of new laws that included protection of private property.  Perhaps most 
significantly, space opened for obshchestvo, educated society, to play a role in public affairs.72  
From the perspective of the predatory rule theory, the Great Reforms originated in a 
tectonic shift in constraints facing the autocracy, starting with economic and social backwardness.  
Russia’s loss in the Crimean War in 1854-56 exposed the gulf between industrializing Europe and 
a Russian economy built on a society of 50 million serfs.  No longer was Russia an unassailable 
Great Power.  Russia needed to modernize the economy.  But an autocratic police state prevented 
the emergence of political mechanisms to mediate social change that would inevitably accompany 
industrialization.   Russia also needed to introduce new principles of public administration to 
replace a system largely based on serfdom.   Yet in emancipating the serfs, the crown would also 
lose the service of nobles who had been responsible for tax collection, military mobilization, and 
judicial administration in rural areas.73  
Though the topic of this study is not rural land, serfdom represented the primary constraint 
to Russia’s autocrats in reforming land rights as the basis for modernization. As Nicholas I (1825-
55) observed, serfdom was an “’evil, palpable and obvious to all,’”74 but reforms could unleash 
civil disorders, similar to the Pugachev rebellion.  The manner in which Catherine introduced 
private landed property complicated the process.  It “was a mixed blessing because it was 
purchased at the expense of the serfs….besides freedom and rights for the few, [private property] 
intensified serfdom for the many.”75 Serf-owning nobles fervently believed, based on the Charter 
of the Nobles, that land and serfs were their private property.   Equally fervently, serfs rejected the 
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notion that anyone but the tsar could own the land.  They believed that those who worked the land 
had communal use rights.  Under Nicholas I, it was unthinkable to separate the peasant from the 
land, but “the massive expropriation (as it would be in terms of state law) of the nobility’s lands 
was equally unthinkable.”76   
To modernize the country and preserve the autocracy, the tsars needed the support of 
competing factions in educated society (obshchestvo) and the bureaucracy.  In the 1840s, a 
sociological rift was opening between these groups as access to education raised the qualifications 
of middle bureaucratic ranks and reduced the influence of the aristocratic elite.77  At the same time, 
the repressive reign of Nicholas I (1825-55) created a political gulf between those in the aristocracy 
who feared the costs of change and those in the bureaucracy who feared the consequences of 
continuity.  A Westernizing social and intellectual movement was forming that challenged the 
autocratic order.  As Nicholas Riasanovsky put it, obshchestvo “was coming to a ‘parting of the 
ways’ with gosudarstvo, the state.”78   
The solution of the new monarch, Alexander II, was a bureaucracy dedicated to the 
preservation of autocracy.   Though he himself was not a liberal, and the bargaining power of the 
autocracy had been weakened by the Crimean War, Alexander decided the best way to balance 
elite interests was to keep them in competition.  He proceeded to co-opt the most pro-autocratic 
leaders of the reform movement into the bureaucracy and set them to work on major legislation.79  
The era of Great Reforms began. 
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b. Bureaucratic organization and performance 
The “enlightened bureaucrats” who crafted the country’s Great Reforms believed 
government should serve public welfare through lawfulness (zakonnost’) rather than the arbitrary 
rule (proizvol) that had cast a long shadow over Russian administration.  Beginning in 1848, 
several senior statesmen began to fashion civil service policies based on “clear principles, accurate 
information, and a precise chain of command.”  Drawing on more educated recruits to public 
service, they created the bureaucratic capacity for the Great Reforms two decades later.80  
Initiating major reforms while overcoming arbitrary rule required the tsarist government to 
take an unnatural action: consult the public on major reforms.  The common perception in 
government on the need for consultations raised a dilemma that went to the heart of the autocracy’s 
prerogative to decide and implement policy.  How could the public be engaged without 
undermining autocratic rule?81   
After considerable debate, the government agreed that a policy of glasnost’ (public 
information) would lay the cornerstone for the Great Reforms and for a rule-based government.  
Glasnost’ in the context of the day meant the government would eschew secrecy and share 
information on proposed laws for public comment.  Zakonnost’ meant the tsar and his bureaucracy 
would set a standard of abiding by laws rather than violating them.  Thus Russia’s bureaucratic 
reformers opened channels of communication between the bureaucrats and educated society, but 
they were not liberals or constitutionalists.  They remained “autocratic servants of an autocratic 
master.”82 
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Scholars agree that the enlightened bureaucrats played a central role in aligning the tsar, 
nobility, government, and educated society around a process of fundamental institutional change 
that began with freeing 22 million serfs.83  Though the Emancipation Act of 1861 was a 
monumental step, the process began poorly and ended less advantageously for serfs than liberals 
had hoped.   The eventual formula for the Emancipation Act of 1861 gave serfs personal freedoms, 
including the right to marry at will and acquire property, but “saddled communities of former serfs 
with heavy payments for overpriced land allotments that, they believed, were theirs by right in the 
first place.”84  By the end of the 19th century, the emancipation paradoxically strengthened both 
peasant communes and the government at the expense of individual property rights.85 
The bureaucracy grew in power and prestige as a consequence of the Great Reforms.  After 
the Great Reforms, the link between land ownership and nobility declined as ennoblement through 
bureaucratic service grew and the share of the hereditary nobility who owned land declined to 30 
percent in 1905.86  Nevertheless, the landowning hereditary nobility dominated the social elite 
until 1914.  Many of these nobles overlapped with the political elite, comprised of senior military 
and civilian officials. They did not constitute a ruling class as in 18th and 19th century England, 
where political elites shared common roles and values and channeled authority through formal 
political and judicial organizations.  On the social hierarchy, however, the nobility remained higher 
than the bureaucracy and Moscow business elite.87  
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After the 1905-06 urban uprisings, autocratic power was further circumscribed.  Before 
that point, the tsars could rarely make decisions without consulting the bureaucracy.  After the 
appointment of a prime minister in 1905, Nicholas II (1894-1917) deferred to that individual 
directly.88  Momentum for reform shifted to statesmen such as Count Sergei Witte, who 
championed industrialization and expansion of railroad construction, and Peter Stolypin, who 
introduced agrarian reforms to lift the peasant debt burden and carve individual private property 
rights out of peasant communes. Nevertheless, senior bureaucratic officials remained sensitive to 
tsarist court opinion, which often put them in a delicate position in arguing government policy in 
the legislature. 89 
While the bureaucracy excelled in policy, it failed on implementation, reducing the 
economic impact of land reforms.  In particular, attempts to institute a proper land registry failed, 
as did the issuance of a charter of procedures.  The principal reason was the absence of a national 
regulatory and cadastral system to survey land plots.90  The absence of a Weberian service standard 
is illustrated by the glacial pace of geodesic surveying in Moscow.  The task had not been 
completed at the turn of the 20th century, even after seventy years of mapping.91    
 
c. Public Participation in Decision-Making 
Reform legislation in 1857-64 created a new role for citizens in national affairs.  The 
burden for public health, education and the modernization of agriculture and industry began to 
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shift from the autocracy and bureaucracy to “elected officials and experts employed by local public 
institutions.” 92 
The post-reform period also ushered in a decidedly modern view of cities and electoral 
rules.  For the Great Reformers, municipal decay signified national decay.  After extensive study 
of urban issues and years of public debate, the enlightened bureaucrats introduced a municipal 
reform in 1870 that accorded autonomy to cities, within the limits of the legislation.  The reform 
carried a whiff of Western philosophy that also reeked of social heresy to conservatives:  voting 
rights would be based on property taxes or commercial fees, not on soslovie of nobility, merchants, 
and peasants.  The formula put property or capital wealth above social status.  In contrast, reforms 
of regional administration in the 1860s had given the nobility a power base in the zemstvos 
(zemstva, elected regional assemblies).93  The electoral rules for municipalities were exceptional 
for Russia of the period because the balance of power in cities would shift to the commercial class.  
The reason may be due to the “relative political insignificance”94 of cities in the early post-reform 
years. 
Contrasts are stark before and after the 1870 municipal reform in government attitudes and 
civic activism.  Nobility who loathed city service sought roles in public affairs; public buildings 
that were objects of tsarist conformity became subjects of civic interest; simple public deeds rather 
than grand architectural facades defined the new Russian city.  Property ownership comprised a 
core feature of municipal life as both a source of income and political influence.95 
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Dynamic urban growth in the post-reform period represented an opportunity and a threat 
to the autocracy.  Predatory rulers, national and local, saw fiscal bounty in prospering towns. In 
the growing political polarization of the period, encouragement for urban taxation came from an 
agrarian lobby of nobles, narodniki (commoners) and the gentry-dominated zemstvos.96  But as 
will be discussed later, from the point of view of tsarist authorities, local autonomy and taxation 
authority also planted a dangerous seed of popular democratic ideals in cities.  
The demographic and economic surge of the late 19th century is indisputable.  The urban 
population grew at an average annual rate of 2.3 percent until 1913, compared to 1.5 percent in the 
first half of the century.  From 1883 to 1913, half of cities with over 50,000 residents saw their 
population double, while a third tripled in size.97  Economic data are less precise, with national 
growth estimates ranging from 2.75 to 3.25 percent annually from 1886-90, when state-led 
industrialization started.98  Financial markets and stock exchanges boomed, as did speculative 
investment in urban real estate due to the expansion of railroad construction through cities.  
Landlords became an updated version of the conservative old merchant class by seeking a safe 
income through housing investments.99  
As growth and demand for government services expanded, so did the fiscal deficit. The 
Ministry of Finance began to shift the national tax burden from rural residents to the urban 
economy in the 1880s.100   Minister of Finance Bunge (1880-86) believed that economic growth 
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rather than higher taxes would be the answer to reduce the chronic budget deficits of post-reform 
Russia. His fiscal philosophy was based on the premise that taxation should not exceed capacity 
to pay.  Rural peasants in particular required tax relief in order to increase their consumption.  
Bunge abolished the poll tax on peasants, anachronistic since emancipation, and reformed the land 
tax (paid mainly by peasants) so that the net loss to the Government (and gain to peasants) was 
approximately 52 million rubles.  As part of the Great Reforms, he then proceeded to restructure 
fiscal policy to increase the burden where it could most safely be raised:  the urban and industrial 
economy.  After evaluating urban immovable property in 1883, his fiscal reform raised revenues 
from this source by 46 percent.   Industry and capital gains also received higher tax rates.  But the 
result of Bunge’s policies was disappointing:  budget deficits increased, and Bunge was forced to 
leave office.101   
Count Sergei Witte, Finance Minister from 1892-1903, continued the thrust of Bunge’s 
policies by raising taxes on the urban and industrial sectors, including a 12 percent increase in 
urban real estate taxes in 1893.102  In addition, he raised excise taxes (e.g. on sugar, alcohol) and 
increased government debt through foreign-financed bonds.  He believed it was necessary to raise 
revenues for industrialization in the simplest manner, with low transaction costs.   According to 
estimates by Plaggenborg, the urban and industrial sectors provided 68 percent of tax receipts at 
the national level in 1901. 
Nevertheless, it is important to put the urban real estate tax burden at the national level in 
perspective.  As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, land and property comprised 32 percent of direct 
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taxes, but only 2.6 percent of overall national revenues in 1913.  This share had not risen 
significantly since 1900. 
Table 1 
      
Russia's Budget Revenue Sources for 1900 and 1913 
      Revenue items  Years Growth rate 
in % over 
1900 
 1900 1913  
 mln.rubles % mln.rubles %  
      
Direct taxes 131.9 7.7 272.5 8.0 206.6 
Indirect taxes 658.1 38.6 708.1 20.7 107.6 
Duties, court fees, fees from transfer of 
property 
88.3 5.2 231.2 6.8 261.8 
State monopolies (regalii)* 176.8 10.4 1024.9 30.0 579.7 
Revenues from Government property 
and capital gains 
473.5 27.8 1043.7 30.5 220.4 
Revenues from disposition of state assets 0.6 0.0 2.9 0.1 483.3 
Redemption payments 96.2 5.6 1.2 0.0 1.2 
Compensation of State Treasury 
expenditures  
71.1 4.2 116.7 3.4 164.1 
Other revenues 7.5 0.4 16.2 0.5 216.0 
           
Total revenues 1704 100 3417.4 100 200.6 
      
Source: Ezhegodnik Ministerstva Finansov (Sankt-Peterburg, 1903), 35-36. Ezhegodnik Ministerstva 
Finansov (Sankt-Petergburg, 1915), 40-42.     
      





Direct Taxes in Russia, 1913 
    
 








    
Land tax, immovable property tax and simple tax 87.3 32.0 2.6 
Trade and industry tax 150.1 55.1 4.4 
Capital gains tax 35.1 12.9 1.0 
    
Total 272.5 100 8.0 
    





However, urban property taxation takes on greater significance when seen with local eyes.  
Post-soviet Russian scholars believe fiscal debates in the late imperial period mirror those of 
contemporary Russia. 103 The key issue then and now was how to match fiscal revenues with local 
expenditure responsibilities.  Until the mid-1800s, revenues from rural land and forest had 
comprised the highest share of taxes in the Volga region, reflecting the concentration of wealth in 
landed property.  But land revenues peaked as national, regional and local governments overtaxed 
and nearly exhausted this resource.   Volga region zemstvos of Kazan, Saratov, and Simbirsk 
searched for new sources, and urban real estate was the solution.   In 1864, a regulation 
(polozhenie) on local rule allowed the zemstvos to increase tax collections.  Tax receipts that had 
been unchanged from 1816 to 1842 rapidly increased – by 41% in 1867 and again 41% in 1868.   
Tax performance continued to improve, not because tax rates were increased but because city 
property was better defined and taxed.104   
Significantly, some local governments recognized that tax performance depended on 
proper valuation of land and real estate assets.  Simbirsky Guberniia experimented with a mass 
evaluation system that harkened to 17th century English practice.105  Value depended on size, 
location, and features (e.g. number of windows and chimneys, type of construction material); an 
average structure was valued and represented all others in a similar category.  Detailed town 
mapping provided improved classification by property function (industrial, warehousing, housing, 
land plots for gardening, etc.).  Valuation included a percent deduction for depreciation of 
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structures.  The resulting quantification of property became a model followed by Saratov 
Guberniia.106   
The main conflict of interest between national and local levels concerned the tax retention 
rate of zemstvos  – “taxes, of course, which were largely paid by peasants and townspeople rather 
than the nobles who dominated the zemstvo boards.”107   Zemstvos reported to the Governor 
appointed by the crown.  The Governor needed to fill national coffers before local ones.   In 
Moscow, the provincial zemstvo used its taxation rights to interfere in city affairs, creating 
perpetual animosities.108  Property valuation was a bone of contention.  For example, the incentive 
of urban taxpayers was to undervalue town real estate, and Moscow was no exception. In the late 
1880s, the Moscow provincial zemstvo conducted its own assessment and valued Moscow 
property two-to-three times higher.109 
Tensions initially ignited by vague jurisdictional authorities of city dumas110 and zemstvos 
came to a boil after the 1905-6 Revolution, strengthening calls for financial autonomy.  The 
conservative gentry, anxious over their declining land fortunes, resisted Stolypin’s agrarian and 
institutional reforms that would broaden peasant land ownership and representation.111  At the 
same time, the zemstvos began to assume a more autonomous voice in defending local interests.  
In Kazan, for example, the head of the Guberniia in 1912 bristled at the cap on real estate taxation 
imposed by the national government112 and declared that tsarist fiscal policies were undermining 
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local autonomy.  In 1913 the regional zemstvo passed a resolution calling for the expansion of 
self-government based on greater local taxation authority.  It never came to life.113  
Competition for a slice of the urban tax pie also arose because property ownership was 
linked to a highly stratified income structure.  A defining feature of Russian urban growth in post-
reform Russia was the concentration of wealth in a small stratum of the population in selected 
capital and provincial cities.  One third of designated cities (227 of 761) in early 20th century 
produced less than 100,000 rubles from trade and industry.114 The “merchant city” was dominated 
by petty traders.  According to records of taxation paid by the male electorate of propertied and 
commercially-active residents, those who paid the highest and medium levels in 1872 in Moscow 
fell from 2,400 to 1,600 while those paying minimal levels grew from 15,000 to 18,000 in 1897.115  
Approximately 90 percent of hereditary guild artisans in Moscow could not afford to pay the 
minimum property tax and were thus excluded from the society’s elections.116 Most artisans were 
desperately poor migrants and provided day labor in large cities for temporary periods.117  
Housing ownership in particular was suppressed by poverty.  Housing is synonymous with 
urban landed property.   According to Vissarion Belinsky, "the dream of every Muscovite is to 
have his own house, even if it is only one with three windows. It may be poor, but it is his own, 
and with a courtyard he may be able to raise chickens and even a calf.”118  As noted above, in 1912 
only 4 percent of Muscovites lived in privately-owned homes or apartments.119  They were less 
fortunate than residents of Saratov, where 6,000 out of 65,000 people owned a cottage or hut in 
                                                 
113 Sidorova, “Zemstva Kazanskoi gubernii,” 182-3. 
114 Brower, Tradition and Modernity, 69. 
115 Brower, Tradition and Modernity, 70. 
116 Brower, Tradition and Modernity, 66. 
117 Brower, Tradition and Modernity, 22. 
118 Brower, Tradition and Modernity, 29-30. 




the 1860s. Of these, 2,000 were too rudimentary for taxation purposes.  Spacious urban homes 
formed the fairy-tale life of the wealthy. 120 
From ownership data it appears that urban property reached a limit as a revenue source, 
however politically popular it may have been with the noble-dominated provincial zemstvos to 
raise city tax rates.   Thus Moscow went looking for other sources to supplement its property 
receipts and raised 60% of revenues from fees on utilities and transportation in 1912.121  In 
comparison, property taxes comprised 73% of revenues collected by local governments in the US 
in 1902.122  Moscow’s reliance on user fees rather than on property taxes reflected the socio-
economic gulf between Russian and American cities at the turn of the century. 
Tables 3 and 4 show that the state and nobility continued to dominate land ownership nearly 
150 years after the introduction of private property for ruling elites.  But members of the land-
owning nobility were not all equals.   The 155 families in the upper aristocracy who owned over 
50,000 desiatiny sold only 3 percent of their land-holdings between 1900 and 1914, whereas the 
lesser provincial nobility gave up 20 percent.123  Hence among “different private owners” the 
concentration of holdings varied greatly.  Of peasant allotment land, 80 percent belonged to the 
commune until the Stolypin reforms in 1906 enabled individuals to buy individual land plots more 
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Land ownership in 50 Gubernii (Provinces) of European Russia, 
1905 
    
    mln. desiatin* % 
    
State, royal land, churches, monasteries and other                  154.7  39.1 
Peasant allotment land                   138.8  35.1 
Different private owners                   101.7  25.7 
     
Total                    395.2  100 
Source: Ezhegodnik Tsentral'nogo statisticheskogo komiteta (Sankt-Peterburg:  
Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, 1907).    
 
Table 4 
Breakdown of Government-Owned Lands in Russia, 
1905 
    
  mln. desiatin* % 
    
State  138.1 89.3 
Royal  7.9 5.1 
Military  3.5 2.3 
Urban  2.1 1.4 
Churches  1.9 1.2 
Monasteries  0.7 0.5 
Other  0.5 0.3 
    
Total  154.7 100 
    
Source: Ezhegodnik Tsentralnogo statisticheskogo komiteta 
(Sankt-Peterburg,  Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, 
1907).  
* "desiatin" equals 1.09 ha or 2.7 acres. 
   
 
The political influence of the nobility-dominated zemstvos is not surprising given its high 
land ownership share.  Among private land owners, the share held by the nobility was three times 
that of merchants and townspeople (Table 5).  The amount of urban land owned by the nobility is 
not clear from the data.  Private urban land ownership varied considerably by region in 1905 (Table 










Distribution of Land Ownership in 50 Gubernii (Provinces) of 
European Russia, 1905 
 
      
Category     in thsd. desiatin* %  
      
Noblemen   53,169.0 61.9  
Clergy   337.2 0.4  
Merchants   12,906.8 15.0  
Townspeople   3,763.8 4.4  
Peasants   13,212.0 15.4  
Other   2,213.4 2.6  
Foreigners   352.4 0.4  
      
Total     85,954.6 100  
      
Source: N.A. Rubakin, Rossiia v tsifrakh, 1901-1910 (Sankt-Peterburg: Vestnik znania, 
V.V.Bitnera, 1912).      
 
Table 6  
Distribution of Land Ownership Across Regions of European Russia, 1905 
(in thsd. desiatin*) 
         
Regions   Noblemen Clergy Merchants Townspeople Peasants Other Foreigners 
         
Severnyi  303.9 6.6 522.6 51.4 732.0 16.6 14.1 
Ozernyi  3,041.3 13.2 1,970.6 339.9 1,835.3 196.5 53.2 
Pribaltiiskii  3,400.8 2.6 100.7 36 5.5 471.1 31.6 
Severo-zapadnyi  10,224.6 33.1 709.9 624.5 1,012.0 345.9 3 
Tsentral'nyi  4,379.2 30.8 1,902.6 446.9 1,761.1 86.1 19.5 
Sredne-volzhskii  3,138.2 10.2 1,283.7 345.2 1,452.0 212.3 33.6 
Zavolzhskii  9,913.9 19.8 2,794.6 279.2 1,394.3 70.9 14 
Zadneprovskii  6,982.7 32 937.7 660 925.0 351.7 124.1 
Iuzhno-stepnoi  3,193.9 87.6 941.7 361.6 1,885.0 207.3 33.7 
Dneprovsko-Donskoi  5,377.8 87.7 857.5 407 1,630.1 93.7 13.7 
Volzhsko-Donskoi  3,212.3 13.6 885.2 212.1 580.0 161.3 11.9 
         
Total   53,168.6 337.2 12,906.8 3,763.8 13,212.3 2,213.4 352.4 
         
Source: N.A. Rubakin, Rossiia v tsifrakh, 1901-1910 (Sankt-Peterburg: Vestnik znaniia, V.V.Bitnera, 1912).   
* "desiatin" equals 1.09 ha or 2.7 acres.   
The strengthening of municipal autonomy in 1870 as part of the Great Reforms was short-
lived; it collapsed in 1892 under pressure from the tsar, provincial governors, and the conservative 
nobility.  Self-rule without state supervision was anathema to Alexander III (1881-1894).125 For 
                                                 
125 Alexander III became Emperor in 1881 after the assassination of his father, Alexander II. His regime was devoted 




the Moscow provincial governor, the more that municipal administration assumed leadership, the 
less state administration had significance.   Municipal autonomy, once the ‘golden words,’ 
disappeared in new statutes. Electoral rules for city dumas based on wealth rather than social estate 
were ironically too successful in allowing prosperous commoners to share voting rights with 
nobility and wealthy merchants.  After the regressive 1892 reform, electoral rules were sharply 
curtailed to give even fewer residents a voice in local affairs.  “The specter of ‘popular democracy’ 
figured occasionally in the complaints of tsarist officials,” according to Brower, “but the key issue 
was the legitimacy of the civil public sphere of the city.” 126  
Under these conditions, urbanization lost its muscle as a modernizer of society and politics.   
Hartley acknowledged the emergence of an independent corporate identity among the provincial 
nobility and merchant class, mainly in Moscow, that fulfilled the goals of Peter II and Catherine 
II as the basis for local autonomy.  By the time it appeared, however, such solidarity was 
anachronistic, since local institutions did not represent the reality of social stratification based on 
migrant labor in the early 20th century.127   For Hamm, modernization stalled due to “rigid statutory 
restraints, bureaucratic neglect, and financial strangulation of the city and the consequent 
indolence in city government, for which less than 1 percent of the population could vote after 
1892.”128  Colton acknowledged some vitality in the private sphere of Moscow life, but saw the 
undemocratic and passive public organs as out of step with urban squalor and the needs of the 
disenfranchised poor.129    
The powerlessness of the cities and the weakness of urban property rights are connected; 
it would be hard to imagine that civic-mindedness could go very far without a link between 
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property taxation and political representation.   In this respect the traditions of peasant communal 
society (the mir) were richer as an opportunity to practice democratic principles by distributing 
land and administering justice.  Such traditions did not obtain in urban communities, not even at 
the level of shared housing.  Only the wealthiest nobles and merchants, some 0.5 percent of the 
population, had the privilege to participate in elections in cities. For the lesser ranks of the 
propertied, the obligation to finance the state rather than the local community, without a voice in 
local politics, would be a disincentive to invest in urban amenities or infrastructure.  For the 
majority of tenants who were migrants and owned land in the country, where their families lived, 
the city was a workplace rather than a home.    
The symbiosis of the property tax as a “benefit tax,”130 with real rewards for residents in 
sanitation services and good schools, and real limits on the power of political authorities, did not 
obtain at any point in Tsarist Russia.  Twice, under Catherine II and Alexander II, the predatory 
ruler redirected the institutional path to widen access to property rights, first for ruling elites, and 
then for the broader population.  In the latter case, the alignment of opinion among the tsar, 
bureaucracy and educated society hastened the liberalization process.  But ultimately, tsarist 
policies on municipal autonomy and local taxation contradicted the spirit of initiatives to extend 
private property rights.   Urban land failed to generate the political power that follows widespread 
property ownership, and “taxation without representation” never became a rallying cry by citizens 
in defense of individual rights. 
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5. Land Governance in the Soviet Period, 1917-1990 
Radical change in formal rules rarely represents a clean break from the past. When 
revolutions are ideologically grounded, as in 1917 Russia, they are vulnerable to subversion, either 
from factional rivalries, incompatibility of ideological incentives with human behavior, or from 
tensions that arise between new formal rules and deep-seated, informal institutions.  Hence, 
according to North, “perhaps [the] most striking feature [of discontinuous change] is that it is 
seldom as discontinuous as it appears on the surface.”131  Differences and similarities in Tsarist 
and Bolshevik ideologies are beyond the scope of this study, as is the Russian Revolution as a case 
of institutional change.  The focus here is to understand why, when and how urban property rights 
changed under Soviet-Marxist law as background to the institutional changes in post-Soviet 
Russia.   From such examination we may gain purchase on institutional change from both an 
historical and micro-analytic perspective.   
 
a. Political authority and the legal order 
The “legal order”132  became an early battleground among the new revolutionaries.   The 
initial question was metaphysical: what purpose was there for law when the state was supposed to 
wither away?  At issue was the Marxist assumption that a stateless society could do away with 
bourgeois capitalist law and manage the transition to communism without a legal code to guide 
human conduct.  As Engels had prophesied, civil law regulating property relations would die out 
with capitalism.  Lenin’s State and Revolution (1917) sidestepped the problem by declaring that a 
proletarian State could first end the capitalist legal order; thereafter it would begin to recede from 
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power.  The first normative acts would not represent law per se, but the will of the people as the 
new ruling class in society.  Soviet leaders philosophically rejected the need in the long-term for 
the state to administer legal rules in a communist society.133   
Due to its significance as political theory, it is important to understand how the Communist 
Manifesto influenced the legal battle, particularly over civil law.  According to Marxist thought, 
power, property and law are interwoven in bourgeois economic history.  Oppressed serfs evolved 
into bourgeoisie in medieval European city communes when they acquired property, won the right 
of self-government, and enshrined their status as free individuals in law.134  As bourgeois wealth 
accumulated, the bourgeoisie overtook the nobility and eventually the state, where it implanted 
laws favorable to capitalist economic interests.  Bourgeois law was firmly entrenched in the public 
mind as the only legitimate legal norm even though ten percent of propertied society exploited the 
90 percent who were without property. To break bourgeois political power, the Communist 
Manifesto exhorted revolutionaries to seize its source of economic power.  The first order of 
business in a communist revolution would be “abolition of property in land and application of all 
rents of land to public purposes.”135  However, the Manifesto went on to stress, “The distinguishing 
feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois 
property.”136  Property that is not exploitative of labor could be exempted from confiscation.    
The Bolsheviks initially put Marxist theory into practice as if following a checklist from 
the Communist Manifesto.   Compared to the gradual pace of industrial nationalization, land 
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seizure was swift and non-negotiable.137  In its first decree of October 28, 1917,138 the Second 
Congress of Soviet Workers and Peasants expropriated all agricultural estates of the nobility, 
without compensation, while protecting peasant smallholdings.139  Once the Bolsheviks had out-
maneuvered competing parties and dispensed with the democratically-elected Constituent 
Assembly, they decreed on February 19, 1918140 that all rights to land, urban as well as rural, above 
and below ground, were abolished.  Whether the structure was a factory, barn, or house, the land 
under it reverted to state ownership.   
Having nationalized all land, the Bolsheviks issued a carefully-crafted decree on urban 
property on August 20, 1918,141  that differentiated acceptable housing from the bad bourgeois 
holdings requiring reallocation.  Specifically, large houses over a designated minimum size would 
be seized, while small homeowners could retain title to their abodes.  In towns of 10,000 or less, 
the definition of a minimum size was left to local Soviets to decide.  Thus, for owners of small 
homes in town or country, property rights underwent a twist not known in Tsarist Russia or the 
West:  land and buildings became two separate properties.  The owner of an izba (cottage) became 
tenant to the local government for the land on which it stood.   
In the two largest cities, the revolutionary zeal applied to the restructuring of property rights 
made ‘legal coercion’ an understatement.  The 1918 decree had declared that in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, families could retain dwellings with up to five units.142  However, the Moscow Soviet 
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had already taken matters into its own hands, well before the decree.  A helter-skelter process of 
seizures and forced resettlements by revolutionary enthusiasts tore families apart or compressed 
many families into one larger housing unit, sometimes at gunpoint.  A scene in the movie, Dr. 
Zhivago, depicts this socially painful process under the glare of the Peoples’ Commissars.  The 
Moscow Soviet sharply raised real estate taxes on residences not yet restructured, cut rents in half 
in apartment buildings, and “municipalized” tenements of the largest landlords, affecting 40 
percent of the population.143  
New laws could not regulate urban and rural land use amidst civil war, the Red Terror, and 
famine. The property battle in rural areas was exceedingly contentious because of spontaneous 
peasant land grabs144 and conservative opposition to reallocation.145   Laws were passed that 
required equal distribution of land; these were promptly ignored.   Finally, the 1922 Land Code 
recognized the futility of dictating land allocation and confirmed the land use rights of those 
working the land, in perpetuity, while title to the land remained with the state.146  Reality on the 
ground forced law to catch up. 
The Civil Code represented ground zero in the legal battle over property relations.  Jurists 
trained in the Tsarist period struggled to square their revolutionary ideals with the evolving need 
for civil law.  The crisis became acute when Lenin proclaimed the New Economic Policy in 1921, 
allowing a measure of private enterprise.  To enable new property relations, the jurists plumbed 
European concepts and sections of a draft by the Tsarist Commission on civil law, and employed 
them in the Soviet Civil Code of 1922.  While heavily amended by subsequent decrees, it remained 
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in place as an uneasy compromise until 1937.  Many of its basic tenets held throughout the Soviet 
era, including the prohibition on buying and selling land and the right to seek permission to build 
a house or enterprise structure.147   
The practical effect of the Code was to enable property rights to be regulated through 
contracts, just as in Tsarist Russia and capitalist countries, and to restore economic principles to 
land use. As in rural areas, city Soviets became the owner of most land and property and distributed 
occupancy privileges by rewriting the contracts from private ownership to socialist leasehold.   All 
land tenants paid land rent, including state enterprises.  Initially, contracts covered several years, 
but after 1936, as new notions of Soviet civil law took root, the local Soviets issued certificates of 
perpetual use rights.  So long as an enterprise had rights to a building, it could retain the privilege 
of using the underlying land.148   
After the initial pell-mell of revolutionary land seizures, Soviet ruling elites began to use 
property privileges as a reward or disciplinary measure.   Since the state owned all land and high-
value housing, access to property was a privilege that could be granted or revoked.  Just as Peter 
the Great had allocated land privileges in line with the rank of nobles, the Communists reserved 
the swankiest addresses for the highest party members.   Swaths of graceful landscapes in western 
Moscow, formerly the nob hill of celebrated families and artists, were filled with rising luminaries 
of the Communist Party such as Joseph Stalin.  Geographic proximity of in-town residences to the 
Kremlin, the center of power, radiated social status.  Favored cultural and scientific groups 
received the higher space allocations once reserved for soldiers returning from the front.149 
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The costs of managing municipal property led the Soviets to introduce a more rational 
housing policy.  An “’orgy of annihilation’” had inspired tenants to depreciate their dwellings so 
as not to become a target of takeover by the Moscow Soviet.150  Several policy correctives were 
implemented during the liberalization of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Gone was the utopian 
notion of free housing. Idealistic visions of communal living also vanished.151  The original decree 
stipulating that owners of dwellings with no more than 5 units could remain private was finally 
implemented, in a move that amounted to “demunicipalization.”   Enterprise-owned housing rules 
that required the eviction of tenants upon a change of job were reinstated, but with a softer face to 
the employee, who received protection from the court to find alternative quarters.   Finally, a new 
form of nongovernmental “housing partnership” was created that reinstituted leases under contract 
to the municipality.   Space allocations, known as “sanitary norms,” favored servants of the people, 
including army, security, and scientific officials, but poor residents received 10 percent of space 
allocated.  By 1924, housing partnerships comprised 31 percent of dwellings but housed 50 percent 
of the population.  Private housing (demunicipalized) comprised 28 percent of dwellings but 
because the units were smaller in size, housed only 5.5 percent.  Overall, the municipality became 
landlord to about 78 percent of the population.152  
After a twenty-year “legal order” that nationalized land but allowed urban land relations 
based on Tsarist and European contractual principles, a new team of jurists declared that property 
law could indeed exist, but in socialist form.  Led by A. Ia. Vyshinskii at a 1938 conference on 
legal science, the new jurists explained that the old school, led by E. B. Pashukanis,153 had 
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misinterpreted the writings of Marx and Engels.  In fact, bourgeois law corresponded to a 
bourgeois phase of power, just as feudal laws had upheld the feudal period.  Hence, law was the 
creation of the ruling class in any society.  Following declarations in the 1936 USSR Constitution, 
there was no doubt that socialism had triumphed over capitalism.  It was time to adopt a Marxist-
Leninist socialist law to administer state property.154  
In the officially-sanctioned definition of Soviet law in 1938, coercive force, the cudgel that 
had restructured property rights, was proclaimed at the height of Stalin terror as the guarantor of 
the legal order.   Substantively, Soviet law represented “the aggregate of rules of conduct 
established in a legislative procedure by the power of the working people expressing their 
will…for the purpose of…building of a communist society.”  Politically, such law would be 
“ensured by the entire coercive power of the socialist State…”  Philosophically, it signified 
acceptance by the Soviet hierarchy that civil law was needed to manage state property and build 
state socialism.155   
While legal precepts evolved significantly and less coercively after 1964 (the Khrushchev 
period), legal norms for property rights established that endured until 1990. Soviet experience 
bears witness to Weber’s observation that “factual regularities of conduct (‘customs’) 
can…become the source of rules for conduct (‘conventions,’ ‘law’).  At the same time, the reverse 
is also true:  legal norms can produce regularities that endure even when laws change.156    Today, 
two such norms -- the separation of land and buildings as two distinct properties and perpetual use 
rights – still stand as sturdy as an oak tree.   What the Soviets decreed in the 1920s and wrote into 
civil law in the 1930s, the post-soviet Russians have been trying to repair since the 1990s.   
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b. Bureaucratic organization and performance  
The early Soviet period established a pattern of central bureaucratic and Communist Party 
control over cities.  The context of “war communism,” a euphemism for the Bolsheviks’ battle 
against their enemies, real and imagined, demanded greater centralization of authority, as did the 
organizational chaos within local soviets (municipal administrations), which depleted already 
shabby communal services.  Three areas of centralization appeared, with lasting effects.  First, as 
early as 1918, local municipal departments reported both to the local executive and to the 
analogous central department in a “dual subordination” that continued Tsarist practice.  The higher 
authority dominated the pecking order.157  Second, rising standardization (e.g. in land and housing 
practices) diminished the bargaining power of municipal officials vis-à-vis the Communist Party.  
This occurred due to the Party’s parallel structure (within the municipal bureaucracy) and its right 
to dictate the hiring of senior municipal officials.158  Finally, large industrial enterprises became a 
salvation for local soviets, and in time, a competitor for municipal power.  Enterprises held the 
biggest trump cards -- access to scarce housing and consumer goods, supported by generous 
budgets – that could not be supplied by local soviets.159  
City planners were challenged to put Marxist ideology into practice in urban life.  Though 
their visions differed, utopian-minded architects and planners who came of age before the 
revolution shared a common goal of founding the ideal socialist city.160  How was not evident from 
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the Communist Manifesto, which observed that the agglomeration of capitalistic activity had 
concentrated wealth and political power in cities.  According to the Manifesto, a critical step in the 
revolution was the “gradual abolition of all the distinction between town and country by a more 
equitable distribution of the populace over the country.”161   Such a philosophy, if put into practice, 
would reverse the pattern of increasing urban density in market economies. 
The “socialist city,” with its inefficient spatial structure, emerged from debates over land 
ownership and urban planning. Starting from the late Imperial Period, urban planners had 
challenged the concept of private land ownership and provided an urban constituency for 
Bolshevik aspirations to transform cities into monuments of socialist development.  Starr believes 
the planning heritage of the late imperial period, which was based on imported models of urban 
form, survived and was adapted rather than destroyed by Bolshevism.  Both the classical 
revivalists, who “gladly subordinated private and individual interest to their general plan,” and the 
left-leaning International Garden City Society that advocated public land ownership, sympathized 
with Bolshevik policies to abolish private land ownership.162 
Urban planning evolved into a rigid bureaucratic exercise to glorify the conformist 
sentiments and national aspirations of the state.   Stalin created a central office for architectural 
planning (Arplan) that led the preparation of General Plans (city designs) and supervised local 
offices, to ensure national conformity.  The single client of Arplan was the Soviet Government.  
The blueprint until World War II was the “superblock” of four-storied apartments and courtyard 
in central zones; thereafter it was the high-rise apartment complex on city fringes with limited 
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services.163  The decaying remnants of these structures stand as a chronological and geographical 
guide to city planning in the Soviet era.   
The sad irony of central planning was that it distorted land use in cities. Five-year plans 
(industrial production goals) came into competition for funding with the General Plan164 (for 
territorial socio-economic development). Once adopted by the Soviet Government, sector 
ministries and regions fought a budget battle to get resources for implementation.   The most 
powerful sector and industrial lobbies dominated the struggle, and their resource needs claimed 
first priority.  As a consequence, fulfillment of the General Plan at the municipal level had low 
priority, leading to disproportionately greater investment in industry, underfunding of municipal 
infrastructure and housing, and distortion of land use patterns of socialist cities.165   
Resource constraints and scarcity led to stratification of social groups and privileges in 
landed property for elites.  The obsession with industrialization since the 1930s and the absence 
of market mechanisms created a chronic disequilibrium in supply and demand of consumer goods 
on the urban street, while ensuring shortages that stimulated a black market and corruption.166  
Access to housing in Moscow in the 1980s is a telling example of how consumer supply shortages 
were rationed.  Depending on proximity of one’s employment to the political center of power, the 
waiting time for scarce living space varied by a factor of three.  For the general public, the queue 
to receive an apartment was six to nine years, while for employees of an enterprise or central 
agency it would be three to four years.  Local government workers in the consumer industries or 
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service sectors had the longest wait, while the shortest was for high-placed Communist Party 
officials, who regularly jumped the queue.  “When they paid the piper, the enterprises and 
ministries called the tune.”167   
In short, bureaucratic performance regarding urban planning placed abstract socialist ideals 
above concrete consumer realities and central goals above citizen interests.  The revenues thus 
maximized by predatory rulers benefited the ruling elites more than the general population. 
 
c. Public Participation in Decision-Making  
A central premise of the dissertation is that public participation can advance the pace of 
institutional change if the public is engaged in decision-making by executive authorities and the 
bureaucracy.   Public engagement contains supply-and-demand features: there must be demand for 
citizen input on the part of public authorities, while citizens must be willing to engage in a 
meaningful consultation process.   According to Reddaway and Glinski, two patterns of state-
society relations have alternated in Russian political culture, producing pendulum swings to the 
right (in favor of dictatorship) and to the left (in the form of liberalizing reforms that weaken the 
state).  Top-down, coercive transformations imposed ‘progress’ without allowing discussion or 
dissent (e.g. Peter the Great, Stalin).  Bottom-up initiatives grew out of political and intellectual 
awakenings of society (e.g. the Great Reforms).  The tendency in bottom-up initiatives was for 
counter-elites to press for more comprehensive changes out of frustration with the illegitimacy of 
the existing order.  Such actions then fanned revolutionary social tensions.168  The question in this 
study is whether state-society dialogue can develop more constructively, at the level of urban 
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planning linked to land use, where decisions are commonly reached with civic input in advanced 
market economies.    
Demand by the Communist Party for greater involvement of citizens in local affairs began 
to appear in the 1960s during a reassessment of Soviet ideology.  Reddaway and Glinski describe 
such moments as periodic attempts by the Party to stage “thaws” of partial liberalization to 
stimulate better economic performance.169  The ideological basis for citizen engagement, however, 
was presented as a third stage following Lenin’s proletarian state in the 1920s and Stalin’s building 
of state socialism in the 1930s.  By the XXI Congress of the Communist Party in 1961, Soviet 
ideologists deemed the country to be in an advanced phase of socialism where an ‘all-people’s 
State” would draw on the services of non-governmental bodies.  The state would not wither away.  
Rather, it would divest more functions to these bodies and citizen groups.170  These concepts were 
formalized in the new Constitution in 1977, while aggrandizing the role of the Party and State.  
However, society was less willing to supply the desired inputs on terms dictated by the 
Party.  The educational, gender and urban migration patterns since the founding of the Soviet 
Union had created a population that was harder to indoctrinate and mobilize than the uneducated 
masses encountered by Lenin.  By 1988, Starr noted, the USSR was as urbanized as Italy and about 
10 percent less than the United States.  Ruble found that specialized employment patterns, urban 
stratification, and creation of a professional female labor force had created a massive social 
transformation.   The result was that “society was starting to outgrow the crude and rigid instrument 
of the party-controlled political system.”171   
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Upon coming to power in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev recognized that an ideological gap 
between the state and society was at the heart of the crisis.172  A dissident movement had raged 
since the 1960s; now the neformaly (informal organizations) were getting out of control.173   Since 
the end of the Brezhnev era there had been no incentive to work or produce.  People were 
demoralized and deaf to the regime’s urgings.  Like Khrushchev, Gorbachev believed the Party’s 
legitimacy was the point of contention.  Just as the enlightened bureaucrats had to build a bridge 
to society before the Great Reforms, Gorbachev framed glasnost’ to open dialogue on pluralism, 
the market, and the rule of law.174  In the process, to use Tatyana Zaslavskaya’s apt metaphor, he 
“uncorked” systemic change.175 
At the practical level of urban planning, glasnost’ opened space for architects and urban 
planners to advocate for the freedom of architectural design from “dogged adherence to central 
decrees.”176  Following a conference in summer 1986 of the Leningrad Division of the RSFSR 
Union of Architects (a professional organization of 1,550 members), an active debate dominated 
the media on ways to reenergize the dreary state of urban planning.   The city’s substandard 
housing stock, only 2 percent of which was constructed after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, 
received withering criticism in the context of the times, together with calls for greater historic 
preservation to retain the city’s cultural soul.   
 Public debate extended past refined professional societies to become “grassroots fury”177 
in both Moscow and Leningrad in the 1980s.  A celebrated case in Leningrad illustrated the failure 
of constructive dialogue and the clash of cultures between planners and residents inspired by 
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glastnost’.   In March 1987, as demolition started on two historic hotels, the Astoria and Angleterra, 
a storm of complaints to media outlets led to the publication of an explanatory interview by the 
city’s chief architect, S. I. Sokolov.   He clarified that the Astoria would be renovated to match the 
monumental style of the pre-revolutionary period while work on the Angleterra would not be 
completed until 1989, without specifying the nature of the works.   The interview prompted large 
and repeated demonstrations outside the hotels and widespread media coverage of concerns that 
the city Soviet and Communist Party committees planned to destroy the historical heritage of St. 
Petersburg.   Meanwhile, the Angleterra was torn down in a matter of weeks rather than two 
years.178 Students from the history department of St. Petersburg University had mounted the 
bulldozers to stop the works, but to no avail.   In the aftermath of the events, Chief Architect 
Solokov resigned179 and the Party, after blaming city officials, cracked down on the demonstrators, 
expelling students from universities who had led the defense of the Angleterra.180  The significance 
of the event, according to Limonov, was that historic preservation had provided an apolitical cause 
for civil society to exercise public authority against the state.181   
The underlying tension between urban planners and residents was the classification of the 
General Plan, a document impacting millions of lives, as a state secret.  In counterpoint to the 
agglomeration efficiencies produced by land markets in Western democracies, Leningrad plans 
had created a geographic divide between inner-city employment and outer-city housing in order to 
reduce population density in the historic center, while intensifying the industrial ring around it. 182   
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As a consequence, the social demands of a growing city were not fully recognized, leading to 
housing shortages, absence of sufficient transport and health services, and inadequate maintenance 
of existing facilities.183  Despite these impacts on economic efficiency and citizen welfare, only a 
cursory reference appeared in public on the “Technical-Economic Foundations of the Unified 
General Plan of Development of Leningrad and the Leningrad Region in 1986-2005,” and then 
only after its approval by Mikhail Gorbachev and the Politburo.184  “Significantly,” according to 
Ruble, “even this overview of the 1986 General Plan provided insufficient information for 
meaningful public participation in the planning process.”185   
 The mounting of bulldozers by students, on one hand, and the secrecy of urban planners, 
on the other, broadcast the bankruptcy of an ideology that could not countenance consultations on 
normal concerns affecting community life.  The event also demonstrated that the directional 
compass of the bureaucracy pointed to state masters rather than citizen interests.  To cross 
Gorbachev’s bridge to society would require bureaucratic planners to relinquish the shield of 
secrecy that had defined the communist nomenklatura for decades.  It would also require them to 
explain why their elegant blueprints had failed to meet their own projections, let alone social 
requisites.  The impatience of society faced the impregnable fortress of the state.   The pendulum 




                                                 
regional framework that integrated Leningrad Region and Leningrad city, a territory slightly smaller than the state of 
Indiana. See Ruble, Leningrad, 74-82. 
183 Ruble, Leningrad, 98. 
184 Ruble, Leningrad, 103-106. 




6. Conclusion  
Urban land, and by extension, urban communities, were stepchildren in the legal order of 
the Tsarist empire and the Soviet Union.  Two related factors retarded widespread ownership of 
private urban land in Russian history.  One was the absence of a tradition of urban real estate as a 
source of social status, wealth, political power, and municipal finance.   Under the Tsars and 
Soviets, social status and personal enrichment depended on favors from or proximity to the 
autocratic leader of the day.  Second was the failure of Russian cities to develop as autonomous 
political communities where all citizens shared the rights and protections of “bourgeois” law based 
on ownership and control of urban property.   
Using the predatory rule theory and the conceptual framework of North, Wallis and 
Weingast (2009), we may distinguish five distinct stages in the institutional evolution of land rights 
from the sixteenth to the twentieth century.  During the first phase, Ivan IV brutally eliminated 
many of the boyar nobles, then used the distribution of inheritable land privileges among the 
nobility to contain violence through a loyalty system.  The exchange of land for service to the 
crown helped establish national unity and a foundation to finance the territorial expansion of 
Muscovy.  Russia became a fragile natural state.   
Over time, the loyalty system eroded as nobles failed to provide service in return for land 
rights and connived with urban residents to deprive the monarch of revenues.  The second phase 
occurred when Peter II used his strong bargaining position from military victories to retract the 
nobles’ land rights and to tie land privileges to state service.  The privileges were revocable and 
not inheritable.  Land lost its value as a source of individual wealth and power, and became a status 
symbol of service to the tsar.  Russia remained a fragile natural state because Peter II redistributed 




Catherine II faced a different set of constraints than her predecessors due to internal threats.  
She was forced by circumstances to strengthen the land rights of noble challengers to secure their 
support for her reign.  Russia became a basic natural state where ruling elites accepted property 
rights and rule of law for elites.  For the first time in Russian history, the word for private 
“ownership” was used by a Russian monarch, and individuals could hold private rights to urban 
land.  However, Catherine failed to reap the benefits of an expanding urban economy by overtaxing 
cities and undermining their autonomy to make financial decisions based on local needs.  The 
beneficiaries of private property were tax-free nobles and the serfs they owned rather than an urban 
middle class.  
In the next phase, a tectonic shift in the fortunes of the empire and the composition of 
society led Alexander II to authorize enlightened bureaucrats to initiate modernization efforts 
through the Great Reforms.  As a consequence, serfdom ended and the opportunity to acquire land 
rights was extended to all members of society.  Russia was on the verge of becoming a mature 
natural state where a rule of law in land rights is extended beyond ruling elites.  However, the more 
land that the nobles lost, the more alarmed they became about the tides of institutional change. 
At the end of the imperial period, in reaction to the growing influence of cities, a 
conservative coalition under Alexander III and Nicholas II curtailed municipal autonomy, 
increased the tax burden on urban property, and denied property owners the right of political 
representation.  There were few champions of private property in Russian society, even in the first 
two constitutional dumas elected after 1905, when legislators were broadly representative of 
society. Rather, the pressure for institutional change was to nationalize or “municipalize” land, but 
not to privatize it.186    
                                                 




The assumption of power by the Bolsheviks was not preordained when the tsarist autocracy 
collapsed in early 1917, but soon after seizing power, the party decreed that all land would revert 
to the collective property of the state.  In the process, Russia had reverted to a fragile natural state. 
Not all cases can be explained by applying the theory of predatory rule to the motivations 
of rulers in instigating institutional change in property rights.  The principal exception is the 1917 
revolution, in which the motivation by the Bolsheviks to nationalize land was ideological.  Once 
in power, however, the Bolsheviks used land as a revenue system, just as all Russian rulers had 
before them.   State land ownership both projected power and maximized revenues through land 
rents.   
The theory of predatory rule as used here is consistent with the proposition by Reddaway 
and Glinski that fiscal crises motivated major reforms throughout Russian history.  In their 
analysis, the primary reason for revenue shortfalls related to wartime losses (e.g. Ivan IV’s 
Livonian War, Northern War under Peter the Great, Crimean War of 1853-56, Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-5, World War I and Afghan War of 1979-88).  The threats to national security 
motivated a usually complacent oligarchy to modernize.187  
The predatory rule theory explains why and when institutional change occurred; the land 
governance model describes how the process transpired.  With the major exception of the Great 
Reforms, when political authorities, the bureaucracy, and society all aligned to enable far-reaching 
statutory changes in land rights, the more common pattern was for political authorities to 
restructure property rights with the compliance of the bureaucracy, which served the autocratic 
ruler of the period.   Considering the relative poverty of urban residents throughout the Russian 
                                                 




and Soviet periods,188 and the disincentives for engagement in urban affairs, it is not surprising 
that society shied away from civic activism.   Given the aversion to compulsory participation in 
communist-era organizations, the voluntary initiative of those who took to the streets in the late 
Gorbachev period is that much more remarkable.    
                                                 
188 A. Zaichenko, an economist writing in Argumenty I fakty, described the Soviet “social pyramid” during the 






The Struggle for Urban Land Rights: 1990-2013 
 
The codification of private land ownership, for the first time in seven decades, presented a 
formidable agenda for a weak state.  As trade and economic production collapsed, inflation soared, 
and regions sought sovereignty from the Russian Federation, the Federal Government took on the 
herculean task of putting the essential features of an urban land market in place.  The agenda 
included: “(i) clear and tradable property rights; (ii) efficient market-oriented information systems; 
(iii) a taxation system consistent with efficient land use; and (iv) the publicity and contestability 
of urban planning decisions.”1  This chapter describes why the results of the first decade fell short 
of expectations from a federal policy perspective, and how corrective actions after passage of the 
Land Code in 2001 advanced the urban land privatization agenda.    
From 1990 – 2000, despite legal chaos and contradictory land privatization and fiscal 
policies, aggressive efforts by President Yeltsin and federal political authorities planted the seeds 
of institutional change.  However, their high level of pro-land-privatization activities did not find 
a ready counterpart in bureaucracy or society.  The bureaucracy remained dysfunctional, 
undergoing several redundant restructurings, while society, represented by debate in the Duma 
(legislature), was highly polarized.  Hence, there was no alignment in the land governance model, 
and institutional change was stymied. 
Starting in 2001, the institutional matrix for land privatization altered dramatically.  
President Putin maneuvered the Land Code through the Duma by taking rural land, the most 
contentious issue, off the table.  His appointment of an enlightened bureaucrat, German Gref, led 
to increased investments in land administration and resolution of turf battles among Soviet-era 
                                                 
1 Alain Bertaud and Bertrand Renaud, Cities without Land Markets: Lessons of the Failed Socialist Experiment, 




agencies.  A national unified property registration system emerged after 2008, under President 
Medvedev.  At the same time, federal authorities adjusted fiscal-federalist policies to give 
municipalities 100 percent of land tax receipts, providing local governments an incentive to 
privatize land, and land taxpayers a lever over local governments.  While the national Duma passed 
the Land Code and related Civil Code allowing land to be bought and sold, as the decade wore on, 
it became a drag on institutional change by extending Soviet-era land privileges.  On the other 
hand, civic organizations in some cities came to life, leading several internationally-publicized 
protests in defense of urban land rights.  Thus, there was greater alignment in the land governance 
model from a federal perspective, but not enough to herald a breakthrough for rapid institutional 
change across the country.   
The chapter begins with a very brief summary of the political and economic context for 
land privatization. It then follows the land governance model and compares the performance of 
political authorities, the bureaucracy, and society across two decades.    The last section compares 
the two periods, including fiscal-federalist policies, and describes the status of urban land 
privatization at the end of the study period. 
 
1. The economic and political context for urban land privatization 
During the two-decade period of this study, institutional change took place against a 
backdrop of dramatic economic swings, social dislocation, and political upheaval. The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 exposed industry to competition that led to 
unsustainable fiscal deficits as the federal government and municipalities financed unprofitable 
enterprises to keep employment from collapsing. In 1998, the Russian Government defaulted on 




savings through ruble devaluation and high inflation.  Public support swelled for protection of 
industry, which also affected the pace of urban land privatization.  Following improved 
macroeconomic management and rising oil and gas prices, the country entered a period of 
sustained growth in 1999 that averaged 5% annually until a dip during the 2008 financial crisis 
(see Table 1).  With the exception of that year, the country also enjoyed a housing boom driven by 
higher personal incomes and access to housing finance.2  Just as economic output contrasted 
sharply between the 1990s to the 2000s, the country pivoted politically from a liberal-leaning but 
polarized government to center-right leadership under an increasingly authoritarian regime.3  
 
Table 1. Social and Economic Indicators, 2007-13 
Russian Federation 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
       
GDP % change,   
y-o-y 
8.5 5.2 -7.8 4.5 4.3 3.0 1.3 
Inflation, CPI, % 
change 




245.6 251.5 259.3 272.5 274.7 286.2 295.7 
Average dollar 
wage, US$ 
532 697 588 698 806 859 942 
 
% of population 
below subsistence 
13.3 13.4 13.0 12.5 12.7 10.7 11.0 





                                                 
2 A record growth of 4.9% was reached in 2012, when 65 million square meters of new housing was constructed, a 
record in the post-communist period.  Oxford Analytica, “Extension of Russian Housing Privatization Misses Goal,” 
April 3, 2013.  Housing production affects demand for urban land. 
3 For an excellent discussion of the contrast between the two periods, both politically and economically, see Timothy 
M. Frye, Building States and Markets after Communism:  The Perils of Polarized 




2. The Land Governance Model, 1990-2000 
a. Political authority and the legal order, 1990-2000 
As Soviet power waned in 1990-91,4 four legal acts adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the 
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) struck down seven decades of communist 
faith in the sanctity of state-owned property.  These included two laws detailing property rights 
and two that established land as an economic asset.  As Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, 
Boris Yeltsin was in a position to counter the conservative land policies of his political and 
personal nemesis, President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR.  Land reform and political 
competition were inextricably linked.5  At the same time, Yeltsin consistently favored liberal 
economic policies and moved early to privatize assets, to prevent the Communist Party from 
returning to power.6 
In November 1990, for the first time since passage of the 1922 Soviet Civil Code, the law 
“On Land Reform” of the RSFSR introduced the concept of private property.7  Thereafter, Yeltsin 
launched a series of initiatives that defined new principles for land and related policies based on 
private ownership, including a Land Code (April 1991).8  Councils of People’s Deputies at the 
municipal level, popularly elected for the first time in 1990, were authorized to assign land plots 
                                                 
4 On December 25, 1991, President Gorbachev signed a decree that dissolved the USSR. Boris Yeltsin was elected 
President of RSFSR in June 1991, and he continued in office as head of the newly-independent Russian Federation. 
5 According to Wegran, the rivalry strengthened Yeltsin’s commitment to anticommunism in all forms, including 
land privatization.  Stephen K. Wegran, Land Reform in Russia: Institutional Design and Behavioral Responses, 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 37. Wegran provides an excellent overview of debates 
pertaining to rural (rather than urban) land in the late Soviet, Yeltsin and Putin periods. 
6 Timothy M. Frye, Building States and Markets after Communism:  The Perils of Polarized 
Democracy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Kindle location 2287. 
7 The Code did not explicitly deal with land tenure but extinguished pre-revolutionary private rights.  The 1936 
USSR Constitution confirmed the collectivization of rural land yet affirmed personal ownership rights.  See Butler 
(2009) 388-390. 
8 RSFSR Law No.x, dated November 23, 1990, “On Land Reform;” amendments to the Constitution on December 
15, 1990; “Law on Property” dated December 24, 1990; Land Code of the RSFSR, dated April 25, 1991. RF Law 




for private ownership or to transfer the rights to the underlying land whenever a residential building 
or structure was transferred from one citizen to another through sale or gift.  In appearance this 
continued the Soviet practice whereby those in positions of power could selectively allocate land, 
except now rights for private ownership were being transferred, not simply opportunities for 
personal use, and the rights could not be revoked, as in the past.   In addition, buildings and land 
could be unified as a single property. The Land Code was a significant step to remove the socialist-
era distinction between use rights to land and to structures.9   
At the same time, in 1991 the Law on Payments for Land introduced the concept of land 
as an economic resource and laid the basis for the 1991 Law on Land Tax requiring owners of land 
to pay a tax and users of land (under a lease) to pay an annual rent.  The law laid out the objects 
of taxation, the calculation methodology, the rates for land sale, rental and taxation, and the 
revenue-sharing formula to allocate revenues among levels of government.  Average tax rates per 
square meter of urban land were set in the 1991 law.  The land tax became the basis for the purchase 
price of land. 10 Following Soviet rather than market principles, the land purchase price was 
initially calculated according to a norm (standard) set at fifty times the land tax.11   
The concept and intent were sound, but the legislation was deeply flawed.  The law 
recognized the importance of property rights and property taxes as a foundation of municipal 
finance, tied to a legally registered parcel of land.12  Indeed, the law was aimed at raising revenues 
while encouraging efficient land use.13  Nevertheless, without a market mechanism to determine 
                                                 
9 Alexander Pusanov, Development of the Real Estate Rights System in Russia in 1989-2009, (Moscow:  Institute for 
Urban Economics), 3-4. 
http://www.urbaneconomics.ru/eng/publications.php?folder_id=19&mat_id=86&from=fp&page_id=373. 
10 Jane H. Malme and Natalia Kalinina, “Property Tax Developments in the Russian Federation,” in Jane H. Malme 
and Joan M. Youngman, eds., The Development of Property Taxation in Countries in Transition:  Case Studies from 
Central and Eastern Europe, (Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, 2001), 72. 
11 Pusanov, Development of Real Estate Rights, 4. 
12 Bertaud and Renaud, Cities without Land Markets, 31. 




prices as market values changed, municipal authorities acquired a valuable resource that could 
easily be traded, at their discretion, for private gain.14  As inflation rose rapidly, the real purchase 
price plummeted, but could not be adjusted without passage of national legislation.  Moreover, 
municipal authorities could vary the tax rate in a given district so long as the rates were averaged 
across the city to stay within the limit set by law.  This led to a significant amount of arbitrary and 
negotiated rates for different users, and taxation rates for similar land parcels became 
“unjustifiably disproportional” across the country.15  Finally, the law did not draw a distinction 
between rates for leasing, to capture the economic value of land use, and taxes, to compensate for 
benefits provided by the public treasury to landowners.  As a consequence, an implicit subsidy was 
written into the law for those who chose to lease land rather than purchase it.16 
Even as these laws were being passed, land reform faced social opposition and political 
headwinds during the Soviet period.  Since land had no economic value, and was bartered rather 
than exchanged transparently on an open market, the concept of trading land commercially as part 
of real property was alien to the population.  Moreover, given a longer legacy in Russian history 
of communal land use compared to Western Europe, the right to buy and sell land like a commodity 
raised considerable concern at all levels of society.17 At the same time, leftist parties in the 
parliament (Communists, Agrarians) remained ideologically opposed to private land ownership of 
any kind, most vehemently with respect to agricultural land, which was defined to include garden 
plots in both urban and rural settings.  There was no real consensus within the Yeltsin 
                                                 
14 Pusanov, Development of Real Estate Rights, 4. 
15 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Land Administration Review of the Russian 
Federation, (HBP/WP.7/2003/, May 17, 2003), 9.  Bertaud and Renaud, Cities without Land Markets, 32-33. 
16 Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) of World Bank-IFC, Business Location Report, Russia (2001), 
Appendix III-16.  This would be the case when land was allocated only upon payment of the land rent and no initial 
price was paid for the right to lease.  Some cities, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, required up-front payments 
for the right to lease. 




administration on the directions or objectives of land reform.  They also underestimated the need 
to build a constituency for land reform at local levels and to decentralize the execution of reform 
measures.  Thus the privatization of land – not just of property on the land -- was politically 
contested and socially sensitive.18  
By 1993, the process was perceived as severely corrupt, leading Yeltsin, now President of 
the Russian Federation, to issue a decree that suspended much of the Land Code adopted in April 
1991. He instead issued a decree giving physical and juridical persons19  the right to sell and 
purchase land plots.20  The decree was intended to remain in place until the adoption of a new land 
code.   Thereafter, in December 1993, the right to private ownership of housing and land was 
enshrined in the Constitution.21  In a Soviet-era holdover, the Constitution declared multiple ‘forms 
of ownership,’ including State and municipal, though private ownership had pride of first place.22  
However, the Constitution also required the adoption of a land code or federal legislation to enable 
citizens and firms to exercise their legal rights by buying and selling land.23 Without the power to 
transact, property rights are meaningless.  Yet given the fierce ideological debates and politically 
contentious issues surrounding land privatization, another eight years passed before President 
Putin could realize this goal.  
                                                 
18 Vera Matusevich, “Land Reform in the Russian Federation:  Why it was not that Efficient,” mimeo (2011); 
UNECE, Land Administration Review, 6-7, 25; Thomas F. Remington, “Russia’s Federal Assembly and the Land 
Code,” East European Constitutional Review, (Rev. 99, 2002), 99-104. 
http://www.heinonline.org.proxy3.library.jhu.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/eeurcr11&id=231&collection=jo
urnalsRemington 2002; World Bank, Implementation Completion Report (ICR) on a Loan in the Amount of US$80 
Million to the Russian Federation for a Russia Land Reform Implementation Support Project, Report No: CPL-
37560 (2004), 8.    
19 Russian law distinguishes between physical persons (individuals) and juridical persons (businesses). 
20 Decree No. 1767, “On Regulating Land Relations and Promoting Agrarian Reform in Russia,” October 1993.  
21 Pusanov, Development of Real Estate Rights, 3-4. 
22 Butler observes that “in a market economy there is no reason why the State or municipal formations should own, 
possess, or dispose of property or property rights on the basis of a form of ownership which differs from other actors 
in property relations.”   Russian Law (2009, 403).  Oxford University Press.  




   Yeltsin’s bargaining power with the regions on land privatization was constrained by 
conflicts with the regions over fiscal-federalist policies.  During the “parade of sovereignties” in 
1992-93, when 30 out of 89 regions stopped remitting taxes to the Federal Government,24 there 
was no longer a Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to resolve inter-regional issues.25 
Inflation, mass privatization, and the federal effort to push expenditure responsibilities to the 
regions further complicated fiscal relations.26 The Federation Treaty signed by Yeltsin on March 
21, 1992 with all regions but Chechnya and Tatarstan did not resolve fundamental 
intergovernmental issues.27 For example, tax offices retained local loyalties.28 Using multivariate 
regression analysis, Treisman found that regions with labor unrest or that declared sovereignty by 
1990 were favored with tax breaks and fiscal transfers in 1992.  Both St. Petersburg and Moscow 
became net donors to the Federal Treasury, but Tatarstan, which had declared sovereignty, was a 
net beneficiary.  
Land privatization and fiscal federalist rules evolved as contradictory rather than 
complementary exercises, even though the initial intention was to assign all land and property 
taxes to the local level.  Three obstacles arose.  First, negotiations between the Federal Government 
and the region, and then the region and the municipality, tended to determine revenue-sharing 
more than budget laws.  Second, revenues from land taxes and land leases were combined into one 
account.  Hence, there was no incentive on the part of municipal authorities, who collected and 
remitted the funds upward, to differentiate between leasing and taxing land. Third, the tax on 
                                                 
24 Christine I. Wallich, Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994), 248. 
25 Daniel Treisman, “The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia.” British Journal of 
Political Science.  Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), Cambridge University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/194103. 
Accessed: 25/11/2014, 303-304. 
26 Wallich, Fiscal Federalism, 6. 
27 Treisman, “The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers,” 304. 




property was managed separately from the tax on land.  The property tax was too expensive to 
implement (the cost of collection exceeded the revenues remitted), so many localities dropped it 
altogether. Had land and buildings been combined and taxed as one real estate object, land 
privatization and fiscal incentives would have been complimentary. 29   In turn, it would have 
encouraged land privatization through a fiscal incentive, and transformed land and property taxes 
into a “benefit tax” that related directly to local services (e.g. quality of schools and social 
services).  Instead, it was in the interest of local authorities to manage leases off-budget or to under-
report revenues so as to keep more funds in the local budget. 
Thus from the perspective of the requirements for private land markets noted above –clear 
and tradable property rights and efficient tax systems – the legal and fiscal framework was 
incomplete and inconsistent and remained so throughout the 1990s.   Land ownership varied by 
form of property or use.  Hereditary life tenure gave permanent use rights to occupants for single 
family dwellings and garden plots.  The property could be passed to heirs but not sold or leased.  
If a municipality wanted to use the underlying land, e.g. for construction of a road, it would only 
need to compensate the occupant for the dwelling, not the land.  Leasehold enabled owners of a 
privatized structure to use underlying land for up to 49 years, subject to payment of rent for the 
lease to municipalities; land tenants were not liable for a tax to compensate for government 
services, such as infrastructure.  Enterprises retained the Soviet-era “perpetual use” privileges on 
land they occupied, until it was purchased or converted to leasehold.  Agricultural land, including 
                                                 
29 Another constraint was the frequent adjustments of land taxes and lease rates by municipalities that had no 
relation to market value, discouraging new investment in landed property and efficient land allocation.  They also 
led to perversely high taxes on individual and business property (office buildings, homes, factories) that were highly 
depreciated and in need of renovation. This in turn increased tax evasion and discouraged registration of new 
construction. As early as 1997, an estimated five million homes were not registered, meaning the land they occupied 




small plots inside urban boundaries, could be held privately but not sold for ten years or leased for 
more than five.30  
Most significantly from the standpoint of economic development, the land under privatized 
enterprises remained the property of municipalities.  According to Pyle, the reason why Russia 
failed to privatize land and buildings as a single real estate unit, as was done in Eastern Europe 
and several former Soviet Republics like Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, was due to the assumed 
complexity of the task and desire for speed more than ideological opposition to land privatization.31 
As discussed in the next section, the complexity of defining land plots and registering property 
was certainly a constraint.  Yet the differing reactions of the regions to decrees by Yeltsin in 1994-
95, which significantly lowered the price of enterprise land plots, and in 1997, which gave regions 
full authority to set land prices, suggest that political considerations were also important.  After 
1995, over 50 regions rapidly sold enterprise-attached land, with St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, 
Kaluga, Samara, Vladimir, Astrakhan, and others among the top twenty in level of activity.32 Yet 
after 1997, when Yeltsin gave the regions authority to set land prices, the process of enterprise 
land privatization practically dried up, either because of high sales prices set by municipalities, or 
outright bans on sales.  In 32 regions, the process came to a halt, including Moscow city, where 
the local legislature allowed only leasehold but not private ownership.  Political motivations are 
also evident in the rejection by the federal legislature of the Government’s first voucher 
privatization bill because it included the sale of land under enterprises or factories.33  The more 
                                                 
30 Bertaud and Renaud, Cities without Land Markets, 28-29. 
31 William Pyle, “The Ownership of Industrial Land in Russian Cities: Explaining Patterns of Privatization Across 
Regions and Firms,” (NCEEER Working Paper, 2011), 3-4.. 
32 Pusanov, Development of Real Estate Rights, 7. 
33 Leonid Bershidsky, “Yeltsin Decree Launches Privatization Phase 2,” Moscow Times, Jul. 23 1994,  
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/yeltsin-decree-launches-privatization-phase-2/350200.html. 
Bershidsky reports that Chubais agreed to hold off on land privatization until parliament passed a land code 
containing land-ownership rules. After deputies still failed to agree on the privatization decree, he pulled back on 




likely reason for the continued bifurcation of buildings and land was that municipalities wanted to 
keep control over valuable urban land for a future stream of rents.34   
Despite political opposition and disarray in the regions, President Yeltsin demonstrated 
strong political will and commitment to drive urban land reform.  During his tenure, 77 presidential 
decrees and government resolutions were passed related to land and property rights.   The State 
monopoly on land ownership was abolished.  Nevertheless the legal order remained highly 
fragmented at the national, regional and municipal level.  The first stage of urban land reforms had 
not met the expectations of society, according to the head of Moscow’s legal department for land 
relations, making it less likely that regions would want to conform to federal policies, even under 
a more centralized government. 35  The situation was reminiscent of the pre-Stolypin period in the 
late 19th century when a patchwork of legal acts applied to different forms of land ownership.36 
Private land ownership was “a classic Russian muddle: it exists in theory, not in practice.”37   The 
historical context of the new laws, the speed of implementation, and sensitivity to the social impact 
of reforms resulted in sub-optimal economic outcomes.38  
b. Bureaucratic Organization and Performance 1990-2000 
The most urgent priority for the land bureaucracy in the 1990s was to develop a system to 
register and guarantee rights to private property, which, when combined with a land code, would 
                                                 
34 Gregory Kisunko and Jacqueline Coolidge, “Survey of Land and Real Estate Transactions in the Russian 
Federation,” Policy Research Working Paper 4115, (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2007).  
35 V.V. Soldatenkov, Chief of Legal Department, Moscow City Committee for Land Use, “Pravovoe  regulirovanie 
kupli-prodazhi prava arendy zemel’nykh uchastov po konkursu v gorode Moskve.”  Chernye dyry v Rossiiskom 
Zakonodatel’ctve . Vol. 1, 2001.  http://www.k-press.ru/bh/2001/1/soldatenkov/soldatenkov.asp. Accessed 
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36 Leonid Limonov and Tatyana Vlasova, editors,  Upravlenie Nedvizhimostiu i Zemel’nimi Resursami Predpriati, 
(Leontief Center, St. Petersburg, 2002).  Mimeo. 
37 The Economist, March 8, 2001. 




lay the basis for private investments in land.   The Yeltsin Administration underestimated the 
importance of measuring, registering and monitoring compliance with land law as a foundation for 
tenure security.  It failed to develop the supportive infrastructure for secure land rights, allowing 
Soviet-era practices to persist throughout the 1990s.39   
Two federal omissions contributed to weak bureaucratic performance, nationally and 
regionally.  First, Soviet-era land administration agencies were not restructured or modernized.  
The State Committee of the Russian Federation for Land Resources and Land Management 
(Roskomzem) carried responsibility for land regulation and administration, including at the local 
level, but was ill-equipped to manage these tasks on market principles.  Some Soviet-era expertise 
was relevant and highly advanced in important areas, including surveying, geodesy, and mapping.  
Absent from Soviet practice were many complex systems that needed to be created and developed, 
including fiscal and legal cadastres, registration of rights to land and real property, market-based 
valuation of land, and mass evaluation of land for tax purposes.40  Even had Roskomzem 
appreciated this complexity, it was distracted by overseeing a multiplicity of Soviet-era agencies 
at the local level, including for surveying, architectural planning, building (technical) inventories, 
and construction.  Since land prices were set administratively rather than by market value, the 
allocation of land by municipal agencies followed Soviet-era needs and norms, with significant 
negative externalities.    
                                                 
39 This section draws on Bertaud and Renaud, Cities without Land Markets; Alain Bertaud, “The Development of 
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Second, the legal foundation for registration was not seriously considered until the adoption 
of several acts in 1997-98. 41   These contributed to bureaucratic fragmentation by separating the 
related functions of registration of rights, on one hand, from the cadastral mapping of land plots 
and inventory of structures, on the other.  Moreover, federal laws and resolutions were not 
supported by normative regulations and administrative reforms to enable orderly implementation 
throughout the Russian Federation.   
The experience of the World Bank in supporting a US$110 million Government project for 
land reform implementation reflects the bureaucratic challenges of the period.42  Approved in mid-
1994, when opposition to agricultural land sales was high in the Duma (Parliament), the World 
Bank took a calculated risk by financing a project to accelerate land reform in rural areas through 
introduction of a uniform land registration system.  Following adoption of the Law on Registration, 
Roskomzem lost its function of registering land rights to the Ministry of Justice.  Thereafter, 
Roskomzem was abolished and replaced by a new Ministry (Land Policy, Housing and Municipal 
Economy) that lasted less than six months.   The World Bank took stock of the shifting terrain and 
agreed with the Government to refocus the project on the system of land cadastre mapping and 
valuation, primarily in urban areas.   As a pre-condition for land registration and a basic 
infrastructure requirement for land markets, the project thus took the more modest but nevertheless 
essential goal of mapping, valuing, and recording land parcels for tax purposes.  
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The Law on Registration further confused the division of responsibilities among agencies 
at the federal level and made land administration at the municipal level even more dysfunctional.  
The Ministry of Justice, technically responsible for registration, had no control over the registration 
chambers created by regional authorities.  Three separate agencies kept records and charged 
different fees for what would be a single piece of real property in market economies: one for the 
land plot (cadastral chamber), one for structures (technical bureau), and another for land rights 
(registration chamber).  They did not share information, organizational systems, or technologies.43 
A report commissioned by the Russian Government from the Land Working Party of the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe summarized the situation in the 1990s as follows:   
The institutional structure of state land administration in the Russian Federations is 
characterized by ambiguous departmental responsibilities, deep conflicts of interests 
between various agencies, and the wide distribution of liabilities for decisions. As a 
result, the decision-making process requires numerous interagency consultations, which 
delays decisions on major economic issues, and spreads confusion among other partners 
and citizens approaching the land administration authorities.44 
 
Looking back, a 2014 government report observed that one of the biggest mistakes from 
the early period was to fail to prepare human resources in agencies or the population at large for 
land registration.45  Following more liberal rules regarding ownership of land under homes and 
farms (as opposed to enterprises), demand exploded for registering ownership rights for small-
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44 UNECE May 2003, 13-14. In a holdover from Soviet law that treated land as an object of planning rather than an 
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scale housing construction and agricultural use.  Given weak bureaucratic capacity, local land 
committees struggled as of 1993 to issue titles to 50 million households for dachas and garden 
plots and to 175,000 newly privatized farms.46 Pressure continued to grow as individual housing 
construction nearly doubled to 10 million square meters by 1996.47 Most of these titles were 
recorded unsystematically in the Land Books of local governments, and were not recognized by 
the Federal Government as proof of land rights.48  
At the end of the 1990s, the Federal Government recognized a more systemic approach 
was needed.   A maze of laws and decrees covering land relations had led to “legal chaos” and 
implementation of land reform measures was underfinanced.49 The Russian financial crisis in 
August 1998 retarded real estate market development and new political initiatives on urban land.50  
Though it was not designated as the lead agency in land issues, the Ministry of Economy took 
responsibility to develop and promulgate the Federal Targeted Program “Development of Land 
Reform in the Russian Federation 1999-2002,” laying the basis for adoption of the Land Code in 
December 2001 after a decade of debate.   
c. Public Participation in Land Market Decisions 1990-2000 
In advanced market economies there are multiple opportunities for public engagement in 
land rights issues, starting with legislative bodies at the national and local levels, and extending to 
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47 Paragraph 3, Article 6 on the “Right of Ownership to Real Estate in the Housing Sector” states that “Private 
ownership of real estate or its part in the housing sector is not limited in terms of quantity, size or value; is secured 
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neighborhood-level decisions on new development projects.  Local land use regulations and zoning 
depend heavily on public participation.  Landowners want to protect their investment by 
preventing newcomers from developing real estate in a manner that could decrease land values, 
such as building a sewage plant next to a luxury townhome.  Public hearings or civic protests give 
property owners an opportunity to influence public or private development plans (e.g. for roads or 
high-rise buildings) and new land-use regulations.51  These mechanisms also allow citizens to 
protect or preserve public space or objects of cultural heritage from unwanted development 
projects either by the state or private developers.52  Such practices were just beginning at the end 
of the 19th century in Russia when Soviet central planning replaced nascent urban land markets.53   
In the 1990s, the primary locus for public debate on land rights was in parliament.  Leading 
the opposition, Communist Party chairman Genady Zhuganov declared that “In Russia, land, air 
and water must belong to all the people, and not to concrete individuals.” 54   Following adoption 
of the Constitution in 1993 and Civil Code in 1994, Yeltsin often avoided the conservatively-
oriented (and democratically elected) Duma by exercising power through decrees and Government 
resolutions.  The direction of land reform was often tenuous, with competing versions of legislation 
adopted by one house of parliament, overturned by the other, or vetoed by the President.    
For example, on May 7, 1996 the President tried to implement the Constitutional 
requirement for a land code by decree.  He reaffirmed the right of citizens to private land and 
ordered acceleration of reforms in Decree 337 “On the Implementation of Citizens’ Constitutional 
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Rights.”  In the same month,  the State Duma (lower house) overturned the decree and used the 
opportunity to pass a conservative version of the Land Code that retracted the sale of land owned 
by peasant farmers and annulled rights granted earlier to landowners.   In June 1996, the Federation 
Council (upper house) rejected the Duma version.  A similar stalemate occurred in summer 1998 
when the Duma debated a compromise bill acceptable to the President, but then failed to garner 
the necessary 226 votes for passage.  Likewise, changes to Chapter 17 of the Civil Code to regulate 
business transactions on non-agricultural land remained blocked by the communist-agrarian 
lobby.55   
A high level of political polarization underpinned the Duma’s inability to pass privatization 
legislation acceptable to all factions, both before and after the 1996 presidential election.56  
Polarization in the Duma reflected a sharp split in society. During his re-election campaign, Yeltsin 
put a high profile on private property and carried the vote in urban areas, while rural residents 
mainly backed the Communists.  Public surveys undertaken in 1995-96 suggest that Yeltsin knew 
the preferences of his electorate.  Private land ownership enjoyed the support of 59% of 
respondents, a higher percentage than those who favored privatization of other state property 
(46%).  Those holding the most liberal (pro-market) views were likely to have a university 
education, be younger and wealthier, and live in a large urban area.57     
In contrast to the national-level debate, which received widespread and independent 
coverage in the media, opportunities in local communities for political action or public 
                                                 
55 Remington, “Russia’s Federal Assembly and the Land Code;” Matusevich,, “Land Reform: Why not that 
Efficient.” 
56 Timothy M Frye,  Building States and Markets after Communism:  The Perils of Polarized 
Democracy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Kindle location 2399.  Frye defines political 
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involvement remained limited due to inadequacies in Federal Law No. 3295-1, “On the 
Fundamentals of Town Planning Activities in the Russian Federation.” Adopted in July 1992, it 
retained the vertical structure of land planning, whereby Federal ministries decided how land in 
municipalities could be planned, allocated and zoned, not just for government purposes but also 
for private or commercial use.   The law did not provide precise definitions of activities to be 
regulated. Nor did it specify how citizens could be involved in land planning or zoning decisions.  
In 1998, the Duma passed the Town Planning Code No. 73-FZ, which opened the door to the 
development of land use zoning standards by local governments.   While the Code was declarative 
rather than obligatory, cities such as Velikiy Novgorod, Tver, Pushkin and Irkutsk began to 
experiment with urban development planning, and Kazan, Samara, Khabarovsk and Ufa were 
among the cities that adopted regulations.58  
While town planning laws were adopted and some experiments were undertaken by sub-
Federal authorities, the process of land use allocation had barely changed since the Soviet Union 
had disintegrated.  Land use zoning was progressing slowly.  In the absence of appropriate federal 
legislation, bureaucrats in municipalities and regions actively traded land according to local laws.59  
Without published data on land market values, a black market in land flourished in the regions, 
outside of public view.  Urban development projects tended to favor large investors with links to 
local officials or bureaucrats rather than protecting the rights of small property owners.60  
The importance of zoning and urban planning is rarely discussed in the literature on 
property rights, but the implications for economic development and security of private urban land 
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ownership are evident in painful transitions now underway in formerly socialist cities. 61  In a 
market economy, firms and households decide how to trade off location with the time and cost of 
transport according to business or personal needs, and land values adjust according to these 
decisions.   Land density and values are thus higher in city centers where transport time is shorter.   
Land use regulations that are clear and transparent help reduce the possible negative effects of 
competing land uses.  Such planning is an important “corrective” in market economies that is 
exercised through public hearings, discussed further below.  
In contrast, land had no locational value in the Soviet period, leading to highly distorted 
patterns of urban development.  This was because the absence of land markets did not allow for 
allocation of land plots according to competitive prices that would determine the most efficient 
locations for construction of different forms of real estate.  Instead, planning ministries drove the 
selection of industrial sites.  As a result, industrial enterprises were located in prime locations at 
the center of cities that in a 20th-century market economy would be occupied by high-rise 
buildings.  Furthermore, with highly subsidized energy prices, planners did not factor in the cost 
of urban transport, leading to a concentration of urban housing and population density on the 
periphery.  With the exception of a few historical settlements such as Velikiy Novgorod, highly-
populated urban areas in the Soviet Union most clearly represent the features of the “socialist city,” 
in which population density increases the farther one moves from the center.62  For comparison, in 
1990, population density 17 kilometers outside Moscow was as high as in the center of Paris.   
Whereas modern metropolitan areas in market economies have multiple employment hubs in 
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surrounding suburbs, jobs in the “socialist city” remain centralized, often in declining industries, 
creating urban rust belts with environment risks.63  The structure of a modern Soviet city was thus 
closer to that of urban areas in mid-19th century Europe.  As a consequence,   
the well−intentioned goal of socializing the collection of the land rent through total public 
ownership and allocation of real estate property has yielded unexpected and undesirable 
outcomes. The resulting structure of socialist cities renders the transition to markets 
economically much more difficult and socially painful.64 
 
 In principle, privatization of urban real estate, accompanied by appropriate policies to 
finance urban infrastructure, should have improved the efficiency of land development and the city 
structure, to the benefit of business and the well-being of citizens.  As of the end of the 1990s this 
had not happened.  To the contrary, as in St. Petersburg, the share of housing, green zones and 
cultural areas have declined, while commercial building increased, primarily because the 
municipality remains the monopoly landlord.65  Hence, even with new laws for town planning, 
without an urban land market, and in the absence of information on large development projects, 
municipalities in most regions continued to allocate land as during the Soviet period, without 
engaging citizens in decision-making. 66 
 
3.  The Land Governance Model, 2001-2013 
a. Political Authorities and the Legal Order, 2001-2013 
Beginning in 2001, Putin pursued pragmatic solutions to expand private urban land 
ownership, as did President Medvedev during his 2008-2012 term in office. While Putin was 
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initially cautious, he and a group of enlightened bureaucrats led by German Gref, Minister of 
Economic Development and Trade, set out to convert land privileges to land rights, and thus 
reverse the predominant tradition of land institutions initiated under Peter the Great and preserved 
in the Soviet era.  The agenda advanced in several respects. First, the focus of political authorities 
shifted from privatization to security of land rights, and the legal order evolved from general 
principles of private ownership, without a firm basis in legislative acts, to specific guarantees for 
land market relations, enshrined in the Civil and Land Codes.  Second, the fiscal framework was 
reformed to compliment rather than contradict land privatization.  Third, the role of government 
agencies rose in importance through the reorganization, consolidation and professionalization of 
the land administration bureaucracy at the national level.   This in turn led to improved citizen 
services and a feedback channel from citizens to government agencies at the local level.   
At the start of the decade this path of institutional change would not have appeared obvious.  
However, the composition of the Duma and Federation Council (upper chamber) became more 
centrist after the 1999 parliamentary elections, and President Putin, elected in March 2000 on the 
first ballot, worked more through compromise than confrontation with the Duma.67 The new 
environment inspired a renewal of efforts by liberal-leaning parties to pass a land code.   Following 
several failed attempts, on January 26, 2001 the Duma voted 229-168 to pass in the first reading 
Chapter 17 of the Civil Code regulating sales of non-agricultural land.68 This created an opening 
for movement on the Land Code because it provided the legal framework for purchase and sale of 
urban land plots.  The margin was narrow, since 226 votes were required for amendments to the 
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Civil Code.  Nevertheless, Prime Minister Kasyanov seized the opportunity to press for land 
reform and instructed the Government to prepare a Land Code for submission to the Duma.69   
It is significant that President Putin waited until five days after the vote to come out strongly 
in favor of legislation to permit buying and selling of land, which he said was necessary to promote 
economic investment and overcome a system that “favored corruption and arbitrary 
bureaucracy.”70  Putin cautiously staked out a position without offending either the agrarian-
Communist lobby or regional leaders and overtly invited the initiative to come from the regions.71  
Nevertheless, the appointment of German Gref, Minister of Economic Development and Trade72 
to lead the process was a sign of Kremlin sponsorship of major land reform. As a pro-market 
reformer with a strong legal background in property rights, he was tasked to design a land code 
that could bridge the views of government and governors in the upcoming legislative debate.    
The emotional and contentious legislative fight over land privatization dragged for nearly 
a year.  It originated first in the Duma, where a 4-party coalition barely passed the Land Code in 
the first reading,73 then shifted to the regions on a constitutional challenge from the Communists, 
then came back to the Federation Council, where a new law on appointment of the upper house 
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representatives strengthened the constituency in favor of pro-presidential parties.   The transfer of 
the draft Land Code from the agrarian to the property committee in May 2001 by the Duma 
leadership and the removal of agricultural land from the code, a clever move by the Putin 
Administration, enhanced the chances of success.74 But most significantly, 79% of the new 
members of the Federation Council voted in favor of the Code.  As they had recently been 
appointed by regional executive organs, they aimed to increase their bargaining power with the 
executive branch by supporting the Kremlin.75  
Approval of the Land Code in November 2001 was a watershed event that clarified the 
conceptual framework for land by unifying land and buildings as one real estate unit, but the more 
critical turning point from an economic perspective was the approval in April 2001 of Chapter 17 
of the Civil Code.   Boris Nemtsov, leader of the Union of Right Forces faction, described its 
enactment as an act of stealth: 
The Communists slept through the land issue – back in March, when Pavel Krasheninnikov 
stood up in the Duma to say – in a monotonous, quiet, insidious voice – that another item 
should be added to the 17th article of the Civil Code, setting out the rules for land 
transactions: inheritance, sales, gifts, leases.  By the end of his speech everyone was half-
asleep, and the vote was overwhelmingly in favor.  That was the start – that’s the moment 
when the land revolution took place in Russia, but nobody noticed it.76 
 
The immediate result of the adoption of the Land Code was a rapid rise in enterprise land 
privatization.   The reason reflected economic behavior: enterprises wanted to buy before land 
prices rose.  The law enacting the Land Code in 2002 set a floor and ceiling for land prices as a 
multiple of the land tax rate, with a higher range allowed in more populous areas (from 5 to 30 
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times) and a lower range in settlements with less than 500,000 residents (from 3 to 10 times).   A 
short window opened before regions adopted laws to reset land prices locally, usually at the highest 
price allowed by law.  Applications surged to repurchase land plots. This led to: 
...very serious battles on the issue of the rate of the repurchase price, as a result of which 
the repurchase price was considerably reduced, right down to the minimum price (e.g. in 
Tomsk and Irkutsk oblasts).  A minimal rate was set by the legislators of Nizhniy 
Novgorod oblast, but the local governors vetoed these resolutions.  In some regions 
considerable changes in terms of repurchasing land plots took place on numerous 
occasions over a short span of time (in Kemerovo, Novosibirsk and Vologda oblasts).77 
Despite these regional battles, nation-wide, owners of privatized enterprises and real estate 
repurchased approximately 11,000 hectares78 of land valued at 14 billion rubles ($450 million) in 
2002 alone.79  
The first Putin Administration (2000-2004) missed a significant opportunity to harmonize 
fiscal and land privatization policies. A two-step reform in the Tax Code considerably tightened 
the Federal Government’s control over tax policy, allowing it to accept or deny local tax rates and 
types of taxes.80  The advantage of centralization was that it was more cost-effective.  The 
disadvantage was that the tax-sharing formula reduced incentives to raise revenues locally, and 
did not respect the “benefit principle” whereby local taxes procure goods and services for local 
taxpayers.81  Instead of motivating local governments with 100% of land tax receipts, the Federal 
Government continued to claw back 50%, dampening incentives to privatize.  Administrative 
price-setting also remained in the law implementing the Land Code.  Finally, because land and 
property registration (cadastral surveys, delineation of boundaries, etc.) was not sufficiently 
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developed, the onus was on local authorities to build expensive systems to take advantage of a land 
tax.  Given the incentive environment and high transaction costs, it is not surprising that many 
local authorities preferred to engage in commercial real estate activity and lease state property, 
with negative externalities on the local investment climate.82 
 Recognizing flaws in the infrastructure for land registration and taxation systems, Prime 
Minister Kasyanov chaired an extraordinary Cabinet meeting on land reform in October 2003.  He 
noted that the creation of a transparent and open land market was a top Government priority, to 
stimulate investment and growth.   Economy Minister Gref then reported that market transactions 
in land were still insignificant, only 7.5% of the total land fund was privatized, and 97% of this 
amount was agricultural.  His proposals to promote the productive potential of land included:  i) a 
one-stop window to record cadastral surveys and register land rights; ii) pilot valuation of land to 
lay the basis for real estate taxes; iii) clear borders for the nearly 900,000 federal, regional and 
municipal land parcels, of which only 200,000 had been delimited;  iv) a process for competitive 
land allocation in municipalities (mainly for construction purposes); and v) measures to require 
enterprises with ‘perpetual’ use rights to either purchase or lease the land they occupied by January 
1, 2004, and thus end one of the most pernicious practices of the Soviet era, by removing the right 
of municipal authorities to reclaim land under an enterprise building.  The Cabinet adopted a 
resolution in support of these measures, stressing priorities on the registration of land, the 
unification of enterprise property, and the harmonization of regional regulation with federal laws.83   
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To complement these measures, federal fiscal incentives and urban land policies started to 
become mutually reinforcing after 2005, during the second Putin Administration.  Most 
importantly, local governments received 100% of the personal property and land tax (for Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, 84.5%). The formula to derive land taxes was universal across Russia, but 
municipalities received authority to set the rate within a prescribed ratio of the cadastral value.84     
As discussed in the next section, the establishment of the Russian Registration Agency (Rosreestr) 
in 2008 ended the turf battles that had hampered coordination among Soviet-era bureaucratic 
organizations.  At the same time, a Federal Targeted Program ramped up investments in an 
electronic, unified property registration system.  A unified property tax was still far in the future, 
but the foundation was laid.85   
To stimulate enterprise repurchases further, the Government pushed amendments to the 
land privatization law in 2008 that capped the price of land at a maximum of 2.5% of the cadastre 
value (20% for Moscow and St. Petersburg).  This served to lower the repurchase price by 5 times 
on average nationwide.  Yet it did not accelerate the rate of land privatization as much as 
expected.86 Aside from pricing incentives, President Putin called a special State Council Presidium 
meeting on October 9, 2012 to address other constraints, including ownership forms, land zoning, 
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information access, state boundary delimitation, and competitive tenders. Introducing the 
discussion, he observed: 
We must admit that our land potential is still managed ineffectively. Reforms of this sector are proceeding 
very slowly and laboriously. The situation has gradually begun to change only in the past six or seven years. 
This is a great challenge for our country because Russia has never had private ownership of land, or only for 
a very brief period and even then in a limited form. 
Today there is great demand for land in our country.  More and more people are interested in purchasing land 
to build homes or do business. However, both companies and individuals are constantly faced with an 
unreasonable amount of red tape.  The President and the Government of the Russian Federation are 
bombarded with letters on this issue from all across the country. 
People write that it is impossible to find information on available land, that they are in a position of powerless 
petitioners whose demands and needs are ignored, and that it takes three or more years to get a plot of land.  
As a result, land remains unused and is not working for anyone’s benefit. The high-handedness and corruption 
of officials greatly inhibit the full-fledged development of land relations in Russia.  And as a result, this slows 
the progress of the country as a whole.87 
In expressing frustration over continuing difficulties with land privatization, Putin was 
acknowledging that institutional change requires more than intentions expressed in laws or federal 
programs. It either fails or comes to life through the actions of local political authorities, 
bureaucrats, and market actors.   The test of the Putin Administration’s intentions depended on the 
performance of a unified land bureaucracy held to common standards across the country.  
   
b.  Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 2001-2013 
The genesis of poor services to citizens and businesses was the executive branch’s failure 
in the 1990s to recognize the importance of land rights registration, beginning with reform of the 
system and functions of property administration.   Despite approval of the Law on Registration of 
Rights in 1997, Russia had “one of the slowest and most expensive systems of registration found 
anywhere” due to multiple organizations and unresolved issues in linking records on actual 
                                                 




properties to formal legal rights.88  Thus, while the legal order had improved after 2001, weak 
systems for registration of rights still curtailed the development of urban land markets.  As of 2004: 
Despite fundamental changes to the economy and nature of property rights in the Russian Federation…, the 
manner in which real property was administered remained little changed. Responsibility for land, buildings 
and rights to real property were spread across three organizations. There were inadequate linkages between 
the organizations, numerous requirements to transact with real property, and poor access to information. The 
property market was operating inefficiently, investment was frustrated, and property was rarely used as 
security for loans.  Consequently, the contributions of the country’s real property resources to economic 
growth and social stability, as well as government revenue, were falling well short of their potential. 89 
Recognizing these weaknesses, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade initiated 
work on a major package of reforms and investments in line with the recommendations outlined 
by German Gref at the 2003 Presidium.  The package included the establishment of a 
computerized, unified record of real property to help stimulate investments in real estate and 
improve the accountability of public administration through better information flows.  To reach 
these goals, the Government requested implementation support and financing of US$100 million 
from the World Bank.  The request followed the successful completion of the Russia Land Reform 
Implementation Support (LARIS) Project,90 which had invested in infrastructure, mapping data 
and training to modernize real property administration.   LARIS had also studied gaps in the 
existing rights registration system and legal framework, prepared an information and 
communications technology (ICT) strategy, and assessed social attitudes to accommodate citizen 
concerns. This operational experience and sector knowledge contributed to the design of a new 
project to strengthen property registration systems.  
A major constraint on Government land registration objectives was fragmentation of 
bureaucratic structure.  Cadastral (mapping) information on land was handled by an urban or rural 
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land committee, cadastral information on buildings was managed by the Bureau of Technical 
Inventory, and information on property ownership (formal land titles) was held by the Rights 
Registration Service (RRS).   The existence of multiple agencies raised transaction costs for users 
and increased opportunity for corruption when citizens needed to petition for services in face-to-
face meetings.  In 2004, at the beginning of project preparation, the Government merged the 
organizations responsible for land and buildings into the Federal Agency for Cadastre of 
Immovable Property (Cadastre Agency, or CA).  However, the merger of the CA with the RRS 
met with stiff resistance from both agencies, a common phenomenon in public institutional 
reforms.  Given the strong commitment and readiness of the CA, the project focused first on the 
Cadastral Development Project, along with the Federal Targeted Program for land development 
from 2006 to 2011.   The Bank coordinated with both agencies to ensure close technology and 
information linkages.   
The project aimed to reduce the average time for completion of transactions in immovable 
property from four months (80 business days), the baseline business standard in Russia as of end-
2004, to one month (20 business days) by project closing in end-2009.   This key outcome indicator 
would be aided by the creation of market competition in technical survey services, which at the 
time were controlled by government agencies.  In addition, several intermediate targets were set 
to help reach the key outcome, including reduction of steps requiring the client to interact with the 
CA, an increase in the number of applications processed per staff person, a reduction in the time 
spent in the cadastre office, and an increase in client satisfaction with cadastre offices, measured 
by client surveys.    
The US$100 million loan financed activities to achieve the project goals, including 




services), ICT systems, and a pilot of mass appraisal methodologies for land and real estate by 
municipal authorities, to support Gref’s goal of more equitable property taxation.   Bank financing 
was modest compared to the Government’s own investments in the Federal Targeted Program, 
which covered complementary activities.91 
Despite these efforts, the decision to accelerate a functional land cadastre, with semi-
autonomous units handling buildings and land, rather than pursue a unified registration system 
under one agency, failed to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding real estate market.  According 
to the Urban Institute, “technical and organizational considerations and departmental interests have 
obscured the essential truth that the system should be established not for the sake of registration 
as such, but for the sake of providing state guarantees of registered rights.”92  While aiming to 
bring more order into regional land committee activities and conformance with federal laws, the 
federal bureaucracy failed to bring coherence to the system of land governance through a single 
state structure. 
Five years after Gref recommended a one-window concept of rights registration to the 
Presidium, the Government decided to merge the two agencies, CA and RRS, to form the Federal 
Service for Registration, Cadastre and Cartography Services (Rosreestr) under the Ministry of 
Economic Development.  The Government recognized the imperative of a unified cadastral and 
registration system in December 2008, just as the World Bank-financed project was about to close, 
having nearly completed a new information system in 1,000 municipal CA offices in 40 out of 89 
Subjects of the Federation.   Disruptions in local offices ensued while two agencies became one, 
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causing the project to be extended to June 2011.   Rosreestr merged 6,000 offices and 46,000 staff 
into a unified structure.  A new legal framework and strategic plan was necessary to accommodate 
the expanded mandate of the new agency.  The onset of the financial crisis in 2009 further 
complicated restructuring as property values fell and budgetary shortfalls limited spending on 
developing the capacity of the new agency.   
Even with the setbacks caused by the restructuring, when the project closed in mid-2011, 
the average time to complete transactions in immovable property had declined from 80 to 19.5 
business days, some 264 private firms were accredited to perform technical surveys, and moderate 
improvements were registered in client satisfaction surveys.  In other areas, such as time clients 
spent in the cadastral office, improved from 120 minutes in 2004 to 20 minutes in 2009, but then 
deteriorated to 48 minutes in 2011.  Despite the disruptions, the final institutional structure came 
into line with best international practice.  The registration of buildings and land is unified in one 
registry, filing can be performed electronically, and information on real properties can be accessed 
in major markets such as Moscow and St. Petersburg from anywhere in the world. 93  
The Putin Administration drove institutional change nation-wide through an e-government 
initiative launched in 2009, while the management of Rosreestr implemented the changes through 
new systems, ICT and staff training.   According to Yuri Akinshin,94 Deputy Director of Rosreestr, 
the ultimate goal was to harmonize protection of property rights across the country, irrespective of 
location, for which technology served two salutary purposes:  greater transparency and 
accountability by civil servants, and better public services for individuals and firms.  Achieving 
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transparency and accountability was an uphill battle given disarray in documentation after nearly 
two decades of non-systematic rights registration.  Rosreestr was charged with collecting, 
digitizing, and storing relevant documents so they could be provided to individuals, municipal 
officials and banks for property transactions, taxes, and mortgages.  This process was underway, 
Akinshin noted, and document collection was improving.  An additional challenge was to 
overcome the resistance by local businesses and officials to relinquishing opaque land deals for 
construction.   
To increase the security of land tenure, national governments invest in information 
technology aimed at disclosing information and thus “reducing opportunities for corrupt and non-
transparent land management.”95 One technological solution was to institute an open portal, where 
all information on sales and rights would eventually be public.96   “Once this is fully in place,” 
Akinshin said, “property registration won’t depend on local relations, where every bureaucrat 
becomes a big player and wants to defend and control their turf.  We try to prevent it from the 
beginning.”   Feedback from the portal based on quantifying user views revealed that the greatest 
obstacle faced by citizens and firms was access to the right information.  “Government understood 
that we were encountering problems created in the past, because people cannot get all the 
documents they need,” Akinshin said.  “If the Minister [of Economic Development] cannot 
respond to this feedback, then top officials have serious issues to solve.  So we in the bureaucracy 
must ‘serve up’ (to executive authorities) and ‘down’ (to citizens).” 
Another important mechanism to implement institutional reforms nation-wide, according to 
Akinshin, was the call center, where clients phone in to raise questions or complaints.  “This 
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removes the discretion of regional branches to interpret the rules arbitrarily, since it serves to 
monitor how accessible the offices are for citizens, and the quality of their services.  It is a powerful 
tool both to control and to evaluate what improvements are needed.”  As of September 2012, the 
call center was receiving 16,000 calls per day; since 2006 approximately 150 million inquiries 
were recorded.  “About half are requests for updated physical evidence of property ownership. 
Other questions refer to where to go for specific services, what documents are needed, and whether 
actions represent violations of regulations.  Clients also ask for appointments and suggest whether 
service was bad or good.  They send us text messages and we can send out responses.” 
In summary, Akinshin said, the modernization of land and property registration services 
through e-government mechanisms saved time and money for clients, while reducing opportunities 
for corruption, because services were automated rather than face-to-face.   This was a major 
stimulus for economic development through land and property transactions.   “As a result of 
automation, Rosreestr could handle an increase in applications for property registration from 2.5 
million in 2010 to 15 million in 2011 and 26 million as of September 2012.  By number of 
applications, citizens dominate, but by value the demand is mainly from banks. Now we see 
collateral, mortgages, and tax revenues all growing.”   
A case study on Russia’s implementation of IT solutions for property registration indicates 
that transparency is indeed improved, business processes are simplified, all fees and requirements 
are published, and documents are provided by Rosreestr on behalf of applicants to 50 government 
and municipal institutions.  Nation-wide, e-services are available on average for 22% of locations 
and access is increasing (where not on-line, application is in person).97  Trends in Russia’s relative 
world rankings on the ease of property registration validate improving performance.  Russia, 
                                                 




represented by Moscow, rose from 49th out of 181 economies in 2009 on registering property to 
12th out of 189 economies in 2014.98 
 
c. Public Participation in Decision-Making, 2001-2013 
The strong and growing demand for Rosreestr’s services notwithstanding, not all Russian 
citizens have embraced the concept of land ownership and many retain mixed views on the value 
of registering urban property.  Social surveys in seven oblasts demonstrate that Russians who have 
adapted to new post-Soviet social and economic conditions are eager to register property.  These 
Russians generally have positive expectations about personal income, political stability and 
security of their legal rights; nevertheless, they remain anxious that arbitrary actions of federal and 
local authorities may undermine their rights.   Those Russians who choose not to register property 
(apartments, dachas, land) generally have negative expectations overall. 99   
When the legal order is in transition, society and political authorities may clash, bringing 
more urgency to the pace of institutional change.   A property rights dispute in Rechnik in 2010, 
inside the Moscow third ring, illustrates Weber’s observation that “factual regularities of conduct 
(‘customs’) can…become the source of rules for conduct (‘conventions,’ ‘law’).   At the same 
time, he notes that legal norms can also produce regularities, so the reverse is also true.100  
The dispute relates to two important legal changes introduced by the Land Code in 2001:  
i) the end of distribution of land plots with right of lifetime ownership and hereditary succession.  
Holders of such rights are entitled to acquire the plot for free; and ii) the establishment of norms 
for town planning, bringing all Subjects of the Federation under the same regulatory framework.  
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Henceforth, town planning regulations would be binding for all users of land, regardless of the 
forms of ownership or other rights.101  
In the 1950s, the Soviet Government bestowed a small area of land along the Moscow 
River to workers of the Moscow Canal, not to own, but as privileges in perpetuity, primarily for 
use as garden plots.  With the passage of time, people improved the property and built dachas and 
fruit trees; with the growth of Moscow, Rechnik, as the area is called, became prime real estate.  
Today’s residents of 200 homes either inherited their plots or purchased them from previous 
owners of the ‘perpetual’ use rights.  By 2007, the Moscow City government eyed the property 
and declared that Soviet-era land use privileges were no longer valid.  In a visit to Rechnik in 2007 
covered on Russian television, Mayor Luzhkov stated that “These are not residents here; they are 
temporary occupants.  This village, like any other illegal construction in the city, does not have a 
right to exist.” 102  The municipal government declared that the land would be reclaimed and zoned 
as a nature reserve; the residents suspected the motive was to expand a near-by golf course.  
Pressure mounted by the municipal government to evict the residents, first by cutting off water 
and power and when this did not work, appealing for and winning a court order to destroy the 
structures.   
While such disputes arise across Russia, the Rechnik case received extensive international 
coverage given the painful image of families and elderly people watching helplessly as demolition 
teams with bulldozers, in freezing weather at 4 a.m. on January 21, 2010, pulled down roofs and 
walls.  Two residents who attempted to protect their properties were hospitalized and 25 others 
were detained by police.  To raise attention to the case, residents demonstrated peacefully in 
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Moscow on January 31, 2010, and attracted support of anti-corruption activist Sergei Udaltsov.  
On February 2, residents of Rechnik filed suit against Mayor Luzhkov and his wife, billionaire 
real estate developer Yelena Baturina, for 100 billion rubles.  On the same date, they appealed to 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on charges of genocide, linking the deaths of 
12 elderly residents to the eviction. 103   Finally President Medvedev intervened and ordered the 
Prosecutor-General on February 4 to review the legality of the Moscow court order to raze the 
neighborhood.  The Moscow court then acted to suspend the demolition on the same date, too late 
for the 22 homes already destroyed.  
The President’s order moved the resolution of the case to the judicial system, where 
Moscow officials defended the legality of their actions, including the offer of compensation for 
those who had received Soviet-era permits, but not those who had decided to build without land 
titles.  An observer from the Accounts Chamber, Anatoly Kucheren, participated in a Kremlin-
created civic council meeting with Rechnik residents and underscored the importance of careful 
legal review, but also expressed hope that the inter-governmental council would resolve the 
conflict.  Given the resonance raised across the country from the case, Medvedev also instructed 
the Government, under Prime Minister Putin, to explore the underlying reasons why dacha owners 
could not register their land plots quickly, in a simplified manner. 104   
It is an important question why, despite significant advances in the legal order and 
improvements in bureaucratic organization and performance, a bitter local dispute over urban land 
rights rose to occupy the attention of the President, Prime Minister and Mayor of Moscow.  One 
theory was that the Rechnik case had become a “theater of war” between the Mayor and Rechnik 
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residents that the Kremlin could use, at some point, to dislodge Luzhkov.105  In fact, Sergei 
Sobyanin was appointed Mayor of Moscow later that year, and one of his first announcements was 
a promise to draft new land use and development regulations by March 1, 2011, including zoning 
to set clear guidance for development on any given plot of land.106   
While political rivalries may have played a part, the display of significant social discontent 
over a property dispute in the capital, while world media observed, revealed the tenuous influence 
of federal authorities over the tortuous process of institutional change.  Had he not intervened, the 
President would have appeared powerless and disinterested in the legal order of which he was an 
architect.  In fact the Land Code, a signature achievement of the first Putin Administration, had 
authorized the holders of Soviet-era permits in Rechnik to acquire the land at no cost, which they 
had not done.  Moreover, the ‘dacha amnesty’ program initiated by the second Putin 
Administration in 2006, when Medvedev was Prime Minister, enabled all holders to privatize and 
register such property.  The program succeeded by 2010 in registering 45% of land plots by 
millions of citizens, but not all.  Those who refrained either believed their current rights were valid 
and could be protected, or did not believe that formal registration would strengthen the security of 
their rights.107 There is also evidence that the transaction costs of acquiring rights to property for 
the purpose of constructing a home or office entail so many risks that people tend to purchase from 
current private owners even without full legal title.108 In the case of Rechnik, some residents 
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reported that they had attempted to register their homes but were ignored by municipal officials.109   
Other reports suggested that residents believed they were protected by the amnesty program. 
Rechnik raises the question whether society can become an impetus for faster and more 
durable changes in economic institutions such as urban land rights.  Perhaps in recognition of the 
need for greater engagement by society, the case prompted several legal rights groups to announce 
the creation of a Public Judicial Center to help individuals register and defend their property 
rights.110  Several observers, prior to the actual demolition, opined that the failure of residents to 
act earlier reflected an immature understanding of ownership rights, harkening to a time when 
individuals were unwilling to take personal responsibility before the power of city government.  
But while people were beginning to defend their courtyards, the city was defending the 
construction companies, which meant revenues for the municipality.111   
Knowledgeable observers are skeptical about the interest and ability of society to drive 
institutional change in property rights.  Masha Lipman, Editor, Pro et Contra explains the 
reluctance of citizens to engage directly in political action on property issues as a continuation of 
the conflict between arbitrary rule (proizvol) and rule of law (zakonnost’) in Russian history. 112  
This was because executive authorities have not just power but the law under their control; rights 
to private property are not yet protected by law.   Pusanov of the Institute for Urban Economics in 
Moscow concludes that the “intricate scheme of regulating land use relations is totally non-
transparent and corruption-inducing.  It deprives owners of an opportunity to efficiently exercise 
their rights.”113 In this same vein, Vlasova of the Leontieff Institute notes that there is an absence 
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of the concept of public interest, which underpins town planning and zoning rules.  When the 
government and investor are both on the same side, the search for a balance in private versus public 
interests, as would be revealed through public hearings, is not relevant.114  Limonov of the Leontief 
Institute concludes that “never in the history of Russia did private owners constitute the majority 
of the population,” so while indicators of nascent awareness are growing, public understanding of 
property rights and political action associated with the protection of those rights remains 
fundamentally under-developed.115  
 
3. Comparing the Evolution of Urban Land Rights in the 1990s and the 2000s 
 
In a nation where land was long a communal resource, centuries before the Russian 
Revolution, the decision by executive authorities to embark on privatization of land, not just of 
apartments or buildings, was politically radical and socially painful.  Land reform began without 
consensus on the fundamental question of how private land ownership would serve public welfare, 
and where regulation by authorities could balance the greater good with individual self-interest.  
The answer is not straightforward, since 
…economic, social and political circumstances, and administrative arrangements, should 
dictate public decisions on the question of land ownership.  There is no one best solution for all 
times and places.  There are solutions for each individual situation.  Often the border between public 
and private ownership is vague since any one of the many rights associated with private ownership 
may be pre-empted by the state for public purposes; public ownership is sometimes accompanied 
by considerable freedom in private use116.     
 
Despite the political controversy over land reform and economic volatility of the early 
1990s, the Yeltsin Administration proceeded to abolish the state monopoly on land.   From 1990 
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to 2000,  federal political authorities took the lead in advocating urban land reforms but overlooked 
two critical factors that retarded their implementation :  i) regional diversity in support for reforms; 
and ii) practical arrangements to register land rights.   First, the need for political compromise led 
the Yeltsin administration to enfranchise regional authorities in making key policy decisions.   As 
a result, local officials exercised arbitrary rule in deciding who received what land allocation and 
at what price.   Second, in the rush to privatize property, federal laws and decrees became 
theoretical exercises, without companion regulations to guide the implementation of land reforms, 
and the registration of rights received insufficient attention.   Multiple agencies had responsibilities 
for land and property administration at the federal level, while at the municipal level, Soviet-era 
agencies continued on ‘auto-pilot’ for planning and allocation of land, except in relatively few 
regions that experimented with modern town-planning exercises.   Public engagement was largely 
confined to a highly contentious debate over land rights in the Duma (parliament).    Inconsistency 
in the legal order and a weak focus on the practical administrative aspects of registration of rights 
enabled local officials to retard urban land reforms and perpetuate Soviet practices such as 
bifurcation of land and building ownership.   Hence, the continued dominance of the public sector 
and the weakness of the registration system prevented citizens, firms and the economy at large 
from reaping the benefits of private land rights.   
  However, since 2001, the Putin era ushered in a second wave of reforms in the legal order, 
starting with passage of the Land Code and amendments to the Civil Code to facilitate real estate 
transactions, and continuing with national improvements in bureaucratic organization and 
performance to reduce regional variation in implementation.  The transparency of information and 
accountability of civil servants to the public increased through the initiative of enlightened 




Rosreestr in line with international standards.  Federal efforts to reduce the purchase price led to a 
six-fold increase in land ownership by enterprises from 2001 to 2010, reversing the stagnant record 
of the 1990s.   Civil society remained largely outside urban land use decisions, given slow progress 
in town planning, with only 40% of cities having approved documents.  However, a very positive 
sign is that 31 out of 35 cities with population over 500,000 have adopted legal regulations for 
town planning, laying a foundation for greater public participation in land use decisions.117 After 
two decades of adjusting to the legal concept of private ownership, the visibility of civil society is 
also growing as will be discussed in the case study chapters. 
The broad conclusion reached by comparing the two periods is that progressive laws 
promoted by reform-oriented political authorities are not sufficient for sustainable institutional 
change.   National outcomes depend on how the laws are interpreted, administered, and enforced 
regionally.118  
5.  The status of urban land privatization 
Against the political and economic swings from 1990-2000 to 2001-2013, it is not 
surprising that the pace of institutional change also differed.  As a consequence, urban land 
privatization remains a work in progress, as illustrated by three issues. 
First, notwithstanding significant advances nationally, municipalities continue to be 
majority landowners.  In the earlier period, no one could buy or sell land, take a mortgage, or seek 
public information on registered property.  All of these rights are now in place.119  A slowly rising 
trend is appearing as citizens acquire lots for city homes and suburban gardens, and businesses 
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turn Soviet-era perpetual use rights into private ownership.  As of end-2014, over 144 million 
rights had been registered following transactions for all forms of real estate (urban and rural land, 
housing, office buildings), about one per capita. The vast majority of rights registered are by 
citizens (124 million) followed by businesses (10.7 million) and municipalities (5.6 million).120  
Considering the economic depression of the 1990s and the on-going delineation of urban land 
boundaries and land parcels, this is a significant level of private real estate registration in fifteen 
years.  On the other hand, while the pace of urban land privatization is accelerating, municipalities 
remain dominant: out of 8.2 million hectares of urban land121 (gorodskikh naselennykh punktov) 
state and municipalities own 7 million hectares (86.1%) while citizens own 0.79 million hectares 
(9.6%) and businesses 0.35 (4.3%).122   
 
Second, vestiges of the Soviet past remain in legal categories of property rights. To 
illustrate, the following figure divides land ownership for housing into two primary ownership 
categories, private (56%) and municipal (44%).  The latter includes leasehold (12.2%), permanent 
(perpetual) use rights (20%), hereditary, perpetual tenancy (5.5%), and unregistered (3.7%) land.  
With the exception of leasehold, the other categories represent Soviet-era privileges.  These 
frequently create civil law disputes due to the assumption that such privileges are equivalent to 
ownership rights.123  The survival of Soviet legal concepts is evident in Article 8(2) of the 
Constitution, which states: “Private, State, municipal, and other forms of ownership shall be 
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equally recognized and defended in the Russian Federation.”124  Ownership (sobstvennost’) rights 
may be defined in a market economy by the form of one’s interest in property (e.g. fee simple).  
However, there is no need to articulate the rights of the state versus private owners. History thus 
bears on the evolution of property rights institutions in Russia.  
Figure 1. Structure of Land Ownership for Individual Housing Purposes in 2013125 
(in percent and thousand hectares) 
 
 Third, national data conceal considerable variation in ownership rights at the municipal 
level and by federal district, with the Far East and Siberia having lower private shares than the 
central, southern and Volga districts.126  The dissertation explores the reasons for this variation in 
the case study chapters that follow.
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 Moscow:  A Case of Institutional Stasis 
 
Demographic density in large urban centers can be a powerful engine of national growth if 
labor is highly educated and the spatial structure enables efficient mobility.  Efficiency of spatial 
structure in turn depends on land markets.1   This chapter argues that Moscow remains spatially 
inefficient because it falls short on every measure of the land governance model:  political authority 
and the legal order favor the state over the private property rights of firms and citizens; the 
bureaucracy serves political masters rather than public interest; and the public is excluded from 
decisions on land use that affect lifestyle and investment choices.   Moscow exemplifies stasis in 
the pace of institutional change because the policies and actions of political authorities and 
bureaucrats are aligned against land privatization, and to date, despite massive and well-publicized 
public protests, state rights through eminent domain prevail over private use rights.2  
By putting in place a legal and regulatory framework for land use, Luzhkov helped stabilize 
the capital3 during a chaotic period of privatization and property seizures.  His administration also 
instilled order in land governance by means of rules to measure, monitor, and register land rights.  
However, lacking a political or fiscal incentive to extend land rights to a broader constituency, or 
to enforce the rules impersonally, the Luzhkov administration solidified property rights for the 
                                                 
1 World Bank, Russia:  Reshaping Economic Geography, Report No. 62905-RU, 2011, pp. 11-15.  Alain Bertaud, 
“The development of Russian cities: Impact of reforms on spatial development,” Mimeo for World Bank Group, 
2010, p. 3. 
2 See Bertaud, “The development of Russian cities.” This chapter draws on his theoretical framework for spatial 
efficiency based on property rights and efficient land use regulations. 
3 Moscow is a federal city with legal rights under the Constitution as a subject of the federation.   Thus it can deal 





municipal coalition in power and related parties.4  Thus, while formal rules were instituted, 
implementation by the bureaucracy was arbitrary.5   
The first section of the chapter discusses the importance of land markets to spatial 
efficiency.  Thereafter, the structure follows the land governance model.  It examines and compares 
the role of political authorities, the bureaucracy, and society in developing land rights, before and 
after adoption of the Land Code in 2001.  
 
1. The spatial inefficiency of Moscow 
Development of property rights and active land markets was an urgent reform requirement 
in 1992 because Moscow suffered from serious land misallocation left over from the Soviet 
planning period.  Two key features of the command economy led to striking inefficiency in land 
use in Moscow: large inner-city areas with obsolete industrial land, and concentration of residential 
property at the periphery. 6 
First, the share of land devoted to industrial plant was extremely high in the city center, 
where land is most valuable.  As seen below, Moscow had almost 8 times more industrial land 
than New York in 2000.   While many of these enterprises were going bankrupt under market 
conditions, the land they occupied was growing in value but could not be sold or used as collateral 
                                                 
4 Theory derives from Douglass C. North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 148-151. 
5 North, Wallis, and Weingast observe that the degree of personalization of institutions tends to correspond with the 
nature of a political regime and how it uses rents. Economic rents provide financial returns greater than the best 
alternative use of capital.  In regimes dominated by a single leader or party, where institutions are personalized, 
ruling elites “manipulate[s] the economic system to produce rents that then secure political order,” p. 18.  
Impersonal institutions are associated with impersonal organizational forms, which are legal persons that exist 
independently of the identities of their individual members.  Such organizations appeared only in the last five 
centuries. They are limited in societies dominated by a single leader or powerful elites, who want to control 
economic rents and political order.  In contrast, competitive political and economic systems are founded on 
impersonal institutions implemented by impersonal organizations. (pp. 22-25).  Also see Levy, Working with the 
Grain, 19-22.  When institutions are impersonal, the quest for rents drives innovators to introduce new products or 
political solutions (Levy, Working with the Grain, 23).   
6 Alan Bertaud and Bertrand Renaud, Cities without Land Markets: Lessons of the Failed Socialist Experiment, 




to finance enterprise restructuring or relocation.  The absence of markets created pockets of 
‘fallow’ land, often requiring environmental clean-up.  This land needed to be recycled for higher-
value use, most likely as combined commercial, residential and office space that would enable 
households to live and work in the center, reducing commuting time.7 
 
Source: Bertaud, “The development of Russian cities,” (2010), 9 
 
Second, the development of industrial belts in the city center from the 1930s to the 1950s 
forced residential housing to be located at the periphery, resulting in a positively sloped density 
gradient, quite the opposite of the population density profile in market cities.  Below, Moscow in 
                                                 
7 In a market economy, rising land values provide an incentive to recycle land to higher efficiency by reducing 
consumption of land per job or resident.  Hence land is most valuable and densely utilized in city centers.  If the area 
devoted to industrial land in Moscow in 1992 was reduced from 32% to a still high level of 10%, approximately 100 
square kilometers of developed land (with water and electrical connections) valued conservatively at US$2.2B could 




1992 is compared to Paris.  Transportation in such a spatial configuration is highly inefficient.  As 
energy prices rose to world levels and parking (a form of land use) was not taxed, the costs in 
travel time and traffic congestion rose dramatically, principally due to Moscow’s socialist spatial 
structure (including road lay-out) and the absence of land markets. 8 
 
Source:  Bertaud, “The Development of Russian Cities,” 7. 
 
The spatial inefficiency of Moscow in 1992 demanded decisive land recycling of the kind 
that is facilitated primarily by land transactions, but also by far-sighted urban planning in 
partnership with property owners.  We will return to this topic in the sections on public 
participation in preparation and implementation of the General Plan.    
                                                 





2. The Land Governance Model in Moscow, 1990-2000 
a. Political Authority and the Legal Order, 1990-2000 
The serendipitous rise of Yuri Mikhailovich Luzhkov from an unspectacular career in the 
chemical industry to a powerful position at the epicenter of the democratic transition gave him the 
political authority to influence property rights in Eurasia’s most populous city.  A hard-working 
and competent technocrat, he passed three decades outside of the limelight until his acceptance in 
1986 of a part-time position as chair of consumer services in the Mossovet (city council).  As 
described by Colton,9  this was the first of several fortuitous decisions that led him to increasingly 
more visible positions in city government and the Communist Party executive committee of 
Moscow.  His organizational prowess and energetic sponsorship of the cooperative movement 
ingratiated him with Boris Yeltsin, who was then the Moscow party boss.   Following the election 
of the new Mossovet (City Council) in March 1990 – for which he declined to run – he was again 
fortunate, with Yeltsin’s backing, to fill the vacant position of head of the Moscow executive 
committee (in City Hall).  This put his managerial skills to the task of running the city government 
while Gavriil Popov, the respected liberal economist, attempted to lead the Mossovet.  The “odd 
couple” of Popov and Luzhkov received a two-thirds majority vote in the first democratic elections 
for Mayor and Vice Mayor on June 12, 1991, the same day voters elected Boris Yeltsin President 
of the Russian republic in the Soviet Union.10 
Several key developments strengthened Vice Mayor Luzhkov’s executive authority and 
reputation in the year after the mayoral election, enabling him to act decisively on property rights.  
                                                 
9 Timothy J. Colton, “Understanding Iurii Luzhkov,”  Problems of Post-Communism  (Vol. 46, No. 5, September-
October 1999), 16. 




He actively defended Yeltsin and democratic forces during the August 1991 coup attempt by 
hardline Communists.  In the emergency period following the coup, as bread lines lengthened, he 
adeptly managed food and economic matters, raising his visibility and legitimacy as a political 
leader.11  
Vice Mayor Luzhkov moved quickly to take control of Moscow property and the 
privatization process in the spring of 1992, but not in the same manner as Mayor Popov.  After the 
August 1991 coup, Popov had seized property of the Communist Party and claimed the former 
COMECON headquarters, where he installed a new mayoral department.12  In December 1991, 
Popov threatened Yeltsin that he would resign without sufficient powers to perform his obligations 
to the public. President Yeltsin relented and granted Popov additional authority, including over 
real estate in the city.13   Luzhkov used this opportunity to secure the city’s land rights, sidestepping 
but dealing adroitly with the obstreperous Mossovet that was blocking Popov.14  In January and 
March 1992 he put legal order into the chaos of the property grab by three instructions:  i) 
establishing leasehold as the primary form of property rights; ii) creating the bureaucratic process 
to manage land relations; and iii) extracting value from land for city income.   
In contrast to Yeltsin’s continuing efforts to push private ownership,15 Vice Mayor 
Luzhkov’s March 2, 1992 instruction, “On Leasing as the Main Form of Land Relations,” went in 
                                                 
11 Colton 1999, “Understanding Iurii Luzhkov,” 17; Blair Ruble, "The Rise of Moscow, Inc," Wilson Quarterly 
(Spring 1998), 84-85. http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/ehost/delivery.   
12 Celestine Bohlen, “Soviet Disarray: In Moscow, Too, A Liberal Feels Besieged.  The New York Times. December 
18, 1991. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/18/world/soviet-disarray-in-moscow-too-a-liberal-mayor-feels-
besieged.html. Accessed December 1, 2014.  
13 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii N 334 ot 29.12.91 "О дополнительных полномочиях органов 
управления г. Москвы на период проведения радикальной экономической реформы.”  Moscow Times, “Mayor 
Popov: Is he resigning?,” June 5, 1992, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/mayor-popov-is-he-
resigning/221428.html, accessed December 4, 2014. 
14 Bohlen (1991) quotes Valery Vyzhutovich, a Moscow legislator, who noted that "There is not a single serious 
problem to which the solution advanced by the Mayor's office was not blocked" by the City Council.   





the opposite direction:  it reduced opportunities for privatization in Moscow.  It is short but striking 
in its categorical assertion of the pre-eminence of municipal land ownership.16  With the “goal of 
modernizing land relations and implementing measures of economic stimulus and rational land 
use,” the Vice Mayor instructed that, going back to January 1, 1992, the main legal option for 
acquiring land use rights would be to lease from landowners.17   While Yeltsin and Popov were 
battling over ownership of buildings in Moscow, demarcation of land in Moscow between levels 
of government had not yet begun.   To fix Moscow’s stamp on city land, the Vice Mayor instructed 
Moskomzem (Moscow Land Committee) to formulate and issue all necessary documents, to 
conclude and register agreements with lessees (including foreign), and to register agreements by 
owners, users and renters of land with third parties for temporary (up to 3 years) leases.   The 
Committee was further instructed to carry out the measures immediately, even before adoption of 
further acts, and “to apply [such acts] only if they do not contradict the present order.” 18 In this 
manner, the Vice Mayor warned the Mossovet that whatever rules they might adopt, and however 
they wished to allocate land, his instruction had precedence.  To assure it became public 
knowledge, the instruction included an order for official publication.  
Thus, in his first key instruction, Luzhkov narrowed the legal interpretation of land rights 
to leasing.  Significantly, the instruction included a draft lease, to be finalized by the Land 
Committee, which spelled out the rights and responsibilities of lessor and lessee.  It included the 
following clause authorizing compensation to tenants in the event the city government exercised 
its right of eminent domain: 
                                                 
16 Rasporazhenie vitse mera № 110-VM ot 2 marta 1992 goda, “Ob arende zemli kak ocnovnoi forme zemel’no-
pravovykh otnoshenii v g. Moskve.” http://mosopen.ru/document/110_rvm_1992-03-02.  The instruction was signed 
by Luzhkov as Vice Mayor. 
17 Rasporazhenie № 110-VM, March 2, 1992. 




In cases associated with the confiscation (изъятия) of land for public needs, to guarantee that the Lessee is 
provided equivalent land in another location (agreed with the tenant) and compensation to the tenant for all 
costs associated with land development and the construction of buildings, structures, storage facilities, roads, 
etc., in accordance with estimates of the costs of the works.19 
 
While in appearance a liberal formulation, the arbitrary implementation of this clause, favoring 
parties related to the Mayor’s regime over common citizens, would later become an instrument to 
expose the extensive co-mingling of public office and private business during Luzhkov’s term on 
Moscow property matters.20  
Within the same month, the Vice Mayor established his authority over land-related 
decision-making.  The Moscow City Government resolution “On Implementation of Land 
Reform” lays out a legal and regulatory framework for land relations that would endure without 
major changes throughout Luzhkov’s tenure.21   Within one year, Moskomzem (Moscow Land 
Committee) had to establish the normative basis for land reform (e.g. environmental controls, 
penalties for infringement of legislation, demarcation of territories, construction protocols) and 
land administration (e.g. cadastral mapping and geospatial data, land inventory, registration, and 
monitoring and control over the use of land).  In addition, the resolution divided responsibility 
between City Hall and the prefects for decisions on the allocation of land or removal of structures 
for projects in support of city development.   Broadly, City Hall would oversee any capital or 
reconstruction project relating to federal buildings, communal infrastructure, industrial zones, 
                                                 
19 Rasporazhenie № 110-VM, March 2, 1992, Lease Clause 2.10. 
20 Boris Nemtsov,  Nezavicimyi Ekspertnyi Doklad: “Luzhkov: Itogi,” (Moscow: Solidarnost 2009) 
http://www.rusolidarnost.ru/files/luzhkov-itogi/Boris-Nemtsov-Luzhkov.Itogi.pdf.  This report is discussed later in 
the section on 2002 to 2013. 
21 Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva № 174-PP of 31 March 1992. О ходе реализации мероприятий по земельной 
реформе в г. Москве.  О взаимодействии Москомзема и префектур административных округов 
по регулированию земельных отношений. “On Implementation of Land Reform in Moscow City; On Interactions 
between Moscow Land Committee and Prefects of Administrative Okrugs Regulating Land Relations.”  
http://mosopen.ru/document/174_pp_1992-03-31.  Municipalities were required to establish a regulatory framework 
to implement national legislation adopted in 1991.  The Law on Payments for Land introduced the concept of land as 






transport and cultural monuments, while the prefects would handle everything else in their 
districts, primarily housing.  Even considering that prefects were mayoral appointees, their scope 
of work was tightly defined; all contractors for reconstruction projects had to be selected by 
competitive tender, and technical agencies in their jurisdictions (land, architecture) received 
precise instructions on when and how to become involved.  Finally, the resolution confirmed 
temporary regulations issued by the Vice Mayor on January 31, 1992 regarding the granting or 
confiscation of land for urban development.22   Compared to arrangements at the federal level 
during this period, Moscow was exceptionally well organized for land-related investments.23 
 City Hall under Luzhkov also acted swiftly to monetize land and secure income for the 
budget.  Attachment 5 to the resolution “On Implementation of Land Reform” specified how the 
city would assess and collect a land tax (if land was privately owned) or land rent (if land was 
leased) from legal entities and citizens, pursuant to the federal law “On Land Payments.”24  Tax 
rates for the 69 territorial zones of Moscow had already been defined.  Anyone wishing to buy 
land from the city would pay 50 times the amount of the land tax for a given zone. No concessions 
on price were allowed. 25   In contrast, lease payments could be negotiated between the city and 
individual tenants, a practice ripe for bribes.  Several categories of budget-supported organizations 
(e.g. cultural, scientific, humanitarian) were excluded from any land payments.  The resolution 
                                                 
22 Rasporiazhenie vitse mera Moskvy no. 51-RVM of 31 January 1992. О poriadke predostavleniia i iz”iatiia  
zemel’ v g. Moskve. [On Procedures for the Provision and Confiscation of Land in Moscow City]. 
http://mosopen.ru/document/51_rvm_1992-01-31. 
23 See Chapter 4, Political Authority and the Legal Order, 1990-2000.  
24 RSFSR law “On Pyment for Land,” October 1991. 
25 Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva  no. 174-PP of 31 March 1992. О khode realizatsii meropriiatii po zemel’noi reforme 
v g. Moskve. O vzaimodeistvii Moskomzema  i prefektur  administrativnykh  okrugov po regulirovaniiu 
zemel’nykh   otnoshenii. [On Implementation of Land Reform in Moscow City; On Interactions between Moscow 







specified collection dates and fines for late payment; it also instructed that receipts be distributed 
to the budgets of the city and its rayons (districts), after deducting for the federal share.26  In short, 
the Vice Mayor clearly understood the value of land; he quickly captured the rents.27   
One explanation of Luzhkov’s preference for land lease could be his stated ideological 
opposition to land privatization.  In contrast to 65.6% of his constituents who supported land 
privatization in the early 1990s, much higher than nationally,28 Luzhkov proclaimed that “public 
ownership is the last refuge of social stability.”29  Continuity in public land ownership at times of 
political, social and economic upheaval can be a legitimate argument.  However, his opposition to 
privatization did not extend to housing privatization, which also enjoyed majority support by 
Muscovites.30  Stating his commitment to create a propertied middle class in Moscow, in 
ideological conformity with the Yeltsin reform team, Luzhkov launched the privatization of 
housing in September 1991, together with Mayor Popov.  All permanent residents except those in 
condemned buildings or shared rooms could obtain a one-time right of ownership to their 
apartment or house for a nominal fee.  As will be discussed in the section on public participation, 
this move enabled wealthier Muscovites and new elites to access the most prestigious living 
quarters at the same cost per square meter as residents of the dismal, Khrushchev-era, five-story 
concrete buildings.31 At the same time, the Moscow budget gained some breathing room, over 
                                                 
26 The federal share specified in the resolution is 10 percent.  See Attachment 5, paragraph 25 of Postanovlenie 
Pravitel’stva № 174-PP of 31 marta 1992 goda. 
27 Understanding land value was the exception in the dissertation’s case studies.  For at least a decade the leadership 
in St. Petersburg and Kazan did not appreciate land as a unique asset. 
28 Colton, Moscow, p. 703. 
29 Yuri Luzhkov, My deti tvoi, Moskva” pp. 184 quoted in Colton, “Understanding Iurii Luzhkov,” p. 19.   
30 69.6 % randomly-surveyed voters during the 1993 local elections favored housing privatization on the whole or 
strongly.  Colton, Moscow, p. 703. 




time, by reducing subsidies for housing maintenance and gaining property taxes.32  Finally, as we 
will see later, the Mayor was willing to bend his stated principle when it suited his purposes to sell 
land.  Thus Luzhkov appeared to vary his position on privatization depending on the category of 
property and its concomitant benefits for city finances or those in the ruling coalition.  This is the 
hallmark of Levi’s predatory ruler:  rather than exploit, he will predate to personal advantage.33   
Having secured a foothold in urban real estate, Vice Mayor Luzhkov consolidated his 
bargaining power with Yeltsin and with the legislature from June 1992 until end 1993. The first 
favor came from Yeltsin, who appointed Luzhkov Mayor when Popov resigned in June 1992, by-
passing the election demanded by the Mossovet.34   Mayor Luzhkov returned the favor in 
September-October 1993, when Yeltsin faced a violent stand-off with the state Duma.  The Mayor 
cut off electricity, hot water and communications to the embattled White House, where the Duma 
was ensconced, and ordered city security forces to support the President.35   Aside from defending 
Yeltsin, these actions also constituted a contingent threat: how would Luzhkov use this power in 
a future contest? 36  Finally, after Yeltsin dissolved the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies in 1993, 
                                                 
32 Two-thirds of regional subsidies in 1994, amounting to 4 percent of GDP, when to housing. Lev Freinkman, 
Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia: Pre-empting a Potential Crisis, World Bank 
Technical Paper no. 452, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1999), 23. 
33 Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988. Levi 
assumes that rulers are predatory (as distinct from exploitative) because they seek to increase their advantage in 
meeting personal objectives.  Ruling and maintaining rule require resources, so raising revenue is the first priority 
after securing a monopoly of violence.  But rulers cannot predate with impunity.  To maintain power they need to 
bargain with agents in the bureaucracy and constituents.  These take the form of contracts in a political market. 
34 Blair A. Ruble, "The Rise of Moscow, Inc." Wilson Quarterly (Spring 1998): 84-85. 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/ehost/delivery.  
35 Lenta.ru, “Luzhkov, Yuri: Byvshii Mer Moskvy.”  Accessed November 30, 2014, 
http://lenta.ru/lib/14159332/full.htm. Importantly, the Mossovet had voted nonconfidence in Luzhkov by 139 to 84 
and had appealed to Yeltsin for a new election. Colton, Moscow, 669. 
36 Donald Jensen, “The Boss: How Yuri Luzhkov Runs Moscow,” Demokratizatsiya  (Winter 2000), p. 94.  
Jensen notes that Luzhkov also topped up the salaries of the MVD forces assigned to the federal government.  




Luzhkov took a similar action (backed by Yeltsin) and dissolved the Mossovet, calling for 
elections to a new, smaller Moscow City Duma that was easier for City Hall to manage.37    
Luzhkov scored a strategic win over Anatoly Chubais, the Yeltsin Administration’s 
privatization champion, in the battle for control over Moscow property.38   In 1994, the President 
decreed a “special procedure” (особый порядок) for privatization in Moscow by which 20 percent 
of the shares of privatized companies would be reserved for the state, and the Mayor received 
significant control over the privatization process.39   At that point, the city owned about two-thirds 
of the real estate in the capital.40   The decision gave birth to a municipal business empire.  As 
Ruble describes:  
“Luzhkov's city government now could assess the assets of Moscow's enterprises at a 
higher level than was standard everywhere else, and it could keep effective title to all of 
its real property in the city, with the right to grant long-term leases (up to 49 years). These 
two powers enabled the city government to micromanage land use and to manipulate 
rents and prices--and, together with the taxing power, to generate the vast sums of money 
Luzhkov has used to renovate his city. Thanks to his victory over the reformers, the 
municipality became the senior partner in all local economic activity. "Moscow, Inc." 
was born.” 41  
 
Now Mayor of the capital, with control over two-thirds of its property and a “compliant 
and largely toothless” city Duma,42 Luzhkov set about building a corporatist economy to further 
strengthen his fiscal autonomy.   Moscow typified a “third model”43 practiced by regions in the 
early 1990s with respect to economic policies:  rather than deepen market reforms or cling to 
socialist precepts, Moscow combined elements of each.  Price liberalization and encouragement 
of foreign investment were accompanied by subsidization and control of enterprises and populist 
                                                 
37 Colton, “Understanding Iurii Luzhkov,” 19; Jensen, “The Boss: How Yuri Luzhkov Runs Moscow,” 94. 
38 Colton, “Understanding Iurii Luzhkov,” 18-19; Ruble, "The Rise of Moscow, Inc.," 81. 
39 Lenta.ru, “Luzhkov, Yuri: Byvshii Mer Moskvy: Na posty mэra Moskvy v 1990s,”Accessed November 30, 2014, 
http://lenta.ru/lib/14159332/full.htm” 
40 Ruble, "The Rise of Moscow, Inc.," 84-85  
41 Ruble, "The Rise of Moscow, Inc.," 84-85.  
42 Colton, “Understanding Iurii Luzhkov,” 25. 
43 Lev Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia: Pre-empting a Potential 




housing construction.  Luzhkov faced an economy in free fall in the early 1990s, as Moscow’s 
industrial production plummeted by 71 percent from 1990 to 1996.44  Real estate and construction 
offered an alternative revenue source.  Moscow also benefited from an unusual fiscal regime that 
enabled it to collect profit tax from all companies registered in Moscow, even if their income 
derived from operations in other regions.  By 1996, six major companies remitted 5.1 trillion rubles 
(US$ 1 billion) to the budget; Gazprom alone comprised 11.4 percent of all tax revenues.45  This 
tax advantage enabled Moscow to spend 2.5 times more than the average region, yet it surprisingly 
did not reduce transfers from the federal government that totaled 5 percent of the city budget in 
1996 and 1997.46  In the context of the mid-1990s, however, Moscow was vital to the center:  it 
provided 20 percent of the federal budget while 30 other regions were withholding tax payments.47    
Having acquired a firm grip on the capital’s real estate, the Mayor resisted federal 
incentives that promoted privatization. In December 1993, the new Russian Constitution 
guaranteed the right to private ownership of housing and land by citizens and businesses, and 
authorized the conversion of state and municipal land to private ownership.  Decrees by President 
Yeltsin in 1994-95 encouraged enterprises to privatize the land they occupied.  These legal acts 
led to rapid privatization of enterprise-attached land in over 50 regions, including St. Petersburg, 
where authorities took advantage of the flexibility allowed by law to lower land prices.48    
                                                 
44 The average national decline was 58%.  Freinkman, et al, Subnational Budgeting in Russia, 11. 
45 Freinkman, Treisman and Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia, 14. 
46 Freinkman, Treisman and Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia, 14. 
47 The backdrop to the fiscal position of Moscow is the ‘parade of sovereignties’ of 1992-93 when 30 regions 
stopped tax remittances to the federal government.  See Christine Wallich, Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal 
Federalism, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994), 248. 
48 Alexander Pusanov, Development of the Real Estate Rights System in Russia in 1989-2009, (Institute for Urban 
Economics: Moscow, 2009), 7.  Leningrad Oblast, Kaluga, Samara, Vladimir, Astrakhan, and others were among 





The Mayor carefully adapted the federal legal framework to suit city preferences. Within 
a month of the adoption of the Constitution, the Mayor pre-empted enterprise land privatization 
with his temporary resolution “On Issues Regulating Land and Property Legal Relations in 
Moscow City.”49  As submitted to the city Duma, the Mayor declared that ownership of buildings 
by enterprises did not carry privileges to the underlying land, and that until federal legislation 
confirmed such legal rights, there would be no registration of private land ownership by 
enterprises.  In fact, most enterprises held perpetual use rights that comprised the basis for a 
transition to legal ownership.  The Mayor acknowledged this point by indicating that enterprises 
would have priority over other legal entities in acquiring title to the land.  However, the mechanism 
to effect this conversion was not specified.  To the contrary, it was contradicted by the spirit of the 
instruction, which media portrayed as a “ban” on privatization.50 
Luzhkov’s first election as Mayor in June 1996, which he won with a landslide victory,51 
cemented his political autonomy relative to federal authorities and largely removed potential 
challenges to his land privatization policies.   The Mayor’s fiscal position appeared to change when 
city revenues slumped during the severe financial crisis of 1998.  Media reports indicated that the 
Mayor had ordered preparation of a new law allowing land sales to raise resources, with restrictions 
on foreign investors.52  There would have been scope to raise the share of land in the city budget; 
                                                 
49 Rasporiazhenie mera Moskvy no. 23-RM of 17 January 1994.  О nekotorykh voprosakh  regulirovaniia 
zemel’nykh i imushchestvennykh  pravootnoshenii v g.  Moskve. [“On Issues Regulating Land and Property Legal 
Relations in Moscow City.”]  http://mosopen.ru/document/23_rm_1994-01-17. 
50 Yevgenia Borisova, “Mayor Orders Law Allowing City Land Sales,” The Moscow Times, September 22, 1998.  
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/mayor-orders-law-allowing-city-land-sales/284740. Accessed 
September 2, 2014. 
51 The share of vote is variously reported as 88.49 and 89.68.  Yeltsin honored Luzhkov with the distinction of 
“мэрскую цепь."  Lenta.ru, “Luzhkov, Yuri: Byvshii Mer Moskvy: Na posty mэra Moskvy v 1990s,”Accessed 
November 30, 2014, http://lenta.ru/lib/14159332/full.htm. Both Ruble and Colton describe the victory as exceptional 
in a period of divisive political allegiances. 
52 An official in Zelenograd, a rayon of Moscow, reported that the Mayor was piloting privatization to find ways to 
raise revenues, while Vladimir Maximov, a deputy head of the Moscow land committee's land policy department, is 
quoted as saying “We are only in the beginning of the preparation of the law."  Yevgenia Borisova,  Mayor Orders 




in 1997, the city received Rub 704 billion from combined land taxes and lease payments out of 
total income of Rub 55 trillion (not including revenues kept off-budget).53   Instead, the Mayor 
increased plans for sale of municipal property other than land54 and relied on existing annual 
targets for land lease payments by quarter and per department (Moskomzem, prefects, Department 
of Finance).  Land sales are not included in the targets.55    However, he offered two exceptional 
opportunities to own land in special territorial units of Moscow:  an experimental pilot to auction 
land in the town of Zelenograd,56 and an option for investors to purchase land under certain 
conditions in the new financial business center, Moskva-City.57  These appeased critics by opening 
selected land plots for investment. 
By the end of the decade, leasehold became the dominant property rights structure.  In 
2000, out of 46,948 land plots registered in Moscow, 44,966 were subject to lease agreements.  
The minimum rent payment was Rub 2,808 per hectare; the average was Rub 154,538 per hectare.   
                                                 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/mayor-orders-law-allowing-city-land-sales/284740. Accessed 
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53 Rasporiazhenie mera Moskvy no. 23-RМ of 14 January 1998, О plane finansovykh postuplenii ot raboty 
Komleksa po ekonomicheskoi politike i  imushchestvenno-zemel’nym otnosheniiam v 1998.  [On Financial Income 
from Property and Land in 1998].    http://mosopen.ru/document/23_rm_1998-01-14. This does not include revenues 
estimated at 10 percent kept off the budget. See Freinkman, Treisman and Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia, 
14. 
54 The Property Fund was to sell rented real estate and incomplete construction for total Rub 750 mln in 1998, only 
one tenth of the amount received from land payments.  Efforts to increase this amount are described in 
Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Moskvy no. 556-PP оf 21 June 1998,  Оb itogakh  raboty Kompleksa po ekonomicheskoi 
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finansirovanie gorodskikh  program i merakh  po povysheniiu effektivnosti upravleniia paketami aktsii (doliami), 
prinadlezhashchimi Moskve. [On the results of the Complex on economic policy and property-land relations for the 
first half of 1998 on the attraction of resources to finance city programs and measures to improve the effectiveness 
of the management of enterprise shares owned by Moscow]. 
55 Rasporyazhenie mera Moskvy № 23-RМ, О plane finansovykh postuplenii ot raboty Komleksa po ekonomicheskoi 
politike i imushchestvenno-zemel’nym otnosheniiam v 1998.  [On Financial Income from Property and Land in 
1998].    http://mosopen.ru/document/23_rm_1998-01-14. 
56 Zakon goroda Moskvy no. 36 of 29 September 1999, Оb eksperemente po prodazhe zemel’nykh uchastkov v 
gorode Zelenograde, [On experimental sales of land plots in the city of Zelenograd.] 
57 Zakon goroda Moskvy no. 30 of 12 July 1999. О territorial’noi edinitse s osobym statusom “Moskovskii 
mezhdunarodnyi delovoi tsentr Moskva-Siti”. [On the territorial unit with special status “Moscow International 




Lease periods ranged from 5 to 49 years.58   The financial data reflect the underlying property 
rights structure: land rents became preferred over revenues through land taxes.  As indicated in 
Table 1, income from leasing land progressively outstripped that from tax on privatized land, such 
that from 1998 to 2001, non-tax land income increased 4.6 times, while land taxes increased by 
1.6 times.  In 2001, land tax income was only 5 percent of payments from land leases, the right to 
conclude land lease agreements, and land sales. 
Table 1: Income from Land in Moscow City, 1997-2001 
 1997 rub mln 1998 rub ‘000 1999 rub ‘000 2000 rub ‘000 2001 rub ‘000 
Total Income 55,154,934 50,233,805 107,589,448 195,851,481 233,396,209 
Tax Income 49,065,463 45,691,620 
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Total Non-Tax 
Income - Land 
    1,035,627     1,479,735      2,842,555     4,746,711 
Data in nominal rubles. Sources:  Department of Finance, Moscow City, in annual resolutions “On Implementation 
of the Budget of Moscow City.” http://mosopen.ru.   Zakon goroda Moskvy № 23 of 9 September 1998; Zakon 
goroda Moskvy № 32 of 7 July 1999; Zakon goroda Moskvy № 27 of 6 September 2000; Zakon goroda Moskvy 
№ 42 оf 26 Semptember 2001; Zakon goroda Moskvy № 59 of 23 October 2002.  
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The casual reader of Moscow land law or observer of city real estate would not expect the 
municipality to be the monopoly landlord. Even the 1993 and 1994 resolutions that defer to leasing 
do not explicitly deny the right of private ownership; this would be inconsistent with federal law.  
But the intent of political authorities deliberately constrain privatization.  In a 2001 academic 
article, a department head in Moskomzem explained the legal framework as follows:  
Since the beginning of economic reform in the capital, about 100 normative acts were decided and introduced 
that reflected such important questions as the forms and types of land relations, including a quantitative and 
qualitative accounting of land; registration of rights on land; and a cadastral evaluation of land.  While based 
on the Federal regulatory system, Moscow acts and decrees had, until recently, differed in one principal 
respect: in the main, they envisaged provision of urban land for lease; land for sale is not allowed.61 
Moreover, the boom in real estate markets and refurbishment of the city’s drab face brought 
Mayor Luzhkov strong public approval.  There is consensus that Luzhkov dramatically 
transformed the image of Moscow.62 A respected Russian source credits the Mayor with these 
improvements:  “First, the streets and courtyards became significantly cleaner. Second, since the 
change in leadership from Popov in 1992, Luzhkov discovered many urban buildings in 
deplorable condition and energetically demolished or renovated the old ones and built them 
anew.   Third, the Mayor himself followed the weekly [Soviet-era] rule and personally went 
around cleaning up Moscow structures.”63 
These positive outward signs of renewal notwithstanding, little changed institutionally in 
Moscow on land rights after a decade of economic reform.  The state owners of land negotiated 
rents with enterprises and businesses that they also partially owned.  This swelled the budget for 
construction, also run by a city enterprise with Soviet roots.  The first deputy premier designated 
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by Luzhkov to oversee land and property management, V.I. Resin, was the former head of 
industrial construction at Mosstroikomitet, the city construction agency, whom Gorbachev had 
put forward to head the Moscow Communist Party in 1989.64   Within and across these projects, 
“the resultant tangle of ownership formulas and networks [was] opaque and all but immune to 
outside scrutiny.” 65 Also hidden from view were the opportunities for rent-seeking and personal 
enrichment created by reliance on City Hall for a postal address.  A statement by Egor Gaidar 
regarding well-known corruption in dealing with municipal offices got him into trouble with 
Luzhkov, who sued but lost the libel case in court.66  
The theory of predatory rule helps explain why Mayor Luzhkov opted to lease rather than 
privatize land in the early 1990s.  During this period, Luzhkov owed his political fortunes and 
appointment as Mayor to Yeltsin, over the objections of the elected City Council.  He faced an 
industrial collapse in a city in which one-third of the territory was devoted to industry.  His political 
and fiscal outlook was decidedly short-term.  Leasing land provided an immediate source of 
revenue and opportunity to consolidate personal political control by granting land use rights to 
investors and city organs.   
By 1996, the Mayor’s strong bargaining position, politically and fiscally, enabled him to 
sidestep national legislation and eschew land as a long-term source of stable tax revenue.   
Distortions in Russia’s regime of fiscal federalism contributed to the Moscow Government’s 
ability to delay reforms and spend 2.5 times the average amount of other regions.  This outcome 
is in line with Zhuravskaya (1999), who demonstrates that the fiscal-federalist structure weakened 
                                                 
64 Colton, Moscow, p. 603 and 905 fn103. 
65 Colton, “Understanding Iurii Luzhkov,” 19. 





incentives to raise taxes locally, thus leading to excessive interference in local businesses by city 
administrators, who could defer difficult reforms.67  Likewise, Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg 
(2005) show that regions with a lower tax retention rate (share of locally-derived taxes in the 
budget) reformed less than other regions.  Moscow’s tax retention rate was 45 percent from 1996 
to 1999, the lowest in the nation except for two small, poor oblasts.68  Consistent with the theory 
of predatory rule, such regimes become less accountable to voters over time. 
Fiscal autonomy based on unearned income streams, rather than local taxes, enabled 
Moscow to retain land rights that benefited the budget and ruling elites in the 1990s.  Mayor 
Luzhkov had no incentive to widen access to land rights to legal entities and citizens.   The Mayor’s 
stated ideological opposition to land privatization does not hold as a rationale, especially given 
privileged sales of municipal property to individuals of importance to political authorities.69  
Paradoxically, while Luzhkov had a high degree of autonomy, his political future was 
neither secure nor independent of the presidential apparatus in the 1990s.  He defended Yeltsin 
when needed, as in the 1993 constitutional crisis. But twice his national political ambitions and 
independent positions met with stiff resistance from the Kremlin, either through unwanted 
financial audits or investigations by federal security services or media smear campaigns. 70  By 
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1999, his relations with Yeltsin hit the breaking point, removing him from contention for a national 
appointment.71  Thus, a superficial view might interpret Luzhkov’s political autonomy as iron-
clad, giving him security in office and freedom to reform; in reality the mayor had a short-term 
perspective that militated against a long-term reform agenda.  The expedient solution was to lease 
land rather than to privatize it.  That this choice also conferred immense power over enterprises 
and investors could not have escaped his attention.  
b. Bureaucratic Organization and Performance 1990-2000 
Another aspect of the predatory rule theory concerns the transaction costs to negotiate and 
establish a land administration system.  Negotiations entail the time and political resources needed 
to subsume control by ruling authorities; budgetary costs include setting up bureaus to measure, 
monitor, and record leases or sales.  In assessing these costs, we need to consider the perspective 
both of the ruler and the users of the land administration system.   This brings us into the micro-
analytical level of the NIE literature pertinent to the governance of contractual relations, which 
determines the transaction costs of change.  The unit of analysis at this level is the contract, because 
each agreement to lease, sell, or acquire the right to lease land represents a formal legal agreement 
between the city as landlord and a legal entity or individual as a tenant or buyer.   
The first priority for the ruling coalition of Popov and Luzhkov in 1991 related to control:  
did the executive or legislative branch manage land allocation?  And within the municipal 
bureaucracy, which agencies managed what functions?   Were the Soviet model to prevail, the 
most powerful actor would become the Mossovet (Council of People’s Deputies).  It had exercised 
the authority to allocate land privileges; now these privileges had reappeared as rights under the 
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RSFSR law of November 23, 1990, “On land reform.”  Hence the first task for the Popov 
administration was to wrest control of land allocation from the Mossovet, newly elected in the 
democratic fervor of 1990.  
The second task involved clarification of city agency functions.  Of those involved in land 
and property, three renamed agencies carried over from the Soviet period:  Moskomarkhitektura 
(responsible for the city’s General Plan and architectural planning), Moskomzem (land committee 
handling cadastral mapping and titling), and the Bureau of Technical Inventory (responsible for 
building assets).  Other key players included the newly-formed Moskomimushchestvo (Committee 
on Property) and Economic Policy (which managed policy for land and property at the federal 
level).   The former Soviet construction agency head and new First Deputy Premier of the Moscow 
government, V.I. Resin, received responsibility for all functions related to land, property, and 
construction on March 3, 1992.72 
Confrontation over legislative-bureaucratic roles on land policy came to a head in March 
1992.  As reported in Kommersant, the competing parties held a session with Vice Mayor Luzhkov 
on March 5, 1992 to discuss the division of responsibilities contained in Luzhkov’s decrees of 
January 31 and March 2, 1992.  These had authorized Moskomzem to design the normative basis 
for land relations.   At the March 5 meeting, Moskomzem spoke first, taking a broad view of its 
leadership role.  Then the Mossovet land commission presented an alternative framework: the lead 
strategic roles would be assumed by Moskomarkhitektura and the Moscow Property Committee, 
which would negotiate contractual agreements on land use.  Moskomzem was relegated to 
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technical support on mapping and registration.  In addition, the Mossovet land commission 
expected to manage and receive all land payments.  In a surprise change of mind, Vice Mayor 
Luzhkov reportedly switched sides, opposed the Moskomzem plan, and requested the legislative 
commission to detail the proposal further.   The Kommersant reporter advised entrepreneurs not to 
rush to curry favor with Moskomzem until the Mossovet submitted its legislative package.73    
The Government Resolution “On Implementation of Land Reform in Moscow City,” 
signed by Luzhkov as Premier on March 31, 1992, struck a middle ground that reinforced a major 
role for Moskomzem while also strengthening other agencies.  The program of implementation 
requires Moskomzem to coordinate all actions except on registration, where it assumed full 
authority.  To strengthen this point, which also contradicted the Mossovet, the resolution ordered 
Moskomimushchectvo (Committee on Property) to stop preparing and registering land lease 
agreements and to turn over all such work within a week to Moskomzem.  In a particular departure, 
the Mayor authorized the prefects, as an experimental approach, to make decisions on the granting 
of land plots in their respective territories with technical input from Moskomzem and 
Moscomarkhitektura.  In short, the resolution recognized and also refuted positions advanced by 
the Mossovet land commission. 74  
Having cleared the path for executive prerogatives on land policy, Luzhkov asserted 
authority over implementation by his appointees and bureaucratic agencies.  In an unusual public 
reprimand issued in May 1994, he “strictly pointed out to A.M. Bryachikhin, prefect of the Western 
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administrative okrug, and V.N. Astsaturov, chaiman of Moskomzem,that the lack of agreed actions 
and division of authority in the process of land reform was leading to violation of land 
legislation.”75  The Mayor instructed First Deputy Premier Resin to clarify implementation 
arrangements and ordered the offending officials to correct their actions in line with regulations 
adopted by the prefect. At the same time, he obliged Moskomzem to exert stricter control over 
land use by bringing any recommendations for repeal or changes in decisions by executive 
authorities to City Hall in a timely manner. 76   As an appointee of the Mayor, the prefect received 
a lighter blow in the public reprimand than the head of Moskomzem.  The message was 
nevertheless clear:  the Mayor was the principal and all others were his agents. 
The expenditure of political resources by Mayor Luzhkov to wrest control rights over land 
policy did not give him administrative capacity to fulfill his wishes.  To institute a new property 
rights structure, he needed to consider transaction costs related to land administration.   The trade-
off was between the cost to administer land leases and sub-leases77 and the cost to sell land (a one-
time source of income) and collect taxes.   Income from leases could be retained entirely by the 
region whereas taxes had to be shared with the federal government.78   However, whether land is 
leased or taxed, the investment and administration costs for cadastral mapping, evaluation, 
registration and monitoring are substantial.79  Even after doubling the income from concluding 
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agreements to lease land (see Table 1),80  land administration expenditures exceeded non-tax land 
revenues by 30 times.    
To consider the counterfactual, how might Moscow have fared fiscally had it instituted a 
property rights regime based primarily on freehold land ownership?  It is difficult to undertake 
such analysis with any confidence. During the 1990s, land taxes and lease rates were set 
administratively rather than by market assessment of land values.  Regional administrations 
adjusted the lease rate within the boundaries set by federal law, providing an incentive or 
disincentive to privatize.81    Lease rates during this period were a multiple of the land tax, which 
were set locally by city dumas within the framework of federal laws.82   Based on available data, 
it is difficult to establish with any certainty whether the Moscow administration kept lease rates 
artificially low to discourage land privatization.  The land tax is clear and set out in the law “On 
the Land Tax.”  For example, the weighted average tax rate across the 69 territorial zones of 
Moscow was Rub 40,500 per hectare in 1998, ranging from a high of Rub 300,277 within the 
Moscow Garden Ring Road to Rub 5,578 in less favorable locations.83  However, multiple 
amendments to the tax law and numerous evaluations by the Moscow Land Committee to 
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differentiate land values within each zone complicate the task of drawing conclusions.  Finally, 
subsidies on leases could be approved retroactively, depending on the budget.84    
Although it is difficult to judge forgone fiscal benefits from a freehold property regime in 
the 1990s, negotiated lease rates offered opportunities for arbitrary decision-making and 
corruption.  For example, a Moskomzem employee was arrested on a charge of understating a 
long-term land lease by US$1.3 million, benefitting the tenant (and, it is implied, the Moskomzem 
employee) at the expense of the city budget.85   
This brings us to transaction costs from the perspective of users of the new property rights 
system.  In conditions where a rule-bound bureaucracy follows clear and published regulations, 
and where market prices are public information and easily available, transaction costs are reduced 
to the minimum specified in the Coase Theorum.  That is, market prices will reflect optimal 
efficiency.  However, if information asymmetries favor ruling elites and prices are negotiated, 
market exchange will be encumbered by high transaction costs.  In short, a land market governed 
by political considerations reduces efficiency and raises costs for market participants.86   Such 
conditions prevailed in Moscow in the 1990s. 
For real estate developers and investors the transaction costs of acquiring land were 
extremely high in Moscow.  In a temporary resolution on January 31, 1992 entitled “On Procedures 
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for the Provision and Confiscation of Land,”87 the Vice Mayor outlined a complicated two-step 
procedure that must be followed by companies applying for land for construction or restoration 
projects.  Moskomzem and the Chief Architect are key bureaucratic players in the process.  On 
March 3, 1992, the Vice Mayor signed a separate resolution88, with the additional proviso that all 
applications received by the Government of Moscow for land shall be addressed to the Deputy 
Prime Minister of the Moscow Government, V.I. Resin, who had the right to preliminary review 
before submission to the Commission on land and town planning regulation as represented by 
Moskomzem. The resolution dwells on actions that that can lead to loss of existing (Soviet) land 
privileges.  Most significantly, all works must conform to the Soviet-era General Plan that was 
drafted in secret but not yet approved by the Central Committee in 1989.    The primary implication 
of these procedures, as discussed in more detail in the period 2001-2013, was a high level of 
interference by the bureaucracy and long delays to acquire land. 
Another level of transaction costs arose from the overlay of Moscow regulations on federal 
requirements for land auctions as a means of allocating land.   Owing to a mismatch in definitions 
in the federal and city acts, the subject of the land auctions was open to interpretation.  From the 
understanding in Moscow, a competitive auction only provided the right to conclude a lease 
agreement; land remained in ownership of the city government.  This interpretation led to several 
complications.  Most critically, according to Moscow procedures, the price of land was related to 
the overall commercial project, which first required pre-approval by several agencies for 
conformity with urban and environmental regulations before bidding could take place.  Hence the 
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bidder for the right to conclude a land lease needed to prepare a full package of documentation 
with pre-approved technical specifications for the full construction project.89  Not only was this 
process extremely costly from the point of view of the bidder, but it carried high risk, because the 
land lease contract still required a subsequent negotiation.  
Given the complexity of bureaucratic procedures, it is not surprising that violations of land 
regulations occurred regularly.  For example, the state land inspection unit in the first half of 2000 
conducted 7614 inspections of conformance with the land law by holders of large plots (over 4,000 
hectares) and found 4243 cases of violation of land laws and city regulations on land use, for which 
fines in six months amounted to Rub 17.2 million.90   
In the calculation of Mayor Luzhkov and the ruling coalition, the benefits of holding rights 
over land were greater than the transaction costs, both political and fiscal, of acquiring control.   
Once in control, the authorities then raised the transaction costs of acquiring land for firms and 
citizens.  The control rights of politicians and bureaucrats posed the greatest challenge in the 
transition from communism to market, according to Schlieffer, raising a two-fold dilemma:  “On 
the one hand, the necessary condition for establishing property rights is reducing the power of the 
bureaucrats.  On the other hand, some power of the government and the bureaucrats is necessary 
to enforce private property rights.91  As will be discussed in the next section on public participation, 
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civic interest in land and housing issues loomed large in the 1990s, yet were insufficient to 
diminish the control rights acquired by City Hall.  
 
Public Participation in Decision-Making, 1990 to 2000 
The premise of the dissertation is that greater public engagement will put political pressure 
on authorities and bureaucrats to open access to land and increase the security of land rights.   The 
importance of civic organizations in influencing the security of property rights in Russia is 
empirically established.92  This section focuses on two arenas through which the public can take 
the initiative to influence land policy: the legislature and voluntary associations.     
For three reasons, the Moscow legislative branch in the 1990s was too weak to challenge 
the Luzhkov administration on significant land policy matters.  First, members were inexperienced 
compared to the power house of former communists and local government leaders that comprised 
the post-Communist coalition in the executive branch. Deputies in the Moscow City Council 
(Small Soviet, elected in November 1991) and the city duma (elected in December 1993) had more 
humble and less official roles prior to legislative service.93 
Second, the territorial and functional reform of Moscow’s sub-city governments by Mayor 
Popov in 1991 created a vertical line of authority from the Mayor’s office down to the grassroots.  
Prefects appointed by the mayor then appointed sub-prefects to new mini-districts; both were 
accountable for implementation of city hall commands.94  Mayor Luzhkov somewhat rectified the 
democratic gap by introducing small elected assemblies in municipal districts in December 1993 
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to advise and confirm the appointment of the sub-prefect.95  While this leavened the top-down 
structure with some neighborhood yeast, it did not provide a forum for discussion of citizen 
concerns or communication with legislators or the mayor’s office.  
Finally, Yeltsin’s authorization during the constitutional crisis in October 1993, giving the 
mayor power to rule by executive instruction (rasporyazhenie), eviscerated the spirit if not the 
letter of separation of powers.   The “hypermayoral” system, as Colton terms it, required the 
Moscow City Duma to go to court if it fundamentally disagreed with an executive order.   The 
legislature could suggest changes to orders and pass bills, but if vetoed by the mayor, a two-thirds 
majority was required to overturn it.96   In short, the power structure in Moscow inverted the 
concept of citizens as the principal and government as the agent of the people.   Accordingly, voter 
turnout to elections of the City Duma was low; almost half of citizens surveyed in 2000 believed 
the Mayor was fully in control and the Duma rubber-stamped his administration’s decisions.97  The 
disempowerment of the legislature also disenfranchised the population.   
In spite of the power imbalance, the Moscow City Duma did its best to carve out a role on 
land policy.  In 1994, it passed a law proposing a joint commission of deputies and executive 
representatives to oversee land rights, land payments, planning and zoning (including the General  
Plan) and dispute resolution (e.g. creation of a Moscow land court).98  The commission was 
established in 1995.  Two years later, the Duma required annual reports by the city administration 
on achievements and plans for land reform, including revenues from land payments and 
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expenditures on land administration.99  The reports undoubtedly increased the accountability of 
the city administration; as will be discussed, the opposition politician, Boris Nemtsov, used the 
administration’s own reports a decade later to expose corruption in land deals. 
Another potential force for change emerged in the early 1990s as the privatization of 
housing, curtailment of new construction, and gradual shift of maintenance responsibilities onto 
residents prompted an outburst of civic activism in defense of housing rights and better living 
conditions.  Shomina et al estimated that 3,000 housing cooperatives, 700 associations of flat 
owners, 500 housing partnerships and several hundred housing committees in municipal buildings 
had sprung up in addition to Soviet-era organizations that gained new adherents, including 120 
MZhKs  (youth housing complexes) and 120 KOS (committees of social self-engagement).100  
Additionally, many city-wide organizations appeared, such as the National Forum of Affordable 
and Decent Housing, formed by Nash Dom (Our Home), a group of residents formed in 1991 to 
take ownership of their apartment building,   Considering the diversity and immensity of actions, 
Shomina et al stated that a true “housing movement” had formed in the capital, bringing 
Muscovites “the first lessons of market economy and democratic behavior.”101   
While Muscovites were slow to appreciate the responsibilities of private property rights, 
they were quick to organize when disparities raised questions of fairness.  Due to the separation of 
land and buildings under Soviet law, citizens did not initially perceive the privatization of 
apartments as linked to land.  Nor did they understand that the absence of affordable housing 
                                                 
99 Postanovlenie Moskovskoi gorodskoi Dumy No 30 of May 7, 1997. О vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v 
postanovlenie Moskovskoi gorodskoi Dumi ot 31 maia 1995 goda N 34 “O komissii Moskovskoi gorodskoi Dumi i 
Administratsii goroda Moskvy po normativnoi baze zemel’nykh i imushchestvennykh pravootnoshenii.” [On 
amendments to the resolution of the Moscow City Duma on 31 May 1995 No. 34 On the Commission of the 
Moscow City Duma and Administration on the regulatory basis of land and property relations]. 
100 Yelena Shomina, Vladimir Kolossov and Viktoria Shukhat, “Local Activism and the Prospects for Civil Society 
in Moscow,” Eurasian Geography and Economics. 43:3 (2002), 252. 




options related to artificial constraints on land access due to the city’s monopoly ownership.  
Perceptions would change in the next decade when the city administration exercised eminent 
domain and evicted residents from multi-story buildings to claim the underlying territory. The 
more immediate issues in the 1990s related to housing privatization, which split municipal 
residents into nearly equal groups of tenants and owners, and the acute social impacts of 
substandard living quarters, such as multiple families living in one flat.  Despite having similar 
housing conditions, tenants had stronger legal protection than new owners, who had to assume 
responsibility for building maintenance without holding title to courtyards and common areas.  
“Ironically, privatization created a situation in which citizens felt that the only opportunity of being 
heard, treated fairly, and taking control was through collective action.”102   
The swell of voluntary organizations aroused the interest and ire of the city administration. 
Seeing benefits in residential improvement initiatives, the city sought to stimulate neighborhood 
activism for maintenance and courtyard security.  Battles arose when housing groups asserted 
authority over non-residential areas, which then raised the question of property ownership.   
According to Shomina, et al,  “[l]ocal authorities, and particularly municipal maintenance 
agencies, do not want to lose control over property and public money and oppose any initiative 
from below….Later, conflict shifted to the field of land use.103”   An advisor to the Mayor, 
Professor Pavel Makagonov, conceded that the city administration needed residential cooperation 
but was at a loss how to engage citizen associations. 104  Groups that attempted to assume real 
power came into conflict with local authorities.105 
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Grassroots initiatives stimulated representative democracy and legislative action in the 
1990s but ultimately did not solve the most vexing housing rights issues at the building level.  
Housing leaders who were elected to councils at the rayon (district) and prefecture levels were 
able to raise neighborhood property issues, while the Public Council on Housing Policy, created 
in 1994 under the umbrella of the Moscow City Duma, represented city-wide organizations.  
Though the Public Council lobbied for better laws in meetings led by the Commission Chair, 
Galina Khovanskaya, it was not able to address practical issues of tenant rights at the building 
level, such as lease agreements and forced evictions.106   
As of 2001, progress on access to better housing was glacial:  almost 200,000 people still 
lived in shared flats and over 600,000 people remained on a list for improved housing.107   Despite 
the sense of injustice that aroused the housing movement in Moscow, property rights failed to 
congeal as an agenda for political action in the 1990s.   This raises a question: why do citizens not 
express grievances in terms of property rights?  We will return to question at the end of the chapter.  
 
3. The Land Governance Model in Moscow, 2001-2013 
a. Political Authority and the Legal Order, 2001-2013 
The political and fiscal autonomy that enabled Mayor Luzhkov to institute a property rights 
paradigm based on leasehold rather than private ownership came under pressure as Vladimir Putin 
came to power and recentralized political authority.  As will be argued, the Luzhkov administration 
managed challenges from the Kremlin less effectively under the Putin presidency.  Luzhkov’s 
bargaining power declined, and his security in office became more tenuous.  Political 
independence and city land practices ultimately cost the Mayor his job.    
                                                 
106 Shomina, et al, “Local Activism,” 253-4. 




As in the previous decade, the primary political issue from 2000 to 2008 was competition 
between the capital’s popular mayor and the occupant of the Kremlin.  After meeting Prime 
Minister Putin in February 2000, Luzhkov stated that his Fatherland party could hardly support 
Putin as a presidential candidate, noting Putin was “a blank page…in essence, no one knows 
anything about him.”108  Thereafter, the investigative committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
opened an inquiry into Luzhkov’s economic activities.  Luzhkov subsequently changed his point 
of view and came out in favor of Putin, who was elected President on March 26, 2000.  Luzhkov’s 
Fatherland party eventually teamed up with Putin’s (Unity) to form United Russia, which captured 
two-thirds of the seats in the December 2003 elections, while Luzhkov was re-elected mayor with 
nearly 75% of the votes.109   Up to this point, Luzkhov’s bargaining power and policy independence 
remained solid. 
The dynamic between the Mayor and the President changed when Putin ended the election 
of heads of regions in 2004.  According to the biography of Luzhkov in Lenta.ru, tensions started 
to grow in 2005 as Putin became more uncomfortable with the gratuitous shows of independence 
of the Mayor.  Putin started to appoint the mayor’s key officials to posts outside Moscow (for 
example, Vice Mayor Shantsev became Governor of Nizhny Novgorod), thus breaking up the 
Mayor’s team.    Luzhkov’s poor handling of the eviction of residents from their homes in Butovo 
(discussed below) triggered speculation that the dismissal of the Mayor was not far off.  Putin 
nominated him to the mayoral position again in June 2006 for a fifth term, but the relationship 
remained rocky.110  After a meeting with President Putin in July 2007, press reports indicated that 
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“Putin and Luzhkov will go out together” when Putin’s second term ended in 2008.111   In short, 
the appearance of numerous indirect threats to the mayor’s tenure indicated the balance of power 
had shifted to the Kremlin.  
There is a significant difference between the 1990s and the Putin period in terms of 
Luzhkov’s security in office and political time horizon.  While his relationship with Yeltsin 
deteriorated at the end of the decade, Luzhkov’s grasp on the capital was secured by landslide 
elections.  That security evaporated when President Putin changed the rules on regional elections.  
With greater uncertainty in his future, Luzhkov had even less incentive to take the risk on far-
reaching institutional reforms that would deprive him of his hold on land ownership in the capital.   
The city of Moscow also faced new fiscal challenges following reforms of the fiscal 
federalist system in the early 2000s.112  From 2002 to 2005, due to consolidation of the number of 
local taxes, regions lost nearly 10 percent of GDP in budget revenues.  To compensate, federal 
transfers to the regions were expected to increase, and local governments were expected to 
maximize other sources of revenues, including from land taxes.113   The principal impact on 
Moscow was a reduction in the tax advantages it enjoyed in the 1990s and a recalculation of the 
fiscal transfer formula that required Moscow to contribute more to the federal budget.  While 
Moscow retained some federal subsidies,114 it needed to fill the gap lost during the tax reforms.   
Moscow was able to tap capital markets to meet expenditure needs.  In 2007, for example, Moscow 
city bonds raised US$4.3 billion of the US$8 billion in regional and municipal bonds placed in the 
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market.115  As a consequence, the Luzhkov administration could afford to resist recommendations 
to increase revenues from land and property taxes.  
During the early 2000s, as new fiscal federalist policies were introduced, numerous 
scholarly articles appeared in Russia that argued in favor of harmonizing the land and property tax 
into a single levy that should become the principal source of municipal finance, particularly in 
Moscow, which received less than one percent (0.33) of the budget from such taxes.116  In 2004, 
S.V. Orlov, deputy chair of the economic policy committee of the city Duma, and R.A. Kamaev 
argued strongly in favor of a unified real estate tax, noting that Russian tax law and Moscow 
practices were counter to market evaluation, contributing to inefficient land use.  In particular, the 
formula for assessing property values was not based on market factors but on the 1991 assessment 
(in 1991 rubles) multiplied by a coefficient that was set annually by the city.  In 2003, the 
coefficient of 15 ridiculously undervalued property values, according to the authors.  At the same 
time, land taxes in 2003, at 35 rubles per square meter, were 50 times higher than land rents, the 
reverse of conditions in advanced economies.   Nevertheless, they noted, land and property taxes 
comprised only 6.5 percent of the budget and 8 percent of all taxes in Moscow.  In contrast, local 
governments in major Western countries received from 15-50% of tax income from real estate, 
even though the tax rate was lower.  Furthermore, they argued, while there were start-up costs for 
administration, a unified property tax system would stabilize at about 5% of revenues, and thus be 
self-financing. The authors called for a wide discussion with members of society, the City Duma, 
                                                 
115 da Silva et al, Intergovernmental Reforms, p. 94. 
116 A.A. Alekseeva, “Rol’ Zemel’nogo Naloga.”  Moscow is compared to Belgorod and Krasnodar Oblasts that 




and the Moscow government on these recommendations.117  Left unsaid, but implicit in the 
argument, was that the city should privatize more land. 
As the predatory rule theory would predict, the Luzhkov administration rejected 
recommendations to sell land and thereby maximize revenue from property taxes.  Given the city’s 
strong fiscal position and the benefits of controlling land rights, the city administration could afford 
to adopt tax policies that created a strong incentive for leasehold while also favoring owners of 
elite properties.  While Orlov and Kamaev were careful not to criticize City Hall, it is clear that 
low rental rates to lease land in comparison with high tax rates to own land would discourage 
privatization.  At the same time, the separation of valuation functions between a cadastral agency 
(for land) and the Bureau of Technical Inventory (for real property) enabled Moscow to manipulate 
land and property values.  The formula used did not account for the location, size or usage of the 
property.  The result was paradoxical: expensive homes in prestigious locations received a low tax 
rate, while concrete-block units (of the Khushchev period) carried high rates.118  
The Luzhkov administration continued the course set in the 1990s, despite the adoption of 
a Land Code in 2001 and other regulations by the Putin Administration that required competitive 
auctions for sale of unimproved or vacant municipal land plots.  A study prepared for the Ministry 
of Economy and Trade in 2005 concluded that Moscow City, in contrast to fifteen Russian regions 
reviewed, held auctions only for lease rights up to 49 years, not for sale of land.119  A different 
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assessment in 2006 specifically on Moscow observed that “obtaining ownership rights for land 
plots in Moscow city happens very rarely or does not exist.” 120 
 While the Luzhkov administration discouraged land privatization, reports published in 
2008 and 2009 pierced the veil of secrecy over land markets in Moscow.   First, in 2008, a former 
business partner of Elena Baturina, wife of then-Moscow Mayor Luzhkov, deposed to a high court 
in London that "Ms. Baturina's sphere of influence is such that no major project can succeed [in 
Moscow] without her backing." The deposition contradicted Baturina’s long-standing rejection of 
claims that she had become the wealthiest woman in Russia due to her relationship to the Mayor.121  
Thereafter, on September 8, 2009, opposition leader Boris Nemtsov issued a report called Luzhkov:  
Conclusions, that demonstrated how Baturina’s company, Inteko, benefited from control by the 
Mayor’s office over the property rights regime in Moscow.122    
Drawing on orders and decrees published on the official website of the Moscow 
Government (www.mos.ru), Nemtsov systematically detailed 23 cases from 2001 to 2009 where 
the Moscow Government ceded rights to Inteko to purchase, develop and build housing and office 
complexes throughout the city.  In several cases, Inteko acquired the rights to the land plot under 
existing hotels in prime locations.  Baturina received land on the secondary market, as a result of 
competition, but mainly through targeted programs for the removal of industrial sites and the 
freeing up of land under authority of federal departments.  While these were all legal approaches, 
acquiring land and the rights to build on it was extremely difficult without connections to the 
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Government through her husband, according to Nemtsov.   Even in the rare cases when developers 
acquired land, he notes, the simultaneous acquisition of municipal authorization to build was 
highly exceptional.   Moreover, Inteko rarely paid for costs that were ordinarily the responsibility 
of developers in Moscow.  As Nemtsov noted, the normal requirements that developers pay into 
the city budget for technical appraisal and utility connections were exempted.  Moreover, the city 
would compensate the developer for any costs incurred for social and engineering infrastructure.  
This formulation was in line with the lease clause in the Vice Mayor’s Rasporiazhenie № 110-
VM, March 2, 1992 pertaining to cases when land was confiscated for city needs, not when it was 
sold for greenfield property development.123 
Finally, drawing on articles in Vedomosti and Kommersant, Nemtsov details the 
circumstances surrounding the mysterious sale of 58 hectares of land in western Moscow near the 
Kiev rail station by Baturina in July 2009.  An unknown buyer purchased the land for 13 billion 
rubles, an astronomical 7.2 million rubles per hectare.  Five days later, the same land appeared in 
“Moszemsyntez,” a new Moscow city fund to develop land.  Financing for the city to purchase the 
land came from an emission of shares in 2009 valued at 20 billion rubles by the Bank of Moscow, 
of which 75% was purchased by Moscow city using budget funds and the remaining 25% by a city 
insurance fund.  After the emission, the city did not take control of the shares, which were held 
instead by private parties with ties to Mayor Luzhkov.  In essence, Baturina acquired rights to city 
land at concessional prices; this land was then purchased from her by the city through directed 
credit from the Bank of Moscow and funds managed by the city.124    
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Though Nemtsov faced judicial proceedings for implicating the Mayor in questionable land 
sales, his critique contributed to the most serious political crisis of Luzhkov’s career.  Following 
publication of Luzhkov: Conclusions, the Mayor filed a defamation lawsuit against Nemtsov in the 
Moscow Arbitration Court.  Nemtsov welcomed the opportunity to meet the couple in court, but 
acknowledged that “we understand the way the Moscow courts operate, they have never ruled 
against the Moscow mayor and his wife.”125  Reports on the outcome of the proceedings differ, 
with Western media indicating that the courts favored Nemtsov and Russian media (RIA Novosti) 
stating that Luzhkov won the case.126  However, after Luzhkov criticized President Medvedev in 
September 2010 for his decision to delay construction of the Moscow-St. Petersburg highway 
through Khimki forest (discussed below), federal television channels began airing damaging 
reports on the performance of Mayor Luzhkov.  All of the issues raised in the media accounts 
could be traced back to the city’s land management policies:  congested traffic, destroyed cultural 
assets, and corrupt land sales.  Elena Baturina figured prominently in the reports.127  Shortly 
thereafter, Luzhkov wrote to the President, accusing him of anti-democratic behavior.  On the 
morning of September 28, 2010, Medvedev issued a decree, relieving Luzhkov of his position “in 
connection with the loss of confidence of the President.” 128 
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While the scale of corruption practiced by Mayor Luzhkov and Elena Baturnia in the 
richest real estate market in Russia was perhaps suspected, it only came to public attention in 2008 
and 2009 following the deposition of a business partner and systematic analysis and publication 
of the facts by an opposition leader.    It is unclear how long the practices continued, and whether 
the federal government condoned collusive practices in land access; if so, the role of President 
Medvedev in highlighting the importance of judicial process in the eviction of residents from 
Rechnik (discussed in Chapter 4) was an important turning point.    
The predatory ruler may maximize wealth, Levi says, “but he cannot do as he pleases.”129 
Aside from pursuing policies that favored his family and those connected to his administration, 
Luzhkov’s urban land policies stifled the formation of land markets that are otherwise the oxygen 
of a dynamically-changing cityscape.  Without the recycling of land for new and more efficient 
uses, land transactions became distorted and hardened into rigid patterns that slowed the 
transformation of Moscow from a socialist to market city.  And without enlightened executive 
political authority and an associated legal order, there was no starting point for institutional change.   
 
b. Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 2001 to 2013 
Despite debates at the national level over the appropriate structure to govern land relations, 
Mayor Luzhkov instituted a strict organizational hierarchy and process for land management early 
in his tenure.  As a consequence of the political negotiations that enabled his administration to 
wrest control from the Mossovet, several Soviet-era units carried over and continued to perform 
selected tasks.  Although these units reported to the First Deputy Premier with primary support 
from Moskomzem, coordination remained a serious challenge.   Until the cadastral and registration 
                                                 




functions were federalized beginning in 2008, leading to significant improvements in Moscow’s 
bureaucratic performance, the early organizational effort contributed to high transaction costs and 
lower efficiency in Moscow property markets.  
A report by the Foreign Investment Advisory Service of The World Bank Group in 2006 
summarized performance in Moscow compared to fifteen other regions on formal procedures, 
required by law, to enable enterprises to acquire land or buildings for business expansion.   The 
report foreshadowed the Doing Business benchmarking approach by quantifying the time, cost, 
and number of procedures required by subnational governments to complete a standard service to 
enterprises.  About half of the procedures had legislatively defined business standards and costs, 
while the remainder fell under local interpretation.   
As noted in the table below, procedures related to the acquisition of land were baffling in 
their complexity.  Land and buildings were treated as distinct objects, and acquisition of land 
through a tender could proceed without the buyer knowing the location.  It is worth listing the 
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Based on the time and cost for each step, as validated in interviews with enterprises, the 
study found several distinctions in Moscow compared to other regions.  First, there was literally 
no experience with any procedure relating to land ownership (procedures 2A and 3A) and very 
little evidence of tenders (procedure 5), as required by law.  Second, on procedures related to land 




in other regions.  Procedure 1, the most commonly used in Moscow, was both the least defined in 
terms of time and costs, and thus, led to the longest number of steps (24) and the highest level of 
unofficial payments. When asked which agency was most problematic among several actors – e.g. 
the Bureau for Technical Inventory, Moskomzem, Mosregistratsia – respondents summarized in 
one statement: “The Government of Moscow.”130 
Coping with a process that could take over two years under the best of circumstances led 
many companies to cut corners to conclude a transaction. The most commonly used were to call 
on insiders in government or to employ former officials in the business.   However, the main factor 
reducing the time and cost of a transaction was the interest of the municipal owner in expediting a 
deal, for reasons that remain murky.131  
Gaps in bureaucratic performance also surfaced in reports after Mayor Luzhkov left office.   
The Resolution “On approval of the property and land policy of the Government of Moscow from 
2012 to 2018” signed by Mayor Sobyanin listed several shortcomings to be addressed in the new 
program.   Management had been overly bureaucratic and transactions were scattered in different 
departments rather than in a single, official register.  Moreover, city regulations were not in 
conformity with federal laws.  For example, the city was renting out the basements of multi-storied 
buildings rather than forming a single property, including the underlying land.  Of most importance 
for future management of land, the resolution raised doubts on the accuracy of land records: 
Information included in the balance sheets are the result solely of documents which are updated mainly in a 
declarative manner; they do not always correspond to the actual situation. The existing land balance does not 
assess how much land from the cadastral records can be engaged in transactions since the plot was formed 
for temporary tasks (provision of construction, placement of municipal towns, repair of underground services, 
etc.) such that the plots intersect or overlap with one another. 
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Also, you cannot currently answer the question of how much and what type of land (unbuilt plots of land, or 
for real estate development, etc.) can be generated on lands that are not covered by the cadastral inventory, 
since not all territorial development projects have been included.132  
 
While there is a tendency for incoming administrations to question the preceding regime, the issues 
raised in Sobyanin’s resolution point to the inadequacies of land administration under Luzkhov 
and a recognition of the importance of reputable records as the basis for secure property rights. 
In summary, until the change in government in Moscow in late 2010, the efficiency and 
quality of land administration compared unfavorably with other regions, contributing to higher 
transaction costs for businesses and reducing the transparency of information.  These factors would 
improve significantly in Moscow after 2010 as the registration and cadastral process was 
federalized.   Until that point, to be discussed in Chapter 8, Moscow’s bureaucracy exhibited no 
interest in promoting land privatization.  To the contrary, officials erected procedural hurdles to 
stymie institutional change.  
 
c. Public Participation in Decision-Making, 2001 to 2013 
In advanced market economies, the main entry point for public participation in land 
development decisions is through public consultations on major development projects or plans that 
impact property rights.  In post-communist countries, this tradition is not well established, partly 
because property rights remain diffused, but also because the General Plans that guided urban 
development in the Soviet period were regarded as state secrets.  The state Duma adopted the 
Russian Town Planning Code in 2005 to encourage greater public participation in urban 
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development.  It required all municipalities to develop and publish General Plans by 2008 that 
would guide strategic planning and land use and development rules, including zoning regulations.  
These plans and regulations are of interest to citizens, businesses and real estate developers as they 
point to locations that may become a focus of urban renewal.   
There is a critical distinction between the planning approach of advanced and command 
economies.   In particular, “In a command economy, the General Plan is a detailed blue print to be 
built as designed; in a market economy land use regulations establish only a building envelope 
within which developers are free to design and build what they want, provided they build within 
the limits imposed by the regulations. 133  Many Russian municipalities have adopted General 
Plans and engaged the public in consultations, while others persist in viewing regulations as a 
control mechanism over construction.  An important question in each municipal case study is 
whether the public was encouraged or allowed to comment on strategic plans, zoning regulations 
or individual (large) development projects.  
In Moscow, the General Plan put forward by the Luzhkov administration in 2010 received 
widespread public scorn.134  Until that point, the city was operating on a draft plan that was 
extensively debated but not approved as of 1989.135  Despite the controversy over the new plan, 
which was intended to determine major investments in urban development, Mayor Luzhkov signed 
it in May 2010.136  The General Plan came under review following the appointment of Mayor 
Sobyanin in late 2010.137 
                                                 
133 Alan Bertaud, “The Development of Russian Cities: Impact of Reforms on Spatial Development,”  Mimeo for The 
World Bank, March 13, 2010, 14. 
134 “Luzhkov, Yuri: Byvshii Mer Moskvy.”  Lenta.ru. Accessed November 30, 2014. 
http://lenta.ru/lib/14159332/full.htm,  
135 Colton, Moscow, 724-727. 
136 “Iu. Luzhkov podpical zakon o Genplane Moskvy do 2025,” RBK, May 28, 2010. 




In the absence of a clear picture of where development is heading and why, the public has 
reacted to individual projects on the basis of environmental, cultural or individualistic rather than 
collective private property concerns.  Moscow has several cases where passionate fights have been 
waged against Mayor Luzhkov, who held opponents in contempt.  However, according to a major 
study of civic protest in Moscow by Samuel Greene, including on housing issues, state protection 
for property rights never became a uniting theme of social movements because the injustice frame 
of protesters and activists is expressed as a gulf between the state and society.  Even if property 
rights did emerge as a congealing ingredient, it would be insufficient to develop into a social 
movement in the absence of anticipation of success by protestors, according to Greene.138  
Three cases, reviewed briefly here, suggest there is more sustainability in the housing 
movement than may appear from the transient nature of each example.  While the cases are 
motivated by a variety of grievances, each one enabled citizens to coalesce around a cause, 
supported by organizations that are strong advocates for protection of housing rights, land rights, 
cultural assets, or green development.  The connective theme in these cases is the reliance by 
residents on sophisticated legal mechanisms to express opposition to city land use planning.    
A highly-publicized case that put Mayor Luzhkov in an unflattering light involved the 
involuntary relocation of a mother and son (the Prokofiev family) from their privately-owned 
wooden home in Butovo, 5 kilometers outside Moscow center, in 2006.  The residents claimed 
compensation not just for their homes, but also for the land, which they said they owned and on 
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which they had paid land taxes.  The city disagreed, insisting the land was municipal property, so 
compensation should only involve equal housing.  The attempted eviction of the Prokofiev family, 
who held out against the authorities, led to a court case, a tent camp of protesters, a human defense 
brigade by Butovo residents against the bulldozers, and the engagement of the Public Chamber, a 
newly-created body to improve communications between authorities and society.  Sergei 
Mitrokhin, a Deputy of the Moscow City Duma, warned that the actions of authorities represented 
a “’time bomb’” by violating property rights, while Vladimir Platonov, also a Deputy, declared 
that the city’s actions were legal and in line with court orders.139   The case was eventually resolved 
when the Prokovievs accepted new housing.  However, the underlying issue that stimulated the 
long legal battle was the absence of documentation that the land under the home had been 
registered.  Without such documentation, the city was legally not in a position to evict the 
residents.140 
Following the Butovo case, the Luzhkov administration in 2007 submitted a bill to the city 
Duma to expand its powers of eminent domain so it did not have to engage in lengthy legal 
disputes.  “The main problem,” said Sergei Belyakov, a lawyer who advises the Yabloko party in 
the city Duma, “is that the [Moscow] government does not allow people to privatize their 
property.”141 As a consequence, land plots were reserved by the city to indicate it was municipal 
property, explained Alexi Navalny, then a lawyer with the Committee for the Defense of 
Muscovites, an organization that represents landowners in legal disputes with the city 
government.142   These legal issues arose in the planned condemnation of 3 apartment complexes 
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on Khoroshyovsky Proyezd in 2007 to make land available for school and kindergarten 
construction.  The residents had received an assessment from the local prefect in 2005 that the 
apartments, built in the early 1950s, were in satisfactory condition. Two years later, they received 
an eviction notice because the buildings were condemned as dilapidated.  The interesting aspect 
of this case is that the residents wanted to exercise their rights under the Land Code to acquire the 
land under the building, which would require the city to pay market rates to remove the residents.  
To acquire the land through city procedures would take more time than the deadline for eviction 
from their homes of 30 years. The residents intended to take the case to the Supreme Court if 
necessary. As of this writing the outcome is not known.143   
In another legal case, a deputy of Lefortovo district’s municipal assembly, Alexandra 
Andreyeva, is fighting the decision to allow construction of a kindergarten in the Stroganov Estate 
Park, an 18th century heritage site, where development is prohibited by environmental protection 
and cultural heritage laws.   An effort to stop the project by preservationists was overturned by 
Moscow’s Presnensky Court, which decided in favor of the property developer, Terra Auri.  
Although the project started in 2010, City Hall passed an amendment to the City Development 
Code two years later, in April 2012, to allow daycare centers funded by the City to be constructed 
in protected areas.   Andreyeva observed that “the authorities want to show that the residents mean 
nothing, and that they should not impede public projects.” 144   Moreover, winning in court against 
a government department was difficult due to interference by the executive branch in judicial 
proceedings.  Nevertheless, she said, the preservationists intended to file an appeal. 145 
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Perhaps the most serious case of government suppression of private property rights relates 
to local opposition to the construction of a new Moscow-St. Petersburg highway through Khimki 
Forest in the northern Moscow suburb of Khimki.   The case is notable due to the use of physical 
violence to intimidate the opposition leaders and journalists who exposed details of the proposed 
action, leading to beatings and the near-death of several protesters.   Following a series of violent 
clashes in the summer of 2010, federal authorities intervened and President Medvedev ordered a 
temporary halt to construction, noting the need for more public discussion.  Furthermore, a federal 
investigation led to the arrest of Andrei Chernyshev, the head of the municipal property 
department, and two others, for the life-threatening attack on an environmental protester and head 
of the local branch of Right Cause.  Nevertheless, President Medvedev later allowed construction 
to continue, signaling the limits of local public participation in decision-making on major federal 
projects.146 
In his study, Greene reviews Butovo, Khimki, and other cases that are loosely related to 
housing rights, and observes that the state was coherent in intervening in people’s lives.  However, 
he concludes that housing/property rights never congealed into a social movement because the 
state was inconsistent in its policy response to protesters.  In the case of Butovo, the state settled 
the demands of the Prokovievs by negotiating a better trade (a two-bedroom flat on Kutusovskii 
Prospekt).  In the case of Khimki, the riot police cracked heads.  In a different case, the district 
prefect was replaced.  Whether planned or not, Greene says, the inconsistency in the range of 
responses, from acquiescence to brutal repression, prevented the formation of a movement 
committed to collective action.147  
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While neither Greene’s study nor this dissertation take a systematic view of housing and 
land-related protests, the quantitative evidence from Shomina et al148 and Lankina149 suggests that 
a movement is forming, loosely related to property rights, with a strong legal foundation.  In 
Moscow, political authorities were fairly coherent in obstructing the formation of private rights 
and responding to protestors.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to conclude that grievances are 
articulated in terms of failure of the state to protect property rights.  This may be due to the 
inconsistency between urban land policies advocated nationally and those implemented in 
Moscow. For residents of the capital, where both battles played out, confusion over legitimacy of 
land institutions would be understandable.  As Kurzman observes, during times when institutions 
are in flux, and rules of the game suddenly change, confusion is created, confounding efforts to 
interpret grievances.150   Moreover, to expect public protests to stop corruption in real estate 
development is naïve, since the high return from each investment will continue to motivate new 
projects.  This does not lessen the potential for individual protests to have an iterative impact over 
time if they represent major victories over state entities.151  
 
Following the appointment of Mayor Sobyanin in September 2010, land relations as 
practiced by the Luzhkov Administration have changed, and so has the transparency of 
information.  The Mayor has outlined a detailed plan for land administration to 2016.  Cadastral, 
registration, and financial data related to land ownership and use are published electronically.  The 
response time for clients to register land is improved in local offices of the federal registry 
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(Rosreestr).  Full information is available on the city’s website on the income sources of city 
officials involved in real estate, in conformance with federal anti-corruption laws.  There continue 
to be troubling signs of state preference for land leasing as opposed to land privatization in 
Moscow, and the General Plan is still not public.  Data on the outputs and impacts of land 
administration are reported for the three case study cities in Chapter 8. 
As of 2013, while developers still view investment projects in Moscow with extreme 
caution, the dynamic also changed due to an unexpected development:  the proposal by Mayor 
Sobyanin and Moscow Oblast Governor Gromov in July 2011 to increase the territory of Moscow 
(then 1000 sq. km.) by 2.5 times.  As announced, “New Moscow” would extend to the southwest 
towards Vnukovo Airport to the border of Kaluga Oblast and 
this sparsely-populated, primarily forest area with only 
250,000 residents would house the presidential 
administration, federal agencies, the Moscow municipal 
government, and villages of officials (chinovniki).152  A 
visiting international panel of the Urban Land Institute found 
such a proposal “perplexing” considering the strong need for 
modernizing the cityscape within Moscow, but observed that if the intent was to harmonize the 
vision of city and oblast development there may be merit, so long as all stakeholders were 
consulted on expansion plans.153 In fact, there were no public hearings or consultations, and polls 
conducted from June (before details were published) to August 2011 showed increasing skepticism 
about the proposal among Moscow City residents, while those living in the Oblast hoped the result 
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would be an improvement in socio-economic conditions and infrastructure such as water, 
sanitation and roads.154  
 Aside from declarations of intent to relieve overcrowding and improve congestion, the 
annexation of territory to construct a government district was unprecedented because “no country 
has built a new “satellite” capital adjacent to its old capital….Officially, New Moscow merely says 
“Old Moscow is dysfunctional.”155 Russian commentators expressed a wide range of possible 
motivations for the 20-year mega-project, but most focused on two key issues: power and profit.  
Following the long tenure of an independent-minded mayor, who enriched himself on Moscow 
real estate, several believed the Kremlin wanted stronger control over politics, economic 
development, and the wealth of the capital.156 
 Expert international opinion on the planned expansion of Moscow highlighted the negative 
consequences for urban development: 
 
Based on analysis and consultation, the Panel found that the proposal to move significant amounts of new 
employment and government into this area will result in several unintended consequences. While there may 
come a time when new construction in this area is necessary, the Panel did not believe that time is now, and 
may not be for several generations. There is much work to do inside of MKAD (the Moscow Ring Road), 
and plenty of opportunities are still present to develop the city. Redirecting talent and capital to the 
development of greenfield areas is an exercise many other cities have previously attempted and, after decades 
of effort, they are universally seen as a failure in their ability to create vital and economically dynamic 
communities. These new areas fail to create new economic value or increase the competitiveness of the cities 
they replaced, and are often viewed as the least desirable places to live.157  
 
As the legal, economic and financial implications of the original project became clearer, the idea 
of creating a federal enclave within a poorly developed region died a quiet death.  By 2013, reports 
flourished of a more residential, single-family development 158 that harkened back to Medvedev’s 
proposal to create a Federal Fund for Housing Construction Development in 2010.  In fact, the 
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Fund became an important tool to increase federal ownership of land in New Moscow.  As of 2013, 
only 3% of the new territory (4,000 out of 148,000 hectares) belonged to the City of Moscow and 
was suitable for building in terms of water, sanitation, power, and transport connections.  About 
half belonged to the forest fund, and the remainder was owned privately.  As a result, the share of 
private ownership by citizens shot up from 0.5% in 2011 to 14.1% in 2012, putting Moscow in 
one of the highest municipal rankings for citizen ownership. 
 Will higher rates of private home ownership in New Moscow increase the political 
influence of property owners?  Early indications are not promising.  As land values are rising 
dramatically (from 50-100 percent) due to demand for development, the Duma is considering the 
adoption of a law, similar to one used in Sochi for the Olympics, to accelerate the process whereby 
the State can enforce court rulings to claim rights to develop private land for public purposes.  In 
other words, “…no matter how long you may argue about the indemnification amount, while you 
are doing so, some highway may be under construction on your land plot.”159 Such an 
extraordinary legal measure would multiply the power of the state to deal with opposition to 
development such as occurred in the Stroganov Estate Park, Butovo, or Khimki Forest cases.  
Equally significant was the agreement by the Federal Fund for Housing Construction Development 
to grant federally-acquired land to Mayor Sobyanin for housing development in New Moscow.  
The criteria for allocating land to Moscow would depend on the scale of investment required for 
development.  If the intention is to build single-family housing, the land will remain in the Federal 
Fund.  However, if more complex projects are envisioned that include infrastructure and 
commercial property, the land will be allotted to Moscow.160  In all likelihood, more massive state 
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projects will crowd out smaller private housing, and in the battle for rights to land, the bigger 
developers with connections to city officials will be able to resolve issues related to indemnity in 
return for preferences on future projects.161  
 
4. Conclusion 
Moscow is emblematic of municipalities in institutional stasis because the land governance 
model retains more elements of the Soviet past than of modernizing, market economies.  In such 
municipalities, “the state and its agencies were simultaneously owner, client, financier, designer, 
and builder of all real estate objects, and conflicts that arose among stakeholders were not resolved 
at “arm’s length” on the basis of law.”162  The path of change was determined in the early 1990s 
when the Mayor of Moscow built his political base and city finances on leasing urban land and 
property; once he became secure, politically and fiscally, he had no incentive to sell land that 
conferred power and rents.  As predicted by the predatory rule theory, the more entrenched rulers 
become, and the more they rely on rents, the less accountable they become to constituents.  Even 
had 49-year leases been fully marketable, the municipality would have remained the ultimate 
owner.    
By applying the analytical framework of the land governance model to Moscow, it is 
evident that there has never been alignment at all levels in favor of land privatization.  Political 
authorities and the bureaucracy strongly resisted land privatization in both periods, before and after 
adoption of the Land Code.  At the end of the latter period, the new mayor demonstrated more 
awareness of public concerns, and bureaucratic performance improved, which may signal the 
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beginning of more secure land rights through professional standards of title registration.  In both 
periods, society, as represented by the Mossovet (City Council) and civic organizations, challenged 
the state’s hegemony in land use decisions.   During Luzhkov’s tenure, public officials failed to 
consult the population on land planning, regulations and zoning, and attempted to stifle the public’s 
voice through the courts and physical violence.  Yet the repeated use of legal channels and public 
protests by civic organizations and citizens had some effect, as evidenced by greater public 
outreach and market information by the Sobyanin Administration.   
In the absence of increased land sales in Old Moscow, the boundary expansion of New 
Moscow will inhibit rather than improve the spatial efficiency of the capital. Were the suppression 
of private land ownership and increase of territory merely a matter of power or profit for a few 
officials in a single municipality it would be sorry enough; the fact that the capital is the locus of 
such policies has wide-ranging consequences for the entire economy, relegating Russia to a lower 






St. Petersburg: A Case of Incremental Institutional Change 
 
 
From its origin as a planned city in 1703, to an over-planned city under the Soviets, St. 
Petersburg today is struggling more than elsewhere to dissemble the painful spatial distortions of 
the Socialist legacy, without marring the beauty of its imperial past.  A wide swath of aging 
industry, taking 40% of the territory, hugs the small historic center, covering a mere six percent, 
while distant from the core lies another ring of rapidly-depreciating multiunit apartments.1  Though 
the Soviet authorities of then-Leningrad invested mightily in a series of General Plans2 aimed at 
coordinating physical plant and human resources, they underinvested in consumer services, 
particularly housing, leaving a major social project for the new authorities of renamed St. 
Petersburg to tackle.  A key indicator of an incomplete task today is the queue of over a quarter-
million families and 120,000 residents in shared apartments who are waiting for improved 
municipal housing,3 despite the achievement in St. Petersburg of higher floor area per capita than 
the national average.4  The solution to St. Petersburg’s housing dilemma, along with its spatial 
stress, is more efficient land markets, which in turn requires more efficient land rights.   
The chapter argues that contradictory land privatization policies, combined with over-
reliance on an outdated General Plan, laid the basis for incremental institutional change that 
hampered the efficiency of land rights. Periodization is more difficult in St. Petersburg because 
political authorities alternated more frequently than in Moscow and Kazan.  Nevertheless, a pattern 
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of contradictory policies characterizes both the 1990s and 2000s.  Despite an initial pro-land-
privatization stance that made St. Petersburg an early leader in land sales to enterprises, political 
authorities adjusted land policies opportunistically in response to federal incentives and local fiscal 
needs.  Where political authorities had full authority to innovate, on the General Plan, they instead 
perpetuated a Soviet-era planning and land allocation bureaucracy and used the Plan as a tool to 
favor former state-controlled industries in distributing land rights. Exceptions to the General Plan 
by the municipal government stimulated civic sentiment against zoning rules that favored powerful 
enterprises and threatened preservation of St. Petersburg’s cultural heritage after 2006.   Thus, 
despite early advances that put St. Petersburg at the forefront of urban land privatization in the 
1990s, failure to adapt land privatization policies and the General Plan to the dynamics of a market 
economy constrained the development of land rights. 
 The structure of the chapter follows the land governance model. The influence of political 
authorities, the bureaucracy, and society on the development of land rights institutions is presented 
and compared over two decades. 
 
1. The Land Governance Model, 1990-2000 
a. Political Authority and the Legal Order, 1990-2000  
Political authorities established a favorable legal framework for land privatization in 1994. 
With 44 percent of its territory occupied by industrial enterprises and the election of Anatoly 
Sobchak in 1990, arguably the most liberal municipal leader of the period in Russia, two of Pyle’s 




market: a strong industrial lobby and a pro-privatization policy environment. 5   Nationally, 
privatization occurred as a two-step process.  First, small, medium and many large enterprises 
became private starting in 1991, but the land they occupied could only be acquired after adoption 
of the new Constitution in 1993 and decrees by Yeltsin in 1994.   Mayor Sobchak acted quickly in 
1994 to establish local regulations and administrative procedures to enable the sale of land, 
prompting strong interest by enterprises.6  However, St. Petersburg's desire to speed up the pace 
of land privatization was hampered by federal controls on land prices, which were set too high for 
newly-privatized enterprises.7  On May 11, 1995, Presidential Decree 478 eliminated a major 
obstacle to the privatization of industrial land by reducing the purchase price.8  
  Land sales proceeded at a fast clip in 1995-1996, including to foreign investors.  The lower 
price allowed by federal law stimulated 50 regions to sell urban land rapidly.9  St. Petersburg 
became a leading region for privatization, applying so-called “normative” prices derived from land 
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tax rates that in fact had no relation to market forces.10  In April and May 1995, Unilever became 
the first foreign investor to buy land in Russia and its subsidiary, Severnoye Siyaniye, a cosmetics 
company, bought 7,959 square meters of downtown land from the St. Petersburg Property Fund.  
Reflecting on the purchase, General Director of Severnoye Siyaniye, Yury Borisov, noted that in 
“dangerous times” there was greater security in having full ownership of the land.  He noted this 
would also avoid paying rent to the city that could be arbitrarily increased at any time. 11  As of 
July 1995, 600 companies had filed to purchase their land plots and Mayor Sobchak reportedly 
aimed to have all enterprises apply by September 1995.12  Enterprises that were going bankrupt 
under market conditions also could sell land as a financial safety valve, and many sold to wealthy 
investors to keep the business going.13  
While the process held initial promise, conflicting signals by political authorities and flaws 
in the legal order retarded land privatization and opened avenues for abuse. Three principal issues 
arose from 1996-2000 that set the city on a course of incremental institutional change.  First, fiscal 
incentives shifted from land privatization to leasing, making the policy environment unpredictable.  
Second, the legal and regulatory environment for acquisition of land rights was uncertain and non-
transparent.  This led to the third factor: discriminatory land practices favored large enterprises 
that reduced overall land revenues and access to land by small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  
                                                 
10 Tat’iana Vladislavovna Vlasova, Predpriatiya kak subekty rynochnykh zemel’nykh otnoshenii. Doklad dlya 3-ei 
Mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii, “Reformirovanie obschectvennogo cektora,” provodimoi Stokgol’mickim 
Universitetom, SECID, sovmectno c Fakul’tetom menedzhmenta Sankt-Peterburgskogo Gosudarstvennogo 
Universiteta.  Sankt-Peterburg.  2-3 iunia 2000 g. 
11 Tolchakova and Katz, “Unilever to Be First Foreign Firm to Buy Land.” 
12 Rachel Katz, “St. Petersburg Firms Flock to Buy Location Land,” Moscow Times, July 6, 1995. 
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The cumulative effect was to worsen both municipal finances and the business investment 
environment.14  
First, consistent with the predatory rule theory, political authorities adjusted incentives for 
land privatization in order to maximize land revenues in response to fiscal needs.  Just as demand 
was increasing, the Sobchak Administration started to adjust land taxes, which rose by 14 times in 
the city center.15  A major reason was to capture the gains from rising demand, mainly in the center, 
which would also address fluctuations in the municipal budget balance.  St. Petersburg had a fiscal 
surplus in 1991, but dipped into deficit in 1992, and regained a small surplus in 1994.16 The city 
then experienced one of the country’s most dramatic and surprising swings into red ink.  By 1996, 
it had a budget deficit of 23.67% of net revenues, putting it well above the 15% limit then under 
discussion in the federal draft budget code, hampering its ability to borrow externally.17  
The loss of Mayor Sobchak to Governor (renamed from Mayor) Yakovlev in the 1996 
municipal elections coincided with a decided policy shift in favor of land leasing.  The Yakovlev 
Administration took advantage of Yeltsin’s decree that allowed regions to set land prices, and 
raised them so high that leasing became a more attractive option, particularly for enterprises that 
did not have a strategic interest in land as an asset.18  After strong demand in 1995-6, land 
purchases started to taper (Table 1).  Ultimately, the land tax rose above the land lease rate. By 
                                                 
14 These factors are discussed in depth in the following sources: Leonid E. Limonov, Nina Y. Oding, and Tatyana V. 
Vlasova, “Land Market Development in St. Petersburg: Conditions and Peculiarities,” (Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy Working Paper No. WP00LL1, 2000) and World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in 
the Amount of US$161.10 Million to the Russian Federation for a St. Petersburg Economic Development Project, 
(Washington, D.C.: Report No: 25550-RU, April 15, 2003). 
15 Tolchakova and Katz, “Unilever to Be First Foreign Firm to Buy Land.”  
16 Christine I. Wallich, Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994), 275, 
278. 
17 Lev Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia: Pre-empting a Potential 
Crisis, World Bank Technical Paper No. 452, (Washington D.C.: World Bank Group. 1999), 40.  St. Petersburg also 
operated commercial banks, against federal law. 
18 The purchase price of land increased every year in line with the rising rate of the land tax set by local authorities, 





early 1998, land lease agreements (137,000) vastly exceeded land plots privatized (1,843) while 
tax rates on land had more than doubled, thus dampening incentives to purchase.19  After Mayor 
Sobchak promoted privatization by low purchase prices, the decision by Governor Yakovlev to 
reverse course created uncertainty surrounding ownership of property.  The taxation and pricing 
process was not straightforward or fully transparent.20 By 2000, only half of enterprises had 
privatized their land; the rest retained permanent (perpetual) use rights. Their experience was 
mixed; the few that had purchased the land for a specific purpose, such as to increase investment, 
realized their goals.21   


































Source:  Vlasova, Predpriatiya kak subekty rynochnykh zemel’nykh otnoshenii (2000), 4. 
 
 Second, the legal and regulatory framework raised uncertainties that created risks for 
investors due to a confluence of federal and local factors.  The initial failure to unite buildings and 
land into one object of real estate was an error of federal legislation.  In principle, long-term leases 
                                                 
19 Limonov, Oding and Vlasova, “Land Market Development in St. Petersburg,” 15, 22-24. 
20 Maxim Kalinin, Partner, Baker and McKenzie.  Interview. St. Petersburg, Russia, July 30, 2013.  
21 This is the conclusion of Vlasova, Predpriatiya kak subekty rynochnykh zemel’nykh otnoshenii,;  Limonov, Oding 
and Vlasova, “Land Market Development in St. Petersburg,”; and Howland and Katkhanova, "Changes in St 




by the city could have provided the tenure security of private ownership.  In practice, uncertainty 
over the marketability of leases and commitment of political authorities to abide by lease terms 
created tenure insecurity, as evidenced by the reluctance of banks to accept lease agreements as 
collateral for mortgages.22 In addition, while progress was made during the decade on a land 
inventory and cadastre, the case-by-case delimitation of land as either municipal or federal 
property in St. Petersburg raised the question of which party was legally in a position to sell or 
lease the land plot.  As of 2000, an estimated 30-40% of land in St. Petersburg was federal, a much 
higher level than elsewhere due to federal buildings and major cultural sites.23  In addition, while 
the law allowed a three-year period to buy land in installments, ownership in St. Petersburg could 
not be registered until the process for purchase was completed, raising the power of municipal 
authorities over property owners just as ownership rights were being established in the early years 
of land market formation.24   
Finally, the Yakovlev Administration implemented discriminatory land practices that 
decidedly promoted land leasing.  Presidential decree 478 in 1995 had lowered land purchase 
prices but also provided a subsidy for land occupied by privatized (former state-owned) enterprises 
established prior to the Gorbachev perestroika period.  Emerging entrepreneurs were put at a 
competitive disadvantage because they did not qualify for the lower price and had to pay twenty 
times more for their land than previously state-owned firms.25  After 1997, land prices could be 
                                                 
22 World Bank, Appraisal document, St. Petersburg Economic Development Project, 9. 
23 Kalinin, interview, and World Bank, Appraisal document, St. Petersburg Economic Development Project, 9.  
Mayor Luzhkov resolved this issue early in the 1990s through agreements on ownership of selected sites and by the 
agreement with President Yeltsin in 1994 that Moscow would retain a 20% share of privatized buildings, giving it 
also a claim on the underlying land. 
24 Limonov and Vlasova, eds., Upravlenie Nedvizhimostiu i Zemel’nimi Resursami Predpriati, 3; V. N. Miagkov,   
“Otsenka iavnykh i kosvennykh trancaktsionykh zatrat pri investitsiiak v nedvizhimost’ i ctroitel’sctvo.  
Sravnitel’nyi analiz regionov,” Mezhdunarodnaia konferentsiia ‘Zemel’naia reforma i razvitie rynkov nedvizhimosti 
v Rossii,’  Lincoln Institute of Urban Affairs and Leontief Center,  St. Petersburg, 2002.  Mimeo. 




adjusted locally, but the bias against SMEs remained in St. Petersburg.26 For those enterprises that 
continued to hold permanent (perpetual) use rights to land, the authorities subsidized lease rates as 
part of an economic and industrial policy that received greater impetus from the 1998 financial 
crisis, which hit the city’s defense-oriented industrial sector particularly hard.27 Thus, the 
Yakovlev Administration reduced leasing rates by up to 75% for large industries located in the 
center that occupied more than 24,000 hectares of land. In addition, commercial entities owned by 
the city received subsidized rates.  In all, 50% of centrally-located businesses received a 
preferential leasing or tax rate, reducing land revenues to the city by 3% of Gross Regional Product 
by 2002. The opportunities for abuse were rife, both on the part of enterprises, which could rent 
out their excess land on informal markets, and on the part of political authorities, which did not 
report or justify which firms received preferential rates.28 
 Another important distinction between the Sobchak and Yakovlev administrations 
concerned the shift from competitive tenders to arbitrary procedures for acquisition of city land or 
properties by private firms.   Sobchak’s Order N585-p, “On allocation of property rights on 
investment conditions” (June 1994), had required that open competitions be used for commercial 
projects.   In April 1997, Governor’s Order N283-p allowed exceptions to competitive tender, 
either if a waiver was approved by Yakovlev himself, or if the purchaser agreed to pay twice the 
fair market value for the property.  While the option of leasing or owning was offered in the Order, 
                                                 
26 Dmitri Babiner, Partner and Head of Tax and Law Department, Ernst & Young (CIS), St. Petersburg, Russia,  
Interview July 31, 2013; Limonov and Vlasova, Upravlenie Nedvizhimostiu i Zemel’nimi Resursami Predpriati, 2-3. 
27 The industrial sector led a decline of 5.4% of Gross Regional Product in 1999 compared to - 4.9% of GDP at the 
national level. World Bank, Appraisal document, St. Petersburg Economic Development Project, 7. 
28World Bank, Appraisal document, St. Petersburg Economic Development Project, 9-10, 12; Limonov, Odling and 




the practical result was to freeze land sales.  From 1997-2001, 384 out of 385 land plots transferred 
to legal entities were leased, and 98% of real estate approvals were done by exception.29 
Contradictory land privatization and fiscal policies illustrate the different perspectives of 
two predatory rulers. While the progressive land privatization policy of Sobchak began to alter on 
the eve of a fiscal deficit crisis, the Yakovlev Administration pursued a decidedly anti-privatization 
policy by raising land taxes above lease rates and giving incentives for large industries to remain 
as tenants.  Essentially, Yakovlev created an artificial land scarcity by raising land taxes, but then 
allocated land for twice the offering price through exceptions to the law on tenders.  From the 
perspective of the predatory ruler, Yakovlev’s motive for preferential leasing discounts was surely 
not fiscal in the short-term, since it came at the expense of the budget, but it was an excellent 
means of setting up a stream of rents for the city in the longer term. It also rewarded allies in the 
business sector for his successful 1996 election and shored up the base for his successful re-
election bid in 2000.30 
An important implication of land privatization policy instability in the 1990s was that 
political authorities did not build a normative or administrative basis for land as a revenue source, 
even though land taxes and leases comprised a growing share of the municipal budget by the end 
of the decade.  Specifically, the “value zones” established for taxation purposes did not set a 
                                                 
29 Competitive tenders took place only for development of residential housing on municipal land.  After construction 
was completed, the land under the buildings could be privatized.  In contrast, in cases where city land was allotted 
for investment projects, such as rehabilitation of buildings, the city would grant a 49-year lease for the land upon 
conclusion of construction, but would not specify options for lease extension.   Foreign Investment Advisory Service 
(FIAS) of World Bank-IFC, Business Location Report, Russia (2001), III-P, 8-11. 
30 In 1996, then Deputy Mayor Yakovlev was backed by conservative advisors to Yeltsin in the Kremlin and Mayor 
Luzhkov, but opposed by associates of Sobchak, including Vladimir Putin, who was Sobchak’s campaign manager. 
Putin attempted to raise funds from businessmen for the campaign, reportedly in return for the benefits they had 
received from property privatization.  The effort failed and the business elite supported Yakovlev. See Clifford 





transparent link between location, cadastral value, and tax and lease rates.31  Until the authorities 
and enterprises factored land into all aspects of investment planning its impact on economic 
development would remain limited.32  
An equally serious consequence of the policy uncertainties of the 1990s was that the 
process of recycling land to more efficient uses stalled.  Aside from fiscal motives, another 
objective of the Sobchak Administration in raising land taxes in 1995 was to push industry out of 
the center to open space for new investment.33  Contrary to expectations, significant displacement 
of enterprises to outer regions did not take place.34   One reason is because the early enthusiasm of 
Mayor Sobchak for land privatization succeeded in unleashing a first wave of land sales, freeing a 
valuable asset for acquisition by privatized enterprises and citizens.   During the early transition 
from communism to capitalism this policy choice enabled non-competitive enterprises to use 
buildings and land for income.35  Land that was sold or leased by struggling or failing enterprises 
started to change the economy in the city center and industrial belt, with new high-value services 
(logistics, insurance, legal, accounting), office buildings, and small manufacturers of basic 
necessities (e.g. food) taking the place of rust-belt Soviet factories.36  This allowed some 
adjustment of the density of St. Petersburg in response to market forces.37  However, it also enabled 
                                                 
31 Limonov, Odling and Vlasova, “Land Market Development in St. Petersburg,” 22-24, 27. Taxes and fees on 
property constituted 15-17% of total revenue to the city budget in 2000. 
32 Vlasova, Predpriatiya kak subekty rynochnykh zemel’nykh otnoshenii. 
33 Maxim Kalinin, Partner, Baker and McKenzie.  St. Petersburg.  Interview July 30, 2013. 
34 St Petersburg's industrial belt occupies prime land, 4 to 8 km from the city center. In a market economy, the land-
intensive manufacturing and warehousing, and even some farming, activities which are carried out in this belt would 
have been decentralized to the city fringe and would occupy less city space overall.  Howland and Katkhanova, 
"Changes in St Petersburg’s industrial belt.” 
35 For example, a large optics manufacturer that had employed 20,000 in the Soviet period drastically reduced its 
workforce and in 2008 reported rental income of 20 million dollars from various inherited properties. (Pyle 2011, 
15) 
36 Howland and Katkhanova 2000, 283 
37 Alain Bertaud, The Development of Russian Cities: Impact of Reforms on Spatial Development, Draft Report #2 





many industries to stay put and survive on land rents.  Thus, land that could have been recycled to 
more efficient uses was locked up in rusting industries or laid fallow.38  
 
b. Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 1990 - 2000   
The bureaucracy imposed constraints to land market development by raising both the risk 
and the costs of investing in urban land. Given St. Petersburg’s early rapid privatization, which 
freed land for transactions, two land markets are relevant and can be compared: primary (sale or 
lease by the city) and secondary (sale or lease by new private landowners).39   Land administration 
practices of greatest concern for investors on the primary and secondary markets involved the 
inter-related steps of land registration and land permits for urban development projects.40  While 
St. Petersburg had a “relatively efficient” title registration system by the end of the decade, which 
was a public resource, it depended on an inventory of surveyed land plots in a cadastre, which was 
only 30% completed and inaccessible to investors.41  Moreover, the quality and accuracy of the 
database on land plots remained questionable in the absence of delimited land boundaries and 
urban planning and zoning regulations to ensure that construction on a given plot was not 
encumbered.42  Generally, companies active on the small secondary market regarded land titles as 
secure, though the time to register rights took longer than for transactions on the primary market, 
while privatized enterprises holding lease or land ownership rights from primary market 
                                                 
38 World Bank, Appraisal document, St. Petersburg Economic Development Project, 10; Limonov, Odling and 
Vlasova, “Land Market Development in St. Petersburg,” 22. 
39 St. Petersburg was one of very few cities with a small but active secondary real estate market in the 1990s.  See 
Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) of World Bank-IFC, Business Location Report, Russia (2001), 
Appendix III-25. 
40 Limonov, Odling and Vlasova, “Land Market Development in St. Petersburg,” 55. 
41 FIAS, Business Location Report, Appendix III-P-4, 21. 
42 Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, “Real Estate Developments: A Variety of Perspectives,” (Paper presented at a 




transactions had greater doubts about tenure security.43  The difference in these markets relates 
directly and primarily to arbitrary bureaucratic practices in the primary market. 
The arbitrariness of land use decisions related to the absence of transparent urban land 
regulations, which was at “the root of widespread complaints about inefficiency, unpredictability, 
bureaucratic arbitrariness and alleged corruption.44  Opportunities for officials to obstruct issuance 
of land use permits existed at each step of the process to approve an urban development project. 
The process inverted market practices in advanced market economies whereby secure land rights 
are provided before construction begins. The first step in St. Petersburg (as elsewhere in Russia) 
entailed agreement with municipal officials on the project concept and its technical parameters, 
including a preliminary decision by administration officials on the land plot.  In the second phase, 
developers designed the project and received the right to lease land for up to 50 years.  Construction 
of the object began.  In the last phase, only after completion of the project and approval by technical 
supervisors, the agreement on long-term lease rights received final approval, and land rights were 
registered. 45     
The absence of transparency in land acquisition and baffling bureaucratic procedures 
opened avenues for corruption at each step in the permit process.  It is worth reviewing the steps 
for land acquisition to underscore how seriously bureaucratic disorganization and performance 
weakened urban land privatization and land development in St. Petersburg in the 1990s. The initial 
phase involved two agencies, the Committee on City Planning and Architecture and the Committee 
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ctroitel’sctvo.  Sravnitel’nyi analiz regionov,  (Mezhdunarodnaia konferentsiia ‘Zemel’naia reforma i razvitie 





for Land Resources and Usage (further, the Architecture Committee and the Land Committee).  
First, the Architecture Committee provided a draft topographical map to the enterprise or project 
developer, who contracted with a licensed firm to turn the draft into a topographical survey and a 
land cadastral map with boundaries.   The developer then submitted the cadastral plan to the Land 
Committee.  After approval, the Architecture Committee forwarded the cadastral map to an office 
that reviewed its compatibility with the St. Petersburg General Plan. Any restrictions on land use 
would be attached to the project.  The Architecture Committee then sent the documents back to 
the Land Committee, which prepared draft instructions; once approved, these went back to the 
Architecture Committee and a third Committee -- for Monument Conservation and Protection – to 
ensure compatibility with city cultural heritage traditions.  Any of the three committees could 
decide at any time to disapprove the land plot privatization or to place restrictions on land 
development.    In parallel, the developer submitted an application to purchase land to the City 
Property Management Committee, which calculated the land price based on zones in the General 
Plan.  Once all documentation was in order, the enterprise or developer received a purchase 
contract, on which basis it could request a land ownership certificate from the Land Committee.46   
As a consequence of excessive approvals and competition among bureaucratic offices, 
accessing land for urban development was more time-consuming in St. Petersburg than in other 
regions.   While it was possible to pay fees to accelerate each step, enterprises reported that in St. 
Petersburg, without additional payments, the process took 2 to 2.5 years to complete. 47  According 
to a different study, with payments for the assistance of a city-run agency, the time could be 
reduced to 15-18 months, which was longer compared to 8.5-10 months in Novgorod and 10.5-
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13.4 months in Leningrad Oblast.48  The time and cost undermined the business investment climate 
and prevented land access particularly by SMEs.49  Recognizing the problems posed by numerous 
approvals, the municipal administration reduced the number of steps between project application 
and final building permit from approximately 125 to 50 days from 1994 to 2000.50  Despite these 
measures, bureaucratic performance lagged other regions.  While lengthy approval procedures are 
also common in advanced market economies for major urban projects, in St. Petersburg “the main 
causes of delay are uncooperative attitudes on the part of city personnel, failure to enforce strict 
time discipline in the process, and unreasonable positions taken by bureaucrats who are immune 
from effective challenge.” 51     
 Authorization for projects on a case-by-case basis, rather than by zoning, also increased 
the arbitrariness of land use decisions.  The argument of municipal land administration authorities 
against a simple legal zoning regime was that it was inappropriate for an historical city. In fairness 
to the authorities, project approval was complicated by additional reviews to protect Russia’s 
largest historic preservation district, an area of approximately 7,000 hectares in central St. 
Petersburg containing about 5000 historic buildings and objects.52 In this area, sensitivity to 
cultural harmony was warranted.  However, such oversight was not required on the remaining 
139,000 hectares of the city’s territory.53  In those areas, the question was simply procedural: 
should regulations be designed and issued by project or by broad, multi-use land zones?  The 
preference in St. Petersburg was to issue approvals on an ad hoc basis, which also raised risks for 
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49 World Bank, Appraisal document, St. Petersburg Economic Development Project, 9. 
50 FIAS Business Location Report, III-P-14. 
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investors. This approach was “dramatically inefficient” because it allowed micro-management into 
project purpose, as opposed to a broad zoning system that gave a wide range of project choices. 54     
A more flexible zone-based system would conflict with infrastructure and industrial zones 
in the Soviet-era General Plan and require a solution to the expensive problem of who paid for 
infrastructure to support land use.55  In the 1990s, zoning for major inter-city infrastructure needed 
to follow requirements in the 1945 General Plan, while inner-city projects should conform to 
infrastructure zoning requirements in the 1986 General Plan, providing room for interpretation 
depending on location of the project.  The commonly-used city practice was to required advance 
payments for public infrastructure (e.g. for utilities, roads) in large-scale projects.  For example, 
in 2000, developers wishing to bid for lease rights on 16,300 square meters of land in Kalininsky 
Raion for a housing project were required to pay $380,000 into the budget, plus an infrastructure 
investment of $32,000, plus $1,000 into the Property Fund (to defray the cost of the auction), plus 
$41,000 to a designated firm to prepare the tender documents.  To participate in the auction, the 
preliminary project documentation had to be pre-approved by the administration. 56 These 
investments would be lost if the developer did not win the bid, undermining any incentive to 
participate in the auction.  As a consequence, the City had greater control over which party received 
the rights to develop urban land. In the absence of specific regulations, investors lobbied city 
administration officials and bureaucrats for multiple projects, and those with good connections 
gained access to land without payments into the budget.57   Until a new General Plan was proposed 
in 2005, the Soviet urban design was the guidepost for investment, where some industrial uses 
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were allowed and others were not valid.  The plan was a profitable way for the city (and city 
officials) to reap income; it was adjusted according to the ‘dizhurnyi’ plan – the plan of the day.58  
To reduce arbitrary decision-making through urban regulatory reform, the St. Petersburg 
authorities implemented a Center City Rehabilitation Project from 1997 to 2002, financed with a 
US$31 million loan by the World Bank.59  It included pilot schemes to introduce new mechanisms 
for the city to develop land commercially.   The World Bank loan had financed infrastructure 
upgrades, including roads and utilities, to make unutilized urban land more attractive to private 
investors, with the aim of putting in place a process that would increase private land rights while 
creating future revenue streams for the municipal budget.  In the Block 130 pilot, four lots were 
successfully auctioned by the city in 2001 for the right to develop 6,590 square meters for US$2.26 
million, or US$34.3 per square meter. 60   This was the first time the City had auctioned improved 
land for investment.61  However, the World Bank later assessed this component of the project as 
unsatisfactory because the model for commercial land development was not replicated or adopted 
through municipal regulations, even though it was preferred by developers because the technical 
condition of infrastructure improvements and development costs were predictable.62    
                                                 
58 Leonid Limonov, Director General, ANO ICSER "Leontief Center" St Petersburg, Russia, Interview, (St. 
Petersburg, Russia. August 1, 2013).  The constraints posed by infrastructure investments and zoning also were 
corroborated by Babiner (Interview) and Howland and Katkhonova, “Changes in St Petersburg’s industrial belt after 
land privatization."  
59 The project development objectives were to “(a) further develop and agree with the City Government and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on a strategic plan and an investment program for city center rehabilitation; 
(b) continue regulatory reform to assure competitive real estate markets and a competitive business environment in 
the city center; (c) initiate a program of public information and participation in the decision-making process for city 
development and investment; and (d) assist cultural organizations in the city to improve their ability to generate non-
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61 World Bank, St. Petersburg Center City Rehabilitation Project ICR, Annex 8, Borrower’s Contribution to the ICR, 
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Ultimately, St. Petersburg paid a price for arbitrary decision-making. The city acquired the 
reputation of being inhospitable to business due to “lack of a level playing field” and “lack of easy 
access to land and commercial real estate.”63 Unregulated requirements for developers to pay into 
the municipal budget for infrastructure costs in return for land leases further dampened enthusiasm 
for urban development.   In short, “the attitudes and behaviors of St. Petersburg bureaucrats were 
an impediment to investment.”64  
 
c. Public Participation in Decision-Making, 1990-2000    
.   A central premise of the dissertation is that public participation can advance the pace of 
institutional change if the public has a role in influencing decision-making by executive authorities 
and the bureaucracy.   In the last hours of the Soviet Union, civic activism swelled in defense of 
historic preservation in St. Petersburg, as discussed in Chapter 3.  A point of contention was the 
secrecy surrounding approval of the General Plan without adequate time or information for public 
input.65 Celebrated protests for historic preservation had provided an apolitical cause for civil 
society to exercise public authority against the state.66   
  Despite demand by civil society to be consulted on major urban development decisions, or 
perhaps because of the risk such consultations posed, St. Petersburg officials continued a closed-
door approach during two failed attempts at strategic planning in the 1990s.67  The first, led by 
Anatoly Chubais in 1991, aimed to turn the city into an economic free zone that could stimulate 
growth through privatization, liberalization of prices, introduction of a tax-free regime and land 
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use planning, thereby encouraging foreign investment in the modernization of the city and earning 
income from renting and selling real estate.  The planning effort collapsed with the Soviet Union, 
but elements of the plan carried forward both at the municipal and national levels.  Now renamed 
St. Petersburg, the city restarted the planning effort in 1992, but without changing the secretive 
format employed earlier.  A narrow circle of well-intentioned officials labored on detailed 
economic growth and urban development targets, without the benefit of public input or media 
attention.  By 1996, Mayor Sobchak’s loss at the polls to Governor Yakovlev signaled a shift in 
public concerns from privatization to protection of local industry.  With society divided, and a 
more conservative mood descending on the city, no agreement was reached on a new strategic plan 
that would frame land-use decisions.68 
The failure of the five-year process stimulated local experts to undertake a more broad-
based approach to strategic planning based on public consultations.  Supported by international 
institutions, including through the World Bank loan for a St. Petersburg Center City Rehabilitation 
Project,69 the City Government embarked on an ambitious outreach campaign to engage citizens 
in the economic development planning effort, led by the Leontief Center, a non-profit research 
institute. In-depth surveys of experts and citizens identified priorities for development and key 
factors influencing socio-economic development and city competitiveness were analyzed, leading 
to establishment of 14 thematic commissions that proposed public policy solutions.   Intensive 
debate accompanied each phase through media and a web-site in two languages.  Citizen calls and 
letters were encouraged through a hot-line.70  Based on these inputs, the City Government adopted 
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the Strategic Plan on December 1, 1997.71  In September 1998, the City sponsored a conference to 
initiate an Investment Strategy for the Rehabilitation of the Center of St. Petersburg. It was adopted 
by City Government in April 1999 after receiving 1,000 inputs from stakeholders through public 
consultations and the internet.72 
The World Bank’s ex-post evaluation of the St. Petersburg Center City Rehabilitation 
Project73 deemed the final Strategic Plan and Investment Strategy to be of high quality; both 
influenced municipal government policy and resulted in a stronger inclination by city officials to 
engage the public in decision-making.  The Territorial Information and Analytical System (TIAS) 
in Russian and English dramatically increased public access to information on land, buildings, 
infrastructure and cadastral maps, receiving 3,000 visitors per month as of 2002, of which 15-20 
percent were potential foreign investors.  The data were collected by the City Government’s 
Construction Committee from 34 entities that agreed to share information, marking a “major step 
forward.”  With budget funding for TIAS, the system was likely to be sustainable and open 
opportunities for real estate development to smaller investors that lacked connections or inside 
knowledge.74  
Nevertheless, implementation fell short of expectations and the World Bank rated the 
US$31 million- project unsatisfactory on overall outcomes and Bank and Borrower performance.  
City Government was rated poorly due to the slow-down in regulatory reforms governing the real 
estate market and unclear ownership rights, including minimal progress on zoning reform. More 
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fundamentally, the City legislature did not approve key legal and regulatory initiatives, delaying 
improvements to real estate and land markets.75  
Among other project design issues, the Bank team was rated poorly for overlooking the 
influence of the Legislative Assembly on the reform environment.76 While individual legislators 
participated in the strategic planning process, the Assembly as a whole was not integrated from 
the beginning, and thus did not feel part of the process.77 In addition, the Bank “significantly 
underestimated the political difficulties of advancing the reform agenda within the City 
Government….With turnover in executive branch officials and a recalcitrant Legislative 
Assembly, the reforms envisioned by the project progressed much less rapidly than anticipated.  
Finally, City Government agencies were sometimes disinclined to coordinate among themselves, 
which hindered project progress.”78 
  Vice Governor Vakhmistrov, and Head of the Construction Committee, vigorously 
objected to these conclusions, noting that institutional reform was at the center of the investment 
strategy.  Among other points, he noted that 66 laws and nearly 1700 normative acts had been 
adopted to regulate real estate and urban development, and that “[s]takeholders and citizens are 
regularly informed and involved in the investment decision-making process affecting interests of 
the citizens.”  He disputed the lack of coordination among city government agencies, observing 
that the strategic planning process had brought them together in thematic working groups to agree 
on investment and reform priorities.79 The Foundation of Investment Projects (FISP) of the 
Government of St. Petersburg also prepared a 12-page assessment80 that, among other points, 
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positively evaluated the experience gained by the city in working with private real estate 
developers on rehabilitation projects in the historic city center.  Beneficial new practices included 
public hearings at the outset of new projects, which raised awareness; competitive tendering, which 
created savings; and investment auctions based on upgraded urban planning regulations, which 
included financing for public infrastructure.81 
Despite the difference of views between the World Bank and City Government on the pace 
of institutional reform, both credited the strategic planning processes with increasing public 
participation in the decision-making process.   This in turn empowered the gradozashchitniki, or 
city defenders (of cultural heritage), and laid the basis for greater public voice on Government 
projects and zoning laws that would reduce green spaces or mar the urban landscape.82   The 
presence of civic activism was fundamental to the pace of institutional change in St. Petersburg in 
the next decade. 
 
3. The Land Governance Model, 2001-2013 
a. Political Authority and the Legal Order, 2001-2013 
  Beginning in 2002, the Yakovlev Administration recognized that fiscal instability and a 
poor regulatory environment for real estate were hampering much-needed private investment.  
Given its highly educated workforce and geographic proximity to the EU, St. Petersburg was not 
realizing its potential as a “Window to the West.”  Persistently weak municipal finances and a poor 
investment climate were mutually-reinforcing: without funds to upgrade obsolete infrastructure, 
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the city could not attract new business investment; and without investors, the city could not raise 
revenues. 83   The adoption of the Land Code in 2001 removed legal excuses used earlier by the 
Yakovlev Administration to block land privatization.84  The time was ripe to level the playing field 
for outsiders. 
Political authorities decided to strengthen fiscal stability by improving land and real estate 
markets and exploiting the economic potential of St. Petersburg’s rich cultural heritage.  In a letter 
to World Bank President Wolfensohn on February 11, 2003, Governor Yakovlev stated that efforts 
had begun to improve city finances through better management of municipal property, but that 
“much more should be done. Therefore, we try to improve operation of the land and real estate 
markets to enhance competitiveness of St-Petersburg, to engage new enterprises more actively and 
thereby contribute to economic development of the city.”85  To improve market conditions, he said 
the City would increase land in private ownership or long-term lease in compliance with the Land 
Code, including by reducing prices for privatized land; remove tax concessions and preferential 
rents on commercial real estate and harmonize tax and rental rates; simplify land development 
regulations; and complete an inventory of municipal land and buildings that would be made 
available publicly. In the policy matrix attached to his letter, the Governor also committed the City 
Government to initiate auctions for sale of municipal land and premises.  The expected outcome 
was to lay the foundation for private land and real estate markets and enable private transactions 
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to grow by 5% annually compared to the base year of 2002.86  The commitments laid the political 
basis for a US$161 million loan from the World Bank in 2003. 87 
 The early departure of Governor Yakovlev from St. Petersburg led to the election on 
October 5, 2003 of Valentina Matviyenko, who came to office promising to double the city’s 
budget revenues in three years.  Upon taking office, Matviyenko declared that improvement of the 
investment climate was her highest priority.  She announced that the General Plan would be 
updated to meet new economic development demands and that land auctions would replace the 
former, non-transparent land allocation methods, thereby contributing to higher budget revenues.88  
She additionally declared that the fee charged by the city for allocation of land for commercial 
development would be reduced to US$80 per square meter, from rates that ranged from US$100 
to US$500 per square meter, depending on the location.89  Evidence indicates that her 
administration supported legal changes to simplify procedures for making properties available to 
investors, to reduce property tax rates, and to assist in making land available for strategic projects.90   
These were important measures that led to increased land privatization and, particularly in the case 
of land auctions, improved the legal framework in line with the 2001 Land Code.   Urban land area 
owned by private firms more than doubled from 2000-2005, from 4.7 to 11.1 percent, while the 
share owned by the City Government declined from 86.8 to 82.7 percent. 
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 From the perspective of the predatory ruler, Matviyenko’s motivation to expand property 
rights related to fiscal as well as political exigencies.  The fiscal case is unequivocal, based on the 
foregoing evidence, while the political logic may be inferred from the conditions of Matviyenko’s 
rise to elected office.  In 2000, she had been Putin’s candidate for the position but failed to garner 
even one percent of voter support based on pre-election polls.  She withdrew from the competition.  
In 2003, the increasingly-powerful President Putin appointed Mr. Yakovlev to a position as deputy 
prime minister for housing and communal services, opening the race for Governor in St. 
Petersburg, one year early.  A Putin protégé, Ms. Matviyenko was appointed as the President’s 
envoy to the Northwest District in March 2003 before running for Governor in October 2003, 
winning 63 percent in the second round with low voter turnout (28%).91 Given the new Governor’s 
close relationship to the President, we can assume that federal policies carried greater weight 
compared to Yakovlev, given his tense ties with Putin.92   Even had she wanted to rebuff 
presidential policies, she lacked the fiscal and political autonomy to do so.    
 While Matviyenko implemented meaningful land and real estate reforms early in her 
tenure, a pattern appeared in 2005-6 of arbitrary land-related decisions and exceptions to zoning 
requirements in the General Plan, often linked to preferences for oil and gas interests.93  The pattern 
persisted until she left office in 2011.  Fiscal and political motivations again appear to be 
intertwined.  First, she became more indebted to President Putin after he nominated her as 
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Governor in 2006, a year before her term was to expire.94  During the same period, Sibneft, 
acquired by Gazprom in 2005, relocated its headquarters to St. Petersburg, bringing with it fiscal 
benefits.95  Moreover, strong economic growth contributed to a rapid rise in real estate values, 
raising tax receipts.96  With fiscal constraints declining,97 and her political career increasingly in 
the orbit of presidential power, Matviyenko could take exception to federal rules where it benefited 
her benefactor and long-term political career.  
An example of the Matviyenko Administration’s tendency to allocate land arbitrarily rather 
than through transparent rules involves abuse of state ownership rights over cultural assets. In 
2004, two historic properties, Gardener House and Literary House, were acquired without auction 
by the then-largest vodka holding company, Veda.   Two reporters for Kommersant detailed the 
complex transactions that enabled the properties to pass from federal to municipal and then to 
private ownership. The two properties in St. Petersburg were among many that were linked to a 
scandal involving Minister of Defense Serdyukov, who was accused of massive theft of state 
property and fired by President Putin in November 2012.   As detailed by the reporters, formerly 
federal or municipal property would be acquired by state-controlled companies and then sold at 
extremely discounted prices to real estate developers with offshore accounts. The state-controlled 
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companies collected kickbacks from the developers, who invested in luxury real estate projects.   
One such project, the Literary House, caused an outcry in St. Petersburg because the 19th-century 
property had been listed in 1999 for historic preservation but was destroyed for construction of a 
hotel complex. The Matviyenko Administration facilitated such purchases by the lack of 
transparency in land allocation decisions.   Alexander Vakhmistrov, who was the Deputy Governor 
in charge of construction at the time that the building was transferred to the investor in 2005, later 
became the head of the real estate company that was assigned by Governor Matviyenko to 
supervise the hotel construction project.98  The Ministry of Defense scandal, as it is referred to in 
St. Petersburg, revealed how lack of clarity of ownership rights between municipal and private 
owners raised risks for all private investors.99    
 The Matviyenko Administration fostered an environment where exceptions to zoning 
requirements in the General Plan came to be expected.  In 2005, it had revised the 1986 General 
Plan without the intense public input that had characterized the strategic planning process in the 
late 1990s, and without addressing serious issues such as the removal or renovation of industrial 
zones close to the city center. 100   The 2005 General Plan reflected the instincts of Soviet planners, 
prescribing a construction blueprint for specific plots rather than a broad zoning framework for 
urban development. 101  First, the plan constrained investment in individual zones of St. Petersburg 
in a manner that was not conducive to market development, particularly for small business.  For 
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example, both industrial and micro-activities were needlessly segregated according to inputs, i.e., 
any activity that used paper (including publishing) could not be located near activities that used 
wood or leather.   Second, to balance the tension between redevelopment of the aging industrial 
zone and the adjacent historic city center, urban planners prescribed height limits to preserve views 
and architectural harmony in locations near the city center.   While this approach was appropriate, 
height limits were set arbitrarily and did not reflect demand for density in a given location.   
Exceptions to height limits were numerous in selected zoning areas and for special projects, as 
demonstrated by Figure 2. 
Figure 2. 
Source:  Alain Bertaud, “The Development of Russian Cities: Impact of Reforms on Spatial Development,” (Mimeo 
for World Bank, 2010), 17. 
 
 Exceptions to the General Plan that impacted objects of cultural heritage raised particular 
concern in St. Petersburg.  Many historic objects were in disrepair but the city lacked funding for 
renovation; when property values in St. Petersburg quadrupled in 2005, following seven years of 
strong economic growth in Russia, property developers had an incentive to purchase and upgrade 
real estate.  Tension rose, however, between preservationists and developers over disposition of 




historic preservation became subject to development.  For example, in August 2004, all twelve 
tsarist-era Preobrazhensky Regiment barracks were removed from the preservation list; several 
were demolished and replaced with modern buildings rather than restored to original architectural 
styles.  The reaction to these exceptions had political overtones: 
"I'm not against new construction and architectural styles, but just don't do it in or near the 
historical center," said Alexander Margolis, head of the St. Petersburg Historical 
Preservation Foundation. "City Hall makes too many concessions to developers, and if this 
continues, in 15 years the city will lose the architectural harmony that makes it one of the 
most beautiful cities in the world…."The people who run our city are above the law," said 
Margolis. "In the 1990s, St. Petersburg was crumbling and threatened by a lack of 
investment, but now it's threatened by too much money in the hands of too few people who 
have unlimited power to do whatever they want."102 
 
In 2008, politically-oriented citizen groups protested proposed amendments to the General 
Plan that would remove green areas from municipal protection through exceptions to zoning 
regulations.  Alluding to President Putin’s appointment of Governor Matvienko, the extent of the 
exceptions arose due to the lack of elections for Governors, according to Olga Kurnosova, the local 
coordinator of United Civil Front and pro-democracy coalition, The Other Russia.103  The most 
exceptional waiver, proposed by City Hall in 2009 to allow Gazprom to erect a structure in the city 
center in violation of zoning regulations, will be discussed in the section on public participation. 
In summary, the Matviyenko Administration followed contradictory policies that kept St. 
Petersburg on a course of incremental institutional change.  She laid the basis for an improved 
legal and regulatory environment upon assuming office but failed to implement it impersonally. 
Land privatization patterns reflect the conflicting policy environment.  In terms of land area, 
enterprises increased their holdings from 2000-2005 by 157 percent; from 2005-2010 the rate 
slowed to 17 percent. Similarly, the share of private land ownership grew by about 8 percent in 
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the first half of the decade, exceeding the national rate of increase, but slowed to 4 percent in the 
second half of the decade (Table 1). 
Table 1. Changes in Private Land Ownership, 2000 to 2010 
                         (percent) 
 2000 2005 2010 
Individuals 1.2 2.1 3.8 
Legal Entities 4.7 11.1 13.5 
Total Private 5.9 13.2 17.3 
Total Municipal 94.1 86.8 82.7 
Zemel’nyi Fond Rossiiskoi Federatsii of January 1, 2000; Goskomitet po zemel’noi politike 
RF 2000: 4-6, 178-183; Zemel’nyi Fond Rossiiskoi Federatsii of  January 1, 2005; 
Rosnedvizhimost’ 2005: 42-49, 245-247; Zemel’nyi Fond Rossiiskoi Federatsii of January 1, 
2010 ; Rosreestr  2010: 247-249. 
The contradictory policy environment after 2001 retarded the institutional development of 
secure property rights. Land was allocated arbitrarily or through irregularly-held auctions; 
exceptions to zoning regulations benefited state-connected companies, sometimes at the expense 
of cultural objects; and land acquisition procedures discouraged privatization of municipal 
property.  As noted by local experts, the Matviyenko Administration strengthened the “oligarchic 
overtones” of land ownership because the beneficiaries of major municipal projects tended to be 
large rather than small or medium enterprises.104   
 
b. Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 2001 - 2013   
 Performance by bureaucratic offices bifurcated in the 2000s: on one hand, obstacles 
increased in land use and planning offices; on the other hand, transaction costs declined for land 
administration and registration. In its appraisal of the St. Petersburg Economic Development Loan 
the World Bank judged that “the principal risk for a successful implementation [of the policy part] 
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…. will come from the possible resistance to changes in the City bureaucracy where officials at 
various ranks may attempt to maintain the status quo and protect vested interests.”105  This 
assessment was fulfilled for the Committee on City Planning and Architecture rather than the 
Committee for Land Resources and Management, where there is evidence of improvement in 
bureaucratic performance.  
Increased obstacles to acquire land for commercial development are likely to be related to 
the rising value of real estate in St. Petersburg.  According to a study by Kisunko and Coolidge, 
the more costly and complex the urban development project in Russia, the greater and more 
frequent were unofficial payments to acquire land to complete the project.  Regression analysis 
demonstrated that this relationship was statistically significant in St. Petersburg at the one percent 
level.106  Similarly, a 2006 study by the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) of the World 
Bank-IFC found that 72 percent of all firms in St. Petersburg made unofficial payments for at least 
one stage of land and real estate transactions.  The highest payments were made by privatized 
enterprises that owned their premises but not the underlying land; they either wanted to obtain 
lease rights or to buy the land that was municipal property.107  These enterprises had the most to 
gain from use rights, and hence the cost imposed by the municipality was the highest.   
 In view of obstacles to acquiring land from the City Government (the primary market), 
builders preferred to access land from the secondary market, even though costs were higher.  
Several issues led to this conclusion.  According to a survey of builders and consulting companies 
conducted from October to December 2010, auctions by the municipality were irregular and 
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unreliable, with timing often changing during the year.  Once the right to develop land was 
acquired, there was a high risk of losing the plot before the period expired for construction due to 
long delays in completion of the survey work.  This raised the risk of corruption because unofficial 
payments were needed to accelerate approvals, which could cost from 30-50% of the project 
value.108  The option to lease land was not necessarily more attractive, since land plots with “a full 
packet of documentation,” including legal subdivision, registration, and clarification of third party 
rights and environmental clearances, was very costly, albeit with very low risk.  In contrast, leasing 
without full documentation was faster and less costly but carried very high risk, mainly due to 
uncertainty over ownership rights, as the Ministry of Defense scandal revealed.  For these reasons, 
the preferred method of land acquisition was through existing private owners on the secondary 
market.109   
In contrast to experience in land use and development, the adoption of significant reforms 
in land registration at the national level also contributed to dramatic performance improvements 
in local land registration offices of federal agencies in St. Petersburg (Rosreestr).  Evidence from 
national surveys, local interviews, and comparative regional data confirm that these improvements 
provided positive impetus to development of land markets.   Barriers to land privatization declined 
in St. Petersburg consistent with national trends.  According to one survey, key improvements 
nationally included the delimitation of land by government level (declined in importance as a 
barrier from 20.3 to 15.4 percent) and government registration of rights to land (declined from 
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18.8 to 9.9 percent).110  Interviews in St. Petersburg in 2013 confirmed these trends. 111   Previously, 
the process of transferring land titles from municipal to private ownership was prone to bribes to 
the head of the district office; now it was difficult to find someone who would take a bribe.  
Electronic filing had changed the incentive environment and simplified the process.  There were 
no major issues with land administration in local offices of the federal registration agency, 
Rosreestr.  In addition, the regional information system that was initiated in 1998 under the St. 
Petersburg Center City Rehabilitation Project had evolved into a “fabulous” resource in Russian 
and English on cadastral values, city planning regulations and restrictions, and sanitation zones 
(requiring environmental clean-up).112  This resource removed access to information as a barrier 
for real estate development because it provided investors a guideline on where to locate a particular 
business and what was needed in terms of documentation to manage the process.113   
Comparative regional data indicate that St. Petersburg improved more on bureaucratic 
performance on property registration compared to other cities after 2008.  Research undertaken by 
the World Bank and IFC found that St. Petersburg had demonstrated the fastest rate of 
improvement on property registration between 2009 and 2012, reducing the number of days to 
register property from 117 to 44, while it still remained the slowest compared to ten cities, together 
with Moscow and Perm.114  In addition, following the 2006 federal amnesty on registration of 
dacha property rights, 77 percent of citizens in St. Petersburg had registered their property by 2012, 
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compared to a national registration rate of 45 percent.  According to survey results, the primary 
motivation of citizens to register property titles was to strengthen the security of ownership rights; 
the higher levels of registration correlated with lower transaction costs in individual raions 
included in the survey.  Those citizens who did not register either had confidence that their current 
rights would be protected, or else they lacked information about the rationale for property 
registration.  The research also showed a correlation between Russian regions with higher levels 
of economic growth and higher rates of registration of all forms of property between 2000 and 
2007.115    
The positive change in bureaucratic performance on property registration in St. Petersburg 
after 2008 represented a counterbalance to continuity in arbitrary land allocation decisions by 
political authorities and to bureaucratic obstacles to land access.   Improvement by the Rosreestr 
municipal office and the Committee on Land Resources and Management contributed to a faster 
pace of institutional change and property ownership, particularly by citizens.   
 
c. Public Participation:  2001-2013 
Discernment of the public interest is difficult in St. Petersburg due to its high industrial 
density and the close association of big business and the state.  In the 1990s, a rare combination of 
citizen-focused public officials and a civic orientation among the population created the basis for 
meaningful public engagement on urban development during preparation of the Strategic Plan and 
Investment Strategy.   The question in this section is whether the public was in a position to 
influence the implementation of those plans by municipal authorities in the 2000s.  Public 
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participation is most critical before urban development projects impact the local community.  This 
is the general practice in advanced market economies.  Land use decisions in Russia would stand 
a better chance of representing the broader public interest rather than narrow lobbies if city 
authorities followed the requirements in the Land Code and Town Planning Law to conduct 
hearings before initiation of major projects.116    Representation of public interest in Russia, 
however, depends on whether: i) public hearings are conducted and used appropriately to garner 
community input on major projects, and ii) there is a common understanding of “public interest.”  
As Tatiana Vlasova, Deputy Director of the Leontief Center asked, “If the Government and private 
investor are on one side, who is on the other?  Finding a balance in public and private interests as 
would be revealed through public hearings is not obvious.”117   
Just as political authorities and the bureaucracy diverged in their perspectives and actions 
on land privatization, so too did society, as represented by elected deputies and civil society 
organizations.  On one occasion, the Legislative Assembly took a major step forward in 
transparency by publishing the Rules on Land Use and Development, pursuant to the General 
Plan.118  More generally, the Assembly represented City Hall more than citizen interests.119 Civil 
society, on the other hand, slumbered during preparation of the new General Plan during the early 
2000s.  As noted by political analyst Vladimir Gryaznevich:  
Unfortunately, the inhabitants of St. Petersburg are proving slow in attending 
to their own interests. We only have ourselves to blame, then, if there are any 
oversights in the General Plan. And despite all its drawbacks, the Plan has 
one undoubted advantage — the fact that it will cover such a long period of 
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time, reaching far beyond current state programs or the strategies of 
companies. This will make it a basis for the creation of our plans in the shorter 
term.120  
 
Although the General Plan received approval without a public wimper in 2005, citizens reacted 
more angrily thereafter.  For example, in 2008, protesters demonstrated against amendments to the 
General Plan proposed by Governor Matviyenko, which had passed the Legislative Assembly on 
the first reading.  A series of protest marches, with representatives of civil society organizations 
and political parties, raised concern about authorization to replace parks and recreational areas 
with shopping malls.121  Nevertheless, the new zoning regulations were approved by the St. 
Petersburg Legislative Assembly in February 2009.   
Of particular importance for public participation, the new Rules on Land Use and 
Development limited the maximum height to 100 meters for land at the proposed site of the Okhta 
Center, a major development project led by Gazprom.122   Sponsors of the project immediately 
declared their intention to seek an exemption from the height limit in order to permit construction 
of a 300-meter skyscraper (later increased to 403 meters) at the site.  The proposed project quickly 
drew the ire of historic preservationists because the skyscraper would stand three times higher than 
Saint Isaac’s Cathedral and alter the skyline on the banks of the Neva River in the historic district.  
The project originated in November 2005 when Gazprom Board Chairman Alexei Miller met with 
Governor Matviyenko and agreed to shift the registration of Sibneft from Omsk to St. Petersburg, 
thereby bringing tax revenues to the region.  In March 2006, the St. Petersburg Legislative 
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Assembly passed a bill proposed by Governor Matviyenko that would enable Sibneft to receive a 
60-billion ruble subsidy from 2007 to 2016 to construct a major commercial center that would 
become the property of Gazprom Neft (as Sibneft was reregistered in May 2006).123    
When the project was officially made public in mid-2006, it set off a public furor, pitting 
cultural, architectural, and political figures against the Governor and Gazprom.  Opponents 
included the Russian and St. Petersburg Architects Union, the Petersburg Branch of the All-Russia 
Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Landmarks, and Director of the Hermitage 
Museum Mikhail Piotrovsky.  Political movements opposing the skyscraper project included 
Yabloko, the Communist Party, and the United Civic Front.  In 2007, the opponents called for a 
referendum to let the public decide whether the project should receive an exemption to the height 
limitation, but it was blocked by the Legislative Assembly.124   
According to the federally-approved Town Planning Code, exemptions are permitted to 
height limits in certain cases where construction at the proposed building height is not possible.  
In line with the Code’s requirements, City Hall sponsored a public hearing on September 1, 2009 
on whether to authorize an exemption to the height limitation.  The hearing was conducted with 
high security, including police dogs and OMON troops, and debate was heated.   While participants 
in the packed 300-seat hall appeared to be carefully selected to favor the project, expert opinion 
was allowed, and in the four-day period required for public comment, numerous written objections 
were submitted to the District Land Use and Development Commission.  The Commission rejected 
the requests to deny permission to exempt the project from the height limitation and did not fully 
reference objections in the public report, against requirements in the law. 125  
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On September 22, 2009, thirteen members of the City Government led by Governor 
Matviyenko met and voted unanimously to grant the height exemption.  Earlier, the Urban 
Economics Institute, which had supported drafting of the federal Town Planning Code, had 
published a report that the application for exemption by sponsors of Okhta Center did not meet the 
legal requirements of the Code.   
Following the vote in favor of exemption, the defenders of the city, the gradozashchitniki, 
increased the pressure on the City Government through a court appeal, a petition to President 
Medvedev signed by 4,618 people, and a massive March in Defense of Petersburg on October 10, 
2009.    The exemption allowing Gazprom to build a skyscraper in an historic district was 
ultimately rescinded in late 2009 through the efforts of the gradozashchitniki.  UNESCO had 
announced in September 2009 that the skyscraper could threaten the listing of St. Petersburg by 
UNESCO as a World Heritage Site.126  The unexpected opposition of the Russian Minister of 
Culture, Alexander Avdeev, in September 2009, also contributed, as did negative programming on 
the primary state television channel in early October 2009.127  The project was moved to a new 
location that is technically outside the city, and it will still be the tallest building in Europe.  While 
not all residents are fully satisfied, observers credit the gradozashchitniki with an exceptional 
success in overturning a decision of City Government.128  Thus, to answer the question posed at 
the beginning of this section, the public was indeed able to influence an important zoning decision, 
despite a flawed process of public consultations and opposition by arguably the most powerful 
company in the country.    
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Paradoxically, the Ministry of Defense scandal and actions of the gradozashchitniki are 
contributing to more secure land rights in St. Petersburg, according to Maxim Kalinin.129  Most 
enterprises in 2013 preferred to buy land but the decision depended, first, on the relative values of 
the land tax versus the lease rate, and second, on an assessment of hidden risks in purchasing 
privatized land that could be subject to ownership disputes, due to the uncertain legal environment 
of 1990s.  The Ministry of Defense scandal had turned into a key criminal case where land sales 
from illegal privatizations were now being invalidated in the courts; this was teaching investors 
not to rely on connections for sales but on the law.   As of 2013, disputes had increased on the sale 
and purchase of existing private parcels, but litigation was a positive development in clarifying 
ownership rights.  Likewise, the gradozashchitniki were contributing to more secure property 
rights by demanding that public interest be considered more consistently and transparently during 
selection of projects under the General Plan, which should reduce arbitrary decisions.   In the past, 
the interpretation of the General Plan by municipal government raised risks for investors because 
implementation was on a case-by-case basis, and predictability was important for investment 
decisions.     
At the instruction of Governor Poltavshchenko, who was appointed in late 2011, City Hall 
imposed an informal moratorium on land auctions as part of an effort to revise the General Plan 
and improve land governance.  The specific goals were to: i) enable the municipality to introduce 
more fiscally-affordable methods to manage infrastructure related to land investments; ii) address 
public tensions over density and green space, linked to allegations over previous misuse of land; 
and iii) demonstrate that, once revised, the General Plan would be taken more seriously than in the 
past, when industry got used to lax interpretation of zoning requirements.   As of August 2013, 
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2000 applications for land auctions were being held up while decisions were reached on such issues 
as cost-sharing by the public and private sectors for infrastructure (roads, power, water and 
sanitation) in major complex projects that were needed for territorial development. 130     
The chair of the legislative committee on land, Sergei Nikeshin, agrees that adoption of a 
serious General Plan that attracted private investment while meeting infrastructure needs was an 
urgent priority.  At the same time, he believes that any new regulations must apply equally to all 
landowners and real estate developers, regardless of their size or market power.  The largest 
landowners wielded the most power and had more negotiating power with City Hall on financing 
of infrastructure for urban development projects.  Change required strong political will from the 
Governor’s office to overcome large bureaucratic interests for projects131 and a more active 
legislative branch, which could not keep pace with fast-moving markets.  Finally, he said, legal 
vehicles were needed to empower the community of landowners to be both responsible for 
property as well as to know the boundaries of ownership.  Not all political decisions should be 
motivated by the interests of landowners.132   
 
4.  Conclusions 
Two decades of contradictory land privatization policies in St. Petersburg established and 
perpetuated a course of incremental institutional change.  Early privatization policy choices created 
a secondary real estate market that operated in parallel to a primary market dominated by large 
industries with connections to city authorities.  One side competed in private markets; the other 
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“worked in the old soviet system of administrative allocation of state land.”133    Failure to reform 
the General Plan froze the St. Petersburg urban landscape as effectively as its northern latitude.  
With the opening of the secondary market, however, new landowners could begin to invest in more 
efficient land uses.  
The motivation for rapid land privatization during brief windows in 1994-96 and 2000-
2005 oscillated with fiscal imperatives and political interests, largely in line with the theory of 
predatory rule.  Mayor Sobchak was ideologically inclined to privatization and encouraged land 
purchases by using the lowest price allowed by law in 1995.  He started to raise land taxes to 
capture rising land values just when the budget surplus swung deeply into deficit in 1996.  
Governor Yakovlev then raised the land tax above the lease rate in 1997 and erected administrative 
barriers to land sales, creating incentives for leasing that provided a stream of rents.  When this 
strategy worsened the investment climate and the budget deficit, he initiated a new land 
privatization strategy that Governor Matviyenko followed until the fiscal crisis abated.  With her 
career increasingly dependent on President Putin, her tendency was to make exceptions to land 
rules for large projects that benefited political interests. 
Never during the two-decade period were political authorities, all sides of the bureaucracy, 
and society aligned on land privatization policy. While political authorities promoted land 
privatization early in the 1990s, the bureaucrats resisted it; after 2001, conditions reversed, with 
political authorities resisting privatization for all but state-controlled industries, while bureaucrats 
promoted faster registration of property rights by firms and citizens.  Public participation in the 
1990s focused on strategic planning more than urban land rights, but this experience contributed 
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to greater public input in the 2000s, and an exceptional victory in 2009 demonstrated that the 
public interest could influence decision-making on urban land use. 
 As of 2013, the stimulus provided by public activism and the response of political 
authorities are positive developments that hold promise for improvements in land governance.  The 
alignment among political authorities, the bureaucracy, and citizens is strengthening in favor of 
institutional change in urban land rights.  Private transactions in land are increasing and the 
municipal government is reducing its role in land markets.134  If this trend continues, institutional 
change may accelerate, leading to more competitive private land markets, and a more dynamically-
developing urban environment. 
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Kazan: A Case of Rapid Institutional Change 
In the early 1990s, it would be difficult to predict that Kazan would become an outstanding 
case of rapid institutional change.  The high rate of urban land privatization in Kazan is surprising 
for two reasons.  First, urban land in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, was neither 
seen as an asset nor as a priority for privatization in the 1990s.  Rather, Kazan possessed extremely 
valuable industrial assets, including the Kamaz truck factory and an advanced aviation and military 
complex dating from the 1940s.1   As a closed city dominated by a military-industrial complex that 
was run out of Moscow, the concept of value in municipal land did not exist.2   Second, like other 
municipalities, Kazan lacked autonomy as a self-governing community; it was administratively 
delimited but financially and politically under the authority of the Republic of Tatarstan.  Even 
had the Mayor of Kazan wanted to initiate privatization of land or of industrial assets, as did Mayor 
Sobchak in St. Petersburg, he was not empowered to do so.3   
How Kazan transitioned from a closed city shaped by its national security assets to a case 
of rapid institutional change based on privatized land assets is the subject of this chapter.   Kazan 
benefited from the fiscal and political autonomy of the Republic of Tatarstan in the 1990s, which 
increased the security in office of its leader, President Shaimiev.  Kazan also gave birth to a land 
market in the 1990s as the unintended consequence of a program to eliminate dilapidated housing 
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from the city center.  Consistent with the predatory rule theory, Kazan’s municipal finance crisis 
after 2003 triggered a decisive acceleration in land sales.  But the key distinguishing feature of 
Kazan compared to other cases in the study is that political authorities and the bureaucracy pursued 
consistent policies and actions in support of urban land privatization. The chapter follows the 
structure of the land governance model in detailing how this alignment occurred in the two periods 
under review. 
 
1. The Land Governance Model in Kazan, 1990-2000 
a.  Political Authority and the Legal Order, 1990-2000 
The political and legal environment for institutional development of land rights in Kazan 
was shaped by President Mintimer Shaimiev’s success in achieving political autonomy for the 
Republic of Tatarstan, and subsequently, in laying the legal and regulatory foundations for  private 
land ownership.     
In 1990, the Republic of Tatarstan audaciously declared its independence from the Soviet 
Union, marking the beginning of a three-year political negotiation that ended in a formal treaty of 
autonomy within the Russian Federation in 1994.   President Shaimiev, then a respected 
communist official and leader of the largest non-slavic ethnic group in Russia, engaged in an artful 
battle of wits with Boris Yeltsin that included refusal to sign the federation treaty in 1991, official 
non-participation in the June 1991 election that elevated Yeltsin to President of Russia, and 
sponsorship of a referendum on state sovereignty in 1992.  The referendum resulted in adoption 
of a constitution that associated the sovereign state of Tatarstan with the laws of the Russian 




constitution, both significant and fairly assertive separatist acts, were mechanisms to ensure 
serious and rewarding negotiations with the Russian government over the status of Tatarstan.”4  
 The consolidation of political authority within an autonomous republic shaped federal-
republic relations and internal policies.  From the perspective of federal relations, the negotiations 
resulted in specific agreements to the fiscal benefit of Tatarstan, including the full income from 
the proceeds of privatization and tax revenues from sales of oil and gas.   In contrast, in the Soviet 
period, less than 3 percent of Tatar industrial income accrued to the republic.  From an internal 
perspective, the referendum on sovereignty revealed an urban-rural divide that could potentially 
disrupt stable political development.  Predominantly rural and ethnically Tatar citizens 
overwhelmingly voted for sovereignty while a majority of the urban and ethnically Russian 
population voted against.5 Over time, Shaimiev developed policies on land reform that rewarded 
each of these constituencies with private land rights, giving them a stake in the stability of the 
republic. 
Two key decisions in the 1990s set Kazan on a path to becoming a leader of urban land 
privatization in Russia.  First, in 1995, Shaimiev declared a program to relocate all residents living 
in dilapidated housing in the city center of Kazan.   These citizens, largely ethnic Russians, 
received new housing within or near the city borders for free.  As will be noted, this decision was 
highly consequential for the development and privatization of urban land in Kazan.  Second, 
Tatarstan adopted a progressive land code in 1998, well before passage of the Land Code by the 
federal Duma in 2001, which notably allowed privatization of land even for agricultural use.  As 
a member of the Federation Council, Shaimiev thus aligned the republic with the federal land 
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privatization policies advocated by President Yeltsin, and staked out a progressive national 
leadership role on the contentious topic of land privatization.  
 
i. Program to Liquidate and Reconstruct Dilapidated Housing (1995) 
The dilapidated housing program in Kazan derived from social needs and political 
necessity.  Distinct from Moscow and St. Petersburg, which were partially evacuated during World 
War II, Kazan received industrial plants relocated from cities closer to the front.  These industries 
were placed in the city center along with evacuated factory workers, scientists, musicians, writers, 
and artists.  After the war, Kazan consolidated as an industrial, scientific and cultural center, and 
the population increased steadily.  Communal housing in the city center became overcrowded and 
deteriorated into slums with the onset of economic crisis in the early 1990s.   
In July 1991, when the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation decided to privatize the 
nation’s housing stock, followed by similar legislation in Tatarstan in 1993, it fundamentally 
changed the role of the state in the housing sector.6   Difficult legal issues arose, particularly in the 
military-industrial complex in Kazan, where companies privatized or went bankrupt but left 
dilapidated housing assets in the unwilling hands of municipal authorities.  Whereas the national 
legal framework envisioned a single family taking ownership of an apartment or home, in the 
center of Kazan, multiple families shared dormitories (obshchezhitiia) that could not be privatized 
easily.7   Having inherited property that was depreciated beyond repair, the Kazan authorities still 
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needed to fulfill national and regional laws by improving living conditions while allowing families 
the opportunity to privatize their residences.   
The solution came in the Program to Liquidate and Reconstruct Dilapidated Housing in 
Kazan (1995-2002), authorized by the Kazan Council of People’s Deputies on November 1, 1995, 
following a decree by President Shaimiev for a republic-wide program.8  After completing a 
detailed analysis of the affected families, the Council approved: i) work by the City Administration 
to establish a legal basis for the program; ii) mechanisms for funding it, including through 
attraction of foreign investment; iii) an object-by-object engineering and construction plan, and 
the quarter-by-quarter project development schedule including communication and communal 
services.9  Uniquely for Tatarstan, the program involved the resettlement of 50,000 families, 
primarily through demolition and construction of new housing rather than rehabilitation. 
The unintended consequence of the program was to free up large areas of land in the city 
center that municipal authorities enhanced with infrastructure and communal services, thereby 
stimulating a new private industry in housing construction.10  As in the rest of Tatarstan, the Kazan 
program “joined the interests of industry, investors, municipal authorities, and citizens….Housing 
construction inevitably led to the development of different industries and to the financial-credit 
field in Tatarstan.”11  The allocation of new housing to resettled families, for free, reflected an 
extreme choice in the 1990s, whereas public-private partnerships are now considered more 
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appropriate, to share costs and risks.12 The effect, however, was to give the poorest residents a 
stake in the new political and legal order in the form of property rights.13 
The dilapidated housing program distinguished Kazan from both Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, where industrial land existed within city limits, but not slums in the historic city center.  
In contrast, as described by an advisor to the program, “Dormitories had been built for working 
families from livestock stables and in 19th-century buildings, but no one minded at the time because 
the first priority was to end the war.  After forty years these deteriorated into unlivable slums, with 
one family per room, no internal plumbing, and latrines on the street.”14  Fortuitously, the timetable 
for reconstruction happened to coincide with the celebration of the Kazan millennium, to take 
place in 2005.  As noted by President Shaimiev, "Kazan has been turned into a large-scale building 
site, and it is very important that we are finishing the dilapidated housing program by Kazan’s 
1000th anniversary.”15   The millennium enabled the city to attract huge federal funds that were 
invested in construction, infrastructure and innovation, especially in the historic center of Kazan.16  
As another unintended consequence of the dilapidated housing program, land became 
traded as a commodity, and the beginnings of a land market appeared.  “At that time, no one 
considered land as an asset,” noted Vladimir Gritskikh, then an advisor to the program.  “It was 
seen in the framework of Soviet economics.  There were no borders to the land plot; banks did not 
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use it for collateral.  Land was space to be mined or cultivated.  Only the structure on it – the 
factory or building – was considered a hot asset.”17  A land market developed organically, 
according to Gritskikh.  “First, land was provided to developers by the city in exchange for a share 
of built apartments.  The city would receive rent from the apartments in compensation for the land.  
Later, developers saw it was more profitable not to make this exchange.  Instead, the developers 
decided to buy the land from the city and to determine the rent for the real estate, both land and 
buildings. The city administration began to see that the land had value, apart from the structures 
on it, and that the exchange process was becoming corrupted.  The city administration also feared 
making mistakes.  Was it right to receive payment for land in the form of apartments? Perhaps it 
was so valuable the city should ask for much more than 10% of apartments built in exchange?  The 
desire of both sides (developers and municipal authorities) to fix the right price led to trading of 
land as a market commodity. Later, banks started using land as the basis for financing 
development, putting land into use for finance.”18  The development of the land market was an 
unintended consequence that in turn became fundamental to the success of the dilapidated housing 
program. As noted by Rustam Nigmatullin, then in charge of [x], “In Samara, in contrast to Kazan, 
it was not economically profitable to resettle citizens from the barracks to new houses financed by 
the city. In Kazan the market enabled us [the city administration] to do that.19  
The growing recognition of the value of urban land stimulated demand for a legal and 
regulatory environment to manage land as a municipal asset.  Municipal land had never been traded 
like a commodity; at the national level in the mid-1990s, there was no cadastral or registration law 
to determine demarcation and ownership, and no land or civil code to guide the buying and selling 
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of land.  Once an enterprise had been privatized or sold off, particularly in the military-industrial 
complex, it was not known what to do with the land, because at that time, there were no clear 
borders, and it was not clear who was the owner.20  The city then became preoccupied with the 
legality of using land plots with unclear borders for sale or lease.  Gritskikh credits Rustam 
Nigmatullin with actively laying down a regulatory system for cadastral accounting:  “the 
appearance of strictly-delimited borders suppressed conflict and enabled the market to work more 
effectively. In this manner, land became an operational asset.”21 
ii. Adoption of Tatarstan Land Code (1998) 
 
As an early supporter of progressive land reform laws, President Shaimiev represented a 
staunch ally to President Yeltsin during Duma debates on the federal land code.  In 1997, Yeltsin 
vetoed the first version of the land code passed by the Duma and Federation Council because it 
did not allow for the development of a free market to buy and sell land.  When the Duma passed a 
revised version in April 1998 that would also encumber land markets, he counted on supporters 
such as President Shaimiev in the Federation Council to block the advance of the bill.22  
Land reform was both a personal and an economic issue for Shaimiev.  His first motivation 
was to transform rural Tatarstan and the agricultural economy, where he spent his youth and early 
professional life.  Nevertheless, he understood the connection between the rural and urban 
economies.   For Shaimiev, land represented “my joy, my hope, and sometimes my pain.”  To put 
it briefly, he said, “Land is everything to me.  Land is the basis of life…it is the moral beginning 
of mankind.”  There were two critical issues, however, that he believed Russia needed to address.  
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First was that in developed countries, land had a real owner, with private land rights.  From this 
arose the second issue: a well-functioning market mechanism for agriculture in trade relations 
between village and town.23 
In the long absence of a federal land code, regional legislation on acquiring land was 
enacted over a number of years in the regions where the regional administration allowed land 
ownership.24  Five Russian regions (Kaliningrad, Primorske, Saratov, Samara, and Tatarstan) 
enacted their own land codes and took the position that they could sell all kinds of land, including 
agricultural land, into private ownership. 25  At the direction of President Shamiev, Tatarstan began 
to develop a legal framework for land market relations in both urban and rural areas.  The 
framework included five laws: a land code, a law on land reform, a law on payment for land, a law 
on the farm economy, and a law on the administrative responsibility for infringement of land 
legislation.  As he said, “while in many regions all around Russia there are debates about the fate 
of land as society is reformed, while various draft laws about land “amble” around the Ring Road 
in Moscow, in Tatarstan today we are working with full force on five laws.”26  
The adoption of a progressive land code in Tatarstan in 1998 set a high standard for the 
national land reform process.27  The first region to pass a land code, Saratov, restricted the purchase 
of land to Russian citizens.  Tatarstan’s Land Code went further by allowing foreign nationals and 
companies to buy land.28  At the same time, many cities throughout Russia did not allow owners 
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of buildings to obtain ownership rights of the underlying land, despite federal law to the contrary. 
Occasionally, cities would permit enterprise land privatization but then obstruct the process.29  In 
Tatarstan, privatization of premises and land went together, starting with auctions where 
appropriate.30  The Tatarstan Land Code also empowered municipalities to implement regulations 
to enable the purchase and sale of land and required them to follow federal legislation in all 
respects, including on land use planning and development and on encouragement of registration 
of land for all owners of buildings. 31   
Distinct from other regions at the time, the Tatarstan Land Code also aimed to attract both 
foreign and domestic investment.  “Why throughout all Russia is Tatarstan considered a more 
favorable region for investment? “ President Shaimiev asked rhetorically in an interview. “Because 
in the republic there is the beginning of action on land ownership.  This goes beyond the political 
and social-economic stability that is being preserved in Tatarstan. 32  The abundance of black-earth 
agriculture represented an important target for foreign investment, against the strong opposition of 
the Communist and Agrarian parties.  While development of urban land rights took longer to 
develop, the task of forming land parcels for private ownership in agriculture was seen as critically 
important.33  Shaimiev challenged the assumptions of Russian politicians both on privatization of 
agricultural land and on the benefits of private land to attract foreign investment.  For Shaimiev, it 
was clear that land relations were at the heart of foreign investment, and that the separation of land 
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and buildings represented a serious problem in Russia.  Investors would not put their funds where 
they could not put their feet – on the ground where they owned property.34  
In summary, President Shaimiev provided enlightened leadership on a highly contentious 
issue during a period when land privatization faced stiff opposition throughout Russia.  Based on 
Shaimiev’s understanding of the value of private land ownership for economic development, it is 
noteworthy that Tatarstan did not follow the path of either Moscow or St. Petersburg in rapidly 
privatizing or leasing land in the 1990s, particularly for industrial enterprises.35  Rather, the 
Republic and capital city followed a steady and gradual path of enterprise land privatization, 
preceded by a formative period of legislative and regulatory development.  
  
c. Bureaucratic Organization and Performance 1990-2000  
 The general understanding by scholars of relations between republican and municipal 
authorities in Tatarstan during the first decade of the post-Soviet period is that: 
successful rent-seeking bargaining of the regional elite with the federal Center 
contributed to its organizational unity around the leadership of the President of Tatarstan, 
Mintimur Shaimiev.  Under these circumstances, agents of local government did not 
emerge at all.   Local government in the region turned into local branches of regional 
government, and city mayors were simply appointed (and dismissed) by Shamiev.  No 
organized municipal opposition to Shaimiev was established in Tatarstan, and rebellions 
by city majors were quashed without serious resistance. 36 
Clearly, Shaimiev exerted executive leadership on matters that involved the capital city. At the 
same time, without the development and implementation of land regulations by responsible 
municipal executive officers and bureaucrats in Kazan, it would not have been possible to 
transform urban land into a valuable asset.  Moreover, several actions taken by municipal 
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authorities contest the proposition that agents of local government did not exercise autonomy in 
Kazan.  
Several efforts to put order into land relations began in the 1990s at the initiative of 
municipal agencies.  The Land Inventory was initiated in 1993 by the City Land Committee, one 
of the first to do so in the country, and the requirements of the market after the start of the 
dilapidated housing program accelerated the process. 37   Likewise, following the renovation and 
opening of the city center in 1995, cadastral boundaries and an accounting of city land began in 
earnest.38   Regulations were developed for zoning and to manage land use, stimulated by the 
beginnings of a market for real property.  Kazan was one of four cities to put the generic concepts 
of the Town Planning Code of the Russian Federation (№ 73-FZ, dated May 7, 1998) into concrete 
regulations based on a law adopted by the local parliament. The federal code was later amended 
in 2004, based on experience in Kazan and other advanced municipalities. 39   By being one of the 
first cities to adopt the Town Planning Code in 1998, the city engaged the local parliament to 
address gaps that affected the development and building process.   
Nevertheless, the development of a dynamic market was initially not easy to regulate, 
according to city officials involved in the process at the time.  The process gave rise to the so-
called “landlords” with direct ties to the municipal land and property management administration, 
who received the “sweetest” deals.40  It also demonstrated to the President that the construction 
industry was good for the economy, allowing him to intervene actively in the emerging market.41   
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Over time, “developers learned it was equally profitable to build housing in greenfield sites further 
from the city center where land lots were less expensive and easier to acquire, with less 
bureaucratic interference.  People flocked to buy them.”42  Questions also arose regarding who 
was benefiting the most from the land privatization process.  Evidence became available through 
an open-source data base developed by the local cadastral administration that identifies the 
holdings of the top landowners in the republic and capital.  “Today there is limited interest in such 
research, since it would reopen questions about the accumulation of the initial shares and the 
acquisition of property.” 43  
Municipal agencies in Kazan stepped into a void to establish a regulatory framework for 
land relations.  It is important to recall that the federal law on registration of property was adopted 
only in 1998, and in that one year, responsibility for land cadastral boundaries and registration 
shifted three times among federal agencies.   In contrast, during the same decade, republican and 
municipal agencies in Kazan such as the Committee on Land and Property Relations and the Land 
Committee were advancing rapidly in putting the foundations of a land planning and use rights 
system in place.  The adoption of a regulatory framework increased the appreciation of 
municipalities and enterprises for land rights, laid a precise basis for cadastral valuation of land 
plots, and formed the basis for land taxes.44  The bureaucrats, seeing the market demand, and 
recognizing the legal vacuum, rising conflicts over ownership, and concerns of society, tried to 
step in with a framework to manage the process according to rules.  “Thus, together with the 
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market, there appeared legislation, and regulations.  Throughout all the eccentricities of our 
market, it acquired a more or less civilized appearance.”45 
 
d.  Public Participation in Decision-Making,  1990-2000 
Due to the political structure of Tatarstan in the 1990s, there were limited opportunities for 
the legislature and civic organizations in municipalities to participate in decision-making on 
contentious issues.  Out of 130 candidates that President Shaimiev supported for the 1999 elections 
to the State Council, 109 were elected, creating a parliament that largely rubber-stamped executive 
initiatives. Heads of local governments were also heads of local parliaments.  Representation in 
the State Council was largely skewed to rural areas.  The city of Kazan, with almost 800,000 voters 
in 1995, had the same representation as Zainsk, a town of under 30,000. 46   
At the same time, the parliament of Kazan was deeply engaged in the regulatory and legal 
framework of the program to eliminate dilapidated housing, having drawn up a list of each member 
of 50,000 families and the year and location to which each family would move.  “The local 
parliament is so to say closer to the people, and of course there was a common interest [in the 
program] since a long period of administrative management [of property] caused some gaps. This 
was ineffective.  Land Administration only partially covered the legal sphere,” and thus, “the 
appearance of the [Tatarstan] Land Code alleviated contentious issues with respect to 
ownership.”47  
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While the dilapidated housing program created a land market in the capital, it also aroused 
civic awareness around historic preservation.   Motivated by the market, developers found it 
cheaper to demolish property of historic significance and to rebuild rather than to restore old 
buildings.   A journalist and historian, Olesya Baltusova recalled in 2011 how the program in the 
1990s stimulated her interest in defense of the city’s cultural heritage: 
The story of the loss of the historic look of our city and how we looked after our own 
roots dates from the past, already in the 1970s.   But when, before the 1000-year event, 
we lost the slums together with the historic monuments, we lost all our ancient 
architecture.   Tel’man street went, from which the Kazan scholar Bulat Galeev had 
proposed to create a museum street, where tourists could visit for payment.  What a place 
that would have been for excursions!  But then I was young, studying at the university.  
Many of those who fought then for the city’s heritage don’t want to hear about it:  they 
are disappointed with everything.48  
 
Just as in St. Petersburg, while civil society was initially relatively detached from urban 
development in the 1990s, the arousal of civic interest in historic preservation created the 
conditions for a greater public role in decision-making in the next decade.   
In retrospect, the 1990s in Kazan was a period of preparation for land privatization.  From 
the perspective of the predatory ruler, the city was not in a hurry.  The President of the Republic 
was secure in office based on the sovereignty treaty with the Russian Federation.  Tatarstan and 
its capital could take a long-term perspective to develop both land privatization policy and fiscal 
revenue sources.  
Nevertheless, Tatarstan compared favorably with the other case study cities and national 
performance.  As noted in Table I, by the year 2000, only 1.8% of urban land across the Republic 
of Tatarstan was owned by enterprises compared to 4.7% in St. Petersburg, where Mayor Sobchak 
openly advocated industrial land privatization.  Nevertheless, both cities compared favorably to 
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the national average of a 0.6% enterprise land ownership share.  St. Petersburg exceeded the 
national average by 8 times; Tatarstan by 3 times.  The situation is reversed for citizen ownership, 
where at 1.2%, St. Petersburg lagged significantly behind the national average of 6.2%, while 
social housing programs in Kazan and across Tatarstan catapulted citizen ownership above that of 
St. Petersburg and the nation to 8.8%.   
The early investments made by Kazan in the formation of land governance institutions 
provided fertile ground for faster urban privatization and deeper land market development after 
adoption of the federal Land Code in 2001.   As discussed in the next section, this outcome required 
the alignment of executive authorities, bureaucrats and citizens in favor of policies to privatize 
land.    




Urban land in 
thousand hectares 
   Urban Land by Ownership Share (%) 
           Citizens Legal    entities State and 
municipalities 
1.1.00 1.1.05 1.1.10 1.1.00 1.1.05 1.1.10 1.1.00 1.1.05 1.1.10 1.1.00 1.1.05 1.1.10 
Russian 
Federation 
7645 7945 7964 6.2 6.2 7.8 0.6 1.4 3.1 93.2 92.4 89.1 
Moscow 
City 
109.1 109.1 109.1  -  -  0.1  -   -  1.9 100 100 98 
St. 
Petersburg 
139.9 139.9 139.9 1.2 2.1 3.8 4.7 11.1 13.5 94.1 86.8 82.7 
Republic 
Tatarstan 
112 122.3 154 8.8 9.8 10.7  1.8 6.2 14.6  89.4 84.0 74.7 
Data are not disaggregated at the municipal level by Rosreestr. For the purposes of this table, Tatarstan is taken to 
represent the ownership structure of Kazan, which at 61,300 hectares is 40% of the Republic urban area in 2010.  As 
discussed in the conclusions section, based on land tax data, it is likely that Kazan has a higher rate of privatization 
than other municipalities in Tatarstan.  Data in the table is derived from Zemel’nyi Fond Rossiiskoi Federatsii of 
January 1, 2000; Goskomitet po zemel’noi politike RF 2000: 4-6, 178-183; Zemel’nyi Fond Rossiiskoi Federatsii of  
January 1, 2005; Rosnedvizhimost’ 2005: 42-49, 245-247; Zemel’nyi Fond Rossiiskoi Federatsii of January 1, 2010 














2 The Land Governance Model in Kazan, 2001-2013 
a. Political Authority and the Legal Order, 2001-2013 
Political and fiscal exigencies motivated the Kazan municipal authorities to manage the 
city’s land and property assets more actively and profitably after 2002.  Politically, the Republic 
of Tatarstan lost sovereignty to the Federal Government while Kazan gained autonomy as a self-
governing municipality; fiscally, the Republic remitted a higher share of its revenues to the Federal 
Government while Kazan received fewer subsidies from the Republican Government.   Thus, just 
as Kazan was gaining political autonomy, it was losing income, putting municipal finances under 
severe pressure.  These developments coincided with the celebration of the Kazan Millenium and 
contributed to decisions that accelerated the rate of municipal land privatization. 
A primary political objective of the first Putin presidency was to restore the ‘vertical’ of 
power between Moscow and the regions.   In line with his policy to recentralize authority, President 
Putin sought to renegotiate the special status that Tatarstan had received from President Yeltsin.  
Shaimiev had supported Putin in March 2000 election, delivering 70% of the Tatarstan vote.49  As 
part of the negotiations with Putin, Shamiev struck a bargain:  in return for re-entry of Tatarstan 
into Russian legal and fiscal systems, the Federal Government had to adopt a targeted program for 
the social and economic development of Tatarstan, including funds to prepare for Kazan’s 
Millenium celebration.  As Shamiev later reported to the Kazan City Council, “Effectively, the 
federal grant was compensation offered to the Republic for the renunciation of its claims of state 
sovereignty.”50   
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As part of the recentralization process, Putin revised the system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations and adopted a new budget code, which had a cascading effect down to Kazan’s municipal 
finances.  Tatarstan began to provide a higher rate of subsidy to the federal budget, and within 
Tatarstan, the share of taxes received by Kazan declined.  The federal grant program negotiated 
by Shaimiev consisted primarily of block grants for capital investments such as public transport 
and urban renewal; it did not cover recurrent expenditures to run the city.  Kazan began to run a 
deficit in 2002-2003 that reached 2.4 billion rubles (US$80 million) by 2004, putting municipal 
finances at risk.51   
The revision of intergovernmental fiscal relations corresponded with preparations for the 
Kazan Millenium, which was partially funded from the Special Federal Program for the 
Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Center (2001–2005).  The budget for the 
program was 64.93 billion RUB (or approximately US$2.19 billion), to be funded by federal 
(30%), republic (30%), city (9%) and other funds.  This dwarfed city revenues of 3.66 billion RUB 
(or approximately US$0.12 billion) in 2001.  Consistent with several large public investment 
programs in Russia, the design and number of subprojects exceeded fiscal reality.  By June 2005, 
just before the Millenium celebration was to begin in August, the Deputy Mayor announced that 
the program had only received half of the expected funding.52  The city had already reduced the 
number of projects and begun to sequester the budget, but it was still not sufficient. 
The period of fiscal stress also coincided with Kazan’s transformation from an 
administrative unit of the Republic to a self-governing municipality in 2004.  Until that time, all 
state property in the city belonged to the Republic of Tatarstan; it was held in trust and managed 
by city units that were subordinate to regional ministries and agencies.  Now, Kazan was 
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responsible for managing both its finances and property assets.   With a fiscal deficit equal to about 
three-quarters of its 2001 revenues, Kazan wanted to reduce its dependence on transfers from 
higher government levels and implement the “Kazan Development Strategy to 2015,” adopted in 
April 2003, that was designed with all agencies and the public at large.53 
As part of its strategy to gain control over municipal finances, the city decided to increase 
the rate of land privatization and to improve the management of property assets.  From 2003 to 
2005 land was actively sold at auctions, both land parcels and property complexes.54  The city 
administration created incentives for land privatization and ownership in several ways.  The 
formula to derive land taxes was universal across Russia, but municipalities had discretion to set 
the rate within a prescribed ratio of the cadastral value.  Until 2004, the tax burden and the amount 
of mobilized land tax was one of the lowest in Kazan.  With cadastral valuations high and land tax 
rates low, the purchase of land was attractive.55  Enterprises had a strong incentive to privatize the 
land they occupied.  The city also granted privileges on land purchase and leasing.  For example, 
land with free lease rights was provided for investors in the tourism sector (e.g. hotel complexes 
for the Universiade in 2013) and industry (e.g. Technopolis Himgrad, the redevelopment of 400 
hectares for the chemical industry in Kazan). 56   
Social policy also provided a stimulus for land privatization.  With 42 percent of the city’s 
residents living on monthly incomes at or below the subsistence level of 1,200 rubles as of 
September 1, 2002, and barely 5 percent of the population receiving incomes at the national 
average of 11,800 rubles, the city’s most important social policy goal was to improve the standard 
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of living of the vulnerable population.57  As the program of elimination of dilapidated housing was 
coming to a close, the city launched the social mortgage program to provide apartments for sale at 
a discounted state mortgage.  Land was provided near or outside the city limits where prices were 
lower so that the population could afford to buy these apartments. 58 
The city also received funding and expertise on municipal finance through a World Bank-
financed operation that improved the regulatory environment for property management.59  The 
project was officially requested by President Putin in 2003; it was agreed between the World Bank 
and Kazan municipal officials in 2004.  Based on evidence of reforms aimed at improving fiscal 
management, the Bank disbursed to Kazan US$50 million in 2005 and US$75 million in late 2006. 
The project aimed to strengthen the capacity for local self-governance by improving the 
financial and institutional basis for city management.  In 2003, social services were primarily 
provided by municipal unitary enterprises.  The system was highly inefficient because 
infrastructure for utilities had seriously depreciated and revenues were insufficient to cover the 
cost of basic water, sanitation and heating services.  Property management in Kazan was 
particularly inefficient.  Services such as maintenance and rehabilitation of housing, which are 
provided by private firms in market and most transition economies, were provided solely by 
Municipal Unitary Enterprises (MUEs) in Kazan.  According to the practice in 2003, the Cabinet 
of Ministers of the Republic established a list of necessary goods and services and then the Mayor 
would issue a purchase order to specific firms.  According to the World Bank’s independent 
evaluation report, “Based on the data from the Committee on Economy and Industry of the 
Ministry of Economy and Industry of the Republic of Tatarstan, in 2003 in Kazan direct contracts 
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were used to procure goods and services worth some 4 billion rubles, which was 55% of the city 
budget. Such a system resulted in higher costs for the budget, absence of competition and increased 
opportunities for corruption.”60 
The program exceeded a similar one in St. Petersburg by creating new private firms for 
housing maintenance, bringing lease rates closer to market levels, and revising the General Plan. 
To improve municipal finances, the project subcomponent on “Improving the Municipal Property 
Management System” aimed to privatize municipal property, starting with 21 MUEs, including all 
those engaged in housing maintenance.  It also strengthened city finances by identifying excessive 
and idle assets of MUEs and recording them in a transparent municipal property registry that listed 
transactions with these assets.  To increase revenues from property ownership, Kazan established 
rules for privatization of municipal enterprises using market-based mechanisms.   Information on 
municipal property transactions had to be disclosed regularly, and the registry of municipal 
property was transformed into a state-of-the-art data base.  The city also adjusted lease rates for 
the premises owned by the municipality so that at the time of project completion, at least 90% of 
leases were at market rates (compared to 50% in 2004). The number of lease-holders eligible for 
preferential lease rates was reduced dramatically.  In addition, a zoning plan (under the General 
Plan) was approved and implemented, and competitive procedures were adopted for allocation and 
sale of land parcels.  
As a result of the incentives, and based on efforts to improve land governance, Kazan 
outstripped all municipalities in Tatarstan in the rate of enterprise land privatization in the period 
from 2000 to 2005.61  As noted in Table 1, the rate for all municipalities in Tatarstan grew to 6.2% 
in 2005 and to 14.6% in 2010, overtaking St. Petersburg.  Much of this was accomplished 
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transparently through auctions, the results of which were published on official websites.  As will 
be discussed later, the burst of new landowners came with a level of corruption that is taken very 
seriously by the city administration.  Nevertheless, it also sparked a dynamic land market with a 
high rate of transactions.  As a consequence, by 2010, all but 25% of housing was privately owned 
in Kazan, far above the levels of other Volga regions.62    
 
b.  Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 2001-2013 
 
 
As the dissertation hypothesizes, the pace of institutional change is a function of the 
alignment of policies and practices by executive authorities and civil servants at both the 
republican and municipal levels.  In Kazan, the degree of conformity between executive authorities 
and civil servants on matters of land governance is singularly impressive, as is the commitment of 
civil servants in Kazan to standards of excellence.   Evidence of this commitment is based on: i) 
achievement of policy targets by the Ministry of Land and Property at the republican and municipal 
level; ii) reduction of time for property registration; and iii) efforts to improve the security of 
property rights, including through transparency and accuracy of data reporting, and by monitoring 
and addressing land rights violations. 
The publication of performance targets and ratings underscores the professionalism of the 
civil service in Tatarstan.  Since 2005, following federal requirements, the Republic of Tatarstan 
(RT) Ministry of Economy publishes an annual report on how well ministries meet agreed targets 
and policy goals.   The Ministry of Land and Property Management is evaluated against targets 
for: i) socio-economic policy (share of multi-children families that received free land plots); ii) 
property management (share of budget revenues accruing from buildings and land, including from 
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property privatization); iii) general performance (relating to professional training), and iv) 
“executive discipline” (degree to which executive decrees and orders are implemented in a timely 
manner).  From 2003 to 2010, for example, following the established policy goals, the Ministry 
reported that the RT had privatized half of all state unitary enterprises, provided social housing to 
80% of the poorest families, and published the results of auctions for land sales, as required by 
law.  Embedded in these figures are data for Kazan.63  Separately, as noted below, the Mayor of 
Kazan reports annually on these and other indicators of municipal performance.  Among ministries 
in Tatarstan, Land and Property is rated in the top quarter.64   
Another indicator of Kazan’s interest in reaching high performance standards is its decision 
to be subject to external evaluation by an international organization in the Subnational Doing 
Business Report for Russia in 2008 and 2012.  The 2012 report ranks Kazan in fourth place out of 
30 municipalities, both for ease of doing business and for registering property.  Impressively, 
Kazan reduced the number of days required for property registration from 80 to 33 between 2008 
and 2012.  Still, local authorities are dissatisfied.  While responsibility for property registration 
rests with the territorial offices of the federal agency, Rosreetr, there is close cooperation with city 
authorities that handle land and property management.  As an official noted, “this issue is under 
the direct control of the Mayor of Kazan and the President of Tatarstan. We also rely on the World 
Bank report on ease of doing business.  Despite our loyalty with this study, there are some errors 
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in it. However, it is a good opportunity to look at ourselves from outside. We work on each 
parameter as the integral indicator of the effectiveness of decisions of local authorities…”65 
Finally, in a sign that it recognizes the importance of the transparency and quality of data 
both to the security of property rights and to fiscal revenues, the municipality strives to report 
frequently and accurately about the results of municipal property management and on the 
administration of land rights.  Sources include the Mayor’s annual report and on-line information 
on auctions, cadastral ownership, administrative actions, and legal violations. 
In the Mayor’s 2012 report, he said that public auctions of municipal property had 
contributed 46 million rubles to the municipal budget, of which half had come from the sale of 
land plots.  However, demand for privatization of municipal property was on a declining trend, as 
witnessed by the rise in the number of auctions announced but not held due to lack of bidders.   For 
example, of 15 land auctions announced in 2012, only 4 took place.  On the other hand, the city 
had issued 1,400 acts to authorize the allocation and formation of private land rights, and 
competitive allocation of land to families with multiple children was rising.66 
The transparency of information on public auctions for tendering of municipal land is 
noteworthy.  Auctions are required by federal law to open urban land to competition and establish 
fair market value, but have been conducted infrequently by municipalities, including Moscow and 
St. Petersburg.67  The Mayor’s report provides an annual overview; more interesting is the active 
marketing of auctions of municipal property on official websites, including in English, to attract 
investors.  Systems for cadastral valuation and registration are well advanced in Kazan, providing 
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open access of information to buyers and sellers.   The city publishes land parcel values by location, 
size, value per square meter, and total value.   As of 2014, the file includes 183,903 land parcels.68  
Nevertheless, the Executive Committee on Land and Property Management of Kazan 
acknowledged in its 2013 evaluation that there needed to be better accounting of land parcels in 
the city in order to improve the effectiveness of its use,  arguing that the backbone of the economy, 
tax revenues, and budget were private landowners.  For example, the area of Kazan and number 
of registered land parcels differed in reports of the Committee and of Rosreestr for certain years, 
and greater effort was required to improve accuracy. 69   For its part, the regional office of Rosreestr 
also acknowledged the need to correct deficiencies in cadastral and registration data, for which it 
has implemented the national single registry (ЕГРП) in all 44 raions and Kazan.  This has allowed 
the “cleaning” of data that included duplication of ownership titles during the transfer from one 
owner to another.70 
Across Russia, there is an established system to verify the proper implementation of land 
laws and regulations, and both in RT and Kazan this process is taken seriously.  As discussed in 
the RT annual report for 2013, a total of 19,000 inspections of referred cases were conducted, 
which uncovered 11,000 cases of infringement. From this amount, fines levied on 8,000 cases 
resulted in payment of 13 million rubles to the republican budget.  In 56% of the cases, the 
                                                 
68 Gorod Kazan’ Ofitsial’nyi Portal Goroda, Resultaty gosudarstvennoi kadastrovoi otsenki zemel’nykh uchastkov v 
sostave zemel’ naselennogo punkta g. Kazani na 1 ianvarya 2013. http://www.kzn.ru/. 
The share of private land owners is not aggregated but the owner of each land plot is identified.  To estimate the 
percentage of private versus public would require viewing information on each parcel. 
69 Gorod Kazan’ Ofitsial’nyi Portal Goroda, Informatsiia po proverke Munitsipal’nogo kazennogo uchrezhdeniia 
“Komitet zеmel’nykh i imushchestvennykh otnoshenii Ispolnitel’nogo komiteta munitsipal’nogo obrazovaniia 
goroda Kazani 2013”. http://www.kzn.ru/. 
70 Azat Zyabbarov, “Upravlenie Rosreestra Po Respublike Tatarstan: Itogi I Perspektivi,” Vectnik Nedvizhimosti No. 
2/9, (July 2012), 7-9. As explained by Zyabbarov, during the “conversion of applications,” that is, when rights are 
transferred, the system will ensure that ownership rights are registered to one ‘lizo’ (physical or juridical) instead of 




infringement was due to use of land without proper documentation to validate ownership or lease 
rights.71   
The verification process reveals areas where greater public information or action by land 
administrators is needed to ensure that land use rights are properly documented.   A case in point 
is the 2006 passage of the so-called “dacha amnesty” allowing citizens to register small homes and 
accompanying landholdings for personal use in a simplified manner.  To assist smooth 
implementation in the first two years, the RT Ministry of Land and Property Relations conducted 
consultations with 5,300 citizens in districts of Kazan and recorded the areas of greatest concern.  
The outreach assisted in the registration of 15.5 percent of the 1.14 million objects in RT that are 
subject to the simplified procedure.72 
Despite outreach efforts, violations continue, primarily due to mishandling by 
administration officials or to the transitional nature of the registration system in the 1990s.   Cases 
that relate to corruption are exposed.  As First Deputy Director of the Executive Committee of 
Kazan, Rustam Nigmatullin, explained, “A recent case, widely publicized, was brought by the city 
against one of its own employees73.  The simplified opportunity to register and build houses -- the 
dacha amnesty – revealed how land in Kazan had been distributed earlier by Selsovets (village 
councils).   There were no archives, and the land administration officials were simply crooks. The 
city is prosecuting and will return the lands to the treasury.”74  Across Tatarstan, 312 land plots in 
16 districts will revert to municipal property in 2013 as a result of judicial proceedings relating to 
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registration with violations.   President Minnikhanov (who replaced President Shaimiev in 2010) 
stated that “We have to correct the mistakes to prevent such cases in future.”75 
At the same time, violations are often difficult to assess given the uncertain legal 
environment in the 1990s and lack of congruence among various laws regulating real estate.  For 
this reason “…several cases are still in court.  These are complicated cases because the citizens 
who have bought the land are respectable owners and they have already built houses on these areas, 
so the decision is made at the discretion of the judge. Formally, according to law of dacha amnesty 
a house can be built without problems, but there remain discrepancies with the Town Planning 
Code.”76   
Given the professionalism of the land administration bureaucracy in Kazan and at the 
Republic level, and the dedication to privatization and effective management of land resources, 
there are very few areas where improvements can be recommended.  These relate to bureaucratic 
organization, statistical reporting, and performance on anti-corruption monitoring. 
Organizationally, matters relating to land ownership, planning and use are handled in federal, 
republic and municipal offices, giving the appearance of fragmentation.  Between Rosreestr (local 
and regional offices of a federal agency), the Ministry of Land and Property Relations (republic 
level), the Committee on Land and Property Relations of the Executive Committee of Kazan 
(KZIO-IKMO -- municipal level) and the Department of Architecture and Town Planning 
(municipal) there is lack of clear boundaries across related functions.  To take one example, a 
citizen who (logically) posted an on-line question to the Architecture and Town Planning 
Department (responsible for zoning matters) on whether it was appropriate to construct a house 
                                                 
75 Administration of President of the Republic of Tatarstan, “Work on transferring land plots registered with 
violations to municipal property continues in Tatarstan,” March 1, 2014.  
http://tatarstan.ru/eng/index.htm/news/274869.htm, downloaded 7/1/14 




along a riverbank was referred to Rosreestr (responsible for formation of property rights).   A 
single window called LAND with links to all related websites could assist users, but more 
fundamentally, a functional audit could suggest organizational improvements. 
Likewise, statistical reporting is not consolidated nor is it user-friendly.  While there are 
numerous reports, legal documents, and data posted on various websites, answers to simple 
questions such as the share of private land ownership in Kazan, the level of tax for a given land 
plot, or the contribution of land resources to the municipal budget are not available.  Often very 
interesting analytical reports are posted, but without dates or sources.77  Finally, performance on 
anti-corruption activity by Rosreestr in Tatarstan is very poor, according to the Freedom of 
Information Foundation (FIF).  Under a state contract, FIF monitors websites of regional affiliates 
of federal agencies for compliance with unified federal requirements to overcome corruption 
through public information.  These requirements include publication of detailed information on 
the activities and income of public officials and their immediate family members in order to reduce 
the possibility of conflicts of interest or direct benefits related to government service. Tatarstan 
received a score of less than 30 out of 100, putting it in 70th place out of 81 subjects of the 
federation, and below Moscow and St. Petersburg.78   This is a relatively easy deficiency to rectify 
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c.  Public Participation in Decision-Making, 2001-2013 
In contrast to the rating on anti-corruption, the town planning (legal zoning) regulations in 
Kazan are considered among best-practice cases in Russia, according to the Moscow-based 
Institute of Urban Economics.   Specifically, the Kazan model includes elements that are 
beneficial: i) for municipal development, by increasing the rate of land allocation and thus 
contribution of land to budgetary revenues; ii) for property owners, real estate developers and 
investors, by registering land rights prior to construction, thus allowing the land to be mortgaged 
to finance the project; and iii) for citizens, by “enhancement of opportunities to participate in 
decision making and to protect their interests in the use and improvement of real property; [and 
thus, by] reduction of conflicts between local communities and local governments.”79   
Urban planning decisions in Kazan are conducted with citizen input in accordance with 
federal and regional laws on principles of self-government80 and with the law adopted by the Kazan 
City Duma in 2006 on public participation.81  Ten specific areas of municipal affairs require public 
hearings, of which six concern land use planning, including adoption of the General Plan.   
According to Section 9 of the Kazan law, the Mayor must officially disseminate the draft General 
Plan no less than one month before the start of public hearings and use multiple outreach tools to 
convey the contents, including fairs, expositions, town hall meetings, television and radio 
addresses, and presentations to the Kazan City Duma.  According to Section 7, minutes are taken 
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at all public hearings and are summarized in a final report on the results of the process.   The report 
is published and becomes part of the Mayor’s official records.   For the General Plan specifically, 
the results report must be published within three months of the date of dissemination of the draft.   
In all cases, while the hearings are obligatory, the results are of an advisory nature and do not bind 
the local government.82    
The most important opportunity for citizen engagement during the decade concerned the 
development of a new General Plan, which had not been updated since 1969.  While intended for 
implementation up to the year 2000, it appears the municipality first focused on development of a 
Strategic Plan for 2015, which was conducted with civic input and approved in 2003,83 and then 
turned to revision of the General Plan after the conclusion of the 1000-year celebration in 2005.  
The Strategic Plan sketched out a vision for socio-economic development, based largely on 
nationally-approved legislation, while the General Plan underpinned it with several more specific 
aims to improve the physical and investment environment for economic growth and better living 
conditions.  As required by the city law on public hearings, drafts of the General Plan were 
published in the media and on the internet, and public hearings were announced on December 26, 
2006.84   A discussion preceded the hearings in the locally-managed real estate internet portal, with 
some citizens expressing frustration due to the absence or quality of information, and professional 
bloggers quickly providing links and explanations.85 
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On December 28, 2007, in presenting the draft General Plan for approval to the City Duma 
and Mayor Metshin (as head of the Duma), the Acting Chief of the Municipal Executive 
Committee, R. T. Burganova, underscored several themes that reflected best urban planning 
practices and some citizen concerns.86  Regarding urban planning, she said the General Plan was 
shaped by population growth projections, housing needs, and “the optimal balance between 
territory for mass housing construction and allocation of land area for industrial enterprises, and 
between zones for intra-city transport and the frame of nature.”  While observing that population 
growth would require the absorption of three adjoining districts and seven settlements by 2050, 
she stressed that all available and ineffectively-used land within the city would be intensively 
utilized before the city expanded its borders from the current 42.5 thousand hectares to a total 61.3 
thousand hectares.87  All of the neighboring districts had participated in consultations in the course 
of developing the draft General Plan, she said.  To improve the effectiveness of land use, some 
obsolete enterprises would be closed and others relocated to industrial zones where transportation 
and services were convenient.  This would free up more land for close-in housing.  Finally, zoning 
was designed broadly enough to enable multi-functional (office, residence, shops) development in 
given downtown areas.88  
With respect to citizen concerns, she proclaimed the importance of preserving cultural 
heritage as the historic city center underwent reconstruction, which was a high priority of the 
General Plan.  Ecologically harmful and unprofitable industries could be relocated, freeing space 
for multi-functional development.   She observed that open green space occupied only 19% of 
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Kazan’s territory, while international organizations recommended that this should be 30 percent 
at a minimum.  To rectify this deficit, the Executive Committee proposed to increase the ratio of 
green areas to 40 percent, but this would be done gradually as the city expanded.   
While the process for preparation of the 2007 General Plan compared favorably to that in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, it suffered from two drawbacks that undermined the public outreach 
effort.   First, lacking any link to the budget or a financing plan, the Plan as presented to the public 
offered an unrealistic and unaffordable volume of housing, social infrastructure (heat, power, 
water, sanitation) and transport that could not be realized within the proposed implementation 
period.89  For example, priority is placed on completion of 2 metro lines totaling 29 kilometers, 
primarily, it seems, because the task remained unfulfilled since the 1969 Plan.  The need and fiscal 
space for such a large capital project is questionable for a city of 1.18 million people.90  Similarly, 
the Plan included the construction of 13 million square meters of housing between 2007 and 2020, 
requiring output of 1 million square meters per year, thirty percent more than the highest annual 
output achieved to that date91.   While there would be scope to increase housing production by the 
private sector, for all social services the Plan became a platform for fund-raising, much as it did 
during the Soviet period.  Mayor Metshin thus raised public expectations for a higher level of 
investment than the city could afford and missed an opportunity to solicit the input of society on 
project priorities.    
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The second drawback in the General Plan process was the relative paucity of public 
information issued for deliberation.   Proposals relating to infrastructure for land development 
(water and sanitation, electricity, etc.), which help guide investors to the most profitable locations 
for urban development projects, are described on the public website of the Department of 
Architecture and Urban Planning as “secret attachments” to the Plan.92   And contrary to 
requirements in the law, a report on the results of the public hearings does not appear to be 
available.93 
The rise of citizen advocacy for historic preservation following adoption of the General 
Plan in December 2007 suggests the City Government did not go far enough to incorporate the 
results of public hearings on protection of cultural heritage.  Unusually for Kazan, where Republic 
and municipal authorities are rarely challenged in public, the journalist and historian, Olesya 
Baltusova, gained the attention of Mayor Metshin and President Minnikhanov by her blog on the 
inadequacy of government oversight during renovation of the historic city center. In 2010, when 
conducting an educational tour of the center aimed at defending historic homes, she recalled that:  
Right before my eyes they started to tear down a home from the early 1800s.  Then I hit 
the limit of my patience….[W]e met with the Minister of Culture, the recently fired 
Deputy Minister of Culture Igor Nesterenko, and the Mayor.  The results of the meetings 
were promises, that all would be taken care of…but time passed, nothing was 
reconsidered, and the home was destroyed.  That summer, five houses on the list for 
preservation were demolished. 94  
  
Following this experience, Baltusova decided to reach above the Mayor of Kazan and the 
Republic Ministry of Culture and engage President Minnikhanov directly.  She invited him to 
participate in her next walking excursion of the historic city center.  He refused four invitations 
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before accepting the fifth in the fall of 2011.  The tour extended over several days as the President 
queried an entourage of experts on the historic significance of each demolished home, the 
circumstances of its demise, and on the owners of the newly-constructed buildings.   Based on his 
exposure to the issues, the President invited Baltusova to serve as his Assistant on Cultural 
Preservation and Historic Heritage of the Republic, requiring her to analyze the issues and serve 
as a liaison between civil society and government.  She accepted the offer, but publicly refused the 
Mayor’s invitation to be part of a working group on tourism.   
Baltusova’s activism led to the temporary cessation of construction in the city center, 
examination of the ownership of the new structures, a review of all high-rise projects under 
development in the city center, an order by the President to halt construction of a parking garage 
in place of the single city park, Black Lake, and threats against her by developers.   In an interview, 
in response to expressions of admiration, she responded, “I only spoke out about matters that have 
sickened all Kazan residents.  Don’t make a hero out of me.”  She added that while orders had 
been given, it was still too early to claim success.95 
Early in the following year, the Kazan City Council acted in response to citizen concerns 
and passed a law requiring the Executive Committee to take further actions to improve the 
historical architectural appearance of the city.96  In his annual report of 2012, Mayor Metshin 
observed that pursuant to this law, the city had invested in 31 properties, including 14 of cultural 
heritage and 15 of historic value, consisting of 30,751 square meters of floor space and 74,054 
square meters of land, for a total value of 573 million rubles. 97 
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The circumstances of this case illustrate how cultural heritage has become an aperture 
through which citizens can safely express discontent with authority in Kazan on implementation 
of land use rights in the transition from public to private ownership.   Given the circumstances of 
the dilapidated housing program in the 1990s, when the legal regime for property rights and system 
of registration was weakly developed, many developers had gained access to lucrative business 
opportunities in coordination with land administration officials.  While cultural heritage activists 
may be viewed as a conservative force, constraining urban development, they also represent a 
positive force, promoting regulation of property rights in the community interest.  The more 
attractive the cultural face of the city, the more it projects historical harmony, the more attractive 
it becomes for private investors, bringing benefits to residents, property owners, and the municipal 
treasury.98 
The case also illustrates the maturing of a political system in which public opinion on 
property rights is recognized and carries value.  In a system with elected local officials, the political 
value of property would be much greater, as studies in China have demonstrated.99   Mayor Metshin 
demonstrated little interest initially in the public challenge to his management of urban 
development, perhaps due to the large stake by the city in on-going construction.   Only after the 
President of the Republic intervened did the Mayor acknowledge the significance of a single-
minded activist armed with expertise and followers on social media.   
However, in a separate case, Mayor Metshin recognized the political importance of 
property rights when he faced the opposition of the business community to land taxes in Kazan.   
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The level of the land tax is subject to federal laws and municipal discretion, and has a strong 
influence on the preference of the private sector either to lease or purchase land from the city. In 
Kazan, initially low tax rates and high cadastral values encouraged the privatization of enterprise 
land.   Levels rose as the city sought to adjust cadastral values to capture the gains from rising 
market prices. . Following an in-depth consultation process that included several meetings with 
the business community, the municipality agreed to policy measures that would encourage 
enterprise land privatization, make additional municipal land available for sale, and provide an 
incentive for enterprises to purchase land by reducing the rate of the land tax on various business 
types.   As noted by Mayor Metshin, who steered the process, “we listened to business, and 
business listened to us.” 100   In the short run, the tax cut would reduce city revenues; in the longer 
run it would encourage a higher rate of private land ownership and sustainable income source for 
the city. As of January 1, 2014, a new law on land taxes went into effect that represents a more 
sophisticated understanding by city authorities of how to manage land, both as an asset and as an 
instrument of social policy.101 
 
3.  Conclusions 
In contrast to Mayor Luzhkov of Moscow, President Shaimiev had the political and fiscal 
autonomy throughout the 1990s to take a long-term view of revenue maximization.  Ideologically 
disposed to land privatization, he framed a strategy for the Republic that was complemented by 
the diligence of dedicated and professional municipal civil servants, who have since risen in the 
bureaucracy to senior positions.  The ground was laid for Mayor Metshin of Kazan to accelerate 
land privatization when faced with a municipal crisis after 2003.  The puzzle of how a formerly 
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closed, military city could achieve the highest rate of urban land privatization in Russia is less 
surprising in light of the confluence of these conditions. 
Based on selected indicators, Kazan represents a maturing land market that is transforming 
land into a source of wealth.   This is striking given the short decade of robust growth in private 
land ownership.   As noted in Table 2, land transactions are accelerating.  Registration of land 
rights increased by 42 percent while land transactions grew by 57 percent from 2011 to 2013.  
Land is also being turned into capital.  From 2012 to 2013, registered legal mortgages (v cilu 
zakona) increased from 16,584 to 20,976 or a 26.5 percent increase.  In addition, citizens believe 
in property ownership. The rate of housing privatization in Kazan, at 77 percent, exceeds that of 
the Republic (63 percent) and neighboring oblasts, such as Perm (40 percent). Only Samara (75 
percent) has a similar rate.  Finally, land is now central to municipal finances.  Out of all taxes, 
37.2 percent are from the land tax.  This is the only tax of which the municipality can retain 100 
percent, since other taxes (e.g. duties and income tax) are shared with higher levels of government.  
Table 2.  Land Market Activity in Kazan, 2011-2013 
Year Rights Registered on  
Real Estate 




Of which land 
transactions 
2011 158,702   21,013 35, 912 2,903 
2012 164,095 32,777 43,362 4,959 
2013 193,523 36,131 38,138 6,821 
Source: Gorod Kazan’ Ofitsial’nyi Portal Goroda. Informatsiia v sfere gosudarstvennoi registratsii prav na 
nedvizhimoe imushchestvo i sdelok s nim.   http://www.kzn.ru/. 
 
Based on these indicators, the estimate used for private land ownership in Kazan (29 
percent) is likely to be conservative. According to the 2013 report of the Committee on Land and 
Property Relations, out of 61,300 hectares of land in Kazan, 20,473 hectares are subject to the land 
tax, or 33%.  In a city that clearly understands the economic and fiscal benefits of privately-owned 




One important conclusion from the experience of Kazan is that, like a careful gardener, the 
municipality prepared for privatization with laws and regulations and a land inventory, and when, 
upon achieving autonomy in 2004, it was fiscally in need, it had fertile ground which could be 
planted and transformed into wealth.  In exploiting its land resources, Kazan placed equal priority 
on freeing up municipal property for private use and on using its land fund for social policy, to 
accommodate the poorest citizens in better housing.  This in turn stimulated a new construction 
industry and more dynamism in land markets.  It also kept zoning relatively flexible in the General 
Plan, allowing multiple uses of land, thereby changing the face of the center city.  In comparison, 
St. Petersburg’s early launch into enterprise land privatization in the 1990s, without a solid legal 
foundation, and with preference for Soviet-era enterprises over new firms, has served it less well, 
as has the city’s rigid adherence to an outdated General Plan.    
As land privatization increased in Kazan after 2003, so has the influence of property owners 
in the management of urban affairs.  This is a positive development on par with the economic 
indicators noted above.  As the municipality gains experience with public consultations and learns 
to anticipate concerns and expectations, it is likely to engage society more actively.  The more that 
executive officials and citizens are aligned on land use decisions, the more secure property rights 
will become, giving impetus to greater investment in urban land, and higher returns both to public 





Chapter 8   
Urban Land Privatization and Development Outcomes 
 
 
The dispersal of wealth and power into citizen hands, when both are in the firm grip of 
ruling elites, is the most intractable dilemma in development studies.  According to North, Wallis 
and Weingast (2009), the first necessary step is for elites to convert their privileges into elite rights.  
When Boris Yeltsin launched a process in 1990 to privatize the collective land heritage of the 
Russian Republic,1  he effectively accomplished that first critical step.  Land use was largely under 
the control of central planners and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), not the 
people living within the territorial borders of Russia.  Yeltsin’s initial privatization effort 
transferred de facto land privileges within Russia into de jure rights for the political elites who 
would assume authority under the new Russian state. The main beneficiaries were municipal 
officials, once at the bottom of the planning hierarchy under communism, and now poised to 
become General Planners of urban land.  The dark epithet of Yeltsin as a destroyer, bestowed by 
his nemesis, Mikhail Gorbachev, did not apply to the city level.  The majority of urban land in 
Russia is still controlled by municipal authorities.      
Yet two decades after codification of private land ownership in the 1993 Constitution, the 
dispersal of property rights to the population is far from negligible.   The pace of institutional 
change in urban property rights is gradually gathering momentum in many, but certainly not all, 
urban centers.  After ten years of political struggle, when society severely split over the need for 
private land ownership, and a fumbling bureaucratic beginning, when state organizations at all 
levels competed for leadership on land relations, a Land Code was adopted, urban land rights have 
                                                 
1 At the time, Yeltsin was Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet (under the USSR), and in competition with 




clarified, a professional land bureaucracy has emerged, and Russia has become a world leader in 
property rights registration systems.2  Most significantly, property rights institutions that were once 
informal and personalized, requiring insider connections to acquire urban land, are now 
implemented much more formally and impersonally.  This improving trajectory of institutional 
change is captured in major gains on the Worldwide Governance Indicators from 2000-2010 in the 
quality of rule-of-law and government effectiveness. 3   
A market economy requires a market society;4 likewise, private land ownership requires 
society to congeal around the value of land privatization.  There is no ideal division of urban land 
rights between state and society.  In cities everywhere, economic imperatives and social objectives 
are woven into a unique institutional fabric.5  Majority private urban land ownership is found only 
in advanced economies.  State-owned land predominates in Russia and other middle and low-
income countries, where 85% of the world’s population live.6  As Russian cities privatize urban 
land, the process and outcomes should be of interest to urban dwellers elsewhere. 
The chapter summarizes the study’s findings in four sections.  The first compares the 
findings on why and when land privatization took place in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan, 
based on the predatory rule theory.  The second section compares the “how” of institutional change 
in the case study cities, using both qualitative and quantitative indicators.  As hypothesized in the 
                                                 
2 In 2014, the Russian Federation received a score of 91.27 out of 100 on ease of property registration, putting it in 
12th place out of 189 economies. World Bank-IFC, Doing Business 2015, 213. 
3 Russia gained 0.37 (from -0.77 to -.40) on government effectiveness and 0.36 (from -1.13 to -0.77) on rule of law 
scores.  The Worldwide Governance Indicators aggregate governance data on several variables.  Indicators range 
from -2.5 to +2.5.  See Brian Levy, Working with the Grain:  Integrating Governance and Growth in 
Development Strategies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 122-128. 
4 This is the central insight of Karl Polyani in The Great Transformation (1944). The author discusses the painful 
transition process when society is subordinated to markets, creating the promise of economic progress but at the 
price of social dislocation. 
5 Roy J. Burroughs, “Should Urban Land be Publicly Owned?” Land Economics, (Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System: Vol. 42, No. 1, 1966), 20. Article Stable 
URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3145490. 
6 Douglass C. North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, (New York: 




land governance model, the pace of institutional change is correlated with the degree of alignment 
on privatization policies and actions by political authorities and the bureaucracy, resulting in 
change that is in stasis (Moscow), incremental (St. Petersburg), or rapid (Kazan). The third section 
compares selected development outcomes in the case study cities.  The final section assesses the 
explanatory power of the new institutional economics in deciphering the case of urban land rights 
in Russia.  
Overall, the evidence largely confirmed the hypothesis that institutional change in urban 
property rights is a function of the revenue-maximizing incentives of ruling elites.  The qualitative 
and quantitative analysis found that the pace of institutional change was correlated with the 
alignment between political authorities and the bureaucracy on land privatization policy.  Public 
engagement emerged as an instrumental factor in the formation of private property rights in all 
case study cities.   Finally, economic outcomes differ in each city in line with the pace of land 
privatization, further validating the literature’s conclusion that institutions are a critical factor in 
economic development. 
 
1. The why and when of institutional change  
Margaret Levi’s (1988) theory of predatory rule predicts that rulers will relinquish property 
privileges in order to maximize long-term revenues.  However, this decision depends on trade-offs 
that serve to increase the bargaining power and office security of the ruler, while reducing the 
transaction costs of raising revenues.  In other words, among a set of alternatives at a given time, 
rulers will opt for the highest-yielding and most feasible revenue sources that strengthen their hold 




Drawing on this theory, the dissertation hypothesizes that the institutional change is a 
function of constraints facing rulers as they seek to maximize revenues to the state while 
maintaining personal power.  Extraction of revenue cannot come at any cost; it must be within the 
capacity of the regime to collect and the population to pay.  Put simply, the choice for political 
authorities is to own land and collect rents, or to sell land and collect land taxes.   This choice 
determines the path of change. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the fiscal-federalist framework influenced cities in making this 
choice. Yeltsin famously told regions to take all the power they could swallow, and 30 regions 
repaid his gesture by not remitting taxes to the center.  Moscow, St. Petersburg and the Republic 
of Tatarstan had greater political leverage over the Yeltsin Administration than other regions 
because they were the first to elect heads of government in 1991.  Their relative political 
independence enabled them to exploit the system of tax-sharing and federal transfers, which was 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  No region had an incentive to report revenues accurately 
because it would reduce the level of transfers from the center.  Moreover, a “society tolerant of tax 
evasion and long accustomed to government support unrelated to its cost”7 led regions to ignore 
agreements they had reached.  Tatarstan was among the republics that did not send its required tax 
share in the mid-1990s to the center.8   
In contrast, the Putin administration recentralized political authority and reduced revenue-
sharing to encourage greater reliance on local taxes.  The 1998 debt default gave Putin greater 
negotiating power to instill fiscal discipline in the regions because society yearned for an end to 
the financial and political instability of the 1990s.   A two-step reform in the Tax Code began in 
                                                 
7  Jane H. Malme and Natalia Kalinina, “Property Tax Developments in the Russian Federation,” in Jane H. Malme 
and Joan M. Youngman, eds., The Development of Property Taxation in Countries in Transition:  Case Studies from 
Central and Eastern Europe, (Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, 2001), 70. 




1999 that considerably tightened the Federal Government’s control over tax policy, allowing it to 
accept or deny local tax rates and types of taxes.   
Tax rates and revenue-sharing arrangements under both the Yeltsin and first Putin 
administration worked at cross-purposes with land privatization policies, sending conflicting 
signals to local governments on the desirability of land privatization.  The Federal Government 
frequently changed the formula for taxing land, which in turn set the land sales price 
administratively.  Local governments also received more leeway in setting the lease rate on 
municipal land than the tax rate on land occupied by enterprises.   While all these measures were 
intended to speed land privatization, the Federal Government clawed back 50% of land taxes, 
dampening incentives to privatize.  The incentive environment was thus highly contradictory: local 
predatory rulers could choose between privatizing or leasing, and collecting taxes or rents.  
Federal fiscal incentives and urban land policies became mutually reinforcing only during 
the second Putin Administration.  Most importantly, local governments received 100% of the 
personal property and land tax (for Moscow and St. Petersburg, 84.5%). The formula to derive 
land taxes was universal across Russia, but municipalities received authority to set the rate within 
a prescribed ratio of the cadastral value.    A unified property tax was still far in the future, but the 
foundation was laid.9   
Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan responded differently to these federal initiatives in line 
with the predatory rule theory.  The Mayor of Moscow built his power and city finances on leasing 
urban land and property; once he became secure, politically and fiscally, he had no incentive to 
                                                 
9 Pilot tests in Tver and Novgorod from 1995-98 demonstrated that local governments would have little incentive to 
introduce a uniform property tax unless the fiscal federalist system was reformed, because any increases in taxes 
collected would accrue to the federal level. Moreover, the transaction costs to introduce the system would be very 
high, consuming a minimum of two years to conduct cadastral surveys and register property. See Freinkman et al, 
Subnational Budgeting in Russia, 54. These findings contributed to a long-term strategy to introduce a unified 




sell land, and his accountability to voters declined.   In contrast, the President of Tatarstan was 
politically and fiscally secure from the outset and adopted a long-term strategy to maximize 
revenues and privatize land.  Following the adoption of local self-government in 2003,10 the Mayor 
of Kazan took advantage of new fiscal incentives and accelerated land privatization in response to 
a municipal financial crisis.  Contrary to both Moscow and Kazan, political authorities in St. 
Petersburg zig-zagged between privatizing and leasing.  Initially, the city privatized land at a rapid 
pace. It then reverted to leasing, in part to increase municipal revenues; later it stimulated 
privatization following a budget deficit, only to slow the process when the local economy 
rebounded.  A brief summary follows of why and when each city decided to retard or promote land 
privatization.   
As discussed in Chapter 5, Mayor Luzhkov of Moscow opted early in 1991 to build a 
property empire based on leasing that would strengthen his hold on power and maximize revenues 
for the city.  Luzhkov faced two realities from 1991-95:  his position depended on Yeltsin, who 
had appointed him Mayor, and the economy of Moscow was in freefall, as 71% of its industrial 
output collapsed by 1996,11  a steeper decline than other case-study cities.  He took advantage of 
conflicting federal fiscal signals and made Moscow a monopoly landlord, eschewing land sales for 
land leasing. He went on to build a municipal real estate empire containing two-thirds of all 
property in the capital.  As investment grew in Moscow, faster than in St. Petersburg and Tatarstan 
(Table 1), he could control the rents and addresses of investors.  By 1996, he was politically and 
fiscally secure from an electoral landslide victory and a small budget surplus (Table 2) that came 
partially from property but also from profit taxes of enterprises such as Gazprom that were 
                                                 
10 Prior to 2003, municipalities were not granted fiscal powers. 
11 The average national decline was 58%.  Lev Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational 
Budgeting in Russia: Pre-empting a Potential Crisis, World Bank Technical Paper No. 452, (Washington D.C.: The 




registered in the capital but domiciled in other regions.12  During the 1998-99 financial crisis, 
Mayor Luzhkov sold municipal property rather than land to compensate for lost revenues.  By 
2001, land taxes comprised only 5% of revenues from leasing.  With the power and rents conveyed 
by control over urban land, the Mayor had no incentive to shift his strategy, even after the Putin 
Administration recentralized taxes and required Moscow to contribute more to the federal budget.  
The Mayor turned instead to international capital markets and raised US$4.3 billion in municipal 
bonds in 2007 alone.  Luzhkov’s abuse of the Moscow City land monopoly, including insider sales 
to benefit his wife’s real estate company, contributed to the decree issued by President Medvedev 
in September 2010 that relieved the mayor of his position.  “Rulers maximize revenue to the state, 
but not as they please.”13   
Table 1. Economic and Social Indicators in Case Study Regions, 1990-96 
 Real industrial output 




Poverty (% of 
population), 1995 
Moscow 29.4 83.2 19.1 
St. Petersburg 32.4 39.3 20.0 
Rep. of Tatarstan 65.9 37.5 22.1 
Source: Lev Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia: Pre-empting a 
Potential Crisis, World Bank Technical Paper No. 452, (Washington D.C.: The World Bank: 1999), 80-81. 
 
Table 2. Fiscal Indicators in Case Study Regions, 1996-7 
 Adjusted revenues per 
capita, 1996/1992,%   
(1991 prices) 
Deficit in 1996 
(expenditures-revenues, 
rubles per capita, 1991 
prices) [Minus=surplus] 
Deficit as percent of 
expenditures,  
1996 and 1997 
[Minus=surplus] 
   1996 1997 
Moscow 145.9% -18.2 -0.7 -3.6 
St. Petersburg 98.8% 248.82 18.7 3.5 
Rep. of Tatarstan 67.2% 92.56 5.3 0.0 
Source: Lev Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia: Pre-empting a 
Potential Crisis, World Bank Technical Paper No. 452, (Washington D.C.: The World Bank: 1999), 85-89 
 
                                                 
12 Six major companies, including Gazprom, remitted US$1 billion in 1996, or 15% of all city budget revenues.  The 
President decreed in 1997 that revenues should be shared across oblasts, but enforcement was insufficient.  Lev 
Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia: Pre-empting a Potential Crisis, 
World Bank Technical Paper No. 452, (Washington D.C.: The World Bank: 1999), 12- 14. 





As discussed in Chapter 6, political authorities in St. Petersburg adjusted their land 
privatization strategy opportunistically in line with the shifting incentive framework set by federal 
authorities and local fiscal needs.  As a leading liberal politician, Mayor Sobchak was ideologically 
inclined to privatization and acted quickly to encourage land purchases by using the lowest price 
allowed by law in 1995.  Foreign investors who initially flocked to St. Petersburg also sought land 
ownership as part of the investment package.  However, just as demand was growing, the City 
Administration started to adjust tax rates (as allowed by law) within city zones to capture the gains 
from rising land values.  The timing coincided with a radical swing from budget surplus to deficit 
in 1996 (Table 2).   Soon thereafter, newly-elected Governor14 Yakovlev followed his political 
ally, Mayor Luzhkov, by creating incentives for leasehold.  Lease rates fell below land tax rates, 
and the City Administration offered the largest industrial tenants below-market leasing discounts 
that were neither transparent nor justified.15  Land privatization fell from its peak in 1996.  By 
1998, the total number of land-rental agreements signed (137,000) greatly exceeded land plots 
privatized (1,843).  Land area leased grew by 3.5% from 1998-1999 while lease revenues soared 
by 69%.   With its deficit worsening in 2001-2, and new federal incentives to stimulate land 
privatization, the City Administration again shifted tactics and sold land.  When finances stabilized 
in 2004, the pace of privatization slowed.  The zig-zags in St. Petersburg’s land privatization 
policies were among the factors that inhibited the investment climate in the post-communist 
period.  
As discussed in Chapter 7, President Shaimiev of the Republic of Tatarstan developed a 
long-term revenue-raising and land privatization strategy that was emblematic of a predatory ruler 
                                                 
14 The title was re-designated but the functions and administrative level of St. Petersburg did not change. 
15 World Bank, World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$161.10 Million 
to the Russian Federation for a St. Petersburg Economic Development Project, (Washington, D.C.: Report No: 




with security in office.  Shaimiev negotiated “unique economic and political benefits” for Tatarstan 
that were “the envy of many of its ethnically-Russian counterparts”16  by capitalizing on a 
referendum in favor of state sovereignty in 1992 and ample oil and industrial assets. As part of 
Shaimiev’s agreement with Yeltsin to stay in the Russian Federation, Tatarstan gained fiscal 
benefits that far exceeded its receipts in the Soviet period, when less than 3% of Tatar industrial 
income accrued to the republic.  With a less dramatic industrial decline and rise in investment than 
Moscow (Table 1), Shaimiev plotted a slow rise to fiscal recovery (Table 2) that led to one of the 
highest revenue retention rates in the nation in 1999 while Moscow had next to the lowest.17   
Tatarstan’s fiscal situation deteriorated during the Putin Administration, with contradictory 
impacts on Kazan, the Tatar capital.   Politically, Tatarstan lost sovereignty to the Federal 
Government while Kazan gained municipal autonomy during the nation-wide reform of local self-
government.  Fiscally, the Republic was required to remit a higher share of its revenues to the 
Federal Government, with a cascading effect on Kazan, which received fewer subsidies from the 
Republican Government.   Thus, just as Kazan was gaining political autonomy, it was losing 
income. Kazan began to run a deficit in 2002-2003 that reached 2.4 billion rubles (US$80 million) 
by 2004, putting municipal finances at risk.  As part of its strategy to gain control over municipal 
finances, the city decided to accelerate the rate of land privatization and to improve the 
management of property assets.  From 2002 to 2005 land was actively sold at auctions, both land 
                                                 
16 Freinkman et al, Subnational Budgeting in Russia,” 16. 
17 Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg (2005) show that regions that achieved more fiscal autonomy through a higher 
tax retention rate (share of locally-derived taxes in the budget) also experienced higher economic growth, better 
fiscal management and higher private investment.  A higher retention rate was also associated with greater 
privatization and foreign investment.  This is because the authorities were motivated to improve the business 
environment and encourage new start-ups in order to secure the tax base.  In contrast, regions like Moscow city that 
derived fiscal autonomy from unearned income streams performed economically less well.  Moscow’s tax retention 
rate was 45 percent from 1996 to 1999, the lowest in the nation except for two small, poor oblasts. Raj M. Desai, 
Lev Frienkman and Itzhak Goldberg, “Fiscal Federalism in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia,” Journal of 




parcels and property complexes.  The city administration created incentives for land privatization 
and ownership in several ways.  Until 2004, the tax burden and the amount of mobilized land tax 
was one of the lowest (compared to) in Kazan.  With cadastral valuations high and land tax rates 
kept at the low end of the range, firms and citizens had an incentive to purchase land. The city also 
granted privileges on land purchase and leasing to attract major new investment.  In addition, as 
part of its strategy to improve living standards, the city instituted a social mortgage program to 
enable poorer residents to purchase housing.   Finally, a market-oriented zoning plan (under the 
city’s General Plan) was approved and implemented, and competitive procedures were adopted 
for allocation and sale of land parcels.  
As these cases illustrate, the constraints and trade-offs facing rulers can differ greatly, even 
within one country, leading to diverse revenue policy choices that also influence the institutional 
regime.   Having gained understanding on why rulers chose a particular institutional path and 
when, we now turn to the case study findings on how institutional change transpired. 
 
2. The ‘how’ of institutional change:  the land governance model 
The state is not one but a bundle of independent variables that defines and enforces the 
rules on property ownership.  Following North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), multiple 
organizations comprise the state, both vertically18 (federal, regional, municipal) and horizontally 
(across executive and civil service agencies).  To simplify this complexity, I constructed a land 
governance model to unpack the process of institutional change.    
                                                 
18 In Russia’s federal structure, Moscow and St. Petersburg are federal cities and thus treated as regions, while 
Kazan, as a city formation, is administratively under the Republic of Tatarstan. This distinction does not alter the 
analysis in the land governance model since we are interested in the interaction of political authorities, the 




The critical factor in the land governance model is the alignment of policies and actions of 
political authorities and the public bureaucracy.   If all parties favor and act to promote land 
privatization, the pace will be rapid; if all oppose privatization, institutional stasis will result.  
When political authorities and the public bureaucracy take divergent positions, or when agency 
mandates are in conflict, there may still be some institutional change, but the pace will be 
incremental. Society is an intervening variable that can hasten or slow the pace in favor or against 
privatization.  By adding society and a time dimension of institutional change, the model includes 
areas not fully specified in the new institutional economics (NIE) literature. 
Figure I.  Hypothesized Land Governance Model 
II.Incremental Change 
 
Political authorities oppose land privatization 
Bureaucrats implement policies effectively  
 
Society is passive or active 
IV.Rapid Change 
 
Political authorities promote land privatization 
Bureaucrats implement policies effectively 
 




Political authorities oppose land privatization 
Bureaucrats resist implementation 
 
Society opposes privatization  
III.Incremental Change 
 
Political authorities promote land privatization 
Bureaucrats resist implementation 
 
Society is passive or active 
 
 
3 (a). Qualitative Analysis 
 The qualitative analysis, summarized in Table 3 as a highly simplified assessment of an 
exceedingly dynamic process, demonstrates that alignment of the core independent variables was 
an exceptional occurrence over two decades.   At no point were political authorities, the 
bureaucracy, and society fully aligned in favor of private urban land ownership along the vertical 
axis of the polity.  Only using a horizontal cut do we see such alignment in Kazan after 2001. This 




independent variables, as revealed in the national overview (Chapter 4) and case study research 
(Chapters 5-7).  The next section looks at quantitative indicators of the same independent variables.  
 
Table 3. Land Governance Model: Qualitative Analysis 
Activity Level to Promote Private Urban Property Rights 
 
  Political Authorities Bureaucracy Society 
 
Federal 1990-2000 High Low Low 
 2001-2013 High High Medium 
     
Moscow 1990-2000 Low Low Medium 
 2001-2013 Low Medium Medium 
     
St. Petersburg 1990-2000 High/Low Low Low 
 2001-2013 Medium/Low Medium Medium 
     
Kazan 1990-2000 High High Low 
 2001-2013 High High High 
 
At the federal level, to paraphrase McFaul, the state in its first decade was not strong 
enough to ‘extract the state’ from urban land ownership.  To the contrary, while private ownership 
was codified in the Constitution, the de facto legal outcome was to transfer ownership from the 
collective privileges of CPSU members to control rights of municipal authorities.  Widely regarded 
as a weak regime, the Yeltsin Administration could not overcome opposition in the Duma 
(legislature) in a highly acrimonious political environment to get approval of a land code.  Duma 
deputies, in turn, reflected the acute polarization of society on the question of land privatization, 
mainly linked to rural land.  Communist and agrarian parties used their strong electoral strongholds 
in agricultural regions to block major land legislation that would address urban land as well.  
Scores of resolutions and decrees by the Yeltsin Administration could neither patch over legal 
lacunae on the basic right of land alienation nor remove the contradictions between private 
ownership and Soviet perpetual-use privileges that arrested the transition to market-based land 




land systems.  It primarily undertook redundant reorganizations that perpetuated Soviet-era 
functions for land allocation and planning.  The high energy exuded by political authorities in favor 
of privatization could not overcome low activity by the bureaucracy and society (represented by 
the Duma) that retarded progress on institutional change.  
Three key factors enabled urban land privatization to accelerate in the 2000s, while not 
fully overcoming resistance in those regions opposed to land privatization.  First, President Putin 
sought to work with the Duma on an agenda for economic and social stability in his first term, and 
while still consolidating his power, he was willing to compromise for results.  Throughout his 
tenure, Putin consistently sought pragmatic solutions to expand private urban land ownership, as 
did President Medvedev after him.  The rating of pro-privatization policy and activity by political 
authorities during the decade is high.   
Second, a talented team of bureaucrats, led by Minister of Economy and Trade German 
Gref, took charge of the legislative agenda and deepened a series of targeted programs to 
professionalize land administration systems.  The results are discussed in more detail in the 
quantitative analysis.  Again, a rating of high activity is warranted. 
Third, the composition of the Duma and Federation Council (upper chamber) became more 
right-centrist as the decade progressed, reflecting a reduction of polarization in society, but not its 
elimination, as the Communist Party remained opposed to land reform of any kind. In May 2001, 
the Duma leadership withdrew the draft Land Code from the agrarian committee and gave it to the 
property committee, opening the door for a compromise that enabled passage of the Land Code in 
July 2001, without coverage of rural land.  After a decade of intense political struggle, the final 
result was to regulate only 2 percent of the national land fund.   Despite this minimalist spatial 




Land Code victory, the Duma performed poorly, extending the deadline for conversion of many 
Soviet-era land tenure privileges to ownership rights.   For this reason, society (represented by the 
national Duma) received a medium rating of commitment to urban land privatization. 
The high level of pro-privatization activity by federal political authorities and the 
bureaucracy in the 2000s met a dissonant chorus of accolades and objections from the regions.    
The dissonance has not disappeared fully as of end-2013, as evidenced by the case studies. 
In Moscow, the Luzhkov Administration established an anti-privatization pattern in 1992 
that endured for nearly two decades.  Vice Mayor Luzhkov’s first resolution, “On Leasing as the 
Main Form of Land Relations,” pointed the directional compass of institutional change to stasis.   
The legal framework in favor of municipal land ownership was reinforced by financial incentives: 
purchase prices for land were set at the highest levels allowed by federal law while the price to 
lease from the city was open to negotiation, and thus ripe for bribes.   Throughout his tenure, 
Mayor Luzhkov effectively banned registration of enterprise land rights through legal and 
administrative barriers to privatization.  The significant exception was Inteko, the real estate 
company his wife, Elena Baturina.  A report issued by opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, drawing 
on publicly-available information, detailed 23 cases from 2001 to 2009 in which the Moscow 
Government ceded rights to Inteko to purchase, develop and build housing and office complexes 
throughout the city.   Among other land-related issues, the report contributed to the Mayor’s 
dismissal from office. 
Until the change in government in late 2010, the efficiency and quality of land 
administration in Moscow compared unfavorably with other regions, contributing to higher 
transaction costs for businesses and reducing the transparency of market information on real estate.  




from the pre-approval process for commercial construction projects.  While difficult to imagine, 
commercial developers would not know the exact location of the land plot for a project until the 
process was finalized, a period that generally took two years.  Construction projects also required 
conformity with the General Plan, drafted in secret, but never approved before the Soviet Union 
fell. The unpublished General Plan gave bureaucrats a tool to deny projects for ostensibly technical 
reasons.  Finally, competitive land auctions required by federal law to acquire land by leasehold 
or freehold very rarely took place in Moscow.   
Society, represented by the City Duma as well as the public at large, evolved during the 
two-decade period from a passive to a more active force for institutional change, resulting in an 
activity rating of medium for both periods.  A critical structural impediment to a higher rating of 
legislative activity and influence was Moscow’s “hypermayoral” system.  The legislature could 
suggest changes to orders and pass bills, but if vetoed by the mayor, a two-thirds majority was 
required to overturn it.   In short, the power structure in Moscow inverted the concept of citizens 
as the principal and government as the agent of the people.  Almost half of citizens surveyed in 
2000 believed the Mayor was fully in control and the Duma rubber-stamped his administration’s 
decisions.  In spite of the power imbalance, the Moscow City Duma did its best to carve out a role 
on land policy.  For example, the Duma required annual reports on land rights, planning and zoning 
from City Hall; these undoubtedly increased accountability by the administration and transparency 
of public information that enabled Nemtsov to expose corrupt land practices.  Moreover, the Duma 
created a dispute resolution mechanism (the Moscow land court) as a line of defense for citizens 
to appeal their land rights.  Overall, however, the Duma served more as a forum for discussion 




A more potent force with consequences over the longer term for institutional change was 
civic activism in defense of housing rights and better living conditions.  Motivated in the early 
1990s by the privatization of housing, curtailment of new construction, and gradual shift of 
maintenance responsibilities onto residents, citizens started organizing for collective action.  
Shomina et al estimated that 3,000 housing cooperatives, 700 associations of flat owners, 500 
housing partnerships and several hundred housing committees in municipal buildings had sprung 
up in addition to Soviet-era organizations that gained new adherents, including 120 MZhKs  (youth 
housing complexes) and 120 KOS (committees of social self-engagement).  Initially, citizens 
failed to grasp the connection between the lack of affordable housing and the municipality’s 
monopoly control of land rights.  This began to change in the mid-2000s after several highly 
publicized cases of evictions from homes and apartment buildings led to street protests following 
the exercise of eminent domain by the Luzhkov Administration.  The most important result of 
civic activism in this period was the increasing use of the courts by civic organizations to defend 
legal rights.19  
The appointment of Mayor Sobyanin by President Medvedev in October 2010 offered an 
opportunity to reform urban land policies in Eurasia’s largest city.  Initially, indications were 
promising as the Sobyanin Administration addressed numerous administrative barriers to land 
acquisition and brought city regulations in line with federal laws.  Information transparency 
increased and the time required for land registration declined, bringing the rating of the 
bureaucracy on the land governance model up to medium for the decade.   However, in a highly 
unexpected development in 2012, the Mayor succeeded in more than doubling city territory from 
1.1 to 2.6 hectares.  By absorbing small towns and rural land in Moscow Oblast, where many 
                                                 





residents owned homes and small farms, the private land ownership share in Moscow skyrocketed 
from 0.5%, one of the lowest in the nation, to 14.1%, one of the highest.  Aside from this statistical 
increase, there are few signs of any change in city policies on land privatization.  The privatization 
activity rating for political authorities thus remains low, and there is no imminent indication that 
Moscow will transition out of institutional stasis. 
After starting as a national leader in urban land privatization in the mid-1990s, St. 
Petersburg settled into a course of incremental institutional change due to contradictory policies 
and actions by political authorities and the public bureaucracy.  Several developments in the St. 
Petersburg case led to this outcome.   
First, political authorities reverted from a high level of pro-privatization activity to a low 
level after Mayor Sobchak lost his bid for re-election in 1996.  The periodization is more complex 
in St. Petersburg due to higher turnover in the chief executive than in other case study cities.  
However, there is a clear break between the liberal policies of Mayor Sobchak and his successors, 
Governors Yakovlev and Matviyenko, who served from 1996-2003 and 2003-2011, respectively.  
Among other actions, Sobchak initiated a land inventory and registration system and put the legal 
framework in place for auctions of municipal land20 and enterprise land privatization.  Following 
Sobchak’s departure, Governor Yakovlev raised land taxes above the land lease rate, provided 
discounted leasing rates to large industries, and replaced competitive tenders with land allocations 
based on exceptions.  As a consequence, the rate of privatization of land plots peaked in 1996.21  
However, land area purchased by privatized state-owned enterprises and retail firms (the primary 
market) had been sufficient to create a secondary market when the initial purchasers sold their 
                                                 
20 Directive No.585 of the Mayor of St Petersburg “Regarding Procedures for Allocation of Objects 
of Real Estate and of Legal Title to Such Objects Under Investment Agreements.”  
21 As discussed earlier, the primary reason was the shift in relative costs to business of leasing and owning land.  See 




parcels to private parties, enabling some urban land to be recycled to more efficient purposes. After 
an initially market-oriented stance, Matviyenko later retarded the institutional development of 
secure property rights by exercising authority arbitrarily in favor of large investors, particularly 
through loose interpretation of zoning requirements under the city’s General Plan.  The pace of 
land privatization picked up and then slowed dramatically under Matvienko.22  Given the policy 
shifts in each decade, a high/low rating for the 1990s is followed by a medium/low activity rating 
on the land governance model from 2001-2013.   
Second, until late in the period under study, the bureaucracy largely stymied urban land 
development by overly complicated urban planning and land registration procedures. More 
fundamentally, as in Moscow, the bureaucracy stultified market development by using the Soviet-
era General Plan to guide all land use decisions until a new plan was approved for 2005-2025.  
However, the new plan continued to zone the city as a construction blueprint rather than a 
regulatory framework for urban growth.  An arcane but telling example is that industrial and micro-
commercial activities were segregated in the plan by inputs, i.e., any activity that used paper 
(including publishing) could not be located near those that used wood or leather.  Height limits 
were set arbitrarily and did not reflect demand in a given location.  Frequent exceptions inflamed 
civic activism after 2006, discussed below. Upon Matvienko’s departure, the General Plan came 
under intense scrutiny and was undergoing revision as of end-2013, an action welcomed by 
investors.   Regarding basic land administration functions, the city-run system required 117 days 
to register property as of 2008, the worst of ten cities studied in the World Bank’s Subnational 
Doing Business in Russia report. After the federalization of the process, the time for registration 
fell to 44 days, investment-related information became public, and transaction costs in the 
                                                 





secondary real estate market declined.  Bribes for services became unnecessary, according to 
sources interviewed.  Blending these factors, the activity rating for the bureaucracy is medium 
after 2001.   
Society, represented by civic activists rather than the Legislative Assembly, significantly 
influenced major land decisions in St. Petersburg, but not until after 2006, leading to an activity 
rating of low for the first period and medium for the second.  During both periods the Legislative 
Assembly opposed measures to liberalize land relations, and after Sobchak’s departure, generally 
adopted measures advocated by City Hall to protect former state-owned enterprises on land issues, 
including removing rental payments for unused land and lightening land taxes for selected 
enterprises.  Legislators reflected the conservative national mood that descended during economic 
depression and the 1998 financial crisis, although it was more pronounced in St. Petersburg due to 
the city’s high, soviet-era industrial concentration.  Occasionally, the Legislative Assembly 
demonstrated openness, such as its decision in 2009 to publish the Rules on Land Use and 
Development (formerly not public), giving investors more certainty on allowable uses of specific 
land plots, and providing civic groups a tool to monitor City Hall’s conformance with the rules.  
Overall, it was not a force for institutional change. 
In contrast to consistency in the legislative branch, the public pivoted from passive 
bystanders on urban development to determined activists after 2005.   During preparation of the 
city’s Strategic Plan and Investment Strategy starting in 1996, the combination of citizen-focused 
public officials and a civic orientation among the population created an interactive and meaningful 
precedent for participatory consultations.  Regrettably, the precedent was not repeated during 
development of the 2005-2025 General Plan.  Several key questions of spatial development, such 




favor of a focus on specific plans for individual plots.  A prominent political analyst, Vladimir 
Gryaznevich, commented in 2005 that if the residents of St. Petersburg would not look after their 
own interests in the General Plan, then others would do it for them.  An opportunity for public 
action arose in 2006 when Gazprom announced its intention to construct a 403-meter skyscraper, 
the Okhta Center, on a site with a 100-meter height limitation, intended to protect the cultural 
harmony of the historic center.  The announcement set off a public furor.  Aside from the brazen 
assumption of an exemption from the General Plan’s height limitations, the deal included a 60-
billion ruble subsidy approved by the Legislative Assembly at Matvienko’s request.  A coalition 
of preservationists, architects, political parties, and distinguished figures fought a three-year battle 
against the project, losing on several key questions such as a referendum (opposed by the 
Legislative Assembly in 2007) and the exemption itself (approved by the Governor and Legislative 
Assembly in 2009).  Undaunted, the coalition filed a court appeal, petitioned to President 
Medvedev, and on October 10, 2009, led a massive “March in Defense of Petersburg.”  The 
exemption was rescinded in late 2009, and the project moved to a different location.  The city-
defenders (gradozashchitniki ) had taken on the Governor and Gazprom and won.23   
The larger victory was the decision in 2012, after Matvienko’s departure, to revisit the 
General Plan and its impact on urban development.  As of end-2013, a major review, welcomed 
by investors, was underway.  The gradozashchitniki are contributing to more secure property rights 
by demanding that public interest be considered more consistently and transparently during 
selection of projects under the General Plan, which should reduce arbitrary decisions that raised 
                                                 
23 The project moved outside the zoning area to where the height limitation was not a factor, leaving some residents 
still unhappy about the outcome. Nevertheless, there is consensus that the victory set a precedent, according to 




risks for investors.24  If a market-oriented General Plan is embraced by political authorities, 
bureaucrats, and society, and implemented without preference to large landowners, the pace of 
institutional change will hasten.  To set this process in motion, as the predatory rule theory would 
suggest, political authorities need to move decisively to a long-term fiscal strategy based on land 
taxes rather than land leases.  
As the capital of a republic that was profoundly in favor of land privatization in the first 
decade after the Soviet Union dissolved, Kazan started the 1990s with an orientation more like that 
of St. Petersburg than of Moscow.  However, Kazan differed from the case study cities in other 
respects.  Like other municipalities in the 1990s, Kazan lacked autonomy as a self-governing 
community; it was administratively delimited but financially and politically under the authority of 
the Republic of Tatarstan.  Even had the Mayor of Kazan wanted to initiate privatization of land 
or of industrial assets, as did Mayor Sobchak in St. Petersburg, he was not empowered to do so.25  
Like Moscow and St. Petersburg, the city center was filled with historical and industrial assets.  
Unlike St. Petersburg, Kazan also contained disgraceful slums that it removed in the 1990s, 
opening land in the center city ripe for green field development. 
More critically, Kazan was distinct from other case study cities in the alignment of political 
authorities and the bureaucracy on land governance throughout both periods.  While the mayor 
and civil servants erected barriers to land sales in Moscow, and worked at cross-purposes in St. 
Petersburg, authorities and civil servants in Kazan carefully prepared a sound legal and regulatory 
                                                 
24 This view was expressed by all persons interviewed in St. Petersburg, including from the real estate industry, 
legislature, and the Leontieff Center. 
25 Kazan had no local self-governing experience until after the adoption of Federal Law № 131-FZ dated October 6, 
2003, “On Key Principles of Local Self-Governance in the Russian Federation.”  World Bank, Implementation 
Completion and Results Report (Loan/Credit No: 47660) on a Loan in the Amount of US$125.00 Million to the 






framework in the 1990s that laid the basis for a faster rate of privatization, development, and 
taxation of land after 2003.   
As an early supporter of progressive land reform laws, President Shaimiev set a high 
standard of land governance for Tatarstan that extended to cities and civil servants.  One of the 
first regions to pass a Land Code as of 1998, the Tatarstan law went further than others in allowing 
foreigners to own land, in unifying buildings and land as one property, and in encouraging 
municipalities to establish local regulations for land registration, planning and monitoring.  Even 
prior to the Tatar Land Code, the Kazan City Land Committee had initiated a land inventory in 
1993, and cadastral boundaries and an accounting of city land began in earnest in 1995.   
Regulations were developed for zoning and to manage land use, stimulated by the beginnings of a 
market for real property.  Kazan was one of four cities nation-wide to put the generic concepts of 
the Town Planning Code of the Russian Federation (№ 73-FZ, dated May 7, 1998) into concrete 
regulations based on a law adopted by the local parliament.  Its experience later became a model 
for changes in national law. 
Activities and policy alignment between political authorities and civil servants continued 
after 2001.  Evidence of a joint commitment to high performance standards is notable in the 
achievement of policy targets set by the Ministry of Land and Property at the republican and 
municipal level, in the reduction of time for property registration, and in efforts to improve the 
security of property rights, including through transparency and accuracy of data reporting, and by 
monitoring and addressing land rights violations. 
The congruence between mayor and the bureaucracy is also evident in the harmonious 
approach to town planning (legal zoning) regulations, considered among best-practice cases in 




model includes elements that are beneficial: i) for municipal development, by increasing the rate 
of land allocation and thus contribution of land to budgetary revenues; ii) for property owners, 
real estate developers and investors, by registering land rights prior to construction, thus allowing 
the land to be mortgaged to finance the project; and iii) for citizens, by “enhancement of 
opportunities to participate in decision making and to protect their interests in the use and 
improvement of real property; [and thus, by] reduction of conflicts between local communities and 
local governments.”26   
As in St. Petersburg, civic activism shifted from a low to a high level in Kazan in the mid-
2000s.  Nevertheless, a blended rating for the activity level of society and the City Council (Duma) 
in Kazan is more difficult to judge, because the Mayor chairs the Duma, which elects the Mayor 
from among its members.  As we would expect relatively consistent policies between the 
legislature and City Hall, the activity rating for Kazan is weighted more heavily to civic activism.   
A movement for historic preservation was re-energized in the 1990s when the program to remove 
dilapidated housing also led to the destruction of cultural assets.  The most important opportunity 
to air concerns on cultural assets arose in 2005, when the city dusted off the 1969 General Plan 
and initiated a major revision of its urban planning framework.  It is notable that the city followed 
a detailed procedure for public hearings on revision of the General Plan.  Nevertheless, the rise of 
civic advocacy for historic preservation following its adoption in December 2007 suggests City 
Hall did not go far enough to incorporate the results of public hearings on protection of cultural 
heritage.   A respected journalist and historian, Olesya Baltusova, challenged the Mayor and 
President of the Republic in a personal blog on urban development and through walking tours that 
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In addition to Kazan, other cities implementing this model are Veliky Novgorod, Samara, Khabarovsk, and 





galvanized public opinion starting in 2010.  Media-based attacks on public authorities are 
extremely rare in Tatarstan.  Impressively, Baltusova’s activism led to the temporary cessation of 
construction in the city center, examination of the ownership of the new structures, a review of all 
high-rise projects under development in the city center, an order by the President to halt 
construction of a parking garage in place of the single city park, Black Lake, and, unfortunately, 
threats against her by developers.   Other examples of civic activism include a successful legal suit 
against a city real estate development by MZhK, the housing association, and development of a 
more sophisticated land tax policy in response to active consultations over two years with the 
business community.  In Kazan’s controlled political environment, the level of activity and 
influence of the public on decision-making is assessed as high.  
In summary, the degree of alignment of policies and actions by the two independent state 
variables (political authorities and the bureaucracy) provided a causal input to the pace of land 
privatization in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan.  As an intervening variable, the influence of 
public engagement in decision-making is clearer in St. Petersburg and Kazan than in Moscow, 
where several court cases remain under adjudication.  Nevertheless, as of 2013, a more accountable 
local government on property rights is operating in each city under a more watchful and discerning 
public eye.  In the absence of concerted public engagement and oversight, it is doubtful that public 
officials would have increased the transparency of decisions and information on land rights and 
urban planning.  We further test these findings using quantitative output indicators.   
3 (b). Quantitative analysis 
While the qualitative and quantitative analyses both explain the “how” of institutional 
change, the qualitative indicators may be viewed as inputs while the quantitative indicators reflect 




either for or against land privatization, we would expect to see a quantitative difference in measures 
of performance as a consequence, or output, of that alignment.  The dissertation thus employs the 
logical chain as used in World Bank investment operations:  inputs (physical, financial, 
organizational, legal) lead to outputs (directly measurable results), which lead to development 
outcomes (changes in economic behavior).  In World Bank parlance, the adoption of the legal right 
to own land is an input, actions to put law into practice are outputs, and the change of behavior by 
people to buy or sell land and register rights is a development outcome.  The dependent variable, 
share of private urban land ownership, is thus an outcome indicator.   
The outputs we are most interested to measure are at the end of the two-decade period of 
institutional change.  Based on the qualitative analysis, we would expect to see a higher level 
(higher than what) of outputs and outcomes reflecting a stronger commitment to private property 
development in Kazan. Summary indicators are presented in the chapter.   Some of the indicators 
are customized for this study; others are taken from authoritative sources.  Data availability for 
Kazan varies by topic; Tatarstan is substituted when necessary.   Moscow presents statistical issues 
due to the increase of its geographic area by 2.5 times in 2012.   Wherever data for Kazan or 
Moscow present issues of comparability, it will be noted.  
 
1. Political Authorities and the Legal Order 
Output indicators for political authorities measure efforts to establish and maintain 
compliance with an appropriate legal and regulatory framework.  Establishment includes systems 
for measurement and monitoring, while compliance includes mechanisms for enforcement by civil 
servants.   Many monitoring systems were in place from the Soviet period, particularly to ensure 




systems to monitor compliance with land legislation.  Whether land is privately owned, leased 
from the state, or held under other uses, it needs to be legally registered to enable land market 
transactions that bring economic benefits. Finally, political authorities set the standards for 
impersonal implementation of property rights institutions in a low-corruption environment.   Three 
summary output indicators to capture these factors are the property registration rate, access to anti-
corruption information, and compliance with land legislation. 
 













Moscow 78.6 33.0 11 
St. Petersburg 74.3 26.6 12 
Tatarstan (Kazan) 90.3 20.1 37 
Russian Federation 83.3 37.0 37 
Sources: 1Author calculations based on ROSREESTR, Federal'naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi registratsii, kadastra i kartografii, 
Forma N 8.  Svedeniia po gosudarstvennoi registratsii prav na nedvizhimoe imushchestvo i sdelok s nim (2011-2013). 2 Ina 
Kremen, Monitoring - 2013: The Rosreestr and Its Regional Bodies - Analytical Report.  Freedom of Information Foundation, 
December 20, 2013.  http://svobodainfo.org/en/node/2867. 3 Author calculations based on: Ministerstvo ekonomicheskogo 
razvitiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi registratsii, kadastra i kartografii. Gosudarstvennyi 
(Natsional’nyi) doklad o sostoianii  i ispol’zovanii zemel’ v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2011, 2012, 2013 g. “Svedeniia o 
gosudarstvennom zemel’nom nadzore za 2013g., Moskva 2014, 164-167. 
 
 
The registration rate is a report card on the administration’s overall efforts to strengthen 
property rights.  Without registration of property rights, no activity in a given location is legal.  
The reasons agencies may fail to act on applications to register rights could include legitimate 
issues such as incomplete documentation by the applicant or overlapping records that could lead 
to title disputes.  On the other hand, surveys indicate that some local administrations refuse to 
register rights (the refusal rate) to reduce private ownership or extract bribes.  Data for Kazan 
indicates that the average refusal rate in 2012-2013 was one percent of properties registered.27  In 
                                                 




Table 5, we see the three-year average of applications registered against the number received.  
There is a clear differentiation by location, with Tatarstan surpassing national levels and Moscow 
and St. Petersburg trailing (and the latter quite significantly).  These rates reveal a weaker 
commitment by political authorities in Moscow and St. Petersburg to increase the security of 
property rights.  In contrast, the authorities in Tatarstan and Kazan demonstrate the opposite 
tendency.   
The Anti-Corruption Information Access Score is measured by the Freedom of Information 
Foundation (FIF) under a state contract.  FIF monitors websites of regional affiliates of federal 
agencies for compliance with unified federal requirements to overcome corruption through public 
information.  These requirements include publication of detailed information on the activities and 
income of public officials and their immediate family members in order to reduce the possibility 
of conflicts of interest or direct benefits related to government service.  In all of the case study 
cities the performance fell below the national score, which was extremely low.  This is an area for 
improvement across the board.28 
 The compliance improvement rate measures efforts by local authorities to correct 
violations of land legislation by citizens, firms, and the primary business owner.  Enforcement of 
land legislation has a piebald history in the Russian Federation.  On one hand, oversight was 
traditionally lax; on the other hand, depending on how the compliance function was administered, 
rights could be abused for the sake of imposing targets.  Starting from the adoption of the Land 
Code in 2001, monitoring and enforcement rates at the national level dwindled from barely 
effective to ineffective.   One of the reasons relates to multiple reorganizations of the national 
agency responsible for land management and surveillance.  In all, the present-day Russian 
                                                 




Registration Agency (Rosreestr) reorganized eight times.  From 2009-10, all territorial offices 
experienced upheaval.  During the decade after the Land Code went into effect, the number of 
inspections and identification and correction of violations declined by almost half. 29   Only starting 
in 2011 can we judge if standards are comparable across regions.  The reasons for violations of 
land law also point to the influence of personalized institutions.   Citizens committed the majority 
of violations, who may be unaware of their obligations to register or their rights in the face of 
administrative fines.  On the other hand, a small but significant number of offenders are heads of 
companies, who should be aware of and act on their responsibilities to register land rights.   
On this output indicator, Tatarstan demonstrates a higher tendency to bring land users into 
line with legislation by facilitating corrections, before imposing fines.  This is the first step in a 
sophisticated dispute resolution process that begins with administrative review (within Rosreestr) 
but includes non-governmental arbitrage organizations that perform third-party review before 
imposition of fines.  Cases that cannot be adjudicated at this level are referred to court.  The rate 
for Kazan is similar to that of Tatarstan but is not reported in the same format. The Tatars are 
particularly motivated to convert holders of permanent (perpetual) use rights into rights of 
ownership or lease, as required by federal law as of 2013, because it will lead to higher payments 
to the budget for land taxes or leases.30    
 
                                                 
29 A. A. Gerasimov, “Gosudartsvennyi i munitsipal’nyi zeml’enyi kontrol’: analiz praktiki, predlozheniia po 
sovershenstvovaniiu,” Imushchestvennye Otnoshenniia v RF (No. 10, 121: 2011), 39.  The author reviewed ten years 
of data and found that the number of inspections, identification of violations, and imposed fines declined steadily 
from 2001 to 2010.  In examining the reasons for the decline in oversight, he noted that bureaucratic reorganization 
was a primary factor.  As a consequence, the total land area of the Russian Federation inspected declined from about 
8 to a low of 2 percent in 2009 and the number of violations identified and subsequently corrected declined from 73 
to 42 percent. 
30 For example, in the first two months of 2014, Tatarstan reported 2363 inspections that resulted in identification of 





2. Bureaucratic Organization and Performance 
Absent a theory of bureaucracy, the dissertation posits that establishment of secure land 
rights depends on the conversion of the land administration bureaucracy from a rent-seeking to a 
rule-bound organization.   Output indicators for bureaucratic performance measure the relative 
efficiency of public services in terms of speed and procedural steps.  Based on findings from the 
2013 EBRD-World Bank Business Environment Enterprise Survey (BEEPS), shorter waiting 
times are associated with fewer obstacles to obtain a service and lower expectation for payment of 
a bribe.31  Summary output indicators are days to register property, governance obstacles in 
interacting with state authorities to acquire land for business purposes (purchase or lease), and 
expectation of irregular payments (bribes) to get business accomplished.  Disaggregated data by 
city are not yet available on citizen satisfaction surveys or services performed electronically, but 
general trends are discussed below. 
Table 5. Bureaucratic Organization and Performance 
Summary Indicators 








Moscow 44 71 3 
St. Petersburg 43 47 2.7 
Kazan 33 64 2 
 
1World Bank and IFC, Doing Business Subnational: Doing Business in Russia, 2012. http://www.doingbusiness.org/russia 
2EBRD-World Bank, Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPs), 2013. Data are from 2011.  
3 Gregory Kisunko and Stephen Knack, “Russian Federation: National and Regional Trends in Regulatory Burden and 
Corruption,” Policy Note (World Bank, February 2013), 43-45.  Informal payments to local officials to get business done, as a 
mean of: always (6), usually (5), frequently (4), sometimes (3), seldom (2), or never (1).  Data are for payments to local officials 
in the Republic of Tatarstan. 
 
In Table 6, the unexpectedly high percent of respondents reporting no administrative 
obstacle to access land in Moscow, based on disaggregated data from the 2013 BEEPS, requires 
                                                 
31 Gregory Kisunko and Stephen Knack, “Russian Federation: National and Regional Trends in Regulatory Burden and 
Corruption,” Policy Note (World Bank, February 2013), 8.  The finding pertains to a composite “Graft Index” that refers to 




careful interpretation.  The rate is not consistent with the other variables presented nor with 
Moscow’s regional ranking on overall administrative obstacles (29 out of 37) compared to 
Tatarstan (14) and St. Petersburg (33), based on a similar data set but with a wider number of 
issues.32   To test the findings we report the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses on 
obstacles to land as reported by a similar cohort of businesses in the three cities.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, firms that report obstacles to obtaining land, for business expansion or other reasons, 
tend to be larger in size, privately owned, and currently lease land.  Firms that had some previous 
government ownership (e.g. privatized state-owned enterprises) have less difficulty.  Firms that 
report obstacles to land access also tend to pay bribes to get business done (not necessarily for 
land, but for government services).  As noted in the bivariate analysis, the indicator variables for 
Moscow and Kazan are not significant, suggesting these cities are not significantly different than 
the rest of the country in the obstacles they pose to firms in obtaining land. However, the St 
Petersburg dummy is significant and positive, which suggests that firms have greater difficulty in 
obtaining land than those in the rest of Russia.  Thus far, the bivariate analysis confirms better 
performance in Moscow and Kazan compared to St. Petersburg. 
Bivariate analysis 
  Obstacle land 
    
Obstacle land 1 
firm_size 0.0702 
Registration year   
majority_owned   






                                                 





moscow_dummy   




 obstacle obstacle obstacle obstacle 
firm_size 0.565 0.523 0.568 0.573 
 (3.75)*** (3.51)*** (3.78)*** (3.81)*** 
land_rent_dummy 0.331 0.363 0.324 0.324 
 (3.34)*** (3.70)*** (3.27)*** (3.27)*** 
bribes_dummy 0.845 0.842 0.843 0.844 
 (10.25)*** (10.22)*** (10.22)*** (10.23)*** 
some_government -0.343    
 (2.34)**    
st_petersburg 0.964 0.919 0.962 0.970 
 (2.51)** (2.40)** (2.51)** (2.53)** 
moscow_dummy 0.063 0.047 0.060 0.063 
 (0.24) (0.18) (0.23) (0.24) 
kazan_dummy 0.072 0.085 0.079 0.074 
 (0.33) (0.39) (0.36) (0.34) 
soe  -1.918   
  (1.83)*   
private   0.357  
   (2.58)***  
state_ties    -0.401 
    (2.77)*** 
Constant -1.374 -1.419 -1.719 -1.362 
 (13.12)*** (13.81)*** (11.16)*** (12.99)*** 
N 2,896 2,896 2,896 2,896 




In the multivariate analysis we have confirmed the bivariate results. The coefficients for state-
owned enterprises (SOE) and those with former state ties are significant and have the expected 
signs.  Private firms and larger firms have more difficulty accessing land.  As earlier, the dummy 
for Moscow and Kazan are not significant.  In contrast, the dummy for St. Petersburg is significant 
and positive which suggests that after controlling for all other factors, firms in St Petersburg are 
more likely to report obstacles to land than elsewhere in Russia. 
The findings indicate that the standardization of property registration by the federal 




and Kazan.    The Russian Registration Agency (Rosreestr) is a federal agency operating at the 
regional and city level, with support from agencies that report to the Mayor.   The timing of the 
business survey, in 2011, suggests that the arrival of a new mayor in Moscow may have altered 
bureaucratic practices, while arbitrary decisions relating to the General Plan could be reflected in 
the St. Petersburg results.  Data for access to land in St. Petersburg suggest the process is not 
impersonal; repeated references by interviewees to “oligarchic overtones” in the primary land 
market confirm this interpretation.   
These city results reinforce other evidence that the Russian registration system is indeed 
evolving from a rent-seeking to a more rule-bound bureaucracy that improves regulatory quality. 
Regulatory quality extends beyond efficiency to include the accuracy, transparency, and coverage 
of information provided by the land administration system.  In a country spanning eleven time 
zones, electronic access is a critical but also costly and time-consuming investment in people, 
systems, and information technology.  As of end-2013, 24 percent of all land-related services were 
provided electronically, and digitally-sized extracts of records could be obtained on any property 
from any part of the country.  Immovable property data was provided on a fee basis for professional 
service firms while businesses and citizens paid a nominal amount to acquire cadastral and 
property title information. As of July 2012, all governmental agencies must publish electronically 
all regulations, laws and decisions they make, including on land relations.33  Since 2008, 
transparency and information access have evolved from negligible to expansive, significantly 
lowering transaction costs for contracts involving land and property. 
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Differences can appear in quality and efficiency at the local level when the human factor 
enters.   To increase standardization in back office functions across the country, Rosreestr 
developed 20 standard contracts for key transactions; these are available for free via the internet 
and in registration office kiosks that also calculate and print out the charge for services, so officials 
cannot demand more in payment.  Rosreestr local offices do not yet publish client service 
performance records or surveys in Russia as they do in Croatia.34 However, as discussed in the 
next section, Rosreestr offices in the regions are encouraged to collect and report public feedback 
on their performance.   
Corruption in land administration functions remains a concern in Russia.  But Russia is not 
unique.  Globally, Transparency International ranks land-related issues as the third most corrupt 
government function after police and the courts.  Each case study documented corrupt behavior by 
local land agencies and improvements after implementation of federalized, IT systems.  This 
process is still evolving, but the recent decision to distribute applications for processing to offices 
outside the local area should further reduce opportunities for bribery.35  
 
3. Public Engagement in Decision-Making 
In the new institutional economics, it is the struggle for property rights that defines those 
rights.   Without social consensus on property rights institutions, legal coercion by the state, by 
imposing fines or repossessing land, will not instill compliance by society.  Aside from a one-way 
street, where the state defies public concerns, or citizens take to the streets in protest, we are 
interested in evidence of a two-way street of constructive interaction between the state and society 
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that helps define property rights.   In a civil law system (as opposed to common law), institutional 
change depends on legal and regulatory amendments, which citizens can inform through direct 
communications, the administrative dispute resolution system, or court litigation.  An important 
example is the 2004 law to prevent defrauding of shared landholders (dol’shchiki) by requiring 
that developers of multiunit buildings have registered land rights before selling apartments to the 
public.36  Amendments to strengthen the law are under discussion in 2014.   
Russians are not reticent in defense of secure property rights and the Government has a 
strong interest in land registration and transactions, so in principle, the basis exists for a two-way 
dialogue.  As President Putin noted during a Presidium meeting on October 9, 2012 in reference 
to land purchases, he and the Government were “bombarded with letters on this issue from all 
across the country.” 
People write that it is impossible to find information on available land, that they are in a position of 
powerless petitioners whose demands and needs are ignored, and that it takes three or more years to get a 
plot of land.  As a result, land remains unused and is not working for anyone’s benefit. The high-
handedness and corruption of officials greatly inhibit the full-fledged development of land relations in 
Russia.  And as a result, this slows the progress of the country as a whole.37 
 
To validate the presence or absence of citizen engagement, we need to see evidence of 
public interest, such as through information requests or feedback, and of public outreach by 
political authorities and civil servants on questions of common purpose.  In Table 7, we see per 
capita information requests by citizens on property rights from the Unified Property Registry, 
EGRP (ЕГРП), with a significantly higher rate in Tatarstan.  Public outreach and feedback are 
reported as descriptive indicators based on website reviews.  Outreach includes interactive 
methods such as consultations, training sessions and hotlines, and electronically-available 
                                                 
36“Dol’shchiki pod zashchitoi gosudarstva i Rosreestra,” http://rosreestr.tatarstan.ru/rus/info.php?id=608145. 
37 State Council Presidium Meeting, The Kremlin (Moscow, Russia, October 9, 2012).  




information, such as answers to commonly-asked questions.  A high level of outreach is equally 
evident in Kazan. Feedback reported on the Rosreestr website in Tatarstan is particularly extensive 
and includes number and types of complaints registered by citizens.  Statistical information on 
feedback in St. Petersburg could not be located, reducing the rating to medium.  All cities provide 
adequate resources to prevent and report corruption.   
 











Moscow 3.4 High Yes/Yes 
St. Petersburg 4.5 Medium Yes/No 
Tatarstan (Kazan) 15.0 High Yes/Yes 
1 Data is average of 2012-2013. Calculated from ROSREESTR, Federal'naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi registatsii, kadastra i 
kartografii. Forma No 8. Moskva, 2013, 2012. Svedeniia ob informatsii, vydavaemoi Rosreestrom i ego territorial’nymi 
organami.Upravlenie Federal'noi sluzhbi gosudarstvennoi registratsii, kadastra i kartografii po Respublike Tatarstan. Kazan' 
2013.Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik, Moskva 2013, 90-92.Federal'naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki ROSSTAT. 
http://www.gks.ru/.  
2 Upravlenie Federal'noi sluzhbi gosudarstvennoi registratsii, kadastra i kartografii po Moskve. 
http://www.to77.rosreestr.ru/.Upravlenie Federal'noi sluzhbi gosudarstvennoi registratsii, kadastra i kartografii po Sankt 
Peterburgy. http://www.to78.rosreestr.ru/.Upravlenie Federal'noi sluzhbi gosudarstvennoi registratsii, kadastra i kartografii po 
Respublike Tatarstan. http://rosreestr.tatarstan.ru/.  
 
Future research to strengthen these indicators would include number of court cases 
adjudicated and decisions reached, as well as public hearings organized and attended on land use 
decisions pursuant to the General Plan.   As of this writing, reliable statistical information on 
these topics could not be obtained. 
The quantitative data demonstrate stronger commitment to strengthen property rights and 
more extensive public outreach and citizen interest in the Republic of Tatarstan, with 
collaborating statistics on Kazan.  Compared to findings across Russia, Moscow and Kazan do 
not present greater obstacles to firms in obtaining land by lease or purchase, while St. Petersburg 
is obstructing access more than in other cities.  We now turn to outcome indicators to assess the 





3. Institutional change and development outcomes 
The efficiency of a modern city depends on the flexibility of its land markets. When land 
is traded on the basis of market prices, with appropriate zoning to reduce negative externalities, a 
city becomes more efficient with each transaction.  With an appropriate regulatory framework, 
commuting times decline, new services appear, density increases, and obsolete or polluting 
factories are replaced with modern and more energy-efficient structures.38  Transactions between 
private parties on a long leasehold basis can also increase efficiency if leases are fully marketable 
and free from political influence.  This is not yet the case in Russia.  Consequently, the dependent 
variable, the rate of private urban land ownership, is also the first outcome indicator.  Putting land 
in private ownership is the first step to recycling it for greater urban efficiency.    
As indicated in Table 7, the trend from 2000-2010 consistently differentiates the case study 
cities by high, medium and low values of urban land privatization.  The inverse of private 
ownership, the municipal share (shaded in gray) reflects the aggregate output indicators of the land 
governance model.  Table 8 for 2012 shows a break in the data series due to the expansion of 
Moscow when it acquired land in Moscow Oblast with a relatively high share of private homes 
and small farms.  Table 9 validates the higher share of land in real estate transactions in Kazan.  




                                                 
38 Alain Bertaud, “The Development of Russian Cities: Impact of Reforms on Spatial Development,” Mimeo for 
World Bank Group (2010), 1-2.  Bertaud notes that “It is difficult to conceive an efficient modern city without a 
well-functioning land market. Transactions in already built structures are not enough to promote land use efficiency. 
Only well-functioning real estate markets reflecting demand for land and floor space can improve the efficiency of a 




Table 7. The Structure of Land Ownership in Selected Regions1 (2000-2010) 
1Data are not disaggregated at the municipal level by Rosreestr. For the purposes of this table, Tatarstan is taken to represent the 
ownership structure of Kazan, which is 61,300 hectares or 40% of the Republic urban area in 2010.  Data in the table are derived 
from: Zemel’nyi Fond Rossiiskoi Federatsii of January 1, 2000; Goskomitet po zemel’noi politike RF 2000: 4-6, 178-183; 
Zemel’nyi Fond Rossiiskoi Federatsii of  January 1, 2005; Rosnedvizhimost’ 2005: 42-49, 245-247; Zemel’nyi Fond Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii of January 1, 2010 ; Rosreestr  2010: 247-249. 
 
 















(%) Of which 
Federal, (‘000 
hectares) 
Russian Federation 8 193.9 758.0  9.25 325.9 3.98 7 110.0 86.77 613.1 
Moscow 256.1 36.2  14.14 10.0 3.9 209.9 81.96 9.6 
St. Petersburg 140.3 8.0  5.7 20.0 14.26 112.3 80.04 7.8 
Tatarstan 155.5 18.3  11.77 23.3 14.98 113.9 73.25 7.7 
 Kazan1 61.3       70.10  
1
Estimate derived from 2013 tax data.  Other data derived from Rosreestr, “Gosudarstvennyi doklad o 




Table 9. Share of land in all real estate rights 
registered (percent) 
 2011 2012 2013 
    
Moscow 0.42 1.40 3.37 
St. Petersburg 2.57 2.66 2.89 
Kazan 13.24 19.98 18.67 
Source: ROSREESTR, Federal'naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi registatsii, 
kadastra i kartografii. Forma No 8. Moskva, 2012-2014. Svedeniia ob 
informatsii, vydavaemoi Rosreestrom i ego territorial’nymi organami 
 
 Urban land in 
thousand hectares 
Urban Land by Ownership Share (%) 
           Individuals      Legal    entities State and 
municipalities 
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
Russian 
Federation 7645 7945 7964 6.2 6.2 7.8 0.6 1.4 3.1 93.2 92.4 89.1 
Moscow  109.1 109.1 109.1 - - 0.1 - - 1.9 100 100 98 
 
St.Petersburg 139.9 139.9 139.9 1.2 2.1 3.8 4.7 11.1 13.5 94.1 86.8 82.7 
Republic 
Tatarstan 





How does the rate of private land ownership influence other development outcomes?  The 
first consequence, consistent with the predatory rule theory, is expected to be a higher rate of land 
taxes as a share of fiscal revenues of the case study cities.   Table 10 confirms this outcome.  In 
2013, land tax payments were three times greater than land lease revenues in Kazan.  In Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, the reverse was the case.  Succinctly, we observe a high, medium, low pattern 
in the relationship between land tax and land lease revenues:   Kazan – 300 percent; St. Petersburg 
-- 50 percent; Moscow -- 30 percent.  The data explain the strong incentive of Mayor Metshin and 
the land administration bureaucracy in Kazan to register land rights, correct violations, conduct 
public information seminars, and hold interactive consultations with taxpayers on cadastral 
evaluation and land taxes. 
Table 10. Revenue Sources in Case Study Cities 
(% of total revenues) 
 Moscow St. Petersburg Kazan 
 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Federal Transfers 5.7 3.0 11.5 10.5 48.4 37.0 
Tax and Non-Tax 94.2 97 88.5 89.5 51.6 63.0 
of which:       
   Land Tax 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 12.1 13.7 
   Municipal Property 3.5 4.7 3.9 5.6 10.1 9.2 
Including:       
   Lease of land 1.8 2.8 2.3 2.3 3.7 4.4 
   Land sales 1.1 n/a 1.4 0.4 1.7 2.8 
Sources: Departament finansov goroda Moskvy, Strutura dokhodov buidzheta Moskvy v 2010-2014. Komitet Finansov Sankt-
Peterburga, Ezhemesiachnyi otchet ob ispolnenii konsolidirovannogo buidzheta sub’ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii za 
sootvetstvuiushchii mesiats finansovogo goda po forme, ustanovlennoi ministerstvom finansov Rossiiskoi Fedratsii (December 31, 
2013 and January 1, 2013.) Zakonodatel’noe Sobranie Sankt-Peterburga, Ob ispolnenii biudzheta Sankt-Peterburga za 
2013 god. Kazanskaya Gorodskaya Duma.  Otchet ob ispolnenii buidzheta munitsipal’nogo obrazovaniia goroda Kazani za 2012 
god/za 2013 god. 
Note: As federal cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg retain 84.6% of the land tax; the remainder is remitted to the 
Federal Government.  As a city, Kazan retains 100% of the land tax. 
 
 An additional outcome indicator is mortgages trends.  Data on mortgages, including by 




Petersburg.  Taking one comparable indicator, the three-year average from 2011 to 2013 of 
residential mortgages per 1,000 residents, St. Petersburg leads (4.8), followed by Kazan (2.9) and 
Moscow (2.4).39 
Finally, higher levels of landed property privatization are also evident in housing 
availability.  Housing is a socially sensitive issue in Russia due to the scarcity and poor quality of 
stock inherited from the Soviet period.  As of 2013, 75% of Russians still live in sub-standard 
housing.40  Data are monitored closely by political authorities to signal their leadership in 
delivering social progress. All case study cities construct apartments and sell them on the primary 
market.  In Kazan these are allocated through the social housing program.  The price trends are 
relatively comparable across case study cities, which is surprising given the faster population 
growth of Moscow.  Moreover, housing area per capita has not grown as fast in Moscow as in St. 
Petersburg and Kazan, indicating the market for housing development is constrained by 
administrative barriers (Table 11).   
Table 11. Housing Area 
Per Capita, Sq. Meters 
 
2010 2011 2012 
Moscow 18.7 18.7 19.3 
St. Petersburg 23.0 23.3 23.8 
Kazan 21.9 - 22.7 
Source: Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2013, 182Territorial’nyi organ Federal’noi slujhby 
Gozudarstvennoi statistike po Respublike Tatarstan. Informatsionno-analiticheskii doklad, 2014.  
http://tatstat.gks.ru/ 
 
In reviewing conditions following land privatization, we observe better development 
outcomes in St. Petersburg and Kazan than in Moscow.  Kazan demonstrated that a higher private 
                                                 
39 Rosreestr, Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi registratsii, kadastra i kartografii, Forma no. 8, Svodnyi otchet v 
razreze tsentral’nogo apparata i territorial’nykh organov Rosreestra 2011-2013 g. Statisticheskie svedeniia o 
gosudarstvennoi registratsii ipoteki po g. Kazan’ za 12 mesiatsev 2013 goda v sravnenii s analogichnym periodom 
2012 g.   




rate of land ownership by citizens and firms translated into higher local tax revenues.  Both Kazan 
and St. Petersburg outperformed Moscow in per capita residential mortgages and housing 
availability per square meter.   Additional comparisons were attempted, e.g. on trends in real estate 
registrations, transactions, and mortgages per capita and by value, but comparable data were not 
available.  Further research in this area would be valuable to assess economic implications of 
institutional change.  Nevertheless, it is clear that institutional stasis has disadvantaged 
Muscovites.  They are less likely than residents of St. Petersburg or Kazan to own land, take out a 
mortgage, register real estate rights, live in spacious quarters, or receive services based on property 
as a “benefit tax.” Were Moscow a small town on the periphery, these facts would merely be 
unfortunate.  As the largest city in Europe and capital of Russia, land market constraints are highly 
consequential for the political and economic development of the country.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Major institutional change is akin to an urban redevelopment project that starts with a 
wrecking ball, swinging at slow speed, until the force cracks the pylons holding the old structure 
in place.   The debris needs to be cleared before a new edifice built on socially-accepted 
conventions of new property rights takes form and starts to rise. 
A micro-analytic perspective, seen through the aperture of the new institutional economics 
(NIE), brings the change process into closer relief.  The historical steps as observed by North, 
Wallis and Weingast (2009), where elite privileges are transformed into elite rights, and later, into 
rights for the population at large, goes to the core of the urban land privatization process in Russia.  




resist institutional change that undermines the elite bargain to share land rents. 41  The elite bargain 
became clearer in 1995 when privatized (former state-owned) enterprises got a discounted price to 
buy land, while that for new private firms was twenty times higher.  The preferential price was 
later amended by presidential decree, but it was not enforced, allowing local governments to 
manipulate prices for insiders.  The wrecking ball of institutional change has not been forceful 
enough to break the elite bargain over landed property rights everywhere in Russia.  
Why rulers introduce radical institutional change is the most difficult question to answer, 
and as evidenced by the three case studies, Margaret Levi’s (1988) theory of predatory rule has 
better explanatory power than path dependence, Hellman’s “winners-take-all,” or Pyle’s 
proposition of the political and economic costs of privatization.   Path dependence, “comes from 
the increasing returns mechanisms that reinforce the direction once on a given path.  Alterations 
in the path come from unanticipated consequences of choices, external effects, and sometimes 
forces exogenous to the analytical framework.”42  In this definition, North (1990) postulated that 
changes in the polity were necessary to change institutional course.   Once a course was chosen, 
continuity of informal institutions and bureaucratic organizations from the previous regime would 
be likely to prevent radical change.43  The introduction of private property in Russia preceded the 
                                                 
41 According to the authors, “Each elite understands that other elites feel similar incentives.  In this way, the political 
system of a natural state manipulates the economic system to produce rents that then secure political order.”  North, 
Wallis, Weingast, Violence and Social Order, 18.  The authors view the Soviet Union as an exception to their 
general finding that natural states rarely have consolidated control of the military. (See p. 153).  Their model of 
progression in a natural state (from fragile to basic to mature) is not fully applicable to modern Russia because the 
military is consolidated in a political system that is not “constrained by a set of institutions and incentives that limit 
the illegitimate use of violence.” (See p. 21).  Nevertheless, the underlying logic of the progression of elite 
privileges into elite rights is very pertinent. In particular, “the origin of property rights and legal systems is the 
definition of elite privileges in the natural state.” (See p. 151). 
42 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 12.  North attributes the concept of increasing returns to the work of W. Brian 
Arthur, “Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics,” The Economy as an Evolving Complex System,” (1988).  
North subsequently amended this view with his co-authors to observe that “no compelling logic moves states” either 
towards more sophisticated institutions and organizations or in the opposite direction. See North, Wallis, Weingast, 
Violence and Social Orders (2009), 73. 




disintegration of the Soviet Union, and change was initially slow, partially due to continuity from 
the General Plan, a paragon of Soviet planning, but also due to contradictory legal and fiscal 
policies within the control of a federal government that favored land privatization.  Once the 
federal government corrected the incentive framework, conditions were in place for a radical 
change of course.  In both St. Petersburg and Kazan, the path of urban land privatization is unlikely 
to be reversed.  This outcome is not consistent with path dependence.   
 Hellman’s “winners-take-all” approach44 does not address the motivation for institutional 
change, but it is worth examining his explanation for why institutional change tends to be 
incremental, when it occurs, using St. Petersburg as the representative case.  There are elements in 
St. Petersburg of Hellman’s finding of “winners-take-all,” i.e. where institutional reforms in the 
long run are blocked by the short-term winners of rents from partial reforms.  Indeed, local officials 
and former state enterprise directors were short-term winners who acquired valuable land assets 
early in the transition from communism.  The contradictory legal order was ripe for early winners 
in the St. Petersburg City Administration and bureaucracy to implement partially-revised 
institutions in a personal manner. Those who benefited from land rents resisted reform of the 
General Plan to control the land market, which is symptomatic of a partial reform equilibrium.  As 
of 2012, the primary market managed by the city and large former state-owned enterprises was 
closed and non-transparent, while a vibrant and competitive secondary market operated in parallel.  
Firms surveyed in 2011 found it harder to acquire land in St. Petersburg than in Kazan and 
Moscow, confirming the disjuncture in the market.    
Yet the winners-take-all approach does not capture the complexity of incremental 
institutional change.  Complexity derives from fluidity in the constraints and incentives facing the 
                                                 
44 Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,” World 




predatory ruler.  Among a set of alternatives at a given time, rulers will opt for the highest-yielding 
and most feasible revenue sources that strengthen their hold on power and security in office. This 
is where “winners-take-all” falls short: it is a variation of a path-dependent argument in that once 
the gains are in hand, they are never lost.  The political world of trade-offs is a more dynamic 
marketplace for bargains than this concept would suggest.  North’s (1990) argument is more to the 
point of incremental change, which occurs when each actor renegotiates contracts to secure a better 
deal from changing prices and other conditions.  Real estate markets, like political ones, are all 
about getting a better deal.  St. Petersburg may have a partial reform environment, but it is 
improving incrementally, including through litigation over contested property rights. Reconsider 
this sentence.   Moreover, even incremental reformers can deliver better outcomes than cities that 
do not reform, as evidenced by mortgage activity and housing area. 
Pyle’s conclusion that municipalities and enterprises were motivated to privatize land to 
capture a stream of rents comes closer to the predatory rule theory because it is based on the 
incentives of elites. 45  His findings derive from land prices, the industrialization rate, and the 
regional democratic index.   Moscow, he believes, fits the framework well because land values 
were high, raising the cost to the municipality of privatization. Check this sentence. However, 
support by Muscovites for land privatization was higher than the national average, and it is 
doubtful that Gavriil Popov, the city’s liberal, first-elected mayor, would have charted Luzhkov’s 
                                                 
45 Pyle found that municipalities were motivated to privatize enterprise land plots more rapidly where the economic 
and political costs were lowest for municipalities to divest their control rights.  This would be the case in 
municipalities where: i) land values were relatively low; ii) industry had a high share of regional output; iii) 
politicians were sensitive to industrial and social interests; and iv) the policy environment was relatively liberal.  
Controlling for firm location and other factors, lower purchase prices tended to lead to higher enterprise land 
ownership.  Overall, local policies and the self-interest of municipalities and firms are correlated with the pace of 
enterprise land privatization.   William Pyle, The Ownership of Industrial Land in Russian Cities: Explaining 






course of institutional stasis had he not left office in June 1992. The federal legal framework gave 
the local predatory ruler carte blanche to manipulate land prices, which were set administratively, 
with no relation to market prices until a secondary market deepened enough to reveal value.  Both 
St. Petersburg and Kazan took advantage of this flexibility in their initial push for land 
privatization.  Pyle’s finding is helpful, however, in validating that municipalities and enterprises 
followed predictable economic behavior in responding to price incentives, with municipalities 
wanting to hold land as prices on the secondary market rose, and enterprises wanting to buy when 
prices fell. 
By accounting for evolving constraints and incentives facing rulers as they maximize 
revenues, the predatory rule theory does a better job of explaining the distinct land privatization 
strategies of political authorities in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan.  President Shaimiev of 
Tatarstan represented a ruler with greater bargaining power and a longer time horizon who 
gradually invested in systems and reforms to generate stable revenues, including through land 
privatization.  Mayor Luzhkov of Moscow was less secure in office initially and after President 
Putin rescinded regional elections.  His strategy to maximize rents was consistent with a short-
term perspective. Once he acquired greater bargaining power, defined as economic and political 
resources needed by federal authorities and constituents, he had no incentive, fiscal or otherwise, 
to relinquish the land resources that epitomized his economic and political power.   Length of 
tenure can also affect the ruler’s relations with business organizations, contributing to collusive 
behavior. This was clearly a factor that personalized the property rights’ regime in Moscow and in 
St. Petersburg under Governors Yakovlev and Matvienko.46  Ideology is also a political resource 
if it translates into policy action, and both Mayor Sobchak and President Shaimiev played the 
                                                 
46 Although not documented in the case study on Kazan, collusive behavior cannot be excluded in Tatarstan given 




privatization card to good effect.  Finally, while revenue-maximizing incentives are overarching, 
rulers cannot predate with impunity.  The Kazan authorities discovered in 2011, as they did in St. 
Petersburg in 1996-99, that raising land taxes to capture rising land values has consequences.  Nor 
can rulers predate at all if land administration and taxation systems are inadequate.  Given the high 
transaction costs of modernizing property registration and land planning systems, it is not 
surprising that all cities initially relied on organizational structures inherited from the Soviet 
period.  But Mayor Metshin of Kazan could accelerate the pace of privatization in response to a 
fiscal crisis because investments in a land inventory and cadastral surveys had started in 1993.  
The predatory rule theory, as well as the micro-governance school of NIE, implicitly 
acknowledge the relevance of the bureaucracy to institutional change.  If transaction costs are too 
high, the “remediableness” condition (test of feasibility) of Williamson will not be met, and 
existing institutions will dominate over more efficient ones.  However, NIE does not yet contain a 
theory of bureaucracy.  Absent such a theory, the dissertation posits that establishment of secure 
land rights depends on the conversion of the land administration bureaucracy from a rent-seeking 
to a rule-bound organization.  The proposition is not hypothetical.  Brian Levy demonstrated how 
the US civil service was transformed from a patronage machine into a depersonalized, Weberian 
prototype.   Since instillation of a meritocratic civil service is a herculean task, he advocates a 
focus on “islands of excellence” to raise the quality and efficiency of a given agency within a 
system that may otherwise be personalized.47 This is precisely the case of the Russian Registration 
Agency (Rosreestr).   
                                                 
47 Levy noted three reasons why the US managed to introduce a proto-Weberian civil service in the course of half a 
century.  First, top-down reforms laid the basis for a professional civil service.  Second, an emerging middle class 
and business sector demanded improved public services.  And third, enlightened public entrepreneurs within federal 
agencies reached out to public constituencies on key issues of concern.  These “islands of excellence” helped 
establish a professional reputation for agencies that were formerly dismissed as patronage and campaign machines 




How institutional change transpires is captured in the qualitative and quantitative indicators 
of the land governance model.  The model is intended as a simple decoding tool, like a traffic light, 
to enhance understanding of the potential for institutional change that is red, yellow or green at a 
given time and location.  Rarely in any country is alignment close and unidirectional among 
political authorities, the bureaucracy, and society in favor of complex institutional reforms.  The 
findings here would suggest that policy-makers or development practitioners who persist in 
pushing top-down reforms, in the absence of support from bureaucracy and society, need to 
redesign the strategy or plan for a longer implementation period, with intensive investment in 
systems, human resources, and public communication.  
The land governance model does not exhaust all reasons why the pace of land privatization 
varies, but it broadens state-led theories by raising the visibility of the bureaucracy.  In the case of 
urban land rights in Russia, the bureaucracy was hardly a faceless bystander.  To the contrary, it 
served at the end of the period under study as a standardizing force in a sea of institutional 
variation.  State-led models of institutional change that omit the relevant bureaucratic agency fail 
to capture its utility, as Weber observed, as a precision instrument for social change for those who 
control it.  The primary question is whether the bureaucracy serves political masters or the people.  
When political authorities are elected there is a stronger likelihood that citizen interests are 
served.48  For North et al the Weberian bureaucracy is a defining feature of societies where the 
rule of law is implemented impersonally and equally.  Yet the need for a political theory of 
                                                 
Levy advocates an incremental strategy of “public management lite” to increase adherence to rules.  One such 
approach is to focus reforms on a specific sector or agency.  Levy, Working with the Grain, 144-47. 
 




bureaucracy in less than Weberian conditions is contested.  Such a theory is sorely needed.  It is 
time to ‘bring the bureaucracy back in.’49
                                                 
49 This is to paraphrase the title of the well-known work of Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda 
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